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This study examines the evolution of the restrictive theory of
immunity and identifies the various rationales which have contributed
to its emergence at three levels. In the present study it is
shown that all legal systems do not treat issues of sovereign
immunity similarly. A comparative law study provides the
opportunity to examine different approaches to immunity and explore
the characteristics peculiar to a society that are responsible for
generating a particular approach.
Part I deals with the origin of the rule of state immunity and
the evolution in legal analysis which gave rise to the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity under contemporary international law.
The purpose of Part II, namely Egyptian and Sudanese Practice on
the subject, is to show that, although the phenomenon of restrictive
immunity is widespread, there are nevertheless profound divergences
even between two neighbouring Arab states - and even undeniable
incoherences within one of them. This part endeavours to clarify
those practices and to relate them to contemporary international
practice. This objective seems particularly appropriate in the
light of the development of new kinds of commercial activities
undertaken by these countries as developing nations to promote
foreign investment and trade.
Part III deals with the Islamic conception of sovereign immunity.
The examination of the Islamic perspective verifies the extent of its
past contribution to the development of the rule of state immunity
and surveys the possibilities of its further contributions in the
future. Through this approach, contemporary rules of international
law on sovereign immunity will probably prove to be more readily
accepted, widely recognized and strongly supported.
The conclusions which build on the preceding parts are provided
in the last chapter.
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GENERAL SURVEY OF THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION
OF THE LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
CHAPTER ONE
HISTORICAL AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS OF THE RULE OF
STATE IMMUNITY
I. THE RULE OF STATE IMMUNITY IN CLASSIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW
In the formative stages of international law, legal and
political writers had considerable influence upon the formulation of
its rules. Many of them were citizens of major powers, quite aware
of the legal problems resulting from territorial expansion overseas
and the increasing volume of relations of their states. Their
contribution to international law generally, and those concerning
sovereign immunity in particular, was two-fold: they collected
existing norms and suggested new ones; and provided theoretical and
philosophical foundations, justifications and guidelines for those
rules. Against this background it is relevant to enquire if any
doctrine of state immunities existed in their time. However, it
should be noted that a survey of the works of some of these writers
revealed no trace of the doctrine of state immunity although they
have devoted marked attention to diplomatic immunities issues.
Perhaps one explanation was that there seem to be no judicial
decisions concerning immunities of foreign states before the
nineteenth century.
One of the greatest of the classical writers, Alberico Gentili
(1551-1608), treated the question of immunities in the context of
contracts concluded by ambassadors. He maintained that: "an
ambassador should be subject to legal procedure in every contract
which he enters into during his embassy".''' The justification for
this rule of non-immunity is:
.... to prevent ambassadors from having the power of carrying
home .... the property of others, or to preclude the
possibility of a situation .... in which no one would be
willing to make a contract with them, they would be in a
certain sense barred from commerce. 2
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The latter justification appears to be based on practical
considerations, while the former is based on the natural law rule,
that it is in the interest of justice that no one may increase his
wealth to the detriment and loss of another.
Hugo Grotius (1583-1654), carried the investigation further by
discussing the personal inviolability of ambassadors. After
examining the various arguments adduced by jurists, he concluded
that:
.... the rule has been accepted by the nations that the common
custom, which makes a person who lives in foreign territory
subject to that country, admits of an exception in the case of
ambassadors. 3
He regarded ambassadors as representatives of those who sent them
and thus not subject to the municipal law of the state to which they
are accredited.
Writing in 1721, Bynkershoek (1673-1743) advocated the
combination of reasons and precedents as the one source of jus
gentium. According to his thesis, jus gentium provides rules of
conduct which, guided by reason, holds between nations. Custom, in
order to be binding, must pass the test of reasoning. Where the
practice is scanty or contradictory, reason provides the rule.1^ On
a priori reasoning, he moves from the immunities of ambassadors to
establish the immunities of the princes.^ He argued that, since
immunities of ambassadors were well established in practice and
since they were granted because ambassadors represent their
sovereigns, it would be absurd to grant the ambassadors less
privileges than the mandatory.
Similarly, Vattel (1700-1769), writing 35 years later, could
only say of the prince that he was entitled to all rights of
£
ambassadors. The reason seems to be that there was still little
relevant practice in the matter of travelling and visiting rulers.
At any rate Vattel adds no precedent.^
The immunities of states, as juridical persons, and of their
property, attracted less attention than those of sovereigns in the
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literature of international law prior to the 19th century. This
was quite understandable so long as the state was identified with
its ruler, and the sovereign was construed largely in terras of an
individual person. The only passage in Bynkershoek's work which
can be taken as touching on the matter, albeit indirectly, is the
authority cited in Chapter IV of his De Foro Legatorura where he
mentioned that it was fruitless and expressed great indignation to
the Republic of Venice that a sum of money owed to the Republic was
O
to be attached by an Amsterdam merchant. But we might have
expected Vattel to provide some answers, since he had a clear-cut
theory of the state as a juristic person, of which its ruler is only
an organ, to deal with the position of that juristic person in
foreign courts. He does distinguish between the property of the
state and private property in connection with conquest which, he
says, does not affect private title. In another passage he speaks
briefly of rights conceded by one nation in its territory to
another: various sovereigns in the Indies, he says, have granted
the right to establish trading stations and ports in their realms,
and such rights are part of the grantee's property and must be
respected like his ancient possessions. But of immunity of states
from suit, or their property from seizure, he says nothing.^
The absence of reference in the classical writings to the
concept of state immunities can best be explained by the fact that
the actual concept of the state did not as yet exist. The personal
immunities of kings, presidents and diplomatic agents are derived
from the special respect due to the group entity of which they are
organs. Historically, however, the immunity of states is indeed a
recent phenomenon. The concept of state immunity, as we know it
today, has evolved from sovereign immunity, and the latter has
developed by analogy with the norms applied to diplomatic
immunities, the argument being that it was difficult to deny the
sovereign what was conceded to an ambassador. From the 19th
century national courts began to formulate the doctrine of state
immunity.
- 3 -
Badr maintains that even the classical writers can be read to
support the principle of restrictive immunity. He cites Vattel's
distinction between the sovereign's private and public acts on the
one hand, and between his private and public property on the
other j1*1 and considers Bynkershoek to say that: "the goods of a
sovereign, however acquired, whether of a public or private nature,
were liable to process to compel an appearance" and that the
property of a sovereign was subject to the jurisdiction of the local
judge.11
This conclusion, it may be remarked, is difficult to sustain.
It is somewhat premature to speak about the concept of restricted
state immunity in Bynkershoek and Vattel's works. Actual concept
of state, as opposed to the concept of a sovereign, was developed
much later; their theories and exposition have a strong connection
with the historical context in which they arose. There is little
evidence to suggest that these authorities really support the
restricted doctrine of immunity as it is known today.
II. THE RULE OF STATE IMMUNITY IN MODERN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
1. The Origin of the Rule
(a) A sequence of personal immunity in common
law jurisdiction
The concept of state immunities has been developed differently
in different legal systems. In common law jurisdiction the
doctrine of immunity of foreign states has been influenced by the
1 2traditional immunities of the local sovereign. In England, as
Sucharitkul observes, the doctrine has been a direct inheritance of
internal constitutional practice, expressing the maxim: "The king
cannot be sued in his own courts". To subject the king to the
local jurisdiction was a "constitutional impossibility", he writes:
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As the King personified the state, constitutionally speaking
the courts which formed part of the government of the state
could not logically exercise jurisdiction over the sovereign in
whose name, and in whose name only, they could act.
From this he concludes:
the immunity of the crown was later extended to cover the case
of foreign sovereigns with whom foreign states have
subsequently identified. 13
However, it is arguable that immunity of a foreign sovereign is not
identical with that of the local sovereign. The latter may rest
entirely upon constitutional provisions or customs which, if fairly
construed, confer or deny the right to sue. But the appeal to rule *
as to the local sovereign may be useful by way of an analogy, either
as a ground for allowing immunity or as a basis for an argument that
no greater immunity should be given to a foreign sovereign than that
given to the sovereign of the territorial jurisdiction.
Thus the English courts, influenced to a considerable extent by
the position of a local sovereign, developed precedents granting
foreign sovereigns exemptions from territorial jurisdiction. The
immunity of the crown is later extended by way of analogy to cover
also the sovereign heads of other nations. In the Prins Frederick
case (1820),'''^ the court upheld immunity and declined jurisdiction
on the ground that the foreign state, as personified by the foreign
sovereign, was equally sovereign and independent, and that to
subject him to the domestic jurisdiction would insult his "real
dignity". In applying international law to the problem of suits
against foreign sovereigns, the English courts also considered these
rules of paramount importance and thus felt that jurisdiction cannot
be assumed without violating these principles. In 1850, in The
Matters of Wadworth v. The Queen of Portugal,"^ the court held that,
without his consent, a foreign sovereign could not be made amenable
to the jurisdiction of an English court. Chief Justice Campbell
said: "... To cite a foreign potentate in a court, is contrary to
the law of nations, and an insult which he is entitled to resent".^
Other rationales for the doctrine of state immunity advanced by
the English courts were based on the theory of equality of states
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and the principle of consent. In Parlement Beige,^ after a review
of English and foreign cases, Lord Justice Brett declared:
The principle to be deduced from all cases is that, as a
consequence of the absolute independence, of every sovereign
authority and of international comity which induces every
sovereign state to respect the independence and dignity of
every other foreign state, each and every one declines to
exercise by means of its courts any of its territorial
jurisdiction over the person of any sovereign or ambassador of
any other state, or over the public property of any other state
which is destined for public use, or over the property of any
ambassador, though such sovereign or ambassador property be
within its territory, and therefore, but for the common
agreement, subject to its jurisdiction. 18
This received further confirmation by Lord Atkin in the Cristina
case.^ His judgement on such a rule was based on the following
propositions:
The foundation for application to set aside a writ and arrest
of a ship is to be found in two propositions of international
law engrafted into our domestic law which seems to me to be
well established and to be beyond dispute. The first is that
the court of a country will not implead a foreign sovereign,
that is, they will not by their process make him against his
will a party to legal proceedings whether the proceedings
involve a process against his person or seek to recover from
him specific property or damages.
The second is that they will not by their process, whether the
sovereign is a party to the proceedings or not, seize or detain
property which is his or of which he is in possession or
control. 20
In the United States, the exemption of foreign sovereigns from
local jurisdiction is a product of the federal system, in particular
of reciprocal relations between the federal union and member
21
states. During the formative period of the union the question
was directly raised in a number of cases decided by the courts of
22different individual members of the union. These and other cases
led Justice Holmes, in a case concerning the territory of Hawaii, to
observe that an entity which is the source of rights is above the
rule of law, by basing immunity "on the logical and practical
grounds that there can be no legal right as against the authority
that makes the law on which the right depends".23 This view
received a judicial confirmation in the Mississippi case (1934) in
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the following words:
There is .... the postulate that states of the Union, still
possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune from
suits, without their consent, save where there has been "a
surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention". 24
(b) Civil law tradition: primarily a question
of competence
In civil law, state immunity was originally a question of
"competence" or jurisdiction of the court. For example, in France,
the principle of state immunity has received broad application.
The system of the administrative courts, the Conseil d'Etat, under
which an action may lie against the state, influenced to a
05measurable extent the development of the concept. A distinction
has been drawn between certain acts of the government which are
subject to the jurisdiction of the Conseil d'Etat and other
governmental acts which are not. Within the latter falls the
category of acts attributable to foreign states, emanating from the
sovereign authority of the government. It was upon this distinction
that the Court of Cassation on 22 January 1849, ruled that Art. 14
of the Code Civil, which permits suits against foreigners for
liabilities arising out of obligations contracted in France or
abroad with French nationals, was not applicable to foreign
2 7
states. Subsequent judgements in France have closely followed
the same lines. In April 1847, the Civil Tribunal of the Seine
28
rendered a decision in which it was held that the suit involved
examination of an act by a foreign government for which the French
court was without competence. The heavily criticised judgement of
the Court of Cassation (1849) in the matters of the Spanish
government is responsible for laying down the rule for the first
time in French jurisprudence. The court held that the reciprocal
independence of states was one of the most universally recognized
principles of international law; that no government could be
subjected against its will to the jurisdiction of a foreign state,
29
since the right of jurisdiction was inherent in its sovereignty.
Despite the criticism directed against the decision, 30 tjie pj-gnch
court firmly adhered to the view that, when a foreign state was
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sued, the French courts did not distinguish between its private and
sovereign authority, but had declared themselves equally incompetent
to determine such suits.
In Belgium, the question of immunity from jurisdiction of
foreign states is a problem of ratione personae, Art. 14 of the
Civil Code, modified by Art. 52 of 1876 Law on Competence, giving
the Belgians the right to sue foreigners before Belgian courts. As
in France, it was long admitted in Belgium that the word foreigners
only applied to individuals and could not be relied upon to extend
the jurisdiction of the Belgian courts over a public act of a
31
foreign state. This view received judicial endorsement by the
32
Brussels Court of Appeal on December 30, 1840. The Court held
that Article 14 of the Civil Code "in the natural meaning of its
terms, only concerns foreign private persons". The immunity
accorded to the Government of Holland and the Dutch syndicate by the
decision was said to rest on "the mutual independence and equality
of nations". The extraterritoriality of ambassadors was extended
by the Court to the accrediting state itself by way of analogy.
The independence and sovereignty of states had also been relied
upon by Italian courts to exempt foreign states from their
jurisdiction since the 19th century. Yet, when such sovereignty
and independence of states were not in question, the Italian courts
33
have denied immunity. In Germany, the rule of sovereign immunity
was said to be an integral part of the law of nations and as such
Q /
precluded suits from being brought against foreign states.
The above brief survey shows that the rule of state immunity
was established in the 19th century in the practice of various legal
systems and incorporated in international law as an accepted and
uncontested principle.
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2. The So-called Doctrine of Absolute Immunity in
International Practice
(a) The doctrine of absolute immunity in Anglo-
Saxon practice
i. The United States:
The judicial authorities of the United States were among the
first to formulate the principle of state immunity. The principle
was clearly laid down by Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner
"Exchange" v. McFaddon and others (1812). The facts of the case
were as follows: John McFaddon and his partner, both citizens of
the United States, were owners of a schooner by the name of
"Exchange". On one of its transatlantic runs at Baltimore,
the "Exchange" was forcibly captured on 30 December 1810 by
units of the French Navy, taken to a port in France and
converted into a French ship of war. The capture of the "Exchange"
was apparently carried out under a decree by which Napoleon had
declared a blockade of Great Britain and had ordered the capture of
any ship stopping there en route to the continent. In August 1811,
the "Exchange" was brought into the port of Philadelphia, under
stress of whether McFaddon and his partner filed their libel in the
District Court of Pennsylvania, asserting their rights of property
to the vessel. The district judge dismissed the action, as
suggested in court by the executive branch of the United States
Government, on the ground that a public vessel of a foreign
sovereign, in amity with the USA, was not subject to the ordinary
judicial process of the country. From this decision the
petitioners appealed to the Circuit Court, where the sentence was
reversed on 28 October 1811. Then the US Attorney-General appealed
to the Supreme Court. He asserted that: "Whenever the act is done
by a sovereign in his sovereign character, it becomes a matter of
negotiation, or of reprisals, or of war according to its
importance", but the judiciary has no say in the matter. He argued
that as the vessel did not come to trade, there is no implied waiver
of the peculiar immunity of the public vessel, and she had committed
- 9 -
no offence while in the US. To begin with, he unequivocally
affirmed the principle of the territorial jurisdiction of the local
state as "necessarily exclusive and absolute". However, he
recognized the existence of several exceptions to this exclusive and
absolute jurisdiction: (1) the exemption of the person of the
sovereign from arrest and detention in a foreign territory; (2) the
immunities which all the civilized nations allowed to foreign
ministers; and (3) the implied cession of a portion of its
territorial jurisdiction where the sovereign state allows the troops
of a foreign prince to pass through his dominion. According to
Chief Justice Marshall:
All exceptions ... to the full and complete power of a nation
within its own territory must be traced up to the consent of
the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate
source. 35
In his judgement, he based the immunity accorded to a foreign
sovereign on the attributes of sovereign states, including
especially independence, sovereignty, equality and dignity of
states. He declared:
The full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike, the
attribute of every sovereign and being capable of conferring
extraterritorial power, would not seem to contemplate foreign
sovereigns nor their sovereign rights, as its objects. One
sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being
bound by obligations of the highest character not to degrade
the dignity of his nation, by placing himself or his sovereign
rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to
enter a foreign territory only under an express licence, or in
the confidence that the immunities belonging to his independent
sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are
reserved by implication and will be extended to him.
He further observed:
This perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns
and this common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse
and an interchange of good offices with each other, is
understood to waive the exercise of a part of that complete
exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has been stated to be
the attribute of every nation. 36
It is clear from this judgement that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity has been expressed as an exception rather than a rule.
Chief Justice Marshall has invoked the theory that the territorial
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state was understood to waive the exercise of a part of its
exclusive territorial jurisdiction when a foreign sovereign or his
sovereign rights would otherwise be subject to that jurisdiction,
and on that basis a sovereign was entitled to expect that on
entering the territory of another state his immunity would be
respected. Nevertheless, the decision drew a distinction between
the situation of a vessel that visited a foreign port in the course
of its normal activities and that of a military detachment whose
presence in a foreign territory was subject to the express consent
of the receiving state. Sir Ian Sinclair expresses the view that
the Schooner Exchange judgement did not espouse any doctrine of
absolute immunity. He observes that:
Chief Justice Marshall's judgment is in no way inconsistent
with the theory that immunity may extend only so far as to
secure the protection of the 'sovereign rights' exercisable by
a foreign sovereign. 37
In similar reasoning, Mr Badr points out that Chief Justice Marshall
did not envisage a blanket immunity for the sovereign state as a
general rule, to which exceptions should be made to permit the
OO
exercise of the local state territorial jurisdiction. The same
writer concluded, after a careful examination of the decision that:
the schooner Exchange can be rightly said to be the harbinger
of the restrictive theory of immunity, rather than, as commonly
maintained, the starting point of an absolute theory. 39
Nevertheless, the United States courts placed a different
emphasis on that judgement. In the United States judicial
practice, the doctrine of "absolute immunity" was commonly thought
to derive from the judgement of Mr Justice Van Devanter in the case
of Berizzi Bros. Co. v. SS "Pesaro" (1926), in which the court
declined jurisdiction in a suit involving a trading vessel owned and
operated by the Italian Government and engaged in the carriage of
olive oil to the United States. Mr Justice Van Devanter in this
case made the statement that the principles laid down in the
Schooner Exchange:
are applicable alike to all ships held and used by a government
for public purposes, and that when, for the purpose of
advancing the trade of its people, or providing revenue for its
treasury, a government acquires, mans and operates ships ....,
they are public ships in the same sense the warships are.
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He goes on to declare that:
We know of no international usage which regards the maintenance
and the advancement of the economic welfare of the people in
time of peace as any less a public purpose than the maintenance
and training of a naval force. 40
The Supreme Court in this case refused to adopt the suggestion of
the State Department that immunity should not be accorded to a
vessel employed by foreign governments in commercial operations.^
The dual personality of the state was rejected by the Supreme Court
in this case, for unlike sovereigns and ambassadors, states could
act only in their public and sovereign capacities and thus a new
doctrine of unqualified immunity had been recognized.
This triumph of the Supreme Court over the executive branch of
the government in matters touching foreign relations appeared to be
temporary, and was attributable partly to the predominant view of
American judges of that time that:
it is for the foreign government and not for the court to
decide whether a merchant ship is public or private, or whether
an act of the foreign government is governmental or non¬
governmental. 42
However, a new development emerged later. There had been a strong
inclination in the Supreme Court to follow the lead of the executive
branch of the Government and to adopt the suggestion of the State
Department in inclining to accord immunity whenever the claim of the
foreign government was endorsed by the executive branch.
This new attitude on the part of some of the Supreme Court
/ Q
judges is reflected in some subsequent judicial decisions. Such
coordination between the judiciary and the administrative branch
within the same legal system was believed to be desirable in order
to avoid political embarrassment. This rationale was clearly
stated by Chief Justice Stone in the following words:
it is therefore not for the court to deny an immunity which our
government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on
new ground which the government has not seen fit to recognize
.... But recognition by the court of an immunity upon
principles which the political department of government has not
sanctioned may be equally embarrassing to it in securing the
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protection of our national interests and their recognition by
other nations. 44
In this way state immunity ceased to be a purely legal question
involving application of international law per se and the suggestion
of the department has exercised the strongest persuasive influence
of the determination by the court in question.
ii. United Kingdom:
In the 18th century there was much speculation upon the
position of a foreign sovereign before the English courts. During
that century international lawyers were inclined to the view put
forward by Mary, Queen of Scots, as against the legality of her
detention by Queen Elizabeth, that a foreign sovereign was wholly
immune from any territorial jurisdiction.^ This was attributed
mainly to three reasons:
(1) Though English lawyers adhered to the broad principle that the
rules of international law were part of the law of England,^ these
rules gave no certain guides. They tended in the direction of
asserting the immunities of a foreign sovereign; but they also
seemed to say that there were some limitations upon that immunity
though there was no definite agreement as to what those limitations
were.^®
(2) Another source of confusion stemmed from the rules of procedure
prevailing in the Court of Chancery. According to those rules, all
persons in any way connected with the litigations were required to
be made parties in order that the suit might be completed.^ Not
only that, but some equity judges also maintained that a foreign
sovereign might be made formally a party to a suit in equity in
order that the foreign sovereign might have an opportunity to assert
his interests.
(3) Thirdly, at the opening of the 19th century, the English courts
operated under separate divisions. The separation between the
courts of admiralty and the courts of common law and equity was very
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marked and, of course, that distinction had negatively influenced
the formulation of a definite rule as to what foreign sovereign
immunity was.
From this period of uncertainty the case of The Prins Frederick
(1820)"'''" may be noted. This was a dispute involving a public ship
of war owned by the King of The Netherlands. The King's advocate
cited writers on international law to prove that:
foreign princes are held to come in the territory of another
government under a sort of implied consent, which attributes to
them an inviolability as to their persons, and exemption from
the ordinary process of laws. 52
The court upheld immunity and declined jurisdiction on grounds
mentioned earlier in this chapter. However, the dispute was
ultimately settled by arbitration.
Another phase of the development in the English case law was
c o
represented by two cases, The Charkieh (1873) and The Parlement
Beige (1880).In this period there had been a clear tendency
towards more restriction of immunity. The first case involved a
ship which had been engaged in a trading venture and had not been
accorded immunity. Sir Robert Phillimore held that the commercial
nature of the service or employment of the vessel disentitled it to
state immunity. Another ground for rejecting immunity was that the
ship had been owned by the Khedive of Egypt in his private capacity
and had been chartered to a British subject at the time of the
commencement of the proceeding. In his well-known dictum, Sir
Robert Phillimore stated:
No principle of international law, and no decided case, and no
dictum of jurists of which I am aware, has gone so far as to
authorize a sovereign prince to assume the character of a
trader, when it is for his benefit; and when he incurs
obligations to a private subject to throw off, if I may so
speak, his disguise, and appear as a sovereign claiming for his
own benefit, and to the injury of a private person, for the
first time, all the attributes of his character. 55
The dictum clearly affirmed the rule of restrictive immunity
which he later reiterated in the The Cybele (1877),56 and in The
Constitution (1879)57 in which he had drawn a distinction between an
American vessel of war, which had been held to be entitled to
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immunity, and a public ship employed for commercial purposes which
was denied immunity.
Sir Robert Phillimore went even further in the Parlement Beige
case. After reviewing English and American cases, he concluded
that the vessel in question was neither a ship of war nor of
pleasure and thus was not entitled to immunity. His judgement was
reversed by the Court of Appeal on the ground that the ship had
"been mainly used for the purpose of carrying the mails".
Moreover, under the bilateral treaty then in force between Belgium
and the United Kingdom, packet-boats, regardless of subsidiary
employment, were granted the status of public vessels for the
purposes of immunity.
In delivering his judgement in the Court of Appeal, Lord
Justice Brett based his decision on the ground that:
.... the ship has been mainly used for the purpose of carrying
the mails, and only subserviently to that main object for the
purposes of trade. The carrying of passengers and merchandise
has been subordinated to the duty of carrying the mails. 58
The Porto Alexandre (1920)^^ followed that decision perhaps
incorrectly. The Porto Alexandre was formerly a German privately
owned vessel which had been lawfully condemned in Prize by the
Portuguese Prize Court in 1917. She had previously been
requisitioned and, since then had been employed wholly in ordinary
trading operations. The court adopted the absolute view of
immunity, although it endorsed the "theory of public property" upon
which the immunity of public vessels had long been based. This
decision was confirmed by the Court of Appeal with some
reluctance.^ Lord Justice Bankes felt some difficulty but deemed
himself bound by the decision of the same court in the Parlement
f\ 1
Beige case. Lord Justice Warrington was of a similar opinion.
Lord Justice Scrutton shared the doubts expressed by Hill, J. in the
court below, but denied the remedy claimed and suggested some sort
f\ 9
of extra-legal remedies. Thus, the Court of Appeal declined
jurisdiction, maintaining that their judgement in the Parlement
Beige case could not be distinguished. The rule laid down in the
Porto Alexandre case was admitted by the Counsel in the Jupiter
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( (No . 1) without any argument and substantially followed in
Compania Mercantil Argentina v. U.S.S.S.B.^
The next phase in English case-law started with the decision in
The Cristina (1938). The case was believed to have dispelled any
doubt about the position of the doctrine of absolute immunity under
English law. The Cristina was a Spanish privately owned vessel
which had been requisitioned by the Spanish Republican Government
while it was in the high seas and shortly before her arrival in an
English port. In giving the judgement of the majority of the
Lords,^ Lord Atkin had laid down perhaps in the widest terms ever
used in an English court, the proposition that immunity applied not
only when a state became a party to the proceedings, but also when
those proceedings affected in any way the destination or use of
property within its ownership, possession or control. He said:
.... The courts of a country will not implead a foreign
sovereign, that is, they will not by their process make him
against his will a party to legal proceedings whether the
proceedings involve process against his person or seek to
recover from him specific property or damages .... They will
not by their process, whether a sovereign is a party to the
proceedings or not, seize or detain property which is his or of
which he is in possession or control. 67
However, Lord Macmillan cast some doubt on the decisions of The
Porto Alexandre. He expressed his doubts in the following terms:
I confess that I should hesitate to lay down that it is part of
the law of England that an ordinary foreign trading vessel is
immune from civil process within this realm by reason merely
for the fact that it is owned by a foreign state, for such a
principle must be an importation from international law and
there is no proved consensus of international opinion or
practice to this effect. 68
From the above brief survey of English cases, a steady trend
towards granting of immunity to foreign sovereigns could easily be
observed, despite some judicial observations to the contrary. It
is, however, important to bear in mind that the trend had originated
in the United Kingdom in its imperial era and had been influenced by
the immunities of the local sovereign. Account must also be taken
of the extent to which English courts had historically regarded
themselves as bound by the judgements of their predecessors. It is
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well known that it was only within the last decade or so that the
House of Lords has been freed from the strict application of the
doctrine of stare decisis.^
The House of Lords has given expression to this freedom in the
Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) 1966.^ The rationale
behind the doctrine of precedent in the practice of the House of
Lords was stated by Lord Gardiner L.C. in the following words:
Their Lordships regard the use of precedent as an indispensable
foundation upon which to decide what is the law and its
application to individual cases. It provides at least some
degree of certainty upon which individuals can rely in the
conduct of their affairs as well as the basis for orderly
development of legal rules.
The intended purpose of the new practice was to enable the House to
use the power to depart from previous decisions of the House in
certain cases. The Practice Statement announced that:
Their Lordships nevertheless recognize that too rigid adherence
to precedent may lead to injustice in particular cases and also
unduly restrict the proper development of the law. They
propose, therefore, to modify their present practice and, while
treating former decisions of their house as normally binding,
to depart from a previous decision when it appears right to do
so. 71
The discretion asserted in the 1966 Practice Statement ought to be
exercised according to set principles and guidelines. Lord Reid,
in a series of cases decided between 1966 and 1975 articulated at
72
least seven criteria with respect to the new freedom.
75
1. The freedom ought to be exercised sparingly.
2. A decision ought not to be overruled if to do so would upset
the legitimate expectations of the parties who have entered into
contracts or settlements or otherwise regulating their affairs in
reliance on the validity of that decision.^
3. Cases raising only the question of statutory interpretation
will not be appropriate ones to consider with a view to
overruling.^
4. A decision ought not to be overruled if it would be impractic¬
able for the Lords to foresee the consequences of departing from
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5. In the interest of certainty, a decision ought not to be
departed from merely because the Law Lords consider that that it was
wrongly decided.77
6. A decision ought not to be overruled if it causes such great
uncertainty that in practice the parties' advisors are unable to
give any clear indication as to what the courts will hold the law to
be.78
7. A decision ought not to be overruled if in relation to some
broad issues or principles it is no longer considered just or in
keeping with some contemporary social conditions or modern
conceptions of public policy.7^
It is in relation to the last principle that the new freedom is
highly relevant as far as cases involving matters of foreign
sovereign immunity are concerned. The need to avoid injustice in a
particular case is expressly stated in the Practice Statement itself
as justifying the use of the power to overrule. Indeed there is a
fundamental lack of justice which arises from application of the
absolute immunity doctrine in a particular case. Lord Wilberforce
makes this point in 1 Congresso del Partido when he explains, "It is
necessary in the interest of justice to individuals having . ..
[commercial or other private law] transactions with states to allow
OA
them to bring such transactions before the court". While it is
true the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not remove the legal
liability of the foreign state, its application can often be
tantamount to denying a remedy to the aggrieved party.
Even if the old decisions of the House of Lords covering the
matter were being considered as laying down any rule of absolute
sovereign immunity, the presence of manifest injustice flowing from
adherence to these precedents clearly shows the need to depart from
them in order to do justice to the appellant and therefore
characterize the appeal as suitable for the use of the 1966 power.
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(b) Opinion of writers on absolute immunity
The doctrine of absolute immunity was widely held among writers
O 1 o o
in the 19th century, and early 20th century. The most
significant argument which has been put forward in favour of
absolute immunity is that the alternative to absolute immunity is
non-immunity. There is a difficulty inherent in characterizing a
state's activities by reference to the distinction between private
and public acts, and an objective criterion by which to draw that
distinction could not be found. The argument was put by Sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice in the following words:
.... The distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign acts
of states is arbitrary and unreal, and one which is not easy to
apply in practice and which might become much more difficult to
apply if states cared to take the appropriate measures; one
which, moreover, must always leave a sort of no-man's land of
actions capable of being regarded as coming within either
category.
He then goes on to conclude that:
.... The only sound course is to adhere to the strict doctrine
of complete immunity, any departure from it in specific cases
being regulated by international convention. 83
This argument seems to be influenced by the earlier practice of
American and English courts which had failed to find an objective
test which in all circumstances would separate questions arising
jure imperii from those arising jure gestionis. The English
courts, for example, had been deterred from making any distinction
at all, simply because they could find no rational ground for so
doing. With regard to this particular point, the Anglo-Saxon
practice has offered two versions. The English courts adopted the
84
test of public use, while in the United States courts it has
always been acknowledged that the doctrine of immunity has its own
natural limits, namely the activities in question must relate to
O C
governmental functions.
The argument is also closely linked to the position held by
various jurists that states are single entities and could not be
broken up into parts. According to them, the economic functions of
states are no less important than its other functions and states
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carried on economic activities as the holders of public power.
In this particular regard, it should be noted that theories of
states differ and there is no unanimous view that the state is
indivisible. As Sir Francis Vallat has observed:
There are already examples of entities that exercise de facto
and de jure sovereign powers without being states at all, and
the world of the future would not consist solely of monolithic
sovereign states. 87
If comparison could be drawn between private individuals and states
in this regard, Sir Francis Vallat believed that the former are less
readily divisible than the latter, and yet the law is capable of
distinguishing between and treating differently their official and
their private capacities. Thus, it would not be impossible to
differentiate between various kinds of state activities. Indeed,
there is an inherent difficulty to finding a workable criterion that
would permit the making of the kind in question, but difficulties
are by no means impossibilities.
The second argument which has been presented in favour of
absolute immunity is that jurisdiction should not be exercised if
there is no possibility of execution. According to this argument
it would be unreasonable to admit a competence in the court which
would result in an empty judgement, and due to the attributes of its
sovereignty, a foreign state can never be effectively sued against
88
its will in the courts of another state. That theory had found
QQ
wide acceptance in the writings of 19th-century jurists.
In the first place, the argument seems to be based on the
distinction between right and a remedy, a distinction which is not
entirely convincing. Submission to jurisdiction does not imply
submission to measures of execution. In all cases the courts will
have to reconsider the question of their own competence when it
comes to executing the judgement rendered against a foreign state,
and therefore rights and remedies are quite distinguishable and
separate issues. Moreover, the validity of a judicial decision
cannot be made dependent upon matters concerned with its execution.
The truth appears to be that a judgement founded upon the principle
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of universal justice has an effect upon the public conscience more
powerful than the most effective measures of execution.^
Therefore there seems to be no valid reason why a court could not
pass a judgement concerning foreign state property simply because it
would be prevented from enforcing its judgement.
In the second place, it has been argued that the doctrine of
absolute immunity is based on the principle of sovereign equality of
states,^ a principle which is enshrined in the United Nations
92Charter and confirmed by the General Assembly Resolutions. In
this regard, various points must be borne in mind. Firstly, states
are not only beneficiaries of immunities but are also the grantors,
and the rule of state immunity is a two-way phenomenon in this
regard. All states grant and enjoy jurisdictional immunities.
The problem of state immunity arises where there is a conflict of
sovereignties between states as a result of the presence of one
sovereign authority within the jurisdiction of another. The
sovereignty of a state within its own borders becomes vacuous if the
pressures to which it is subjected from outside are not under legal
control. To think in terms of absolute sovereignty would
ultimately lead to recognition of the sovereignty of only the most
Q Q
powerful state. If in such cases the problem concerns which
state should prevail over the other, when both of them are equally
entitled to make conflicting claims, to approach the problem from
the standpoint of the sovereignty of the foreign state, is to deny
another state its sovereign status which is equally valid.
There is no denying that the principle of sovereign equality of
states lies at the very foundation of international law. But the
principle essentially means that states have equal rights and duties
and are equal partners in international relations despite any
differences with respect to economic, social, political and other
factors.^ Such equality does not mean only equality of sovereign
rights but also equality of sovereign duties. Since rights and
duties are interdependent, the concept of sovereign equality cannot
be considered in its strict sense in a situation involving state
immunity. In such a situation, the conflict had to be settled in a
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manner that respected the law of jurisdiction in question, failing
which the equality of states would be impaired.^ Within the
context of state immunity, states are only equal insofar as they are
all interested in the vindication of law. The principle of
equality of states flows from the idea of sovereignty and
sovereignty is not an absolute concept. As several jurists have
said, one of the attributes of sovereignty is to be able to accept
limitations on its exercise. Equally it is one of the attributes
of sovereignty to be capable of living in the context of public
international law, which necessarily implies limits on the exercise
of sovereignty. Professor Brierly has commented that:
To the extent that sovereignty has come to imply that there is
something inherent in the nature of states that makes it
impossible for them to be subjected to law, it is a false
doctrine which the facts of international relations do not
support. 96
Several other lawyers have adopted a similar view.^
Consequently the question whether one state must submit to the
jurisdiction of another, or whether the second state must grant the
first immunity, is essentially a practical problem associated with
QO
the nature of sovereignty. Therefore it remains to be observed
that the principle of equality of states cannot by itself provide an
answer to the question why state immunity should be absolute, since
to suggest absolute immunity is to stress the priority of state
immunity over territorial sovereignty, something which runs counter
to the principle of equality itself, and to international opinion.
For example, in the Lotus case, in which rather similar issues had
been at stake, the majority of judges in the PCIJ held that the
territorial sovereignty of the state comes first and that the rights
accorded to other states had to be grounded on positive rules of
9 9international law. The right to exercise territorial
jurisdiction was stressed by the court in that case in the following
words:
International law governs relations between independent states.
The rule of law binding upon states therefore emanates from
their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages
generally accepted as expressing principles of law and
established in order to regulate the relations between
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co-existing independent communities or with a view to achieve¬
ment of common aims. Restriction upon the independence of
states cannot therefore be presumed. 100
What sovereignty really connotes in inter-state relations today
is a claim to independence which is theoretically tempered by the
recognition of an equal claim to this by all states and by the duty
and obligations not to intervene in the domestic affairs of other
states. The notion of responsibility towards the smooth functioning
of international legal order is implicit in any claim to such
independence, for without this independence, states would come under
constant threat and the claim would be worthless.
3. Rationale and Foundations of State Immunity
The theories which have been advanced to rationalize the
jurisdictional immunities which foreign states have traditionally
enjoyed before the courts of other territorial states may be
summarized as follows.
(a) The principles of the sovereignty, independence
and dignity of states
From the principles of sovereignty, independence and dignity of
states the deduction is made that between two co-equal sovereign
states, one cannot exercise sovereign will or authority over the
other. Thus state immunity is sometimes expressed in the maxim par
in parem imperium non habet.^^ As Judge Hackworth stated:
These exemptions from the local jurisdiction are theoretically
based upon the consent, express or implied, of the local state,
upon the principle of equality of states in the eyes of
international law .... 102
Again, according to this theory it would be undignified if a foreign
state had to descend to litigation with private individuals. In
reality, all these notions are different ways of expressing the same
thing, namely, the sovereignty of the state.103
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(b) Analogy with the local sovereigns
A second basis of state immunity is to be found in the
historical development of the analogy with the immunities of the
local sovereigns. The theory has been advanced mainly by the
courts of common law jurisdiction. In England, for example, the
immunity of the crown rests upon the principle that the king cannot
be impleaded in his own courts. This was understood to mean that
international comity requires that a corresponding immunity should
be granted to a foreign sovereign state.The same rationale is
sometimes stated in the argument that member states of a federal
union are not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of other
member states. The explanation given for this view seems to be
based on the idea that the entity, being a fountain of justice, no
105
court can have jurisdiction over it.
(c) The relevance of diplomatic immunity
The prerogatives of diplomatic agents are among the oldest
principles of international law. The exchange of emissaries has a
long tradition. This principle, based originally upon the supposed
sacred character of the herald or envoy and sanctioned by religion,
was one of the oldest and most fundamental "laws of all mankind"
known to the ancients. Accordingly, it is argued that it is
difficult to deny to the state what is conceded to the ambassador,
for it would be absurd to accord the principal less privileges than
those enjoyed by his agent. This process of analogy appears to
have been adopted by the 19th-century judges when confronted with
the question of sovereign immunity.
The relevance of diplomatic immunity is sometimes expressed in
the expediency tempered by customary law. According to this view,
the true approach to the issue of sovereign immunity is a functional
rather than a theoretical one, and on this functional basis immunity
1 08
should be determined. Moreover, diplomatic immunities may be
said to have provided another legal basis for state immunities,
since it is well established that these diplomatic immunities are
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conceded not for the benefit of the individual, but for the benefit
of the state which he represents.
(d) Reciprocity and international comity
According to these precepts, the exemption of foreign states
from internal jurisdiction is sometimes founded on the desire to
maintain friendly relations among states. Thus Chief Justice
Marshall, who seemed to be inspired by this desire, referred in his
judgement to the "promotion of intercourse and an exchange of good
offices dictated by humanity".International comity was invoked
by Brett, J., in the famous decision in the Parlement Beige as one
of the foundations on which the rule of state immunity is
established. Both the considerations of reciprocity and comity
were later combined to serve as a guide for the political arm of the
government to allow or disallow the immunity claimed. In the
Chemical Natural Resources Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela case,^"-^
the court stated that:
The State Department will recognize and suggest, or fail to
recognize or grant or suggest, sovereign immunity in each case
presented to it, depending (a) upon the foreign and diplomatic
relations which our Country has at that particular time with
the other Country and (b) the best interests of our Country at
that particular time. Ill
(e) Avoidance of political embarrassment in
international relations
In reality this is not a separate basis for state immunity but
rather is an argument deriving from the above considerations of
political expediency and good inter-state relations. For the
purpose of contributing to the smooth functioning of the country's
foreign policy, the court of law should refrain from exercising
jurisdiction or passing judgement which might upset the country's
foreign relations, especially on those matters that are better
reserved for political negotiations.
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(f) Other bases
The theory of extraterritoriality has sometimes been put
forward as an argument for exemption of foreign states from
territorial jurisdiction. The theory developed mainly to deal with
the issues of immunity if the subject matter involved is sovereign
property rather than that of personal sovereign. According to this
fiction, the subject-matter of a claim must be regarded as
physically and legally outside the orbit of jurisdiction of the
territorial state.
Apart from the theoretical basis of extraterritoriality, the
power of execution of a judgement rendered against a foreign state
encountered a difficulty of a practical nature. For example,
execution of a judgement implies the presence of some property upon
which the execution may be levied. This and other practical
difficulties are often advanced as valid considerations for the
local courts to abstain from assuming jurisdiction.^"''^
4. Evolution in Legal Analysis gave rise to the Trend
toward a Restrictive Immunity
There is no surprise about the predominance of the doctrine of
absolute immunity in international practice in the 19th and
beginning of the 20th century, if we accept the fact that most of
the customary rules of international law regarding rights and duties
of states were developed in the 19th century and based on the then
existing division of state and individual activity.
During that period certain activities were carried out
undeniably as state functions: internal administration and judicial
ordering, control of the police and armed forces, as well as the
conduct of foreign relations. Trade and industry, on the other
hand, was peculiarly the province of private persons and
enterprises. But this division did not remain so shortly before
World War I. State functions were increased and began to extend to
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the areas traditionally reserved for private individuals. These
state activities were often carried out by institutions, though
subject to some direction by governments, but, on the other hand,
each was equipped with independent resources and management of its
own: "a corporation clothed with the power of government but
possessed of the flexibility and initiative of private
enterprise".^ ^
States have often ventured into activities like banking,
railways, postal services and other enterprises which produce
revenue and can be also be carried on by private groups. There were
numerous reasons for such a remarkable expansion of state functions.
Among these were the political and economic necessities: one of the
motives of such expansion is the indispensable need in developing
countries to intervene in the interest of the general development of
the country, in ventures which private capital is either not willing
11
or not able to launch. D It is to that end that developing
countries engage in international trade. The governments of these
countries import or export simply because they alone are capable of
engaging in such activities in view of the amount of capital
involved and guarantees required. Furthermore, in the majority of
these countries it would be true to say that state activities are
controlled by efforts to establish and maintain a standard of
subsistence. Accordingly, the governments created public entities
for the procurement of food supplies and medicine, acted as maritime
carriers to save shipping costs and formed various sub-divisions and
companies to act as commercial agents. The overriding purpose in
most cases is to provide a service to the public as a whole or to
generate public revenue for the general good. Unless such
activities, for example, transportation or large public work, are
undertaken by a state, the public in those countries would be denied
the benefits and facilities accruing from them.
As far as independent industrialized states in the 19th century
are concerned, perhaps the explanation for the expansion of state
functions lies in the speedy development in technology and the
emergence of the world economy as such. In order to effectively
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perform certain economic activities, like postal communications
etc., a framework of international cooperation was created, and a
prerequisite to that cooperation was that the state, in order to
make the generally agreed rule effective within their national
boundaries, would undertake certain functions.
Other important motives were defence and strategic
considerations. The emergencies of war have produced in most
countries public institutions designed to administer and regulate
vital production and supply. The USA Shipping Board was thus
recognized to buy, build and operate merchant vessels upon America's
entry into World War I.^"^ A third motive was the belief that
transference of public utilities such as the supply of electricity,
gas and water, to the control of the state, would facilitate the
economic expansion of the state as well as offering large scale
operations without any injury being caused to the private
monopoly,
The growth of state interference in trade and commerce in the
West and the eradication of private capitalism in the East has had
consequences in the field of state immunity that could not have been
foreseen by the very able judges who laid down the basic rule of
state immunities in the 19th century. The following observations
are intended to highlight some of the consequences brought about by
these developments in the field of state immunities.
5. The Paradoxical Consequences of Absolute Immunity
The first argument advanced against the adherence, on the part
of some states, to the doctrine of absolute immunity is that it is a
quite unsatisfactory state of affairs if we realize that companies
conducting identical commercial operations, but under private
ownership, could be sued. It is doubted whether this distinction
has any rationale or is a necessity to the international intercourse
and cooperation among states.119 Both cases are strikingiy
similar: their fundamental essence is contract. If absolute
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immunity is resorted to by the judicial authority of the territorial
state, inequities are manifestly produced and those dealing with
state traders may be placed in a disadvantageous position. The
sovereignty of the foreign state, which is often cited as the basis
of the absolute nature of state immunities, has nothing to do with
the impact of bargaining power on the formation of contract. Lord
Wilberforce makes this point best in 1 Congresso del Partido when he
explained that:
To require a state to answer a claim based upon such
transactions does not involve a challenge to or inquiry into
any act of sovereignty or governmental act of state. It is,
in an accepted phrase, neither a threat to the dignity of that
state, nor any interference with its sovereign functions. 120
Another serious consequence is the question of uncertainties -
the problem of businessmen and their lawyers - in domestic
transactions, which become more acute in international transactions.
For the international trader, the problem is not merely the
competence of a particular judicial body, but rather the complete
absence of any satisfactory forum for the settlement of disputes and
redress of wrongs. This explains why the doctrine of absolute
immunity was looked upon as archaic in conception,qf it was
taken from the standpoint of functional jurisprudence. Lord
Wilberforce has also emphasized this requirement of fair dealing
when he noted that: "It is necessary in the interest of justice to
individuals having .... [commercial] transactions before the
19 9
courts". From the standpoint of traditional equity, the
doctrine was seen as discriminatory in application. When foreign
states establish their commercial enterprises, there is an offer to
the public at large to persuade them to deal with those
corporations, assuring the former that they can rely on the promises
of such enterprises and the enforceability of those promises.
Another evolution in legal thought which gave rise to the
rejection of absolute immunity and the subsequent emergence of
restrictive immunity is that national enactments were adopted by
various countries to remove the immunity of a local state from civil
liabilities in contract and tort. To mention but two of these
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examples: The United States Federal Tort Claim Act of 1946^24 was
issued to deny the immunity of the United States in civil suits for
its wrongful acts arising from torts, with minor exceptions.
Similarly, the United Kingdom Crown Proceedings Act 1947 removed the
immunity of the Crown in proceedings relating to liabilities in tort
cases. This trend to subject the forum state to local jurisdiction
is also observable in continental Europe, although in a different
institutional framework. For example, under the French legal
system, proceedings could be instituted against the French
Government before the various Tribunaux administratif s . A
distinction has been drawn between 'actes d'autorite' subject to the
competence of these tribunals and 'actes de government' which are
125
not so subject. Moreover, some Western powers like the U.S. and
Britain and other major industrial powers have repeatedly declared
wrongful the taking of any property of an alien if the taking is not
for public purposes, is discriminatory in character, or if it is not
accompanied by prompt, adequate and effective payment of
compensation. In such circumstances the doctrine of absolute
immunity can be used to exempt those state enterprises from paying
the compensation that would otherwise be judicially collectable.
As long as this unfair burden is allowed to exist, more businessmen
will shy away from transactions with foreign governments and thus
will hamper the expansion and flourishing of foreign trade, which is
an essential element in present international cooperation, peace and
co-existence.
From a political point of view, some Western countries feared
that state trading was a new instrument for Communist
1 0f\
penetration. Centralized economic planning and state trading
monopolies moreover facilitate the manipulation of foreign trade.
It was believed that pricing and product selection could be made
without regard to foreign factors. Some Western officials have
labelled such tactics as 'economic political offensives in the
I O ~~7
commodity markets of the world'.
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Some of the preceding observations tend to confirm that the
rules of absolute immunity, although they have always been developed
as a legal concept in a legal context, are so mingled with economic
and political issues that it becomes very difficult in the final
analysis to separate them from each other. With the increase in
exploitation of natural resources, the promotional economic
development activities of states and their agencies, and financial
transactions relating to economic development objectives, the
economic strand is becoming more pronounced. In consequence of
these developments and in the context of the problems resulting
therefrom, there has been recorded progress in international
practice away from the absolute formula, a progress focusing on
worldwide conditions, of which a general account will be presented
in the next chapter.
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THE RECENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS OF THE LAW OF STATE
IMMUNITY UNDER THE CURRENT CUSTOMARY LAW
I. THE EMERGENCE OF THE RESTRICTIVE THEORY OF IMMUNITY
IN THE POST-WAR ERA
So far we have been considering the origin of the rule and the
doctrine of what is called 'absolute immunity'. The reasons have
already been given for the emergence of the restricted view of
immunity in the process of the development of the law, and it must
be emphasized that international trade has played a major role in
this development.
With ever-increasing functions of the state in the economic
sphere, particularly in international trade, it was becoming more
and more questionable to continue to adhere to the doctrine of
'absolute immunity'. The restrictive view of immunity has since
been more fully developed, and to that development we may now turn.
The evidence of the development of the rule is to be found in state
practice, the decisions of national courts, treaties that virtually
legislate or codify existing practice, the works of several private
and governmental bodies composed of delegates vested with the task
of codifying the law, and the writings of jurists in international
law.
1. The Development of the Law in the USA
(a) The balance between executive and judicial
responsibility
Some of the United States judges realized that allowing or
withholding of sovereign immunity might affect the foreign relations
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of their country, so they turned to the State Department, the organ
charged with conducting those foreign relations. When one of its
government agencies is sued, the foreign state presents a note to
the State Department which, upon reviewing the note, either
transmits or declines to transmit to the court the so-called
'suggestion' or 'certificate' . Upon receipt of such a document,
the court is expected to accept it, and is thus discharged of its
burden to decide something that might otherwise upset or embarrass
US foreign relations."'' If the certificate suggests that immunity
should be granted, the court is likely to acquiesce and follow the
suggestion. For example, Chief Justice Stone's statement in the
case of Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman may be quoted:
It is therefore not for the courts to deny an immunity which
our Government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity
on new grounds which the Government has not seen fit to
recognize. 2
But since the judiciary is normally, in theory as well as in
practice, independent of the executive in matters of adjudication
according to the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, it
seems that the decisions of the courts do not necessarily follow the
same lines as the conclusion reached by the executive branch of the
government.
The weight of persuasiveness of such a suggestion has been a
matter of considerable controversy. A better view appears to be
that the authoritativeness of the department certificate very much
depends on the prevailing attitude of the court at the material
3
time.
(b) The Tate Letter
The decisive point in any efforts to substitute the doctrine of
absolute immunity in United States' law was the letter issued by the
State Department on May 19, 1952, commonly known as the Tate Letter.
It was in substance a statement by the acting legal adviser to the
State Department identifying certain areas of activities where
immunities should be recognized and allowed. The letter stated
that:
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.... It will hereafter be the Department's policy to follow the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in the consideration
of requests of foreign governments for a grant of sovereign
immunity. 4
The Tate Letter was uniformly welcomed by international jurists when
it appeared,"' and received favourable acceptance by the US Supreme
Court in The Republic of China case. In essence the letter was to
the effect that foreign governmental agencies engaging in
governmental acts were immune from suits in US courts, while
agencies engaging in commercial transactions were not so immune.
An examination of the letter would show that the view of the State
Department was based on the following legal considerations: i- the
misuse of the doctrine of absolute immunity by the Soviet Union and
its bloc; ii- the injustice of relieving foreign governments from
liabilities to which the US government and its organs are subject;
and iii- the inequities of leaving private claimants remediless in
their relations with foreign government enterprises.
The major preliminary point to notice about the letter is that
the new policy of the Department was intended to affect only
immunity from jurisdiction. The immunity of foreign governments
from measures of execution remained for the Department absolute.
The failure to apply the new policy to execution of judgements
rendered against foreign governments cannot, it is submitted, be
justified on the basis of legal logic. The American Law
Institute's Restatement of The Foreign Relations Law of the US''
recommends that, for the restrictive theory to be meaningful, the
decisions given must be satisfied from the property of the foreign
state. But generally the letter brought a return to the
restrictive doctrine and any significant trace of absolute immunity
had in effect been eliminated.
(c) US case-law
In the light of the foregoing developments, the question arises
as to what the federal courts had been doing all this time while
apparently relying on the Tate Letter. To answer this question it
must not be assumed that the administrative procedure established by
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the Department to give effect to the restrictive view of immunity
had ousted the jurisdiction of the court. The letter was intended
to ensure a higher degree of coordination between the courts and the
executive branch of the government, as the lack of such
harmonization might somehow seriously upset the country's political
relations in certain cases. But again, the persuasiveness of the
policy adopted by the Department raised a doctrinal controversy of
considerable degree. It was argued that executive determination
should no longer be dispositive of the issue of state immunity, and
that the courts should resume their proper function in this as in
other international law issues, where the interest of the government
O
is asserted.
During the period between the issuance of the Tate Letter and
the entry into force of The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976
(one of the principal objects of which was indeed precisely to vest
exclusively in the courts the responsibility for disposing of
sovereign immunity claims), the US courts had several opportunities
to render decisions on the specific issues of state immunity. To
give but a few examples, in National City Bank of New York v.
Republic of China ^ the Supreme Court ruled that a foreign sovereign
who instituted a proceeding in the US court could not plead
sovereign immunity as a defence to a counterclaim against him, if
the counterclaim did not exceed the amount of the sovereign's own
claim. Mr Justice Frankfurter referred to the Tate Letter and
based his decision on the "ultimate trust of the consideration of
fair dealing". In other words, sovereign immunity is not absolute
and considerations of fair play must be taken into account."^
In Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, ^ the US courts again considered
the extent to which the State Department's suggestion was binding on
the courts. In this case the Department had suggested immunity and
requested the release of a merchant vessel owned by the Cuban
Government. The circuit Court of Appeal held that it could not
properly go behind the determination made by the Department and
therefore dismissed the claim. Most significantly, in Victory
i 2
Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abasteciemento, no
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suggestion of immunity was filed by the State Department in favour
of a branch of the Spanish Ministry of Commerce. The court treated
the decline of the State Department as highly crucial and denied the
claim of immunity that had not been allowed by the Department.
A further illustration of this tendency on the part of the
American courts can be furnished by the case of Amkor Corporation v.
1 3Bank of Korea in which the court accepted as binding on it, the
determination of the State Department that the transaction entered
into by the defendant bank was commercial in nature.
In 1971, the circuit Court of Appeal had to consider a very
unusual set of facts in the case of J. Heaney v. Government of
Spain.^ The appellant, a lawyer, claimed that he had agreed with
the Spanish Government, through one of its consular representatives,
to generate publicity about the alleged British suppression of civil
rights in Northern Ireland, since this would be of benefit to the
respondants in the context of their dispute with the British
Government over Gibraltar. The respondants immediately raised the
plea of immunity. The court held that the act in question clearly
fell within the category of "strictly political or public acts".
The argument that the making of a contract regardless of its purpose
should be deemed a commercial act, was decisively rejected by the
court and the plea of immunity was upheld.
The case which is often regarded as probably the most important
decision of the US courts on state immunity, shortly before the
enactment of The US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976, is that
of Alfred Dunhill of London Inc. v. Republic of Cuba decided by the
Supreme Court.^ However, it should be noted that this case
basically involved issues of an act of state doctrine rather than
application of state immunity rules. The result created by the
overlapping of the doctrines would be rather astonishing. The court
approved the argument that, since the aim of the restrictive theory
of immunity is to limit sovereign immunities to governmental acts,
to elevate foreign state commercial acts to a protected status would
frustrate this modern development by permitting sovereign immunity
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to re-enter through the back door in the guise of an act of state
doctrine."*^ The minority judgement agreed that the act of state
doctrine should be applied to governmental acts and "should not be
allowed to protect commercial acts of foreign states".
2. The Development of the Law in the UK
Since the Cristina case (1938) and the Porto Alexandre case
(1920), there has been a continuing absence of English case-law
upholding the doctrine of absolute immunity of states. As early as
1938, English judges began to throw considerable doubt upon the
soundness of the doctrine of absolute immunity when applied to
trading vessels.
The influence of these and other doubts expressed by earlier
English courts^ was felt in the courts of other common law
18
jurisdiction outside the United Kingdom, and is widely quoted by
later judges of English courts. This influence may be illustrated
by the Dollfus Mieg case (1950): in occupied France, gold bars had
been seized by the Allied Forces and handed over to the Tripartite
Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold. The ownership of
the bars had not been known and they had been deposited with the
Bank of England by the Governments of the UK, the USA and France.
The Dollfus Mieg company instituted proceedings in the English
courts against the Bank of England claiming title to the gold bars.
At a later stage in the proceedings, the Governments of France and
the US intervened and claimed sovereign immunity, which was duly
accorded. In the House of Lords, three out of four law lords
endorsed Lord Maugham's view that the doctrine of immunity should
not be extended.^ The doubts propounded by Lord Maugham were
shared by Viscount Simon in the decision of the Privy Council in
Sultan of Johore v. Abu Bakr (1952). He was prepared to state that
he did not consider that it had been finally established in English
law that there was "any absolute rule that a foreign independent
sovereign cannot be impleaded in our courts in any circumstances".20
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This case has other particularly interesting features. It
places severe limits on the applicability of state immunity doctrine
through the use of the concept of implied waiver. If the absence
of consent is viewed as an essential element constitutive of state
immunity or entailing disability on the part of an otherwise
competent court, the expression of consent by the state concerned
removed this obstacle to the exercise of jurisdiction.
Sir Ian Sinclair pointed out that in those jurisdictions
applying the doctrine of absolute immunity, the emergence of the
restrictive view of immunity was a direct product of the application
21of the concept of voluntary submission.
The Sultan of Johore case (1952) tends to illustrate the deep
concern of the English courts on the issue. The waiver of immunity
was interpreted by the court in a very liberal way to the effect
that, if a sovereign issues a writ, he submits to the jurisdiction
of another state, in that and in all proceedings ancillary thereto.
In this case the Privy Council disposed of the plea of immunity
raised by the Sultan to an originating summons to set aside a
Japanese court decree concerning property in Singapore. The
original proceedings in the Japanese court were instituted by the
Sultan and the present ones were in the nature of an appeal against
the decree. The waiver of immunity was held to extend to the
instant suit. The Sultan of Johore case may be contrasted with
another one in which the court strictly interpreted the concept of
voluntary submission. It was held in Kahn v. Federation of
22Pakistan that there was no waiver of immunity although the parties
had expressly agreed in writing to submit to the jurisdiction of
English courts in case of any dispute. As regards the requirement
of effective submission, Jenkins, L.J., observed that the submission
must be made at the time when the court is about to, or is being
asked to, exercise jurisdiction over the sovereign, and not at any
previous time. The court also seemed to have been influenced to a
measurable extent by the practice of the Court of Chancery,
according to which a court will not halt the administration of an
English trust because a foreign sovereign makes a claim in respect
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of the trust property, but neither will it submit his claim to the
jurisdiction of the courts.
Apart from the notion of voluntary submission and the equitable
doctrine of trust, the English courts seem to have placed another
severe restriction on the application of the doctrine of absolute
immunity when a foreign sovereign is impleaded in an action
involving title to property. When the action puts at issue the
title of the foreign sovereign, the latter is impleaded. It is
not, however, correct to say that the sovereign is entitled to
immunity upon his mere assertion that he has a right to the property
23which is the subject matter of the suit. It is clear that the
court cannot examine the issue of the claim to title but it may
require proof that the claim is a valid one. The rule was laid
down by the Privy Council in the case of Juan Ysmael and Co, v.
r\ j
Government of the Republic of Indonesia. The appellant, a
company incorporated in the Philippines, issued a writ in rem
against a steamship seeking the recovery of the vessel as its
owners. The Government of Indonesia applied to have the writ set
aside on the ground of immunity, claiming that the government was
the true owner of the vessel by buying it from an agent of the
company, or was in possession or control or entitled to control the
vessel. It was proved, however, that the appellant's agent had no
authority to sell the vessel to the Indonesian Government, whose
title was thus manifestly defective. The court held that the plea
of immunity could not be sustained if the foreign sovereign is in
possession of the subject matter of the action; there is some
authority to the effect that the sovereign is said to be in
possession only when he has the right to possess; and his right to
possess will depend upon the terms of any contract which he may have
? S
made with the actual possessor.
In short, the way was open for restating and delimiting the
scope of the rule because most of the old authorities had come under
attack. The erosion of the absolute view in English case-law began
with Lord Denning's lone dissent in Rahimtoola v. Nazim of
Hyderabad. As to the ground on which English courts based their
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earlier decisions, namely the concept of sovereignty and dignity of
foreign sovereigns, Lord Denning was very critical when he said:
It is more in keeping with the dignity of the foreign sovereign
to submit himself to the rule of law than the claim to be above
it, and his independence is better ensured by accepting the
decisions of courts of acknowledged impartiality than by
arbitrarily rejecting their jurisdiction. In all civilized
countries there has been a progressive tendency towards making
the sovereign liable to be sued in his own courts; notably in
England by The Crown Proceedings Act 1947. Foreign sovereigns
should not be in any different position. There is no reason
why we should grant to the departments or agencies of foreign
governments an immunity which we do not grant to our own,
provided always that the matter in dispute arises within the
jurisdiction of our courts and is probably cognizable by
them. 27
This case illustrates the difficulties involved in
distinguishing between the two conceptions of 'possession' and
'control'. These difficulties have arisen and often arise in
circumstances in which the line between 'possession' and 'control'
is blurred. The case makes it clear, for one thing, that immunity
is not to be confined to cases in which a foreign sovereign is
himself technically possessed of the subject matter either directly
or through his servants. It was argued that technicalities and
fine points of domestic law of agency and bailment should not be
allowed to exclude immunity.
The drastic revision of the doctrine of state immunity brought
about by Rahimtoola's case, and the recognition of this exception of
possession or ownership to that doctrine, had been somewhat
accelerated by the obiter comments of Lord Denning in Thai-Europe
?8
Tapioca v. Government of Pakistan in which the English case-law
has been accurately summarized by the Master of The Rolls. He
confirmed the restrictive view he had earlier proposed in the
Rahimtoola's case. While accepting the general principle that:
"except by consent, the court of this country will not issue their
process so as to entertain a claim against a foreign sovereign for
debt or damages", he then enumerated four existing exceptions to
this general rule in English law:
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first there is no immunity in respect of land situate in
England ....
second .... in respect of trust funds here or money lodged for
the payment of creditors ....
third in respect of debts incurred here for services rendered
to .... property here ....
fourth, [when] a foreign sovereign .... enters into a
commercial transaction with a trader here and a dispute arises
which is properly within the territorial jurisdiction of
[English] courts. 29
Lord Denning held that the case fell within the general
rule that a foreign sovereign cannot be personally impleaded in
English courts and outside any 'commercial exception' since any
such exception related only to disputes which "arise properly
within the territorial jurisdiction of the English courts".
Soon afterwards, The Privy Council had cleared the way forward
30
in The Philippine Admiral case (1975). Notwithstanding the
anomalous distinction created between actions in rem and actions in
personam, it had been held that in an action in rem against a ship
owned by a state and involved in commercial activities, the state
could not claim immunity from suit. The main question before the
Privy Council was whether or not they should follow the decision in
the Porto Alexandre case. There were weighty reasons for not
31
following that decision: l)their Lordships thought the decision
in the Parlement Beige case bound the court to decide the "Porto
Alexandre did not cover the case at all"; 2) in The Cristina three
Law Lords "thought it was at least doubtful whether sovereign
immunity should extend to state-owned vessels engaged in ordinary
commerce"; 3) "the trend of opinion in the world outside the
commonwealth since the last war has been increasingly against the
application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity to ordinary
trading transactions"; 4) "their Lordships themselves think that it
is wrong that it should be so applied - in this country and no
doubt in most countries in the western world - the state can be
sued in its own courts on commercial contracts into which it has
entered and there is no apparent reason why foreign states should
not be equally liable to be sued there in respect of such
transactions". The distinction drawn in previous cases, concerning
government merchant ships, between action in rem and action in
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personam was discussed by Lord Cross who was compelled to admit
that, "to apply the restrictive theory of immunity to action in rem
while leaving action in personam to be governed by the absolute
theory would produce a very illogical result".
The illogical result contemplated by Lord Cross of Chelsea in
the above case evidently occurred soon afterwards in the facts of
Q O
Trendtex Trading Corporation Ltd. v. Central Bank of Nigeria.
Nigeria, having huge oil-based revenue, contracted to buy large
quantities of cement for the development of the country. It
overbought, and the country's docks and harbours became clogged with
ships waiting to unload. Unable to accept delivery of the cement
it had bought, it instructed the defendant Bank not to honour a
letter of credit which had been issued in favour of the plaintiff.
In response to the suit thus brought, the defendant bank sought to
invoke sovereign immunity. One of the main issues before the Court
of Appeal was the status of the Central Bank. The Court agreed
that the test to be applied was to look at the functions and control
of the entity concerned. The Court placed great emphasis on the
Nigerian legislation setting up the Bank as well as the evidence
submitted by experts in the field. Stephenson, L.J., confined
himself to holding that the Central Bank was not entitled to
Q O
immunity because it was not a department of state of Nigeria.
Shaw, L.J., took the same view but was prepared to state further
that, even if it were, "in the conditions of international relations
which now prevail, the restrictive principle which has emerged is
manifestly in better accord with practical good sense and
o /
justice". Lord Denning found it difficult to decide whether or
not the Central Bank should be considered in international law as a
department of the Federation of Nigeria, even though it is a
separate legal entity. For him, this was a secondary issue, but he
was prepared to rule that the Bank should not be so considered. He
preferred to rest his decision "on the ground that there is no
immunity in respect of commercial transactions, even for a
government department".^ In this case Lord Denning had taken the
opportunity to review and re-state the law concerning the
ascertainment and application by English courts of customary rules
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of international law. He discussed at some length rival theories
of incorporation and transformation. According to the former,
international law is not a foreign law for a British court, it is
part of English law which the courts must judicially notice. On
the other hand, the latter theory advocates that international law
has no validity unless it has been accepted and adopted by domestic
English law. Lord Denning preferred to follow the incorporation
theory. This was that international law knows no rule of stare
O/C
decisis and hence the doctrine of absolute state immunity could no
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longer be considered a rule of international law. However, the
Trendtex case was settled before it reached the House of Lords, so
OO
that many issues remained unresolved.
The emerging trend away from absolute immunity reached its
climax in the long overdue decision of the House of Lords in the
1 Congresso del Partido (1980) case.^ Xhe decision of the House
of Lords clearly dispelled any doubts and hesitations on matters of
principle. In the Court of Appeal Lord Denning differed from
Goff, J., regarding the diversion of the two cargoes, viewing them
not as "essentially an act of foreign policy but as essentially a
repudiative breach of contract". He based his decision on the
ground that: "Foreign policy afforded only the motive for the act.
It did not affect the nature of it",^ and concluded that, if a
government of a country started out as a trader, it must end as a
trader, and thus had no sovereign immunity.
The House of Lords, reversing the decision of the Court of
Appeal (1979) and allowing the appeals, held that:
i- at the time of the transaction (before the common law was
superseded by the State Immunity Act 1978), restrictions were
applied to the scope of sovereignty to permit individuals with whom
sovereign states had entered into commercial transactions to bring
such transactions before the court; but when the act complained of
was sovereign, and not a private commercial act, it could not be
challenged and, in deciding into which category the act fell,
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municipal courts, conforming to accepted international standards,
had to consider the whole context.
ii- in accordance with those principles, the restrictive doctrine
of sovereign immunity applied 1) to the case of Playa Larga, since,
in taking the vessel out of Chilean waters for her own safety, no
governmental authority was invoked, even though the instruction
might not have been given had the owner not been the Republic of
Cuba, and also 2) Lord Wilberforce and Lord Edmund-Davies dissented
to the case of the Marble Islands, since the right asserted by the
master to sell the perishable cargo in Vietnam was based by him on
the contractual terms of the bills of lading and the law of Cuba.^
The House of Lords thus applied common-law principles as they
existed before the entry into force of the State Immunity Act
/ 9
1978. The case put an end once and for all to whatever doubts
existed regarding the law on state immunity in English courts and
tended to settle the judicial practice on the subject. It can no
longer be said that the UK judicial practice supports an absolute
theory of immunity to the extent that a ship used wholly for a
commercial voyage would be entitled to immunity from action in rem
or from arrest and detention by English courts. However, it has
been argued that the assumption and exercise of jurisdiction on the
basis of sister-ship jurisdiction is excessive and not free from
controversy. This case brings us to the final stage at which the
law stood shortly before the enactment of the United Kingdom State
Immunity Act 1978.^
(c) Civil law jurisdiction
The continental countries, as mentioned above, were first to
adopt the principle of restrictive immunity in their judicial
practice. Without exception, they based their decisions on the
distinction between commercial activities and governmental
activities as, since the Second World War, there had been a steady
movement towards the restrictive theory of immunity. That steady
progress is clearly reflected in the decisions of the late 1950s and
early 1960s.^ The states which in practice appear to have
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recognized the distinction between commercial and governmental
activities from the very beginning include Italy, Belgium and Egypt,
which were later followed by France, Germany and other countries.
The Italian courts were the first, in 1882, to restrict the
application of state immunity where the foreign state has acted in
the capacity of a sovereign authority or political power, potero
politico as distinguished from personal civile.^ The public act
of the foreign state was the test applied to determine the scope of
state immunity. Immunity was denied in respect of private acts or
acts of a private law nature.^ The same tendency continued after
the First World War. Thus, in 1925, the Court of Appeal of Genoa
held the French Government responsible in respect of a contract to
two certain vessels on the ground that the act was apparently one of
a private law nature to be performed in Italy.^
The post-war cases decided by Italian courts reaffirmed that
judicial practice. Thus, in a relatively recent case decided in
1955 regarding a US military base established in Italy in accordance
with NATO, the Court of Cassation recognized immunity in respect of
public activities connected with the political functions of the US
AO
Government. And the same line of reasoning was followed in later
decisions.^ However, the Italian courts considered contracts of
employment as exceptions to the normal transactions between a
foreign state and an individual amenable to the jurisdiction of the
Italian courts.The Belgian case-law, as already mentioned, was
settled as early as 1875, in favour of this distinction. The
commercial activities of foreign states have since been regarded by
the Belgian courts as an area where no immunity will be allowed.
This limitation of the rule of sovereign immunity has been
consistently applied by the Belgian courts in a number of subsequent
decisions up to the present date."^ Thus, the Belgian domestic
court decisions are looked on as being primarily responsible for the
development of the rule of restrictive immunity from jurisdiction
despite some uncertainty surrounding immunity from execution. For
example, the problem of immunity of government ships arises only in
connection with immunity from seizure, arrest or detention, quite
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contrary to the strong stand in favour of the restrictive view of
immunity that has been taken by the Belgian courts in cases of
immunity from jurisdiction as opposed to execution. The judicial
reform on the matter was brought forward by the decision of the
Brussels Court of Appeal in the case of Murua v. Pinillos et Garcia
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(1938), which was a direct application of the Brussels Convention
of 1926 on the subject. The court permitted the arrest of a vessel
employed by the Spanish Government in commercial activities.
To select another civil law country, the judicial practice of
France may be mentioned. However, it should be observed that
earlier French case-law was more inclined towards unlimited
5 2
immunity. However, a survey of the more recent practice of
French courts will clearly show that immunity has not been accorded
in all cases. Instead, several limitations have been recognized,
with the result that French courts began to bring themselves into
line with the Ita 1 o-Be 1 gian practice. The first case-law
attempting to qualify immunity from jurisdiction was that of
Hungerford (1918)."^ Relying on the functional limitation of state
immunity, the court declared itself incompetent on the ground that
the vessel was employed "not for commercial purposes .... but for
the requirement of national defence, beyond any idea of profit or
speculation". But the first case to endorse the doctrine of
restrictive immunity expressly was that of Lakhowsky, 55 which
concerned the activities of the Swiss Office of Transport. The
court held that the contract for the purchase of goods to be
transported to Switzerland was a commercial transaction, and subject
to the jurisdiction of the local courts. However, the Paris Court
of Appeal found that a careful examination of the facts did not
support the view that the contract was of a commercial nature, since
it was inspired by considerations of international interest and
domestic policy "excluding any profit-seeking and any idea of
speculation". This decision was later followed in a number of
cases where the expression 'actes de commerce' was used by the
French courts to describe certain acts to "exclude any consideration
concerning the exercise of the state's public authority, its
independence and its sovereignty".56 The expression 'actes de
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commerce1 was used by the French courts in a literal sense to mean
'commercial act' or 'trading activities'. The term was described
by some French lawyers as convenient, appropriate and familiar.
The term was employed by the French court in a series of cases,
especially the so-called Soviet cases.^
However firm the adherence of the French courts to the doctrine
of restrictive immunity in current practice, the application of the
theory of actes de commerce has been faced with cognizable
difficulties in post-war case-law. A few examples will demonstrate
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such difficulties. In the case of Martin v. The Bank of Spain,
an action was brought by the appellants against the defendant
concerning the marking of or exchange for new bank notes which had
been recalled in Spain. The test of commercial nature was applied,
though the result was to grant the immunity claimed. Again, in
Guggenheim v. State of Vietnam,the purchase of cigarettes for a
foreign army was held to be a public act intended for public
service. The same result was reached in a case arising out of a
contract for the survey of water distribution in Pakistan.^ On
the other hand, a contract of commercial lease of an office for a
tourist organization of a foreign government^ caused serious doubts
in the minds of the judges as to the question of the determination.
It should be observed that the post-war French case-law basic¬
ally adopted the view that immunity was limited only to public acts
or acts performed in the interest of a public service. Immunity was
determined mainly by reference to the nature of the act undertaken
and not by reference to the legal personality of the agency
r r\
performing it. Basing its decision on this line of reasoning,
the Court of Appeal of Paris, in a recent case, gave an affirmative
answer to the question whether the role of the Central Bank of Japan
could be regarded as an act employed in the public service of the
Japanese state. Yet the actual application of the theory produced
a series of fluctuating decisions which lacked consistency and
uniformity, and these are likely to continue in the future.
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The effects of submission to arbitration have been recently
considered by the Court of Appeal of Paris in the Pyramids case
(1984),^ where it was held that the terms of the contract binding
the Egyptian Government did not imply that the Government had waived
its immunity from jurisdiction. This judgement clearly shows that
it is not entirely correct, as has often been suggested, that
developing countries are at a disadvantage in arbitration when they
are opposed by a powerful company. Going to law could be a total
safeguard for the interests of foreign states involved in commercial
arbitration. The decision of the Court of Appeal does not appear
to be in accord with the emerging trend of restricted immunity
according to which the plea of immunity should not be allowed to
prevail in cases where the sovereign state has agreed to arbitrate
and the jurisdiction of the court of the forum is confined to the
exercise of its normal supervisory role.^~*
In the same year there was some progress in terms of the legal
development of French rules of state immunity and a growing tendency
to bring French law closer to the law of other countries. The most
important case is that of Eurodif (1984),^ involving the Government
of Iran. Although the Court of Cassation had rendered a decision
on the effect of submission to arbitration similar to that given in
the Pyramids case, the Court laid great emphasis on the nature of
the transaction which gave rise to the dispute. In its judgement
the Court stated that:
Immunity from execution benefiting a foreign state is a matter
of principle, nevertheless the principle may be disregarded
in exceptional circumstances; such is the case when the
property attached is intended to be used for an economic or
commercial activity of a private law nature upon which the
claim is based. 67
This, indeed, is a sharp increase in restrictive practice. It is
even a step ahead of other countries in adopting restricted
immunity. The rule of execution of judgement against foreign state
property was not made subject to any limitations. In other words,
the rule is unqualified in the sense that it applies to both
pre-judgement and post-judgement measures of execution.
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68The second important case is that of Sonatrach (1984). It
was a suit brought not against a foreign state itself, but rather
against an agency of a foreign state and concerned activities
conducted by that agency in the promotion of economic development of
the foreign state. The foreign state agency pleaded sovereign
immunity from measures of execution sought against its bank account
in France. The Court withheld immunity on the ground that the
instrumentality in question is incorporated as a separate entity
from that of the foreign state, and that its activities are of a
commercial character. The decision makes it clear that agencies
other than foreign states are not generally immune from the process
of execution, unless sufficient evidence is adduced to prove that
the property subject matter of attachment or execution does not
belong to it but to its own state, held by it on behalf of the state
and intended to be used for non-commercial purposes.
In a commentary on the case,^ it is observed that the decision
was instrumental in blazing new trails in the field of sovereign
immunity, in which an attempt has been made to modernize the
restricted immunity of foreign states in the sensitive area of
economic development. If under the United States Act, a nexus must
exist between the property subject to execution and the commercial
activities to which it relates,^ the French decision has gone
beyond that by subjecting the property of an entity other than a
state to measures of enforcement irrespective of whether such
property has been used in connection with the transaction out of
which the claim arises.
The courts of the Federal Republic of Germany have adopted a
contorted course of action on the subject. The doctrine of
restricted immunity was recognized as early as 1885, when a German
court distinguished between public and private acts and concluded
that state immunity must "suffer at least certain exceptions"."^
Between 1905 and 1938, the judicial practice of Germany tended to
72favour absolute immunity. But, following the ratification of the
Brussels Convention of 1926 and its Protocol of 1934, the
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restrictive view reappeared strongly in German case-law. The true
mark of such an appearance was the number of cases decided under the
7 Q
Convention and started in 1938. The distinction between "the
exercise of sovereign rights" and "activities in private law fields"
was again endorsed in 1953,^ and was closely followed in subsequent
cases.^
The restrictive trend of immunity was confirmed in a number of
7 f\
recent decisions rendered by German Courts. In X v. Yugoslavia.
the Federal Constitutional Court held that state immunity is
restricted only to acta jure imperii, and in a case involving the
Iranian Embassy in Germany,^ the court held the contract for the
repair of the heating system of the Iranian Embassy to be a
"non-sovereign activity" not entitled to immunity. More recently,
the Federal Constitutional Courts, in a case concerning the
garnishment of funds deposited in a German bank by the Embassy of
78
the Republic of the Philippines held that immunity is functionally
limited to sovereign activities, although the actual result was to
grant the immunity claimed, on the ground that to permit an
investigation of the governmental or commercial use of the funds in
question was not only impracticable, but also inadmissible, since
this might interfere with the embassy's public function. The court
observed that claims against a general bank account of the embassy
of a foreign state, which exists in the state of the forum and the
purpose of which is to cover the embassy costs and expenses, are not
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subject to forced execution by the state of the forum.
Austrian courts, after adopting the restrictive concept as
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early as 1919 in Austro-Hungarian Bank v. Hungarian Government,
and then casting some doubt on their position in a later series of
cases, have relatively recently reaffirmed the restrictive doctrine.
The Supreme Court handed down in 1950 one of the most elaborate
immunity decisions to come from any European Court. In a suit
concerning the right to use certain trademarks that had been
nationalized by Czechoslovakia, the court, after an exhaustive
review of all relevant sources of law, concluded that according to
international law foreign states are exempt from domestic
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jurisdiction only with regard to their acts jure imperii; and that
according to municipal law, states are subject to the jurisdiction
of Austrian courts in all disputes arising out of private law
relationships. The conclusions were expressed as follows:
The Supreme Court, therefore, reaches the conclusion that it
can no longer be said that under recognized international law
so-called acta gestionis are exempt from municipal jurisdiction
.... Accordingly, the classic doctrine of immunity has lost
its meaning and, ratione cessante, can no longer be recognized
as a rule of international law. 81
OO
These conclusions were reiterated by other Austrian Courts.
3. National Legislation
The contribution of legislation to the development of the law
is of recent growth. The importance of national legislation in
this matter lies in the fact that such legislative enactments
provide the legal foundation for the jurisdictional immunities of
foreign states and at the same time furnish evidence as to the
OO
actual practice of states and substantive content of the law. °
The preceding survey demonstrates the significance of judicial
and governmental practice on the subject as indications of the
direction in which the law of state immunities is progressively
developing. Now, in turn, the impetus of these developments on
national legislation may be briefly examined. There are several
legislative texts dealing partially with some aspects of the
subject, which for convenience purposes cannot be discussed here.
Focus will be mainly concentrated on the special legislation on
state immunities of various countries.
(a) USA Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
Recent important example of national legislation is the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act 1976 of the USA which came into effect on
OA
19 January 1977. The period since 1945 reflected an era of the
breakdown of the traditional rule of sovereign immunity both in law
- 60 -
and policy. The Act sought to codify the substantive law of
sovereign immunity in the US while also modifying certain aspects of
it. The Act is intended to accomplish four objectives, namely:
(1) to codify the so-called restrictive principle of immunity as
currently recognized by international law;
(2) to transfer the determination of sovereign immunity from the
executive branch to the judiciary, thereby reducing the foreign
policy implications of sovereign immunity determination;
(3) to provide a statutory procedure for making service upon, and
obtaining in personam jurisdiction over, a foreign state;
(4) to conform the execution immunity rules more closely to
jurisdiction immunity rules.
These goals are understood by the official declaration of purposes
contained in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976, S.1602 of
which states:
The Congress find that the determination by the United States
courts of the claims of foreign states to immunity from the
jurisdiction of such courts would serve the interests of
justice and would protect the rights of both foreign states and
litigants in United States courts. Under international law,
states are not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts
insofar as their commercial activities are concerned, and their
commercial property may be levied upon for the satisfaction of
judgements rendered against them in connection with their
commercial activities. Claims of foreign states to immunity
should henceforth be decided by courts of the United States and
of the states in conformity with the principles set forth in
this chapter. 85
S.1604 reaffirms the principle of state immunity and declares
foreign states immune from the jurisdiction of United States courts.
Over the question of whether certain socialist country entities
engaged in foreign trade as 'foreign states', the courts seem to
have divergent views. In Edlow International Co. v. Nuklearna
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Elektrana Krsko, the District Court of Columbia ruled that a
Yugoslav Workers' Organization, established for the purpose of
constructing and operating a nuclear power generating facility, was
not a foreign state. While in Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press
O "7
Agency, the Novosti Press Agency and the Daily World (a newspaper
of the Communist Party in the USA) were held immune under the Act
from libel action. The court observed the Act's definition was
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"ill-suited to the concept which exists in Socialist States". The
court's decision seems to have been based on the great emphasis by
the court on 'state ownership'.
On this specific issue of definition of foreign states, it may
be useful to mention another interesting point which the US courts
had an opportunity to address: that the number of shares which a
foreign state held in the corporation may be determinative of
whether an entity is an agency of instrumentality under S.1063 of
the Act. Thus, in Hezberger v. Compania de Acero del Pacifico,
O O
S .A. , the court held that the defendant (CAP), a corporation
established in Chile with 95.15 per cent of the shares owned by an
entity wholly owned by the Republic of Chile, was clearly an agency
of a foreign state within the purview of S.1603 of the Act, since it
was a separate corporate entity and the majority of its shares were
owned by a "foreign state or a political subdivision thereof".
S.1605 specifies five exceptions to the general rule of
immunity. The first of these concerns commercial activities
(S.1605(a)(2)) which are defined in S.1603(d) as "either a regular
course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction
or act". If the foreign state activity is not a commercial
activity, the foreign state is immune, unless an existing treaty
OQ
provides otherwise. S.1605(a)(2) identifies three situations of
commercial activities in which non-immunity would be applied:
(1) where the "action is based upon a commercial activity carried
on in the United States by the foreign state";
(2) where the action is based "upon an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere"; and
(3) where the action is based "upon an act outside the territory of
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of
the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect
in the United States". The "direct effect" language in this
section requires the detrimental impact to be a substantial,
direct and foreseeable result of an act outside the U.S.90
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It is virtually impossible within this brief survey to mention all
of the cases decided under this section by the United States courts.
Only a few of them will be mentioned here, focusing mainly on three
important questions of determination of relevant activity,
distinctions between jure imperii and jure gestionis and the
question of territorial connection between the cause of action and
the United States.
As to the first question, the attitude of the United States
courts may be demonstrated by two cases involving a foreign state
public organization. In the first case,^ the court considered
applications in admiralty for limitation of liability concerning a
collision in the Mediterranean between a ship owned by a New York
company and another vessel owned by the Algerian Shipping Agency,
CNAN. The agency operated 70 ships in worldwide service, some of
them regularly visiting US ports, but the ship involved in this
incident did not. Although the particular commercial activity
involved in this case had no territorial nexus with the US, yet the
court held that the act was based upon CNAN's worldwide shipping
activities which had substantial contact with the United States.
The court consequently declared itself competent under this section.
The second case was Vencedora Oceanica Navigacion v. Compagnie
Q 9
Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, decided in 1984. The
plaintiff was a Panamanian corporation that owned a vessel anchored
at Algeria after a fire off Sicily, who brought an action for
tortious deprivation of the vessel by CNAN. The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether the District Court
had jurisdiction "by virtue of the unrelated continuing business
CNAN does in the U.S.". After reviewing all the authorities, the
court held that jurisdiction over CNAN did not exist because "there
is no nexus between CNAN's commercial activity and Vencedora's
claim".93
Over the question of what is a 'commercial activity' depriving
the foreign state from the protection of the Act, the United States
courts have experienced several difficulties concerning the
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distinction between jure imperii and jure gestionis.^ A few cases
will illustrate these difficulties. For example, in Arango v.
Guzman Travel Advisors Corp. (1980),^ the plaintiffs, who intended
to visit the Dominican Republic on tour, were denied entry to the
Republic. They then sued the travel agents, hotels and the
state-owned airline of the Dominican Republic which was to provide
transport. The court dismissed two counts against the airline on
the ground that the latter was acting as an arm of the government
and was entitled to the same immunity as the government would have
been for the act of its immigration officers. However, immunity
was denied in respect of the claim of breach of warranty and
contract based on the non-performance of the tour and the refusal to
refund the purchase price. These claims arose out of the airline's
commercial activity in the US, i.e. the sale of tickets and tourist
cards. The same interpretation was followed in the recent case of
McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Islamic Republic of Iran (1985),^
where the court rejected Iran's claims of immunity in an action
relating to a contract for the supply of parts for military
aircraft.
Many difficulties are also observable in cases relating to the
administration of natural resources. In a case involving an
agreement between Bangladesh and an American company to give the
latter a ten year licence to capture and export monkeys from
Bangladesh, the court ruled that termination of the agreement by
Bangladesh was a sovereign act and accordingly held that state
immune from US courts jurisdiction.*^ The case was regarded as
"very troublesome" since "what is good for monkeys is good for sugar
or petroleum or any commodity".9® The decision was clearly based
on the nature of activity test and avoided looking at the purpose of
the agreement.
These difficulties continue to appear in other cases involving
natural resources. Thus, in International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC (1981),^9 a suit was
brought against member countries of OPEC for allegedly conspiring to
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manipulate oil prices in violation of the US antitrust laws. The
action was dismissed by the District Court on the ground that the
activity was of a sovereign nature. The decision was reaffirmed by
the Court of Appeal, but on act of state grounds. In reaching its
decision, the District Court relied on a number of considerations
based on international law. The court observed that the: "United
Nations, with the concurrence of the United States, has repeatedly
recognized the principle that a sovereign state has the sole power
to control its natural resources".l^O The decision was closely
followed in Rios v. Marshall (1981) 101 when it was held that the
"removal of natural resources" from the territory of the state was a
sovereign act.
The issue was raised again in the matter of SEDCO, ^2
an action was brought in a Federal District Court against PEMEX,
Mexico's state-owned oil company. Following the 1970 oil-well
disaster, significant quantities of oil reached the Texas shore
and claims for damages were asserted against PEMEX. The latter
moved to dismiss the action on the ground that it was a governmental
agency entrusted with the exploration and exploitation of natural
resources and that, as such, it was entitled to immunity. The
motion succeeded. The court observed:
Short of actually selling these resources in the world market,
decisions and conduct concerning them are uniquely governmental
in nature .... To deny immunity to a foreign state for the
implementation of its domestic policies would be to completely
abrogate the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity by allowing
an exception to swallow the grant of immunity preserved by
Section 1604. 103
These and other cases^^ demonstrate the difficulties of attempting
to fit complex issues into phrases such as "nature" and "purpose" of
the transaction and it remains to be seen whether that formula will
provide uniformity and consistency in this particular regard.
The third main question is whether the relevant commercial
activity has a relationship to the cause of the action and to the
United States, as described by one or more of the three clauses of
S.1605(a)(2). Unlike the UK State Immunity Act 1978, which is
silent on the question of jurisdictional principles, the American
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legislation provides for jurisdiction where a claim is based on "an
act outside the territory of the US in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct
effect in the United States".
Again enormous difficulties have surrounded the precise meaning
and scope of this complex provision. However, each of the three
clauses of this provision provides for a separate jurisdictional
principle that must be satisfied in order to obtain jurisdiction
over a foreign state. The drafters expected most cases to fall
under the first part of the section commercial activities "having
substantial contact with the United States". ^ One of these
drafters has noted that complex commercial transactions can take an
infinite variety of shapes in today's world, and they (the drafters)
were reluctant to codify these diverse transactions in the rigid
form of a statute. A deliberate decision was taken to allow the
law to develop on a case-by-case basis within a framework of general
principles laid down by statute. "Thus the .... Act is more like a
constitution than a tax code. The basic rules are there, but the
application is left to the development of a federal common law of
sovereign immunity".
The first case decided under this section was that of Carey v.
National Oil Corporation (1977).1^7 cqaqm was based on an
alleged breach by the Libyan Government Corporation of a contract to
supply crude oil to a Bahamian subsidiary of the plaintiff, a New
York corporation. The court declined to assume jurisdiction over
the dispute, although the oil refined in the Bahamas by the
subsidiary was sold in the US. The court declared itself
incompetent because the dispute did not fulfil the "minimum
contacts" requirement or produce a "direct effect" within the US
The courts continue to interpret the first phrase of S.1605(a)(2) as
not imposing any requirement that the act giving rise to the claim
should take place in the United States. If the act that has been
performed elsewhere has had substantial contact with the US,
non-immunity would be applied. Such an act may be carried on in
several jurisdictions at the same time, provided that the act has a
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substantial contact with each. Thus, in Gibbons v. Udaras ha
Gaeltachta (1982),-''^® the plaintiffs were to form an Irish company
to manufacture and export plastic cosmetics containers. It was
agreed to purchase the necessary machinery in the US and to arrange
for its delivery to Ireland; to hold at least 74 per cent of the
company's outstanding stock; and to move to Ireland to manage the
company. The agency of the Irish company agreed to provide a
factory and capital for the venture. Negotiations took place in
New York, in Ireland and by telex. When the project failed, the
plaintiffs brought an action against the agency, alleging breach of
contract and fraudulent misrepresentation. The court held that the
agency's conduct in participating in the venture clearly constituted
"commercial activity" and that this activity had sufficient contact
with the US to satisfy the requirement of S.1605(a)(2).
The substantial territorial link with the forum has been
identified by the court on two bases. In the first place, the
court ruled that, where "the commercial act centers on the formation
of a contract", substantial contractual obligations in the United
States will satisfy the territorial nexus required by the section.
Secondly, the court relied on the assertion that the contract
required the plaintiffs to buy very expensive machinery in the US
However, Gibson v. The Republic of Ireland (1984) provides elements
of comparison. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
stated that the "based upon" requirement is satisfied if:
The plaintiff can show a direct causal connection between [the
foreign entity's commercial activity in the United States] and
the act giving rise to his claims ...., of if he can show that
[the act] is an element of the cause of action under whatever
law governs his claims. 109
The third jurisdictional test under S.1605(a)(2) is the "direct
effect" clause. Various cases have been decided under this clause.
The leading case is Texas Trading and Hilling Co. v. Federal
Republic of Nigeria (1981),arising from Nigeria's repudiation in
late 1975 of a large number of contracts for the purchase of cement.
The Court of Appeals preferred to decide this case under the direct
effect clause. It held that financial loss from breach of contract
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is a direct effect when the plaintiff is a company, and that the
loss took place in the US. Thus the test is "whether the
corporation has suffered a 'direct' financial loss". The court
answered the question in the affirmative because the suppliers were
American companies and they were to present documents and collect
money in the US.
Perhaps the most interesting point in the decision is that the
court held that a foreign state is a person for the purpose of the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the American
constitution and that the federal courts cannot exercise personal
jurisdiction over a foreign state without the "minimum contact"
standard required by "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice"."'""''"'- The court found that the Nigerian Central
Bank had engaged directly and through the New York Morgan Bank in a
series of acts in a way that met the constitutional requirement.
The recent case of Callejo v. Bancomer (1985)"''^ also raises
this issue of determination. This was an action by US nationals,
who were resident in Texas and who purchased certificates of deposit
from the defendant, which was at the time a privately-owned bank.
Their purchases were effected through international inter-bank
transfers. When the Mexican banks were nationalized, the Mexican
Government issued foreign exchange regulations requiring that the
certificates owned by the plaintiff be paid in pesos rather than
dollars. An action for breach of contract was brought by the
plaintiff against Bancomer. The court had no difficulty in finding
that the claim arose from a commercial act. As to the issue of
determination of the territorial nexus, the court held that there
was a direct effect in the US since the plaintiff's cause of action
was based upon the defendant's breach of its contractual obligations
to repay the deposit in US dollars.
In view of these broad interpretations of the three clauses
of S.1605, it has been argued that the courts have gone too far,
particularly in relation to the application of the controversial
"effects" doctrines on the ground that, contrary to the decisions in
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those cases, the "effects" test was not intended by the draftsmen of
FSIA to allow jurisdiction solely by virtue of a financial loss to
I 1 O
an American party. Others have appraised the Act's
jurisdictional approach "by providing a basis to avoid adjudicating
those cases against foreign states having an insufficient
relationship with the United States"."'"''"^
The second exception to the general rule of immunity specified
in S.1605 is non-commercial torts occurring in the United States.
The legislative history of the Act clearly shows that the drafters
thought that it would be unacceptable for legislation to provide
for non-immunity in commercial cases, while permitting immunity to
prevail in civil responsibility for physical damage to a person and
property occurring in the territory of the US."'""'-^ However, the Act
clearly requires that the injury must occur in the United States.
What the Act does not make clear is whether the tortious act or
omission is also required to occur in the United States. In reading
the legislative history of the Act, the courts did confirm that the
117
wrongful act must occur within United States jurisdiction. 1'
A case directly decided under this section which deserves
mention is the decision of the US District Court for the District of
Columbia in Letelier v. Republic of Chile ( 1980) . On 21
September 1976, the former Chilean ambassador to the US and his
Secretary were killed in Washington, D.C., when their car exploded
by the detonation of a bomb. Nine individuals, one a US citizen
employed by the Chilean intelligence agency, were indicted in the
US, and pleaded guilty to conspiracy to murder. The others were
acquitted. In November 1978, personal representatives of the
deceased brought a civil suit against the Republic of Chile and the
individual defendants in the criminal action, seeking compensation
for tortious injuries connected with the deaths. The court held
that the FSIA, which permits a foreign state to claim immunity
for certain enumerated commercial torts and on acts based on
"discretionary functions", does not provide a defence against
liability where a foreign state has ordered its agents to conduct an
assassination or other acts of political terrorism. An ex parte
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judgement was given in favour of the personal representatives of the
victims.
According to this decision, the determination of questions of
sovereign immunity seems to be made with reference to the terms of
the FSIA, and not on the basis of the more customary notions of jure
imperii and jure gestionis. On the other hand, the courts have
declined to assume jurisdiction on the ground that exception to
immunity was not available because libel actions are specifically
excluded from this area of general exception,or because the
1 20incident occurred outside the US, or on the ground that the
exception to immunity for personal injuries does not apply to claims
12i
involving interference with contract rights.
The third exception provided for in S.1605 is maritime claims
in rem. Subsection (b) provides that:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
the courts of the United States in any case in which a suit in
admiralty is brought to enforce a maritime lien against a
vessel or a cargo of the foreign state in which maritime lien
is based upon the commercial activity of the foreign state ....
Here, once again, the determination of issues of immunity depends on
whether the action is jure imperii or jure gestionis.
The fourth exception is real property and estates. A foreign
state will not be accorded immunity in any case "in which rights in
property in the United States acquired by succession or gift or
rights in immovable property situated in the United States are in
issue".122
The fifth exception concerns cases where immunity is waived,
1 22
including international arbitration. However the FSIA does not
contain any provision on arbitration. Legislation to amend the Act
has been introduced in the United States Senate to provide expressly
for jurisdiction to enforce arbitral agreements and awards.124 The
Bill was intended to allow intervention by the United States courts
(a) if the arbitration takes place in the United States; b) if the
agreement or award is governed by a treaty or other international
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instrument which is in force in the US and calls for the recognition
and enforcement of arbitral awards; c) if the underlying claim
against the foreign state could have been brought in a US court
under the FSIA.
However, cases involving an agreement to arbitrate have been
analyzed by the US courts relying on the notion of waiver. That
1
tendency may be demonstrated by a case involving Libya, which was
decided by the US Court of Appeal. The dispute went to arbitration
as a result of Libya's expropriation of a petroleum concession in
1973. The court took the view that, although the United States was
not named as a place of arbitration, consent to have a dispute
arbitrated where the arbitrators might determine was certainly
consent to have it arbitrated in the United States. Though the
court found that Libya had waived the defence of sovereign immunity
and had implicitly consented to the jurisdiction of the United
States courts for the purpose of the enforcement of the agreement to
arbitrate, yet the court declined jurisdiction on the ground that
the matter involved an act of a sovereign state.
A more liberal interpretation was adopted in another case
concerning arbitration. In the MINE case, ^6 the court held that,
as the parties had not contemplated judicial enforcement of their
agreement to arbitrate, the defendant state had not waived its
immunity in an action to enforce a non-ICSID award.
As far as execution is concerned, the position under the FSIA
is not altogether simple. The Act draws a distinction between the
position of a foreign state and that of a foreign state agency or
12 7
instrumentality. With regard to the former, it allowed
execution against property used for commercial activities, with the
important proviso that there is a connection between the property
and the commercial act which has given rise to the claim on which
the judgement is based with regard to state agencies. On the other
hand, execution is possible against any property of the agency
provided that it had engaged in commercial activities in the United
States. In this distinction there is a clear attempt to strike a
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balance between the various interests involved, particularly the
interests of the foreign states and those of private individuals
pursuing their claims against foreign governments.
Following the adoption of the Act, there has been a sharp
increase in restrictive practices and there is clear evidence of a
strong tendency in favour of further restrictions of state immunity
from execution. The most alarming feature is the allowance of
attachment of state property and execution in cases that affect the
means by which diplomatic relations are conducted. In a case
decided in 1980 concerning the Government of the Republic of
I OO
Tanzania, a United States District Court upheld the attachment of
the bank account of the Embassy of the United Republic of Tanzania
on the ground of waiver of immunity. Attachment of the mixed bank
account was allowed, for an embassy can easily protect its
government's funds by segregating its "public purpose funds from
1 ?Q
commercial activity funds". ^ At the same time there has been a
reaction by the courts themselves against the sharp increase in
these restrictive practices. In Letelier's case,-^ a judgement
awarding damages on the tort suit was rendered in favour of the
plaintiffs against the Chilean Republic. Following the judgement,
an attempt was made to execute the judgement against that state's
national airline. The latter argued against the motion on the
ground that it is a separate judicial entity from the Chilean state.
It also argued that, even if it could be deemed liable for Chile's
debt, the FSIA had barred execution of the airline's assets. The
Federal Court of Appeal decided in November 1984 that the Act
contains no provision for the enforcement of judgement in tort
cases, except where the judgement arises out of the commercial
activities of the foreign state concerned. It would of course be
very rare for a tort action to arise out of commercial activities.
The court arrived at a remarkable conclusion that congress had in
that instance created "a right without a remedy".
Due to these contradictory decisions, the proposal to amend the
FSIA includes a provision to remove these ambiguities. S.1071
would amend the FSIA, a) to permit execution of provisions of the
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Act to be applied generally to enforcement of arbitral awards as
well as judgements; b) to remove the limitations on execution
against property of foreign states whether or not there is a
relationship of that property to the cause of action; c) to permit
execution against property of foreign states to satisfy a tort
judgement; d) to exclude execution against property of a foreign
state (including bank funds) used for diplomatic or consular
purposes; e) to allow arrests, execution against foreign state
ships in foreclosure proceedings; g) to allow provisional remedies
in an action against an agency of a foreign state, but not the
property of the foreign state itself, in certain cases; and h) to
remove the act of state doctrine as a defence in cases of illegal
expropriation, a breach of contract or enforcement of an agreement
I 01
to arbitrate an arbitral award against a foreign state.
Now the FSIA has been in operation for 11 years. Various
arguments, interpretations and judicial attitudes have been
expressed as to the meaning of the relevant provisions. Some of
these interpretations go to the extreme of restricted immunity and
show a sharp increase in the extent of restrictive practice. In
some cases the US courts appear to have imposed self-restraint by
holding that they have no jurisdiction on the ground, for example,
that the injury in question had occurred outside the US, or that the
commercial transaction in question had no adverse effect on the US,
thus adopting a more relaxed attitude to liberalizing the provisions
of the Act.
Many critical comments have been made against the Act, not only
from outside the US, but also by American scholars and courts. For
example, an American judge was recorded as saying that the Act is a:
six-years old statutory labyrinth that, owing to the numerous
interpretative questions engendered by its bizarre structure
and its many deliberately vague provisions, has during its
brief lifetime been a financial boom for the private bar but a
constant bane of the federal judiciary. 132
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Other judges noted that the Act "fails to give concrete guidance to
1
courts", and that it "has produced a body of case law somewhat
obscure and confusing and at times seemingly inconsistent".13^
The far reaching implications of some of these decisions have
yet to be seen in the future practice of the United States courts,
in which slow progress in improving the Act seems likely.133 At
any rate the Act appears to have achieved what was intended to be
done after a lot of diplomatic tension and pressure on both the
United States Department and judiciary, namely the avoidance of
diplomatic repercussions in cases involving foreign states. The
point was summarized in the following words by a scholar who wrote
in 1983 that:
In the six years since the enactment of the FSIA, the statute
has been largely successful in affording private parties the
opportunities to have claims arising out of commercial
activities adjudicated in federal courts, without engendering
diplomatic repercussions. 136
(b) UK State Immunity Act 1978
The survey of English case-law prior to the enactment of the
State Immunity Act, 1978, tends to indicate that there has been
steady, if occasionally uncertain, movement away from the doctrine
of absolute immunity. That the movement has been uncertain is
partly due to the role which the doctrine of precedent plays in the
1 07
development of case-law in England; that the courts felt
compelled to apply earlier decisions incorporating the rule of
general international law as they were thought to exist at the time.
The records show that the British Government was very reluctant
to legislate on this subject.138 However, the UK became a
signatory to the 1972 European Convention on State Immunity in the
belief that its provisions reflected with sufficient accuracy
general state practice in the field of sovereign immunity. By
acting as a signatory to the Convention, the UK decided to
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legislate, and thus enacted The State Immunity Act 1978 which came
into force on 22 November 1978.139
The Act put an end to the long doubt and ambiguity and cleared
up much of the uncertainty observable in English courts prior to
its enactment, by adopting the relative theory of state immunity.
Although closely modelled on the European Convention, the Act
goes beyond the scheme of the European Convention in several
respects,while simultaneously improving certain provisions of
the Convention.
Section 1 reaffirms the principle of state immunity or immunity
of foreign states from jurisdiction and goes on to enumerate the
possible exceptions to the general rule as follows:
I/O
1) Submission to jurisdiction. (S.2(2)).
2) Commercial transactions and contracts to be performed in the
UK. These exceptions were primarily based on the nature of
state activities. Commercial transactions were defined in
broad terms by "reference to the nature of the course of the
conduct or particular transaction rather than by reference to
I/O
its purpose". S.3(3) defines commercial transaction to mean
contracts for the supply of goods or services, loans or
financial transactions and "any other transactions or activity
(whether of a commercial, industrial, financial, professional
or other similar character) into which a state enters or in
which it engages otherwise than in the exercise of sovereign
authority".
3) Contracts of employment to be performed in the UK either wholly
or partly. (S.4).
4) Proceedings in respect of death, personal injuries, or damage
or loss to tangible property. (S.5).
5) Proceedings relating to a state's ownership, possession or use
of immovable property. (S.6).
6) Proceedings relating to patent, trade mark and other
intellectual property rights. (S.7).
7) Proceedings concerning state membership of bodies corporate
which have members other than states. (S.8).
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8) Proceedings in English courts relating to disputes which the
state has agreed in writing to submit to arbitration. (S.9).
The third significant group of cases for which there is no
immunity concerns admiralty proceedings relating to ships used for
commercial purposes. This statutory provision endorsed the
restrictive view adopted by the Privy Council in the Philippine
Admiral case (1975).Under this provision, proceedings are
applicable to both actions in rem and in personam.
However, it should be mentioned that the Act does not limit the
scope of commercial transactions to these examples, but includes a
broader definition of "commercial transactions" in order to also
embrace activities of a private nature that do not fall within the
specified cases. Thus, Section 3(3)(c) states the term includes:
any other transaction or activity (whether of a commercial,
industrial, financial, professional or other similar
character), into which a State enters or in which it engages
otherwise than in the exercise of sovereign authority.
To the question as to who is entitled to immunity, the Act
gives an answer by distinguishing between a 'state' and a 'separate
entity'. The term state may include the following categories: The
sovereign or head of state, the central government and its various
organs or departments. In order to determine when an entity
constitutes a part of the state, the Act provides two criteria for
such determination: their distinctness from the executive branch of
the government and their capabilities of suing and being sued. It
was thought that the Act had attempted to help the courts by
providing statutory guidance to enable the court to dispose of the
issue more easily and effectively. However, it may be recalled
that, while the United States Act provides that "the commercial
character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the
nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction, rather
than by reference to its purpose", the United Kingdom Act
contains no provision that expressly excludes the purpose test, an
approach which is endorsed by Professor Crawford. He expresses the
view that it is advisable that a statute enumerates certain
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transactions as commercial, irrespective of any argument that can
be raised about the 'capacity' in which the foreign government
performed those transactions.""1^
Immunity from execution is recognized in S.13 of the Act,
whether by way of injunction or order of specific performance or for
recovery of property. The Act also provides for immunity of state
property from arrest and detention. The Act seems to eliminate the
practice under which the Mareva injunction had been issued to
prevent the Central Bank of Nigeria from drawing on its funds
pending the disposal of the Trendtex case. It is possible that, on
a proper construction of S.13 of the Act, such funds would now be
entirely immune from attachment, unless of course the bank set aside
a separate portion of the funds for the specific purpose of
satisfying the judgement or a creditor's interest. However, it
should be noted that the Act contains no specific rule providing for
immunity of a state from execution as it does in Section 1 for
immunity from suit, although it might be argued that the general
prohibition of Section 1 is wide enough to include measures of
execution, as well as jurisdiction.
Very few cases have been decided by the English courts
following the introduction of the State Immunity Act. One notable
case is the decision of the House of Lords in Alcom Ltd. v. Republic
of Colombia (1984)^9 which involved a sensitive matter concerning
the attachment of the funds of a diplomatic mission. In this case
the appellant was seeking the execution of a default judgement
rendered for some #41,000 in respect of security equipment allegedly
purchased by the Colombian Mission in London. The garnishee orders
granted in Alcorn's favour were set aside by Hobhouse J. on the
ground that the primary purpose of the account was for
non-commercial purposes, namely running the embassy, and was
therefore not subject to measures of execution.The Court of
Appeal, in a judgement delivered by Donaldson, M.R., and concurred
in by May and Dillon, L.J.J. , restored the garnishee orders. In
his certificate before the Court of Appeal, the ambassador of
Colombia stated that the bank accounts in question were not in use
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or intended for use for commercial purposes, but only to meet the
expenditure necessarily incurred in the day-to-day running of the
diplomatic mission. It was held by the Court of Appeal that the
purpose of the account could never be to "run an embassy"; the
purpose was to pay for goods and services to enable the embassy to
be run. In the opinion of the court that purpose fell within the
very wide definition of "use for commercial purpose" as defined by
Section 17 of the State Immunity Act 1978. According to the Master
of the Rolls that definition is consistent with the principles of
international law which lay emphasis on the nature of the
transaction rather than the reason why the transaction was
undertaken.
As pointed out in a commentary^^ on the Court of Appeal
decision in the Alcom case, certain diplomatic missions had had
their embassy accounts attached as a consequence of that decision;
others had moved or had threatened to move their accounts to the
Channel Islands; and yet others had informed the Foreign Office
that, on the basis of reciprocity, the property of United Kingdom
missions abroad was liable to attachment. The Court of Appeal
decision was reversed by the House of Lords in a single judgement
delivered by Lord Diplock. Counsel for the Attorney-General, who
had appeared as amicus curiae in the proceedings before the House of
Lords, and Counsel for the appellant had submitted that neither
international law nor the terms of the State Immunity Act 1978
permitted the making of a garnishee order against a current account
of a diplomatic mission in London that was used to meet the day-
to-day running costs of that mission, and this line of argument
prevailed.
In making his order, Lord Diplock pointed out that the question
of law that was involved was of outstanding international
importance. He gave authoritative confirmation that, before the
promulgation of the Act, English common law had adopted a
restrictive theory of immunity based on the distinction between
sovereign and commercial acts. He unequivocally accepted the wholly
convincing reasoning of the German Constitutional Court in the
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Philippine Embassy case in which the court decided that the assets
of the embassy, including bank accounts, were exempt from
attachment. He also recognized the existence of a rule in public
international law requiring immunity from execution for the current
bank account of a diplomatic mission used for defraying the expenses
of running the mission. After a thorough review of other provisions
of the Act, and in the light of the background of its subject matter
and principles of public international law, he concluded that the
inclusion in the general account held for the diplomatic mission
of some monies due under contract for the supply of goods to the
mission was insufficient to bring it within the exception to the
foreign states general immunity from execution.
The decision in the Alcorn's case raises interesting questions
of interplay between various aspects of state immunity as far as
immunity from execution is concerned. In the first place the case
involved immunity from execution after a final judgement; rather
than immunity from attachment and jurisdiction. Immunity from
execution belongs to the post-judgement phase of the proceedings.
If there are difficulties in the selection of competing criteria for
determining state activities to be accorded immunity and those
which are not entitled to immunity, there are indeed even more
difficulties in regard to the corresponding question of immunity
I CO
from attachment and execution. J It has been generally accepted
that immunity from attachment and execution is far more absolute
1than immunity from jurisdiction. However, the question
continues to be validly asked whether distinctions such as acta jure
imperii and acta jure gestionis could be used to determine the
question of immunity from execution. This debate raises
substantial problems which are still to be resolved.
In the second place the Alcom case raises the question of
the link between immunity from execution and diplomatic immunity
within the context of the State Immunity Act on the one hand and
diplomatic immunities under international law on the other. As to
the former, the Court of Appeal did not consider the peculiar
position of diplomatic missions and the execution of their
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privileges from the scope of the State Immunity Act. 154 jt was
thought that it was due to this failure on the part of the Court of
Appeal that the appeal to the House of Lords succeeded.
As to the second point, namely the relation of state immunity
to diplomatic immunity in public international law, it should be
borne in mind that the Vienna Convention of 1961 had not dealt with
immunities of diplomatic missions as organs of states, but had
merely regulated the question of inviolability of the mission's
premises and personal immunities of diplomats. It must be
emphasized that diplomatic immunity is only a passive aspect of
state immunity, whereas immunity from suit or execution is a
positive aspect requiring the host state to refrain from exercising
jurisdiction in respect of the missions, premises, staff and
property. Apart from the private bank account of a diplomat, which
enjoys immunity, the convention is silent on immunity for the funds
of the diplomatic mission. The travaux preparatoires of the
international law commission's work on the subject and the
plenipotentiary conference throw little light on the point. The
reason for the omission probably derives from the lack of separate
personality enjoyed by the diplomatic mission apart from the state
which it represents. It is incorrect to speak in terms of
"property immunity" since, ultimately, it is always a state and not
property that enjoys immunity. However, it has been argued that
the problem can easily be solved by affording immunity to the bank
account of the mission, if it was held in the name of the ambassador
as head of the mission, but not allowing the process of execution
against the bank account of the sending state, and if the mission
cannot segregate, for whatever reason, its public purpose funds from
funds for other activities, the immunity of its funds as part of the
general state funds must be based on the public purpose functions
which they serve.Yet it should be recalled that the
International Law Commission, in dealing with the subject, was
prepared to include property used or intended to be used for
diplomatic or consular purposes, among the types of property
permanently immune from attachment and execution. ^57 word
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'property' is taken in its literal sense, it obviously would include
funds of an embassy or diplomatic mission of the foreign state.
At any rate, the ruling given by the House of Lords in the
Alcom case is of interest in that it places a strict limitation on
the interpretation by the courts of what constitutes property used
for commercial purposes; recognizes the distinction between
immunity from suit and immunity from execution and, most
significantly, confirms authoritatively the restricted doctrine of
immunity.
(c) National legislation of other countries
Canada adopted its own State Immunity Act 1982.168 The Act
expressly recognizes the rule of state immunity and enumerates a
number of exceptions thereto. These exceptions are strikingly
similar to those provided in US and UK legislation.
(d) National legislation of countries outside
America and Europe
The extensive reflection of the United Kingdom's change of
attitude towards state immunity has been clearly felt in South
Africa, which has recently adopted its own Act.16" This Act
essentially reproduces the provisions of the United Kingdom Act 1978
both in substance and form with minor alterations and modifications.
Australia was the last to undertake the codification of the
rule of foreign sovereign immunity. ^he xeg±slat±on, which
entered into force in 1986, clearly established that immunity from
jurisdiction accorded to foreign states does not extend to
commercial or non-governmental acts of states.
In Asia, two countries, Singapore and Pakistan, have adopted a
similar comprehensive piece of legislation, wholly covering the
question of foreign state immunity. In Singapore, an Act was
passed on 26 October 1979, entitled the State Immunity Act 1979.161
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This is closely modelled on the United Kingdom Act and contains
substantially the same provisions in many respects. No single
variation from the UK Act could be spotted in Singapore's Act. The
other Asian country to enact legislation on the subject is Pakistan
which issued The State Immunity Ordinance 1980, an ordinance
substantially patterned on the United Kingdom enactment.
Although these legislations differ in methods of drafting and
formalities, all of them share an underlying common factor, namely,
the restricted theory of immunity.
II. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TOWARDS CODIFICATION OF THE
LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY
1. Prior to and During the League Era
(a) Institut de Droit International (1889)
The efforts to achieve greater certainty on the subject by
means of codification began in the 19th century and continue to this
day. At Hamburg, on 11 September 1891, the Institute of
International Law adopted a resolution embodying rules proposed by
L. Von-Bar. These would exempt from seizure the movables belonging
to a foreign head of state and intended for his use or for the use
of his suite. They would permit real actions asserting ownership
or possession of immovables or movables claimed by a a foreign head
of state in his character as heir or devisee of an estate or as
participant in commerce or industry.163 -p^g ruies proposed can be
seen to be in harmony with continental practice and jurisprudence,
but in his next two rules, L. Von-Bar was consciously proposing an
extension of the jurisdiction of the local courts into an area where
opinion was much less settled. This was where he allowed action on
contracts concluded and torts committed in the territory. Some of
the participants protested against this extension, but the majority
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of the Institute members supported Von-Bar and the resolution was
adopted. 1^4
(b) The League of Nations' Committee of Experts (1924-30)
The codification effort of the League of Nations was the first
of its kind to be undertaken by an international organization. The
committee had decided to include in its list the question of the
competence of the courts in regard to foreign states on the basis of
1 f\ s
a report submitted to it by a sub-committee on the topic.
Mustada, the Special Rapporteur, had submitted a detailed survey of
the law on the subject and concluded that, in view of the extension
of state activities in commercial fields, it could be considered
just and reasonable to treat certain acts of states as acts of
private parties. Yet he observed that it was difficult to delimit
these acts in a way that could serve as a basis for treaty
provisions. In his observation to the Rapporteur's report,
1 f\f\
Professor Diena took the view that difficulties of that kind were
frequently encountered in international law; but they could not be
allowed to stand in the way of drawing the distinction.
A questionnaire was addressed to various governments to
ascertain the position of states engaged in industry and commerce
before the court of another state. Replies were received from 30
1 f\7
governments, and the committee accordingly recommended in its
Fourth Report that the subject appeared ripe for codification
because the state so frequently appeared at that time as litigant in
the courts of other states. However, the Conference of Codification
of International Law held at The Hague in March 1930, did not deal
with the topic of state immunity. It seems that the Council of the
League had rejected that subject among other topics mainly because
it considered it would be difficult to secure a general agreement
and the matter did not appear to be urgent.
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(c) Harvard Lav School (1932)
Another attempt to codify the rules of state immunity during
the League era was made by the Harvard Law School. "Research in
International Law", a draft on jurisdictional competence over
foreign states was formulated in 1932."''^ The draft emphatically
supported the doctrine of limited state immunity stating that,
despite certain difficulties, it was time to establish the distinc¬
tion between acts jure imperii and acts jure gestionis. The object
of the provisions adopted by the group was to supply a criterion for
the solution of the problem of state immunity. Art. 11 of the draft
requires a territorial link between the activity undertaken and the
forum state in order for non-immunity to be applied. The provision
also introduces the test of whether states are engaging in those
activities which private individuals may perform.
2. The United Nations Era
(a) Efforts of regional governmental committees
i. The Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee
The Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee discussed the
immunity of states at its first session in New Delhi. The subject
was referred for the opinion of the Committee by the Government of
India.The Committee continued its discussion on the subject at
its second session held in Cairo on 1 October 1958 .^^ The
question before the committee was whether, under the modern trend of
restricting state immunity, it is desirable for Asian-African
nations to consider if they also should place restrictions on the
immunity granted to foreign states in respect of their industrial
and commercial activities. All the delegations at the Cairo
session, except that of Indonesia, espoused the view that foreign
states should be made answerable in the local courts when they
engage in business of a private nature.172
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The Committee concluded its work on the subject at its third
session in Colombo in 1960, which was attended by delegations of the
governments of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Japan,
Pakistan and the United Arab Republic. The final report of the
Committee on the question of state immunity recommended that
immunity should be denied in respect of commercial activities of
states. The basic consideration is that a state may be sued if it
engages in a commercial enterprise in which private persons may
there engage. The recommendation was agreed to by all the
1 7^
delegations except that of Indonesia.
ii. European Committee on Legal Co-operation
The topic of state immunity was also considered within the
framework of the legal programme of the Council of Europe. The
council set up a Committee of Experts to examine the problems
relating to state immunity with a view to choosing the best method
of resolving these problems. The Committee's efforts culminated in
the adoption of the European Convention on State Immunity and
Additional Protocol, which was opened for signature at Basle on 16th
May, 1972.174
The Convention mentioned in its preamble, "a tendency to
restrict the cases in which a state may claim immunity before
foreign courts", thus recognizing implicitly the general principle
of immunity as the basis of its provisions.
Articles 1 to 14 of the Convention set out a number of
circumstances in which immunity could not be recognized:
(1) Cases in which a contracting state institutes or intervenes in
proceedings before a court of another contracting state and cases in
which such a state makes a counterclaim in proceedings before the
court of another contracting state (Art. 1); cases in which a
contracting state expressly consents to exercise of jurisdiction
whether by written agreement, international or intergovernmental
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treaty (Art. 2); and cases of implied waiver of immunity (Art. 3);
other than cases of appearance to claim immunity.
(2) Articles 4 to 12 enumerate cases as not entitled to immunity on
the basis that they are jure gestionis activities, including
commercial contracts (Art. 4); contract of employment (Art. 5);
participation in a company or other bodies corporate (Art. 6);
industrial or financial activity of an agency situated in the forum
state (Art. 7); proceedings relating to patent, trade mark and
other industrial property (Art. 8); proceedings concerning the
right or interests of a state in, or its use or possession of,
immovable property (Art. 9); proceedings relating to right in
immovable property arising by way of succession, gift or bona
vacantia (Art. 10); proceedings concerning personal injuries and
damage to property (Art. 11); proceedings relating to the validity
or interpretation of an arbitration agreement or proceedings to set
aside an arbitral award (Art. 12).
However, Art. 23 of the Convention prohibits measures of
execution against the property of a contracting state unless that
state expressly consents thereto in writing. This Article in
effect affirms the classic position in favour of immunity from
attachment and execution of property of a state in the absence of
its consent.
The inherent difficulties of drawing the borderline between
cases of immunity and non-immunity were overcome by the Convention
in the sensible solution of establishing the general rule of state
immunity and then providing for specific cases in relation to which
immunity would not apply, thus avoiding the insurmountable problems
of defining sufficiently the contents of acts jure imperii and acts
jure gestionis.
Again the reaffirmation of the rule of absolute immunity in
cases of execution is clearly based on mutual confidence within a
closer community. This underlying consideration is further
corroborated by an undertaking on the part of each contracting state
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to honour a judgement given against it (Art. 20(1)). Even this
undertaking is further limited by absolving a contracting party from
giving effect to a judgement rendered against it, if it is
manifestly contrary to the public policy of that state (Art. 20(2)),
or if the judgement is in regard to a right of movable or immovable
property arising by way of succession, gift or bona vacantia, or if
the court would not have been entitled to assume jurisdiction, or
its rules on the subject are different from the rules of private
international law of the forum state (Art. 20(3)). Thus many
safeguards have been provided for, which are in effect sufficient
excuse for a contracting state not to comply with a judgement
rendered against it.^^
Finally, since it had not been possible in the Convention to
cover all situations in which a state may act in a private
character, a clause has been included (Art. 24) whereby a state
party may declare that it can go further in restricting foreign
state immunity than that stipulated in the Convention. That clause
has in fact been invoked by most of the countries that have ratified
the Convention. The clause was primarily included in the
Convention to meet the concern expressed by various countries
applying restrictive immunity who feared that some commercial
activities of foreign states might not come within the exceptions
enumerated, and therefore limited the competence of their courts on
these activities.
Under the influence of the Convention, various countries party
to the instrument have adopted certain legislative measures to give
effect to the provisions of the Convention by designating the
competent courts to determine whether foreign states should be
178accorded sovereign immunity. Surprisingly, the number of
ratifications to the Convention since it came into force on 11 June
1976 is still very limited, and it is at present only six states:
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK.
Nevertheless, overall the Convention stands as an outstanding
effort, at governmental level, to deal with a highly complex subject
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in international law surrounded by a divergence of opinions and the
differing jurisprudence of the various legal systems.
iii. The Inter-American Judicial Committee
Recently the Inter-American Judicial Committee adopted the
Inter-American Draft Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of
States (1983). But this draft is not really an international
instrument. It is a draft prepared by the Inter-American Judicial
committee - a technical body - and has not yet been examined by
the political organs of the Organization of American States. If
the Council of OAS approved the draft, it would come before the
General Assembly, which would then convene a conference in order to
convert the draft into a convention. At the present time,
therefore, the draft is not on the same footing as the 1972 European
Convention on State Immunity which is a binding international
convention.
However, the draft clearly endorses the restrictive theory of
immunity. In Part II of the draft, entitled "Exceptions to
Jurisdictional Immunity", Art. 5 expressly excludes commercial
activities of foreign states from the benefit of immunity. Arts. 6
and 7 further list a number of cases in which immunity may also not
be claimed: 1- labour affairs or contract of employment; 2-
proceedings concerning distribution of assets; 3- actions involving
real property situated in the forum state; 4- tax matters related
to real property under 3- above; 5- proceedings related to tortious
liability arising out of commercial activities; 6- judgement
regarding litigation fees; and 7- cases of waiver of immunity and
counterclaims.
The draft, the latest of its kind, is clearly influenced by the
European Convention on State Immunity and The International Law
Association 'Montreal Draft' on the subject. However, a new area
appears to have been added to the exceptions to immunity, namely,
when the judgement includes the court fees.
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(b) Efforts of non-governmental, professional
and academic bodies:
i. The International Law Association
At its 45th session in Lucerne in 1952, The International Law
Association began to study and discuss state immunity. On
conclusion of its work in that session, the Association adopted a
resolution stating that a foreign state should not be protected by
immunity from jurisdiction in respect of acts of a private nature
undertaken by that state. The preamble stated the conviction that,
in view of the encroachment of the state into the commercial field,
the national courts of various jurisdictions have broken away from
the traditional conception of state sovereignty. The traditional
doctrine was said to be getting out of date as regards where a state
I OQ
engages in commercial transactions or other private activities.
The Association resumed its work on the subject at its Belgrade
meeting in 1980, where the preliminary report of a working group was
181discussed. ox This report observed that, in view of the prevailing
state practice and recent codification of state immunity in some
countries, it appeared that the rule of absolute immunity can no
longer be regarded as the dominant rule of international law, and
that the restrictive theory had achieved sufficient adherents. The
restrictive theory is clearly reflected in the draft convention.
Art. Ill of the draft convention enumerates the circumstances in
which foreign states cannot claim immunity before the tribunal in
the forum state and these include: 1- waiver of immunity, counter¬
claims and set off; 2- an implied waiver in the event of an
agreement to arbitrate; 3- cause of action arising out of
commercial activity or out of contract; 4- proceedings concerning
contracts of employment and their enforcement; 5- causes of action
relating to a foreign state's interest in, or use of, immovable
property in a forum state as well as with its rights in both movable
and immovable property arising by way of succession, gift or bona
vacantia; 6- disputes relating to intellectual or industrial
property; 7- causes of action concerning death, personal injury or
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loss to property; and 8- proceedings concerning rights in property
taken in violation of international law.
As far as immunity from attachment and execution is concerned,
Art. VII of the draft convention lays down a general rule of
immunity with respect to attachment and execution against a foreign
state's property in the state of the forum. Nevertheless, Art.
VIII of the draft convention contains the following three exceptions
to immunity from attachment: 1- if there has been a waiver of
immunity, e.g. in the case of commercial activity; 2- if the
property in question is in use for a commercial purpose; 3- if the
property in question has been taken in violation of international
law or has been exchanged for such property. Section B of the
article deals with mixed bank accounts and limits immunity to that
proportion of an account duly identified for use for governmental
activities. Section C gives a list of the type of property in
respect of which execution shall not be permitted. Indeed, the
content of this draft convention appears to reflect the contemporary
thinking of writers or opiniones doctorum. The draft was prepared
by a highly representative group of experts from countries such as
Egypt, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Japan, the
Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, the Soviet
Union, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States of
America, Yugoslavia and Zambia. The draft strongly supports the
conclusion that there is an emerging trend, if not an 'emerged'
trend, in favour of asserting jurisdiction over foreign states in
cases involving commercial activities, despite the fact that the
drafters have been primarily inspired by the rules embodied in the
1972 European Convention and the United Kingdom and United States
legislation on the subject. Generally speaking, what the
International Law Association has done is a splendid effort and a
valuable attempt to channel that trend in a constructive direction.
ii. Institut de Droit International
The efforts of the Institute towards codification of the law of
state immunity started, as has been mentioned, in 1891. The
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Institute resumed its work on the subject and adopted a resolution
at its session in Copenhagen in 1950^2 similar to its 1891
resolution, and a new article was added by which public debts of a
foreign government were exempt from the jurisdiction of local courts
(Art. IV).
The subject was also included in the Institute's programme for
1954. On 30 April 1954, the Institute approved new resolutions
concerning the immunity of foreign states from suit and measures of
execution, the new resolutions once again reflecting the restrictive
view of immunity, confirming immunity in regard to acts done in
pursuance of sovereign power but denying immunity relating to an act
which was non-sovereign. It was left for the courts to determine
whether or not an act is one of sovereign authority.
iii. International Bar Association
The subject of state immunity was included in the Association's
agenda in 1958 at its meeting in Cologne. The draft resolution
proposed at that meeting favoured the application of the doctrine of
restrictive immunity in line with the discussion which took
place.The Association continued its deliberations on the
subject at its meeting at Salzburg in 1960. A resolution was
voted, clearly endorsing the restrictive view of immunity and
containing detailed circumstances in which a claim of state immunity
before local courts might not be accorded.
A brief historical sketch of international efforts has been
given above. The survey affirms the increasing tendency to restrict
the immunities of foreign states when they engage in commercial
activities with private individuals. The work done in that regard
made a large contribution towards the development of the law of
state immunity. As these bodies included a highly qualified group
of experts and international lawyers, their work reflects to a very
large extent the already existing international law and the trend in
its development which is obvious from the early judicial decisions
- 91 -
of continental countries and recent state practice for at least the
last twenty years or so.
(c) The United Nations International Law Commission
The topic of jurisdictional immunities of states and their
property has been part of the Commission's work since its first
session in 1949 and has been included in the current programme of
the Commission since its thirtieth session in 1978. By 1986, Mr
1 O tr
Sompong Sucharitkul had submitted eight reports covering various
aspects of the topic. These reports dealt with both immunity from
jurisdiction and execution, and were clearly based on the
restrictive theory of immunity, covering in great detail rules of
competence and jurisdictional immunities, the concept of consent,
voluntary submission, counterclaims and their consequences. The
reports have identified certain cases of state activities which are
not subject to immunities, namely, commercial contracts, contracts
of employment, personal injuries and damage to property, ownership
and possession or use of property, cases relating to patents and
intellectual property, cases relating to fiscal obligations such as
taxes, customs and excise, cases in which states participate in a
company or other body corporate, ships employed for commercial
service and conclusion of an agreement to arbitrate.
The topic of state immunity is of great practical importance,
particularly in view of developments in international relations and
the interdependent nature of the activities of states. Although
there are existing practices on the subject, they are not uniform,
ranging from simple courtesy to the application of treaty regimes of
varying complexity. There is a pressing need to regulate the
subject by an international instrument which would take these
considerations into account.
Again, the topic lies at the point of intersection of two
equally exclusive sovereignties: the sovereignty of the foreign
state claiming immunity and the sovereignty of the territorial state
seeking to exercise jurisdiction over the first. For the purpose
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of fostering peaceful international relations, an area had to be
created, with the consent of all states, where the two sovereignties
could interrelate and peacefully co-exist with one another. The
problem becomes more acute if we realize that each of the
conflicting sovereignties has its own defenders and its own legal
propositions and doctrines. Thus, the subject is particularly
important in the development of cooperation among states with
different social and political systems.
Another important aspect of the Commission's work on the
subject lies in the fact that a number of states are contemplating
national legislation on the point. Thus, the work of the
Commission will provide very useful guidance for such countries,
particularly with regard to the difficulties of distinguishing
between the various activities of states. Again, the development
of activities of states in the field outside the usual framework of
the traditional concept of the maintenance of law and order within
the state borders and defence of its people and territory, and the
intervention of states in numerous human activities, suggests that
some adjustment in the application of the traditional concept of
state immunity would be appropriate. On the other hand, some
legislation and court decisions have gone too far to the other
extreme. In the unsatisfactory situation being created, the
international community needs an international instrument capable of
re-establishing some order in this domain of utmost importance.
In short, the existing situation concerning the position of
foreign states before local courts is highly unsatisfactory in that
disputes involving states and their property are regulated by
bilateral arrangement and in some cases by the notion of
reciprocity, and where such agreement or reciprocal treatment is
lacking, states are subject to the jurisdiction of municipal courts,
which would have to decide on the basis of their local law on state
immunity. Thus the Commission's work on the subject is of great
concern to the international community, since its aim is to
harmonize various interests, reconcile the differences between legal
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systems and resolve practical problems in international
relations.
It is clear from the eight reports the Special Rapporteur has
submitted that the Commission has adopted the inductive approach,
that is to say, to rely on state practice rather than to base draft
1 07
articles on an expression of the concept in general terms. °' The
unhelpfulness of the inductive approach was pointed out by several
members, including Sir Francis Vallat, who explicitly stated that:
One fundamental consideration to be borne in mind in drafting
treaties is that a better result might be achieved by
expressing the concept in general terms than by attempting to
reflect individual legal systems. 188
The inductive approach was attacked by another commissioner,
who took the view that it seemed pointless to base the draft
articles on the practice of states "either it [is] fragmentary -
often consisting only of the practice of a few large states - or
IRQ
because it [is] non-existent". Some other members of the
Commission, while generally endorsing the Special Rapporteur's
approach, sounded a note of caution not to abuse the inductive
method. In order to be of real assistance to states, the draft
articles must represent a realistic picture of present-day state
practice and of the direction in which it is moving.190
The Special Rapporteur has himself noted in his fourth report
that:
.... The method and techniques employed in preparing the
reports and draft articles have been inductive in the sense
that conclusions and propositions of law are to be drawn from
the practice of states and not in isolation from the living
realities of customary international law. The task before the
Commission includes a process of codification of existing
practice and progressive development of rules of international
law designed to reconcile, if not resolve, the various
conflicts of interest .... 191
However useful the inductive approach might be,192 no^ wholly
appropriate for the present topic. Given the incoherences in state
198
practice on the subject, as noted by the Special Rapporteur,
there is always the danger that state practice, particularly with
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regard to court decisions and internal legislation might be
misunderstood or misinterpreted. Since an essential part of the
Commission's task is to contribute to the progressive development of
international law, taking account of the trend which has occurred
over the past decades, the draft articles must be a reflection of
the present-day trends and take account of the various legal systems
represented in the Commission, and not follow rigidly the inductive
method, bearing in mind the fact that many of the newly independent
countries have no practice whatsoever on the subject and the
materials at the disposal of the Commission are in fact rather
limited.
The subject also presents considerable doctrinal and conceptual
difficulties. In the first place, a sharp controversy continues to
divide those who support 'absolute immunity' and those who support
'restricted immunity', and the Commission's work is still being
hampered by the inflexibility with which proponents of both
doctrines adhere to their respective positions. According to the
first group, the principle of state immunity admits of no exception
save those arising from express or implied consent of the state
entitled to assert immunity. According to the second group, the
essence of the principle of state immunity is that it is neither the
object of the transaction nor the person of the actor, but the
nature of the transaction that determines whether immunity should be
accorded.
Conceptual differences also exist with regard to the
personality and function of states. According to proponents of the
absolute theory, a state is indivisible and cannot act but in its
public capacity, whereas the proponents of the restrictive theory
reject this notion and treat the state as a dual person capable of
performing both public and private acts. The conceptual difference
seems to centre also on the required safeguard which will take more
fully into account the concern and the need of the developing
countries for the reasonable protection of their sovereign rights to
pursue policies in line with the objectives of economic and social
development. Thus, the Commission's task is essentially to
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conciliate between two extreme, opposed views. To these doctrinal
and conceptual differences in outlook, there is no practical
solution.
It would be prudent to wait until the total picture is
complete, and then look carefully at the set of draft articles as a
whole with a view to settling the problem in a reasonable and
balanced manner. However, it was clearly stated by the
Special Rapporteur that these differences of ideologies are
inevitable and it was not the Commission's task to resolve them.
Therefore the Commission's work is not based on any such differences
196which could give rise to objections from one side or another.
At any rate, to put the rule of state immunity in monolithic terms
of 'absolute' and 'restrictive' immunity would not indeed serve the
purpose of the Commission or provide a workable solution. On the
contrary, they would tend to diversify rather than harmonize the law
on the subject and unless something is done to lessen this sharp
controversy, those differences of opinion would continue to
constitute a source of endless dispute. But the existence of
different approaches does not mean that the Commission's work could
not have a successful result or that the scope of such a result is
bound to be very limited. The comments made by the Italian
representative to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly seem
particularly convincing.^7 ^jr Treves observed that two general
ideas seem to be held by all states. Firstly, there are some
situations in which states enjoy immunity and, secondly, that, at
least in some cases, such immunity does not apply. According to
him, that observation seems to be supported by a tendency to give
importance to the notion of reciprocity, on the basis of which
states are readily prepared to change their attitude towards
immunity. In his view this stands as confirmation of the
restrictive view of immunity. He was of the opinion that the draft
articles adopted by the Commission in its first reading are a
reasonably well-balanced compromise, mainly for three reasons:
1) Immunity from jurisdiction has to be treated as a general rule,
thus corresponding to the position of the partisans of absolute
- 96 -
immunity.
2) Limitations or exceptions to that general rule have to be
reasonably numerous and laid out in some detail, thus satisfying the
needs of the proponents of restricted immunity.
3) Immunity from measures of constraint should be spelt out in
wider terms with only limited exceptions.
In this way the first compromise would provide some relief to
socialist states; the second would afford some guarantees to those
countries practising the restricted view, particularly the developed
countries; and the third compromise would give an indispensable
safeguard, especially to the developing countries involved in
litigation in those countries applying restricted immunity. These
suggested compromises might lead the Commission to a successful
result. Thus, it was not impossible to adopt a neutral position
midway between the two approaches.
A third major difficulty confronting the work of the Commission
was the complexity of the subject because it involved domestic law
on the one hand, and public and private international law on the
other. For example, reference must be made to international law
for the purpose of determining the extent to which immunities apply.
Private international law governs problems on conflict of laws,
whether on procedure or on substance, and domestic law primarily
determines the question of the competence or the jurisdiction of the
tribunals. This difficulty becomes more apparent if we recall that
the convention which is intended to be produced on the basis of the
Commission's work is clearly a source of obligations in the strict
sense and of international law as the terra is understood in general
198
usage. Although it is perfectly true that, in the codification
and progressive development of international law, draft articles
should not, in principle, necessarily be based on national sources,
the subject of state immunity, more than any other subject, does
require that it should be so based. As mentioned in Chapter One of
this work, the rule of state immunity was primarily and initially
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enunciated by the judicial decisions of various legal systems and
that treaty practice, national legislation and opinions of jurists
are of subsequent growth. It is an area in which the relationship
between municipal law and international law is directly relevant.
It is, therefore, a difficult task for the Commission to isolate the
concept of public international law from those of private
international law and of private law.199
These difficulties can only be overcome by analyzing, as far as
possible, the various sources of the different legal systems with a
view to identifying the general principles of law applicable by
various legal systems. This would bring the Commission's work
close to the words of Art. 38(c) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice and thereby discharge the Commission's main
functions by basing its draft articles on the sources of
international law.^0
A further difficulty concerning the Commission's work was the
task of distinguishing ratione materiae between commercial
activities and activities that genuinely come within the context of
state exercise of its sovereign powers. Perhaps an even more
serious difficulty was that the various groups of states held
divergent and even conflicting views as to what in the contemporary
international legal system the states should have as sovereign
functions. The states which subscribed to the supremacy of market
forces obviously wished to restrict the concept of the state,
whereas the rest of the world adhered to the view that, in a complex
contemporary international society, the state faces a wide ranging
and ever increasing function in order to achieve the economic and
901social development of their respective peoples. Some other
members expressed the view that, despite the difficulties inherent
in making such a distinction, it would still have to be taken into
consideration, not as a clearly defined formula, but rather as a
general guideline.202 Others have firmly adhered to the
203distinction, J and of course it is categorically rejected by the
proponents of absolute immunity. In the sixth committee's debates
on the work of the Commission, strong objections were raised against
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the application of any such distinction by the representatives of
all socialist states and some of the developing countries.It
seems, however, that in a spirit of compromise, the Commission
90Srefrained from drawing the distinction. The distinction appears
to be feasible only in regard to individual rules, and not to the
90^
whole Convention. Furthermore, despite the necessity of, and
the conveniences afforded by, the distinction, it would be futile
for the Commission to undertake any such efforts in view of the
comments already made by various states regarding the
unacceptability of the distinction.
These are some of the major difficulties that the Commission
has had to address in discussing its set of the draft articles at
the second reading after receiving the comments of governments on
the draft articles already provisionally adopted. It is on the
basis of these points that further work on the subject could be
usefully pursued by the Commission, and on the resolution of these
problems that the acceptability of any international instrument on
the subject depends. If codification is a satisfactory method of
dealing with problems with such great difficulties, it may be
preferable to await the result of the Commission's work on these and
other issues.
Several writers have expressed their doubts whether an
international instrument on state immunity would have any prospect
of universal application; and that the Commission would have
difficulty in finding widespread acceptance for any instrument it
succeeded in formulating and the whole exercise would lose any
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practical significance. It has been observed that the
differences among the members of the ILC are so prominent that they
908will surely limit the prospects of success. °
Professor P.D. Trooboff, in his valuable lectures at the Hague
Academy, suggests a "fresh approach" to the problem by proposing the
adoption of an international instrument that would regulate "the
procedural aspects of foreign state immunity and with the
formulation of only a limited number of rules related to such
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procedural issues".^09 j-^gg ^g view that experience in the
codification of the rules of private international law has shown
that the likelihood of the success of a convention that deals with
procedural aspects is greater than in the case of substantive rule,
and he proposes that such a project could be entrusted to the Hague
Conference of Private International Law. As to the relation
between the ILC document and the proposed convention, Professor
Trooboff suggests that the latter could perhaps serve as a protocol
for the former. He sees little prospect of the emergence of a
convention even within the next 25 years, and concludes:
In short, I submit that gains in the foreign state immunity
field will continue to be made by small steps and not by the
great leap forward that a multilateral substantive convention
would represent. 210
III. RESTRICTED IMMUNITY IN OPINIONS OF WRITERS
There is a rich legal literature on the doctrine and practice
of states on the restricted view of immunity. The preceding survey
of the codification efforts has demonstrated the considerable
influence of the restrictive trend of immunity in the various
endeavours of codification undertaken by almost all of the
international bodies charged with codification and quasi-
codification of rules of international law. If it has been
reasonably claimed that one could not speak of a communis doctorum
on the subject in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the same cannot
be held to be entirely true at the present stage of development of
the law, where the restrictive view has gained a central place in
modern international law literature. A glance at the contemporary
legal opinions will reveal that there is much less support for the
911absolute doctrine of immunity. J-i
Apart from the writings of socialist jurists, modern writers on
international law, largely, if not overwhelmingly, support the
restrictive theory of immunity. Recently publicists have increas-
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ingly adopted this theory. Prominent among proponents of this
trend may be mentioned: Bluntischli ,212 Sir R. Phillimore, 213
J.Y. Brinton,214 J. Garner,215 J.G. Hervey,216 W. Bishop,217
W. Friedman,21®, J.E.S. Fawcett,2^ E. Loewenf eld,2211
P.B. Carter,221 Judge H. Lauterpacht,222 Sir Ian Sinclair,223 and
many others.
As mentioned earlier, the most powerful argument adduced
against the restrictive doctrine of immunity is the absence of a
workable criterion by which immunity could be restricted. This, to
some extent, is true: the writers who adopted the restrictive
theory are not unanimous as to this criterion. Some of them have
0 0/
suggested what is commonly known as the subjective test, which
bases immunity on the capacity, personality or status in which the
government may act. Others have argued in favour of a more
objective test. They propounded that it is neither the object of
the transaction nor the person of the actor, but the nature of the
transaction that determines whether state immunity should be
90 q
accorded. Various terminologies have been used to refer to
the distinction in question. For example, a distinction has been
drawn between "political acts and acts of administration", "public
and private law nature of state acts", "governmental and non¬
governmental acts" and "sovereign and non-sovereign activities".
Even this seemingly objective test has proved to be hardly helpful
in some cases, such as contracts of employment, state loans and
state railways administration.225
This distinction between various acts of foreign states seems
to be based in the first place on the dual personality of the state
and, secondly, it appears to have been derived from analogy with the
classification of acts of personal sovereigns and diplomats. It
has been said that theories of states differ and there is no
unanimous agreement that the state cannot be divided into different
personalities. If a comparison can be drawn between private
individuals and foreign states, the former are less divisible, and
yet the law is capable of distinguishing between their private and
official acts, as in the case of diplomats, and thereby a question
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might rightly be asked, If it has been possible to distinguish
between the official and private functions of the individual, why
should such a distinction not be made in the case of a state as
227well? But this analogical deduction seems to ignore the fact
that it is not always valid to classify conduct of states on the
same basis as acts of individuals.
Some writers believe that the difficulties caused in practice
by the application of the latter test do not by themselves exclude
general agreement to admit the rule. They argue that, since the
rationale on which the distinction is based is sound, the doctrine
should be followed as closely as permitted by the difficulties that
2 2 ftwill inevitably arise in specific cases. It appears that
neither the objective nor the subjective test provides a workable
criterion regarding the proper scope of state immunity and, although
the nature test is more objective than the purpose test, it is
similarly open to doubt. However, writers on the subject have
criticized the logical basis of the distinction and have begun to
suggest alternative approaches to this problem. For example,
Professor Higgins has correctly asked whether the objective test
furnishes a sound basis for the determination of whether a foreign
state should be granted immunity for a particular act.^^ She
seems to prefer the adoption of the distinction established in the
civil law jurisdiction, between public and private law ^cts, in
order to find a firm basis for this key issue. The same suggestion
was closely followed by the American Law Institute in preparing a
Revised Statement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
2 20
States. The Revised Statement adopts in S.451 the restrictive
immunity approach by using the test "whether the acts in question
are of the kind that may be carried on by private persons". It is
clear that both suggestions follow a dual approach by combining both
the nature and purpose tests in one formula.
The issue was also addressed by Professor James Crawford,231
who makes the following points:
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1) The term 'commercial' is not sufficiently comprehensive or
precise in its meaning to include the variety of situations in which
activities of a foreign state are non-governmental and cannot
attract immunity.
2) The definition of 'commercial transaction', which occupies a
prominent place in national legislation, is much less elaborate and
therefore leaves more room for judicial interpretation.
3) The single 'nature' approach is described as a "hallowed
formula" and how one is supposed to classify the nature of a
particular human activity without reference to purpose is unclear.
The nature of the activity is not some abstract idea (certainly not
for legal purposes), but rather the focus, relevant or "central"
according to some criteria. The classifications "governmental" and
9 99
"commercial" are themselves purposive. °
4) It is suggested that commercial acts can be largely defined by
isolating the relevant purpose by examining: "the relevant acts of
the foreign states on which the claim is based".Another
approach to determine the commerciality of the act was also
suggested. This was to allow the court to determine the nature of
the act by asking whether the act was profit-oriented and whether,
in fact, the foreign state will realize a profit from the
transaction concerned.^34
Recently, Professor Ian Brownlie has surveyed the whole field
of jurisdictional immunities and has attempted to pinpoint what are
termed critical elements:
1) If the implementation of state policies necessarily involved
the making of transactions within the context of a system of local
law, including reference to commercial arbitration, the state takes
the risk of accountability within that system of local law.
2) Such accountability is compatible with the principle of
consent, since the foreign state could always choose to avoid such
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transactions; it became a 'visitor' to the jurisdiction at its own
choice and could always stipulate for treaty performance of
servicing operations.
3) Such accountability within the system of local law is justified
by certain general principles of law and in particular by the
principle of good faith, reliance and unjust enrichment.
4) Given the private law character of the transactions, municipal
courts provide the appropriate forum.
It is clear that Professor Brownlie is suggesting a new
technique that would be based on territoriality, i.e. the exercise
of jurisdiction by the local courts takes the form of express or
implied consent of the sending state by the voluntary entry into a
legal relation under national law and on an equal footing with
non-state entities. While distinctions would still need to be made
under this approach for handling an immunity issue, Brownlie thinks
that this will at least mitigate the problems arising from
distinguishing private and public acts.^^ The same line of
O 0"7
reasoning appears to have been adopted by Professor Singer, J who
argues that: "So far as is possible the doctrine of restrictive
sovereign immunity should be analysed in terras of jurisdiction to
9
subscribe rules of law".
Another criterion which deserves mention is that of trading
activities. Among the writers who adopted this view are
Friedman, Fawcett,"^^ and Wolfman. ^1 Some of them rejected the
distinction based on the dichotomy of state activities on the ground
that these distinctions:
do not take account of a number of difficulties. First,
imperium denotes legal capacity, under constitutional or
international law, to perform an act of state or conclude an
international agreement; but the performance of a
non-sovereign act, jure gestionis, may also be in the exercise
of a public function. 242
The core of their argument seems to be the proposition that
activities relating to state trading are outside the ambit of the
- 104 -
rule of state immunity and they then proceed to justify this
exception. 2^-3
At any rate, this is an area in which legal opinions differ
largely and there is little hope that a legal doctorum would manage
to find a unanimous objective test which in all circumstances would
separate questions arising jure imperii from those arising jure
gestionis. It is well known that many writers have tried in vain
for many years to find a test that would permit the making of the
kind of distinction in question and the continuation of that search
O / /
will undoubtedly be at the root of the problem of state immunity.
However, a better view seems to be that it is advisable to identify
certain areas of activities to which immunity would not lie without
reference to the dichotomy in question and then cogent
justifications be adduced as a rationale for these alleged
exceptions. The precise delimitation of these areas will be left
to be determined by state practice, since the law on the subject has
been, and is still, rapidly developing.
A number of relatively recent writers who have adopted the
criteria of commercial activities have justified their view on the
following basis:
1) There is nothing approaching absolute immunity in international
law.245
2) Sovereign immunity "is fast becoming an anachronism as far as
traders are concerned". If a state wishes to trade
internationally, it has to be answerable before the law. If
immunities could be granted to a state engaging in commercial
activities, international trade would be severely hampered. "The
ultimate principles", stated Professor Hyde, "which should be
accepted by the nations must serve to safeguard and promote, rather
than to jeopardize and retard the commercial transactions of private
0/7
concerns with foreign states". The inequities which might be
produced by allowing sovereign immunity to apply are also observed
by Fensterwald who noted that private individuals dealing with
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state traders may shy away from dealing with foreign states if their
legal rights and remedies are so curtailed by the rule of state
immunity.248
3) Another argument for restricted immunity may be based on the
principle of implicit waiver. It is claimed that it is entirely
consistent with modern international law not to allow the principle
of sovereign immunity to prevail in cases of commercial activities
of foreign states. It has been said that this is not a matter of
principle, but of practicality. Experience has shown that when a
foreign state enters a free or or relatively free market, it
consents expressly or implicitly to waive any state immunity in
249
regard to its commercial activities.
4) The last and final argument may be based on the criticism
directed against the absolutists who relied on the doctrine of
equality of states. The proponents of the restricted immunity
asserted that, if trade is carried out by states, there may be a
perfect case for equality, but inequality might well arise if a
state traded with a private individual who might be deprived of his
legal remedies. Using the same doctrine of equality, they argued
that forum states are equally entitled to exercise their territorial
jurisdiction and allow direct recourse by private entities against
9 SOall their trading partners whether private or public. This
seems to be a sound argument because, to insist on full immunity to
apply in all circumstances, is simply to ignore reality and to
render the concept of sovereign equality illusory since states are
not only equal in rights but also in duties. Furthermore, to
extend that principle to a transaction between a state and
non-governmental entity is a departure from that principle of
equality rather than an application.
It is due to the difficulties thus involved that some writers
have suggested the abolition of the principle of state immunity.
Judge Lauterpacht had proposed the abrogation of state immunity, yet
had recognized four exceptions: (1) legislative acts; (2)
administrative acts; (3) state contracts that lie outside
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jurisdiction under rule of private law; and (4) cases of diplomatic
251immunities. He explained the restrictive view of his proposal
in the following words: "by placing, subject to the above
safeguards and exceptions, foreign states in the same position of
subjection to the jurisdiction of courts which it [local state]
occupies in the matter of actions brought against itself".
Whatever the merits of the assimilation proposed by Judge
Lauterpacht, it must not be forgotten that, by closing the front
door against state immunity, Judge Lauterpacht had in fact allowed
state immunity to enter through the back door, since the suggested
251
safeguards and exceptions are capable of wide interpretation.
Moreover, by enumerating acts which are to attract immunities, and
excluding others which are not, Judge Lauterpacht had given a new
version of the distinction which he himself considered unworkable,
namely the varied activities of states.^54
Other writers adopt the view that, between the two extremes,
absolutists and restrictionists, lies an area of compromise in legal
theory, namely the so-called principle of reciprocity. Using this
principle, it has been argued that the gap between the two extreme
views can be bridged or at least narrowed. This theory is based on
the idea that each state is simultaneously a 'claimant' and a
'recipient' of immunity: a claimant in the sense that it claims its
own immunity before a foreign court in which it is directly or
indirectly impleaded.
According to this argument, the question of immunity has dual
aspects, the active aspect where the state is granted or denied
immunity to other states before its own courts, and the passive
aspect where the state is granted or denied immunity before foreign
courts. The doctrine of reciprocity may thus step in and operate
as follows:
a state which professes adherence to the doctrine of absolute
immunity but finds itself subject to the jurisdiction of
foreign states in various parts of the world, realizing that it
is powerless to change its unfavourable passive position, would
have no recourse but to change its active position by denying
immunity to foreign states in those cases where the state
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itself would be denied immunity before the courts of those
foreign states. 255
However, although the notion of reciprocity is operative in many
O CA
spheres of international law, the argument that it can be used to
modify the rule of state immunity is altogether too simplistic and
OC7
runs counter to the object of international law. The reasons
which may be advanced in this regard are: in the first place, the
effectiveness of the principles depends on the existence of a
uniform jurisprudence to serve as guidance to the courts. In the
second place, the interests involved are not simply those of the
states concerned, but also of private litigants. Since immunity
bars the remedy of any potential private litigant, the fact that a
foreign state, against which he wishes to proceed, would grant
immunity to other states in a similar situation does not seem
oro
relevant. ° But that does not mean it would be contrary to
international law for a state to apply a condition of reciprocity
but the application of such a principle seems largely to ignore the
interests of private litigants. In the third place the
jurisdictional issue is basically determined by reference to the
fact that one state will not sit in judgement on the acts of another
state done in its public capacity. Such abstention from
jurisdiction is required irrespective of reciprocity. In the
fourth place, the notion of reciprocity would appear to contradict
the principle of universality of the law in the sense that, under
international law, states have parallel rather than reciprocal
obligations and duties.
At any rate reciprocity is not an essential element of state
immunity. But it has to be borne in mind that it has a very
important role to play in the development of application of the
principle of state immunity, a role which would in effect restrict
the application of that principle. Since states such as India and
the USSR accorded immunity from jurisdiction on reciprocity, it
seems that the growing inter-independence of the world, coupled with
the increasing prevalence of restrictive practice, would lead
inevitably to an ever larger number of cases in which such states
would withhold immunity.259
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IV. THE EMERGING TREND OF RESTRICTED IMMUNITY AND
CURRENT CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
The question to be answered in this section is what is the
current rule of international law with respect to state immunity?
While there is a clearly "emerging", if not "emerged" trend towards
restricted immunity, the question to be posed is, have the
considerable changes that have occurred in the law in the last 50
years or so now come to an end? If not, are they continuing
because of inertia or for some good reason? To answer these
questions, the legal foundation of the restricted immunity principle
in contemporary law deserves the closest attention. There is no
doubt that the prevention of conflict between the conduct of one
state and that of another state is the primary object of
international law, including the rule of state immunity in the
widest sense. The principle of state immunity is primarily
concerned with the consequences of contact between two equally
inflexible, apparently equally exclusive sovereignties: the
sovereignty of the state invoking immunity and that of the second
state seeking to impose its jurisdiction on the first. Thus the
rule of state immunity does not aim to avoid conflict, but to
determine which authority might sit in judgement over the conduct of
one state carrying on activities within another. The question is
whether the existing rules of international law provide the answer
in terms of strict rights and obligations of states to the variety
of situations which the issue of state immunity gives rise.
Although there are abundant judicial decisions of domestic
courts on the subject, decisions of international courts or
arbitrators are totally lacking. This virtual absence of
international adjudication has been attributed to two main reasons:
(a) the refusal by a local court to accord immunity to a foreign
state would not in itself result in damage to that state; and (b)
even enforcement of decisions by a local court is of little
significance in practice to the state whose immunity has been
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denied. This singular absence of international adjudication
does not mean that the subject is not regulated by international
law. If a comparison can be drawn in this regard between state
immunity on the one hand and diplomatic and consular relations on
the other, the latter receives little or no international judicial
9 A1
pronouncement until 1980 in the Hostages case. 1 Again many of the
questions that arise in practice are a matter of comity, since they
involve principles rather than the kind of strict rules that provide
an answer in each and every case. As a consequence of this dearth
of international judicial pronouncements on state immunity, it is
difficult to identify rules of international law in the matter.
Admittedly, there are very few rules of that kind concerning the
relation between one state and the national legal order of another
state. For example, there has been obiter dictum in the Lotus case
(1927)^2 to the effect that international law left the state with a
wide measure of discretion in applying its laws to matters that
occurred outside its boundaries. It was stated in the judgement
that:
It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a
state from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in
respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken
place abroad, and on which it cannot rely on some permissive
rule of international law. 263
The same judgement also established the basic rule that a state
cannot exercise its sovereignty in the territory of another
state.
The 1958 Law of the Sea Convention^^^ preferred to use the
recommendatory 'should' rather than the mandatory 'shall' in regard
to the jurisdiction of the coastal states concerning foreign ships
passing through their territorial waters. Consequently it seems
that, since the jurisdiction of a state is not sufficiently
regulated by international law, one would not expect state immunity
to be so exhaustively governed, for immunity is a corollary to
jurisdiction and in most cases follows it.^66
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The rules of international law on state immunity and waiver
might also well be based essentially on a series of presumptions of
consent. For example, the territorial state is free to admit or
not to admit the activities of foreign states. Once it has allowed
them, then the territorial state's consent is presumed and this
presumption produces certain consequences, including abstention from
9 6 7
exercising jurisdiction. Again, a state which consents to
receive an ambassador, thereby agrees to extend the appropriate
immunities to that ambassador and to the state he represents. The
same presumption, however, could equally be used in other
directions. For instance, when a state agrees with another state
to conduct commercial activities within its territory, its consent
could be made conditional on non-immunity for the other state or its
entity, and it is thus bound to comply with all the relevant
substantive rules and also to accept the machinery set up to enforce
those rules. There are no rules of public international law to
regulate such consent and very little has been written on the
subject.
It appears that, in the light of the above observations, the
principles of public international law that regulate the conduct of
one state within the territory of another are very few and rather
weak. The only established principle appears to be that of
territorial sovereignty. Sovereignty, as explained by M. Huber in
268
his famous award in the Island of Palmas case, is essentially
territorial and "includes certain powers to be exercised in regard
to a particular limited territory unimpeded by any interference from
outside". The same principle was corroborated in the North
Atlantic Coast Fisheries case: "One of the essential elements of
sovereignty is that it is to be exercised within territorial limits,
and that, failing proof to the contrary, the territory is coterminus
with sovereignty", ^69 an(j reaffirmed by the International Court of
Justice decision in the Corfu Channel case^O as "an essential
foundation of international relations". Viewed in this sense,
sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction of states become
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interchangeable terms. This essential and well established
principle seems to favour the restrictive view of immunity. In
this regard, immunity is an exception to this general rule and must
for these reasons be restrictively interpreted. The word immunity
itself suggests that there is a valid territorial jurisdiction which
may be relinquished in certain specific cases.
In dealing with the emerging trend of restricted immunity from
national decisions and state practice, it is necessary to be careful
not to go too far in identifying the details of this emerging trend
since what is the current rule of international law regarding
sovereign immunity "depends greatly on what degree of consensus is
9 7 9
sought for the rule being articulated". In addressing this
issue, it is necessary to emphasize that the subject of state
immunity is different from other subjects of international law
because state practice in that area is based almost exclusively on
domestic legislation, administrative practice and domestic court
decisions. Thus international practice has followed a more
divergent development than other fields of international law.
The point of departure in any discussion on the existence of
customary rule of international law is Art. 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice which describes customary rules as
"international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law". Relying on this conception, the ILC Special Rapporteur
enumerated in a working paper on the International Law Commission
Statute, certain elements for the formation of a customary rule:
i- concordant practice by a number of states with reference to a
type of situation falling within the domain of international
relations;
ii- continuation or repetition of practice over a considerable
period of time;
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iii- conception that the practice is required by, or consistent
with, prevailing international law; and
iv- general acquiescence with the practice of other states.^73
On the basis of these definitions any discussion of emerging
customary rule of restricted immunity has to satisy two constituent
elements namely: (1) material practice and its requirement and
(2) the opinio juris, that is to say not only "general" practice but
also that it must be "accepted as law".
1. Material Practice
The question what constitutes state practice cannot be answered
here; but generally speaking, there is agreement to the effect that:
i- State practice includes any act, articulation or other
behaviour of a state, as long as the behaviour in question
discloses the state's conscious attitude with respect to or in
recognition of a customary rule.
ii- These acts, articulations and behaviour must be attributed to
states and not to individuals or international
97S
organizations. 'J
iii- Such practice must be made publicly known to other states
within a reasonable time.^^
Instances of state practice have been somewhat widened to include
diplomatic correspondence, general declarations of foreign or legal
policy, and opinions of national legal advisers. In 1950 the
International Law Commission identified the following instances as
"Evidence of Customary International Law": treaties, decisions of
national and international courts, national legislation, diplomatic
correspondence, opinions of national legal advisers, and the
practice of international organizations.277 State practice can
also be inferred from the stand taken by a state when sued, or
intervening in any way in judicial proceedings before international
courts and arbitral tribunals.278
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Apart from these generally accepted instances of state
practice, there is much controversy as to whether, for the purpose
of establishing a customary rule, state practice should consist
merely of concrete actions or whether it might also include written
or oral statements of state representatives or their vote at
diplomatic conferences or international organizations. Again this
is an area in which the views of publicists differ widely and there
is as yet no agreement thereon. Some jurists have adopted a
27Qrestricted view of state practice, ? while others have adopted a
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more liberal interpretation. The latter view seems to be more
in keeping with the modern theory of customary law: the restricted
view of state practice runs counter to the practice of the states
themselves; the word practice is general enough to correspond to
the flexibility of the law; and the wider sense of state practice
renders a great favour to research and study in terms of the wealth
of materials made readily available in recent times.^1
As far as restrictive practice of state immunity is concerned,
it cannot be denied that during the last 35 years or so there has
been a reasonable wealth of state practice, whether in its
restrictive or wider sense, to support the emerging trend towards
functional immunity in international practice. Domestic decisions,
governmental practice, treaty practice and national legislations in
various legal systems sufficiently reflect this tendency. But it
is important to see to what extent that practice meets the other
criteria of customary law.
In the first place the formation of customary rule requires
'general' state practice. The meaning of the word 'general', as
used in Art. 38.1(b) of the Statute of the ICJ, has been given
different interpretations. In the ICJ judgement in the Fisheries
case (UK v. Norway), the court concluded that the ten-mile rule,
although adopted by many states and supported by various conventions
and tribunal decisions, had not reached the level of a general rule
since other states had adopted different limits, ^82 ancj tjie
North Sea cases the court preferred to qualify state practice as
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'extensive' rather than 'general'. At any rate it is clear that
the word 'general' refers to the number of states which have to
contribute to the formulation of the rule in question. Although
there is no hard and fast rule by which such a number can be
counted, statistical calculation is not desirable and the term
'general' tends to signify common and widespread practice among many
OOA
states. The brief survey in the preceding chapters clearly
shows that there has been widespread practice among a large number
of states of restricted immunity since the 19th century, although
that practice has been somewhat slow to take its final shape.
It is true that, for historical and political reasons, there
has been no practice in some parts of Asia, Africa and Latin
America.in the 19th century. Various countries belonging to
this relatively new world recently started to adjust themselves to
the realities and to adopt a more restrictive attitude towards state
immunity. It is apparent that the sixth committee of the General
Assembly and the International Law Commission have recognized, on
the basis of the available state practice, that emerging trend,
despite divergent views concerning its scope and application.
The subject of state immunity has been, and still is, rapidly
developing. The evolution of the law does not require the active
participation of all states. According to a widely accepted view
in international law, acquiescence may constitute part of general
practice and thus contribute towards the formation or continuous
existence of a customary rule. The rationale of this
constitutive function of passive conduct is based on the fact that
not every state is required to engage in an active form in the
evolution of the law, and that in certain areas only a few states
OO7
may actually possess the means of participation in such practice. 0
Furthermore, there is hardly any area in international law in which
the development has been in a uniform manner. The law invariably
has developed by stages and sectorially. This is perfectly true in
the case of those states which for some reason have not engaged in
the recent evolution of the law of state immunity, although
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admittedly absence of practice does not automatically mark their
approval or disapproval of the emerging rule, since further
qualification, in the form of absence of protest against the rule,
is required for such silence to form state practice,288 This
absence of state practice in some countries has been taken by some
jurists as an insurmountable obstacle in the way of the evolution of
the law. It has been argued that the restrictive trend of immunity
has been applied in the practice of only certain states forming the
international community,28^ and it is thus one-sided and
geographically limited. Sometimes the argument has been merged
with that of the interests of developing countries.
Although there has been no state practice in any sense in newly
independent states in the field of state immunity until recently,
there is abundant treaty practice in socialist countries accepting
at least some limitations to the rule of absolute immunity. The
USSR, for instance, from the time of its entry into the world
economic system, concluded treaties and trade agreements, and
engaged in a pattern of practice under which it did not claim the
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benefit of state immunity for its commercial activities.
Professor Crawford has analysed some 40 or so bilateral treaties of
the Soviet Union dealing with general or particular questions of
state immunity, the great majority of which subject Soviet trade
delegations and separate state instrumentalities to the jurisdiction
of the forum state in respect of commercial or private law
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transactions. He concluded that in no case do these various
treaties provide for the exclusion of local jurisdiction and
remedies without some countervailing provision, e.g., a guarantee in
OQO
respect of the transaction or judgement.
Moreover, the reference to "international practice" or
"international law" in many of these treaties seems to suggest that
they cannot be dismissed as mere waivers of an immunity to which the
Soviet Union would otherwise be entitled: they simply do not
190
articulate an entitlement of that kind. In the majority of
these treaties, while validity of state immunity is recognized, an
exception is invariably made with regard to commercial activities.
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That would be interpreted either as a deviation from the existing
QQ/
rule of international law or as declaratory of such rule. To
this extent, these treaties indicate that the rule of state immunity
is not a rule of jus cogens, otherwise the conclusion of these
treaties would be regarded as a deviation or derogation from that
norm, in that they constituted a more cogent support for a
restrictive view of immunity.^95
However, in considering contestation by socialist countries to
this restrictive trend of immunity, one has to bear in mind the
effect of silence in this type of situation. Further evidence of
that trend is contained in a letter to the Legal Counsel of the
United Nations dated 3 July 1979 from the Legal Advisor to the
9 Q f\
Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, stating
that the State Immunity Bill, as presented to Parliament, had been
circulated to all diplomatic missions in London and that no state to
which the draft legislation had been sent had offered substantial
criticism of its terms. The draft was then submitted to Parliament
297
and adopted as law.
During the discussion on the subject at the International Law
Commission, some of the commissioners adopted the view that the
trend towards restricted immunity is reflected in only some of the
OQO
national legislation of developed countries. y But this assertion
is not essentially borne out by state practice. States such as
Singapore, Pakistan, Australia and South Africa have followed a
similar line. Again, bodies such as the African-Legal Consultative
Committee, composed chiefly of legal experts from various parts of
Asia and Africa, and the Inter-American Judicial Committee, which is
also essentially a body of lawyers from South America, confirmed
that state immunity did not exist in a number of cases. It has
also been mentioned elsewhere that the International Law Association
also includes among its membership legal experts from various parts
of the world, developed and developing, socialist and capitalist
states.
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In addressing this proposition, the Special Rapporteur on the
subject, Mr Sucharitkul, has stated convincingly in his fifth report
that:
The evolutionary process of the law does not require the
positive or active participation of all states. While it
cannot exclude any state from participation, absence of
practice is no ground for liability of neglect or negligence on
the part of states. However, such absence cannot be invoked to
invalidate or otherwise downgrade the existing or prevailing
practice of which abundant evidence is available elsewhere. 299
He goes on to observe that:
It is easy to say, in the absence of state practice in a given
country or without reference thereto, that the law as developed
in the practice of so wide a region as Asia, Africa or Latin
America points in a definite direction, or is opposite to the
prevailing practice in Western Europe, or is in any way similar
to the practice of socialist countries.
The Special Rapporteur, however, replied that:
Nothing could be nearly so dangerous as such a sweeping
statement .... A glance at the judicial practice and national
legislations of Pakistan, India, Singapore or Japan will reveal
a strong trend away from any absolute doctrine. Neither
Pakistan nor Singapore can be said not to be Asian, nor to be
no longer thriving and developing nations. A brief examination
of their legislations will suffice to silence any sweeping
statement about Asian practice being identified with that of
socialist or capitalist countries. 300
It is admittedly right to say that caution should be exercised in
interpreting this virtual absence of practice in some countries, but
it could equally be argued with some force that the absence of
practice does not necessarily mean that it is impossible to identify
the emergence of a clear general practice of restricted immunity.
As to the duration of this practice, it must be borne in mind
that the concept of immunity of states as an entity which has
emerged by almost imperceptible stages from the concept of the
immunities of the individual sovereign, is of relatively short
301
standing. However, it is doubtful whether under the modern
theory of customary international law any extensive or fixed time
limit is required for the formation of the customary rules. As
early as 1950, Judge Hudson, in his working paper on the Statute of
the International Law Commission, suggested "a considerable period
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of time
. 2 Others have proposed the formula of "from time
immemorial".203 The contemporary jurisprudence of the ICJ seems to
move towards a more flexible requirement such as "constant practice"
without stipulating a rigid time limit,204 an(j that tendency was
unequivocally endorsed in its decision in the North Sea cases.305
Following the jurisprudence of the court, most authors seem to adopt
the view that the time required for the formation of customary law
is a relative qualification, and that customary rules may emerge
OA/*
within a comparatively short period of time. Thus, the argument
that the emerging restricted trend of immunity is of relatively
short standing in international law seems to be somewhat flawed.
Cases in which immunity of states is limited go back to the 19th
century and this trend continues to apply in view of the increasing
number of cases in which states are involved as traders and with the
increasing prevalence of functional practice.
2. Opinio Juris
The other reason why state practice might not rise to the level
of customary international law, even assuming the near universality
and consistency of such practice, is that while the material element
- actual practice - is present, the psychological element - opinio
juris - might not be. In other words, the behaviour of states might
be explained by considerations of comity rather than obligations.
This requirement is clearly expressed by Art. 38(l)(b) of the
ICJ Statute that the "general" practice must be "accepted as law".
The importance of the opinio juris for the formation of customary
law has been judicially endorsed by the PCIJ and its successor the
ICJ. As early as 1927, the PCIJ had expressly affirmed this
qualification by stating that the abstention on the part of Turkey
to assume jurisdiction in criminal proceedings would only be
elevated to the level of customary law if such abstention "were
based on the state being conscious of having a duty to abstain".30^
The ICJ had unequivocally required the presence of such opinio juris
when it articulated that the party relying on a customary rule to
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prove that the constant and uniform usage in question "is the
OQQ
expression of right .... and a duty incumbent" on the other.
Any doubt that might have existed regarding the position of the
requirement for the purposes of customary law was dispelled by the
decision of ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases.33^ The
court laid down the requirement in the following words:
The acts concerned .... must also be such, or be carried out in
such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring
it. The need for such a belief, .i.e.. , the existence of a
subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the
opinio juris sive necessitatis. The states concerned must
therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a
legal obligation. 310
The requirement can be established in the reverse direction. In
the recent Nicaragua case, the court notes that there is in fact
evidence of agreement between the parties as to the content of the
customary law relating to the non-use of force. Nonetheless, the
court observed that this concurrence of views does not discharge the
court from ascertaining what rules of customary law are applicable.
Insofar as these rules are concerned, the court stated:
The mere fact that states declare their recognition of certain
rules is not sufficient for the court to consider these as
being part of customary international law .... The court must
satisfy itself that the existence of the rule in the opinio
juris of states is confirmed by practice. 311
Thus, instead of confirming the practice by the opinio juris, the
court required that opinio juris must be confirmed by state
practice. These are different ways of saying the same thing.313
It has been rightly said that there is no 'psychology' of state and
the requirement is legally relevant only to the extent it is
discernible by other states.313 It is regarded as a "slightly
obscure way" of asking whether a practice is law, or mere usage or
comity, or even accidental.31^
In this connection it might be argued that states engaged in
restrictive practice are motivated by the desire to protect their
own interests and the interests of their nationals by insisting that
their subjects are allowed to have direct recourse to local courts
when foreign governments are involved. This argument, however, is
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altogether too simplistic, since the state of the forum, by engaging
in such practice, has implicitly waived its immunity from
jurisdiction if sued before a court of a foreign state. In other
words, a state which has adopted the restrictive theory of immunity
could obviously not invoke the obsolete principle of state immunity
before foreign courts concerning its commercial activities. Thus,
the motive behind exercising its jurisdiction over other states in
commercial acts would seem irrelevant and has little to do with the
legal conviction of the state as to the position of the rule under
international law.
The crucial point in any discussion of opinio juris seems to be
that of determination and ascertainment of such legal conviction.
The main criticisms which have been directed against the
requirement, as articulated by the ICJ in the North Sea cases, were
that the requirement is rigid and there was failure on the part of
the court to explain precisely how the evidence of opinio juris is
315
to be ascertained. Despite these criticisms, writers are not
lacking who express the view that the task of ascertaining a legal
conviction, however difficult it might appear, yet is feasible. It
was pointed out that the alleged "rigidity" must not be taken away
from the context in which the disputes in the North Sea cases have
arisen, namely: the practice of non-parties to an international
instrument embodying customary rule, which in the court's opinion,
had not been customary at the time of the adoption of the instrument
in question. In this context it was said that: the less
conclusive the available material practice, the clearer must be the
Q 1 /*
evidence of opinio juris".
As far as the restrictive doctrine of state immunity is
concerned, the same difficulty of ascertainment presents itself in a
more acute form. However, some points may be mentioned with a view
to mitigating such difficulties as far as restrictive immunity is
concerned. In the first place, national courts of various
countries, especially the non-socialist states of Europe, had been
among the first to recognize that, in certain areas of trade, state
immunity would not apply. There appears to be no reported instance
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in which the forum states concerned had intervened by legislative
means to overrule these decisions in any form, or to adopt a
different position on other occasions. In the second place, when
the judicial authorities of some countries had revived the
restrictive theory after a period of uncertainty, i.e. the United
Kingdom and United States, their respective countries had responded
to the realities of the situation, albeit slowly, and adopted
legislation in line with the views expressed by the judiciary. The
adoption of such legislation strongly supports the existence of a
legal conviction on the part of those states that what they engaged
in was legally binding as law. The same appears to be true in
regard to other countries who have adopted similar enactments,
although not to precisely reflect locally developed rules, but
simply to provide for what they genuinely believed to be the law.
In the third place, some of these legislations have clearly been
adopted to provide for a judicial adjudication of issues of state
immunity away from any political or quasi-political determination.
For example, before the adoption of the United States Foreign
Sovereign Immunity Act 1976, the United States Department of State
used to employ panels of attorneys to advise on requests of state
immunity. When the Act was adopted, it was pointed out that the
intention of the Congress was to codify the so-called restrictive
principle of immunity as currently recognized by international law.
Most significantly, it was stated that the intention of the Congress
was to transfer the determination of sovereign immunity from the
executive branch to the judicial branch, thereby reducing the
foreign policy implication of sovereign immunity determination and
assuring litigants that crucial decisions are often made on purely
legal grounds Reference to current "international law" and
attempts to avoid "foreign policy implications" in the congressional
debates stand as a good source from which opinio juris may be
derived in individual cases.
The difficulties of ascertaining opinio juris in the
evolutionary trend of restrictive immunity are further mitigated in
the context of the U.N. drafting process. Various multilateral
treaties have been concluded within the United Nations framework,
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regulating some aspects of the law of state immunity. Some of them
have expressly drawn a distinction between commercial and
non-commercial activities, while some others have drawn a
distinction between the official and private functions of state
representatives. Statements made by the states, disclosing their
conviction as to the status of these rules in customary law, are
highly relevant. A vote cast in favour of one of these rules may
also act as a pointer and serve as an indicator of the existence of
such opinio juris. Thus the abundant and easily accessible records
of the International Law Commission, the Sixth Committee of the
General Assembly and the diplomatic conferences convened to adopt
these instruments, render obsolete the problem of the paucity of
states' statements and expressions of conviction. In the light
of these considerations and in the context of consistency of
state practice, it is not an exaggeration, as some writers have
exaggerated, to assume the existence of the opinio juris and
then only require negative proof as to the absence of the opinio
So far we have identified and discussed the status of the
restrictive theory of immunity in the light of contemporary
customary international law. The main problem is usually
associated with that of ascertainment, which is caused by the
scarcity of extensive diplomatic practice and the lack of
international adjudication on the subject. But in the light of the
available decisions, treaty practice, national legislation and other
governmental practice, it can be safely assumed that a rule of
customary law exists to the effect that state immunity is not
absolute and is subject to some limitations, especially in regard to
activities of foreign states in trade and commerce generally. In
the revised restatement of The Foreign Relations Law of the United
States: "though there are differences of detail in its application,
nearly all non-communist states now adhere to the restrictive
O I Q
theory". The same conclusion was reached by The Australian Law
Reform Commission when it proposed the Australian Foreign State
Immunity Act 1986.^^ As stated earlier, a number of scholars,
after analysing the issue, have agreed to this conclusion, although
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they have expressed their deep concern about its application. For
example, Professor Brownlie notes that:
While it is easy to register the trend toward a restrictive
principle of immunity, it is difficult as yet to see a new
principle which would satisfy the criteria of uniformity and
consistency required for the formation of a rule of customary
international law. 321
It appears that Professor Brownlie is influenced by the fact that
there are no unanimously agreed principles which would permit the
making of the distinction between governmental and commercial acts,
something which falls within the judicial discretion of each
forum.322
Professor Crawford, while admitting the absence of any rule of
international law recognizing absolute immunity, nevertheless
observed the lack of agreed principle for making that crucial
323distinction. He seems to favour the approach adopted by
several of the national legislative acts to overcome this inherent
difficulty by laying down certain specific acts which are excluded
from sovereign immunity. He expresses himself in the following
terms:
[t]he better approach is to deal with the specific categories
or classes of case that have arisen in practice and to
elaborate specific rules for each such category, taking into
account the reason for extending immunity, or asserting
jurisdiction in that context. 324
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EGYPTIAN AND SUDANESE PRACTICE ON STATE IMMUNITY
INTRODUCTION
The preceding survey shows that customary law has evolved out
of the practice of various western countries. An effort to find a
workable solution must necessarily include a comparative survey of
the state practice of different legal systems for further growth and
development of the law."*" To this end, it is proposed to examine
here the Egyptian and Sudanese practice.
From a theoretical point of view, a comparative method may be
used in international law to achieve various purposes and in
particular to accomplish the following: (a) to discover trends in
general principles of international law; (b) to use the results of
the comparison as a means of interpreting treaties and customary
law; (c) to evaluate the comparison as evidence of general practice
accepted as law; and (d) to ascertain under what conditions the
results of the comparison of different legal orders can be
transferred into the international order.
Applying this method, the examination of the practice of Egypt
and Sudan on state immunity, leads one to conclude that there is
little convergence between these two neighbouring states, who
otherwise belong to a similar culture and same socio-economic
system. Furthermore, it provides a negative indication of the
extent to which states have more or less preserved the freedom to
regulate their own internal affairs. If in their municipal
practice the majority of states accord state immunity to foreign
states only in respect of sovereign acts and not private or
commercial acts, the comparison of the practice of these two
countries can indicate how far states can adopt different practices
and attitudes, and that the granting of immunity depends essentially
on municipal consideration of municipal policies and the internal
administration of justice. As to the question of determination of
customary law, a comparison of the municipal law of these countries,
and indeed other municipal legal systems, could be useful in order
to clarify what is and what is not recognized at the international
level and to see the internal factors behind such attitudes.
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The comparative method is equally relevant in the field of
codification. For example, both before and after the Second World
War, Egyptian judicial practice has significantly contributed to the
development and eventual emergence of the customary law on the
subject with a wealth of judicial reasoning and authorities, as
evidenced by the various reports on the topic submitted by the
Q
Special Rapporteur of the ILC. Although it is difficult to
evaluate the effect of these judicial decisions on the subject
matter of codification, yet such comparison may provide valuable
help to the process of codification.
An examination of that practice should also provide us with a
critical understanding of the Egyptian decisions on the subject.
National judicial decisions as Professor Crawford points out are
'subsidiary' to, rather than an aspect of state practice (which
would, on this view, be restricted to treaties and custom).^ He
goes on to say that this view regarding the subsidiary role of
judicial decisions cannot apply in the field of sovereign immunity
because the doctrine itself is "about the operation of domestic
courts in matters involving foreign states".^ In short, the
decisions of the domestic courts are the very data from which the
international legal principle concerning the rules of state
immunities have been derived.
Likewise, one cannot afford to ignore the role which that
comparison may play in the interpretation of the convention which
may result from the process of codification. If even only a few of
the judicial decisions of Egyptian courts in this field (and none of
Sudan) have been made available to international lawyers through
readily accessible documentation, the valuable help which the
comparison may render to the development of the law may not be fully
appreciated without reference to sources other than judicial
decisions, sources which are so necessary and yet which remain
neglected. The political and economic development taking place in
both Egypt and the Sudan might well have an impact on their
governmental practices in the law on that subject. That impact
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will only be felt in the international arena when these countries
adopt an attitude towards issues of state immunity pursuant to their
political and economic interests, particularly when they are brought
as defendants before foreign courts and tribunals. These attitudes
may have their repercussions on both their international relations
and the international financial community, which may seriously
affect the progress of the new international economic order that
both countries, like other developing nations, are supposed to
benefit from. The wish of these countries to be involved in the
formation of this new international economic order, which is more
consistent with their interests, may lead them to adopt certain
policies regarding issues of foreign relations and commerce, and
hence an examination of some of these policies appears to be
essential in order to judge the legal impact of these policies on
issues of sovereign immunities.
It is of interest also to see how these states, both of which
may be regarded as newly independent states, and each of which
presumably values its independence and sovereignty very highly,
respond to the emerging trend in the international law of state
immunity, which primarily proceeds from the point of territorial
sovereignty of the local state, and to see also whether that
response corresponds to their needs and interests.
It is primarily for these considerations that the examination
of the practice of certain individual countries provides an
instrument that can be employed to promote the growth and
development of the law of state immunity. Furthermore, lessons of
some significance may also be drawn from the comparison of customary
rules of international law on state immunities and specific legal
systems. The Islamic legal system offers a unique example of a
legal system in which such comparative techniques could be employed,
a comparison which will show that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
has been jointly worked out by different legal systems in the
process of the evolution of that law. Comparison will not merely
be used to contrast the two legal systems' perceptions of sovereign
immunity but also to show how other social environments used or
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adopted similar legal concepts and to assess the extent to which
such adaptation may serve that social environment. Although such a
comparison may reveal a case of parallelism between the Islamic
legal system and the rules of international law, at the same time an
examination of the norms of Islamic law will show that the Islamic
legal system has reached the same conclusion regarding the concept
of sovereign immunity but by employing a different process and
reasoning in shaping that concept. In this way such a comparison
will not only concentrate on purely legal phenomena, but also on the
social bond and environment within which such phenomena are
developed, and thus advance not only the recognition of the
fundamental characteristics of the concept of sovereign immunity,
but at the same time allow insight into the origin of that concept
as developed by different legal systems. The revival of Islam in
the world today, the movements of Islamization of law in different
parts of the Muslim world and trade between the West and that part
of the world, add the element of expediency to other motives for the
study of Islamic law and institutions, which great barriers have so
far discouraged any general interest therein. Such a comparative
method may provide means and ways of bridging the wide gap between
the attitudes of different international lawyers who belong to the
various legal systems of the world, and thus make international law
itself better understood.
It is intended in this part to first try to explain and clarify
the circumstances under which these decisions were rendered in both
Egypt and Sudan. Later, practice other than judicial will be
examined in relation to each country in order to relate those
practices to the development of the law generally.
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IMMUNITY OF FOREIGN STATES IN EGYPTIAN LAW
A. JUDICIAL PRACTICE (1): THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
THE MIXED COURTS
I. THE ORIGIN OF THE COURTS
From 1517 to 1914 Egypt was a constituent part of the Ottoman
Empire, in no way differing from other provinces under Turkish rule.
Islamic law, as administered by the Qadi, was the prevailing
system.^ Into this society at the turn of the century burst a
flood of new and disturbing influences. Mohammed Ali, Governor of
Egypt, had achieved some degree of autonomy when he concluded with
the Ottoman Empire an agreement authorising him to make treaties
with foreign powers provided that he did not thereby injure the
political interests of the Ottoman Empire. By the London
convention of 15 July 1840, Mohammad Ali was confined only to
the Egyptian sphere of influence and the convention required him
to conform to that arrangement. He was also allowed a measure
of financial freedom within the domain of his administration.
Following these international arrangements, Mohammad Ali was granted
Q /
a firman, dated 13 February 1841, conferring upon him the
government of Egypt with a hereditary tenure under certain
conditions. By the same firman he was also granted the right to
govern the provinces of Nubia, Darfour, Kordofan and Sennar for
life. The firman of 1 June 1841,6 which established the basic
pattern of the formal Ottoman-Egyptian relationship until 1914,
provided that the Ottoman laws and all treaties concluded between
the Sublime Porte and the foreign powers, shall be fully applied in
Egypt.6
Although it was often said that Egypt continued to be under
Ottoman sovereignty, that sovereignty was steadily becoming nominal
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only and the actual conduct of affairs remained under the Khedive's
hand. This nominal sovereignty, however, did have a significant
effect on the legal history of the country. The provision of the
firman of June 1841, referred to above, had led to the extension to
Egypt of treaties, known as capitulations, between the Sublime Porte
and Christian powers. It also led the Egyptian rulers, in their
negotiations with foreign states, to keep within the limits
prescribed by the Sultan in Constantinople. It was in this way
that Egypt had come within the scope of the capitulations, through
which foreigners had acquired extensive immunity from Egyptian
jurisdiction and enjoyed positive extra-territorial rights. For
example, the Treaty of 1830 between the USA and Turkey,^ which by
the most-favoured-nation clause (MFN) was applicable to all the
capitulatory powers, provides that:
Citizens of the United States of America, quietly pursuing
their commerce, and not being charged or convicted of any crime
or offence, shall not be molested; and even when they may have
committed some offence, they shall not be arrested and put in
prison by the local authorities, but they shall be tried by
their Minister or Consul, and punished according to their
offence, following in this respect the usage observed towards
other Franks.
While Turkey was unable to fully execute this provision, in Egypt it
O
was obeyed to the letter.
Originally capitulation referred to a class of commercial
treaties which Western powers had concluded with the Ottoman Empire
since 1535.^ It is beyond the scope of this work to enter
into any detailed examination of the capitulatory regimes in
Turkey,"^ but generally they provided for the following privileges
and immunities: freedom of residence, trade, religion, arbitrary
taxes, attendance by the consul of the accused or his representative
in the Ottoman criminal courts, and obtaining the consent of the
consul before searching a foreign domicile. All these privileges
were enjoyed by foreigners in Egypt, together with the extensive
consular jurisdictions over civil cases where their nationals were
defendants.^
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The extension of the application of these privileges and
immunities had been allowed to develop gradually as custom, adopted
as usage, and had led to complete judicial "chaos and babel".^ Jt
is important to emphasize that Egypt had not escaped the general
Westernization movement enunciated in the Ottoman Empire by virtue
1 3of the Tanzimat (reforms) of 1839. Reforms in the law were
considered vital for both Turkey and Egypt so that they could show
that their countries provided a safe place and a secure environment
for foreigners and foreign capital.^ It was on to the stage thus
set, that there stepped on 18 January 1863, Isma'il, grandson of
Mohammad Ali. Isma'il's avowed purpose was to modernise Egypt and
he realized that, in order to carry out his modernisation schemes,
he had to establish a stable and just legal system to which both
Egyptians and foreigners could resort. On 27 May 1866 he succeeded
in obtaining from the Sultan a firman, enabling him to govern Egypt
on the basis of male primogeniture rather than male seniority in the
family, as had been allowed by the firman of 1841. Although he
governed under the sovereignty of the Sultan, for all practical
purposes he actually governed under the rules of Egypt.^
However, some European powers did not consider that Isma'il had
any capacity to conclude with them treaties concerning judicial
reform. To overcome this obstacle, he succeeded in securing
another firman of 8 June 1873,^ giving him almost unrestricted
legislative autonomy and full control over non-political external
affairs such as commerce, customs and other external matters. In
his reign, capitulations were a scandal, with the consular staff of
most of the 14 countries enjoying privileges and considering it
their appointed task to protect their own nationals, with the result
that it became almost impossible to secure a conviction against a
foreigner in either civil or criminal cases. The inability of the
consuls to track down offenders or enforce their decrees, the
endless delays in proceedings in their courts and appeals, the
diversity of their law and procedure,^ and the impossibility of
securing convictions for offences against public revenue and




Originally designed to protect foreign interests, the
capitulations had developed into extra-territorial privileges that
protected racketeers of all kinds - smugglers, forgers, gamblers
and even murderers.^ Premises occupied by foreigners could not be
entered by Egyptian authorities and became the sanctuary of
criminals pursuing their illegal trade, even also affording refuge
90
to Egyptian criminals. w
Since most commerce was in the hands of foreigners, and quasi-
foreigners (i.e. nationals taken under foreign protection by a gross
91
abuse of power), most commercial disputes involving foreigners and
their consuls were decided by consular courts. These courts were
found to be ineffective in most cases and the judges were without
legal qualifications. When a foreigner had a dispute with the
Egyptian Government, and this was quite common because most of the
modernisation schemes were carried out by foreigners, essentially no
Egyptian tribunal would pass a judgement against the Egyptian
Government or Khedive. Thus the consuls intervened and took up the
claims of their respective nationals, however absurd or dishonest,
and submitted them to the Egyptian Government. This explains why
Egypt had paid out indemnities for many worthless projects and was
99unable to have claims tested on their merits. In this way the
Khedive was defendant to numerous lawsuits, having for their object
the extraction of money under one pretext or another. He is
reported on one occasion to have hastily closed an open window when
a notorious European merchant entered his audience chamber. Upon
being asked the reason for this action, he replied bitterly: "If
that man catches cold it would cost me thousands to cure hira".^
In a report submitted to the Khedive Isma'il by his Armenian
Foreign Minister, Nubar Pasha, it was observed that:
The jurisdiction which determines the relations between the
Europeans and the government of Egypt and the inhabitants of
the country, is no longer based on the capitulations. The
capitulations exist only in name. They have been replaced by
an arbitrary law of custom, varying with the character of each
diplomatic chief - a law based upon precedents frequently
abusive, which has been permitted to take root in Egypt through
force of circumstances and constant pressure and desire to make
easy the lot of the foreigners. It leaves the government
powerless in relation to such foreigners and the people without
any security that even-handed justice will be done. 24
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It is quite clear that the commencement of a better order of
things was brought about by circumstances apparently foreign to the
question of judicial reform in the country. The many difficulties
to which the capitulations gave rise became a source of anxiety to
the Egyptian Government. These conditions called for some sort of
reform. The Egyptian Government made representations to the
various capitulatory powers, pointing out the difficulties and
asking their cooperation with a view to establishing a new system.
In its inception, the Egyptian Government's project had suggested a
practical transfer of the consular courts to new tribunals in which
foreign judges would sit side by side with national judges and
administer not foreign but national law. It is impossible to trace
here in detail the course of the diplomatic battle that followed.
However, on 28 October 1869 an international commission was arranged
in Cairo, under Nubar Pasha's presidency, Isma'il's special agent
and his chief negotiator in his dispute with the Suez Canal Company
and in the floating of his loans. The Commission included in its
membership delegates from Austria, Germany, Great Britain, Italy,
Russia, France and the USA. The work of the Commission was
interrupted by the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War. The delay
in the work of the Commission gave the Turkish Sultan an opportunity
to oppose the independent action taken by Egypt in this particular
25
regard. In order to overcome this difficulty Nubar succeeded in
securing from the Sultan another firman issued in 1873, giving Egypt
greater power to negotiate with foreign states.
A second international commission met at Cairo four years later
to consider new proposals and schemes. The work of this commission
resulted in a project and various recommendations which were put
before the capitulatory powers. Eventually, at Constantinople,
conventions with European powers were formulated by the Egyptian
Government and these were known as the Reglement d'Organization
Judiciare (The Charter of the Mixed Tribunals) and the Code which
O A
the courts were to apply. The time between 1873 and 1875 was
spent mostly in arranging practical matters, and the courts were
officially opened in January 1876, with the first cases being heard
- 155 -
9 7
on 1 February 1876. The rules dealing with the whole machinery
28
were subsequently modified, and the courts were abrogated in 1949.
The organization of the courts comprised three district courts
at Cairo, Alexandria and al-Mansourah, and a Court of Appeal sitting
at Alexandria with typical appellate jurisdiction. Each of the
district courts was originally composed of seven judges, three of
whom were Egyptians. The number of judges of the Court of Appeal
was 11, 4 Egyptians and 7 foreigners. The power to select foreign
judges and the method of selection had given rise to controversial
debates during the diplomatic negotiations between the Egyptian
Government and the capitulatory powers.^ Yet it was eventually
agreed that the right to appoint foreign judges lay with the
Egyptian Government after consulting their respective governments.
The courts were declared independent from any interference by the
Egyptian Government in the sense that no Egyptian judge should
accept any mark of distinction or honour from the government.
However, it has to be emphasized that the consular courts
survived the establishment of the Mixed Courts and continued to deal
with civil litigations between foreigners of the same nationality
and the prosecution of crimes committed by foreign subjects (other
20
than those within the competence of the Mixed Courts). At the
time of the establishment of the Mixed Courts, other Egyptian
judicial institutions existed: a) Sharia Courts; b) Mejlis or
administrative Courts of the ruler; and c) personal status courts
for cases involving non-Muslim religious disputes. In addition to
their jurisdiction in minor offences, the Mixed Courts were
established to apply a mixed code of civil law, commercial law,
maritime law, and civil and criminal procedure based upon the French
models.
The Mixed Courts were designed to deal not only with questions
between European nationals inter se but also with disputes which
might arise between them and Egyptian nationals. The jurisdiction
of the courts in civil and commercial matters extended over all
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suits between Egyptians and foreigners of any nationality, even
although the foreigners might belong to a state which was not one of
the signatories to the Treaty under which the Mixed Courts were
O 1
established, and which would not have capitulatory privileges.
The term 'Mixed Courts' serves to indicate the nature of the
jurisdiction assumed by the courts from the very beginning. The
competence of the courts as laid down in Art. 9 of the old Reglement
O O
d'Organization Judiciare, involved an exclusive jurisdiction in
the following types of litigation:
i- between foreigners of different nationalities;
ii- between foreigners and Egyptians; and
iii- regardless of nationality of litigants, cases concerning land
property.
However, it should be stressed that the word 'foreigners' was
not limited to subjects of those capitulatory powers who had
participated in the process of establishing the courts. Following
literally the letter of their charter, the Mixed Courts, from the
beginning, held that the courts were open to subjects and citizens
of all foreign powers. But much greater difficulties were
experienced in treating as foreigners the members of the new states
which were carved out of the Ottoman Empire (i.e. Palestine, Syria
O O
and Iraq). On this point an interesting case was decided by the
Mixed Court of Mansoura in 1911."^ A certain Syrian born in Beirut
was a French protegee. It was held that foreign protection should
be recognized as genuinely foreign unless the status was clearly
changed by a treaty.
In 1926 the Mixed Court of Appeal adopted the view that Syrians
were not to be deemed foreigners for the purpose of the jurisdiction
35of the courts. This decision would have been soundly accepted
before the Treaty of Lausanne 1923, under which Turkey abandoned all
her possessions in Egypt and Asia Minor, but was hardly acceptable
under the new system. It was believed that the signature of the
Treaty of Lausanne had made the position quite clear. Thus, for
the purpose of the jurisdiction of the courts, Syrians should have
been treated as foreigners. The Mixed Court of al-Mansoura
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rendered a judgement on 15 November 1927 in which it adopted a
similar view in express disagreement to the decision of the Court of
Appeal. The court held that the mere fact that Bulgarians were
Ottoman subjects would not prevent their being treated as foreigners
when they were no longer Turkish subjects. It follows that
there is no legal basis for distinguishing between Bulgarians and
Syrians in this particular regard. Therefore, although the
jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts was founded primarily on the
difference of nationality between the parties, the courts had from
the very beginning to go considerably beyond the letter of this
limit.
A new formula was devised by the courts, with the result that
the competence of the courts was not exclusively determined by the
nationality of the parties, but also by the character of the
interests involved. This wide interpretative stance was expressly
O O
followed in a case concerning the Suez Canal Company. The
company was established in 1866 by an agreement concluded by Egypt
with the company. Art. 16 of the Convention declared the company
to be Egyptian, while the internal administration of the company was
left to be determined by French law. The court declared itself
competent on the ground that the foreign holding of shares in the
company was sufficient to justify the competence of the court, and
thus there was a mixture of interests, regardless of the fact that
the company was expressly declared as Egyptian by the convention.
The theory of mixed interests thus enunciated was soon followed
89
in number of cases. One important case in which the theory
was applied in 1888 was that of Daire Sanieh,^ in which the
Mixed Courts of Appeal made it clear that their jurisdiction was
determined whenever 'mixed' interest was discoverable, and not
according to the nationality of those who safeguarded the interests.
This theory brought within the jurisdiction of the courts all
the cases in which foreign states and their organs were involved.
The competence of the Mixed Courts in cases of state immunity was
primarily founded on this theory of mixed interests. However, it
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should be borne in mind that the new development had greatly
contributed to the confidence necessary for the investment of
foreign capital, and may thus be said to have been of great benefit
to Egypt. At the same time it enabled foreign capital to make the
best of both worlds, since by registering in Egypt, a British or
French-owned company could escape heavy taxation, while at the same
time remaining exempt from the jurisdiction of the national
41
courts.
The operation of this doctrine of 'mixed interests' gave the
Mixed Courts practically a monopoly of bankruptcy cases and
commercial litigation, and other civil cases involving foreign
states. This development, however, did undermine the national
courts.
II. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE MIXED COURTS
AND STATE IMMUNITY
The Mixed Courts provided interesting material on state
immunity. These courts had been consistent throughout in denying
immunity to foreign states with regard to their acta jure gestionis.
One of the first questions to arise is why this relatively recent
trend in the law of state immunities at that time had shown itself
clearly and so early in the jurisprudence of the Mixed Courts.
1. The Impact of Continental Law
One answer appears to be that the organization procedure and
the law applied by those courts were to a large extent continental
institutions, where the restrictive trend of state immunities
originated.
1) In its law and organization the courts were largely influenced
/ o
by the continental concept and practice. The judges of the Mixed
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Courts comprised different European nationalities,^ among which the
most numerous foreign judges were from continental Europe where the
theory of limited immunity had firstly been adopted. On the other
hand, Anglo-Saxon judges, who were familiar with the traditional
doctrine of absolute immunity, were relatively few.
2) The laws applicable by the Mixed Courts were basically modelled
on continental civil law. Six codes were promulgated: civil,
commercial, maritime, penal, civil and criminal procedure, which the
Mixed Courts were to apply in all cases that came before them. It
was further provided that, in the case of silence, incapacity or
obscurity of the law, the judges should conform to the principle of
natural law and equity,^ "the equity of course not of English, but
of Roman law".^ The preparation of these codes had been entrusted
to foreign officials who, almost without exception, had been trained
solely in the continental school of jurisprudence, and who
consequently were disposed to look upon the models furnished by the
code Napoleon. It was in reality according to an English observer,
"a system of pure and unadulterated French law".^ The codes were
presented in French to the capitulatory powers and accepted in that
language
3) The organization and procedure of the Mixed Courts were
AO
unfamiliar to English, and presumably also American lawyers. In
the whole conduct of a case, from beginning to end, the system
differed widely from that to which Anglo-Saxon lawyers were
accustomed.
4) Although there were four 'judicial languages', viz. French,
Italian, English and Arabic, any one of which in theory might be
used in the courts, in practice French alone was employed as the
medium, and in general was understood by all the judges. As an
English commentator said, "For a barrister to address the courts in
English .... would simply result in his not being understood".^
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It was probably due to these considerations that continental
jurisprudence in general, and the views of continental courts on the
question of sovereign immunity in particular, found a fertile soil
in the Mixed Courts of Egypt while the influence of the Anglo-Saxon
doctrine of the sovereign - and subsequently state immunities -
found no response in the Mixed Courts.
2. The Influence of the Competence of the Courts in Cases
in which the Egyptian Rulers and Government were involved
Another explanation for the restrictive trend of immunity
adopted by the Mixed Courts on the question of state immunities lies
in the fact that the Government, the administration, the Khedive and
the members of his family were made subject to the jurisdiction of
the courts.
Khedive Isma'il, in order to carry out his modernization
programme in Egypt, had contracted huge debts with various
creditors.^ A very large proportion of the debt was due to the
gross extravagances of the Khedive and his unprofitable
transactions. His creditors had taken advantage of the fact that,
as he was nominally under Turkish suzerainty, he could not contract
loans on the security of Egypt's revenue. Thus his creditors
forced on him unsecured loans at exorbitant rates of interest.
Again, his huge properties, the state railways, the
telegraphs, the sugar works, his palaces, the state lands were all
presented as security for his private debts. In this way the
status of the loan was confused since the Khedive's private debts
were made the liabilities of the state.^"'" The separation of the
liabilities of the state from those which were purely personal was
important since the latter would be charged to the private estates
of the Khedive and the former against the revenue of the country.
Furthermore, the confusion of liabilities in these cases had made
the task of the courts more difficult, since the jurisdiction of the
Mixed Courts over the matter of sovereignty was excluded. Art. 6
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of the Mixed Civil Code provided that: "In disputes with
foreigners, the Mixed Courts were competent to decide matters
relating to the Government and the Khedive's land and that of his
family" provided that there was no question of acts of sovereign
S3
authority being involved.
In this way cases concerning the Khedive's debts were brought
before the courts. Only a few months from the opening of the Mixed
Courts, these cases were decided and the Khedive was summoned before
the courts as defendant in these suits,and in the passage of
time, case after case was decided by the courts against the Khedive.
However, it must be emphasized that most of these decisions remained
unenforced for a long period because of the refusal of the Egyptian
Government to cooperate in enforcing them. The consequences of
this act of non-cooperation on the part of the Government have been
identified as two-fold:
1) The capitulatory powers, who accepted the tribunal system when
they surrendered their privileges, viewed this refusal by the
Khedive to enforce these decisions as a serious obstruction of, and
a manifest reduction in, the powers of the courts.
2) The native Egyptians condemned their rulers for having failed
to implement these decisions since that act would amount to gross
defiance of the law, from which the native population wanted to see
that their government was not immune.^
In fact the Khedive remained adamantly against assisting the
employees of the Mixed Courts in enforcing the judgements rendered
against his government for quite a long time.
The clashes between the courts and the Government raised
serious differences of opinion among the judges of the courts.
Some refused to assume jurisdiction on the ground that the assets of
the Government could not be made subject to measures of execution,
since they were Government property. The court made it clear that
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this is a general rule, for which an exception must be shown by the
r si
creditors concerned. On the other hand, some of the judges were
extremely reluctant to sit in courts whose decisions would be
obstructed by the actions of the Government. Thus, on the
Khedive's refusal to enforce a decision rendered against him, a
Dutch judge openly declared that he was unwilling to sit on this
trial and closed the court.^
This explains how the Mixed Courts, who owed their existence to
the Khedive Isma'il, were the instrument which dealt him a death
blow when he was deposed on 30 June 1879. But the practical result
of these clashes was that the Mixed Courts had tended from the
beginning to act contrary to the principle that a government cannot
CO
be sued without its consent.
The cases involving the Egyptian Government and the Khedive
were accompanied by other decisions enunciating or demonstrating
general principles. The question of the competence of the courts
occupied a large amount of the courts' time, and a number of
guidelines were set out for deciding cases involving public
sovereignty, reviewing administrative actions, and the status and
capacity of government organs.^
3. Basis of the Competence of the Mixed Courts over
Foreign States
In determining its competence the courts had from the beginning
gone considerably beyond the letter of its charter. The result was
that the competence of the courts was not exclusively determined by
the nationality of the parties, but also by the character of the
interest involved. This wider interpretation brought within the
jurisdiction of the courts the largest enterprises of the country,
including the Suez Canal Company and the entire banking system of
Egypt.
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The most notable case decided by employing the theory of "mixed
interests" concerned the Suez Canal Company.^ The Mixed Court of
Alexandria assumed jurisdiction on the ground that foreigners held
shares in the Suez Canal Company and thus there were mixed
interests, irrespective of the nationality of the company. The
same theory was also elaborated in other cases in which foreign
f\ 1
interests were discoverable.
The "mixed interests" formula was also used to bring within the
jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts cases involving Daira Sanieh. The
Mixed Court of Alexandria held that its jurisdiction was based
essentially on the nature of the interests involved and not on the
/" r\
nationality of those who held them.
Similarly, the same theory was used to subject foreign state
organs to the courts' jurisdiction. The most important case on
this point was one concerning the Ottoman Bank. The Bank was a
financial institution managed by a board of directors whose members
were residents of various European countries and Turkey. It was
regulated by a concession secured from the Sublime Porte of 18
September 1878 and 5 April 1879, and the Egyptian Government held
interests therein. It was asserted by the latter that the Bank was
outside the sphere of the Mixed Courts. The Court refused to accept
the contention and declared itself competent on the ground that the
concessions which regulated the establishment of the Bank were
private agreements and could not oust the jurisdiction of the court.
The plea of state immunity was directly raised and it was
claimed that the Bank was in reality an agency of the Ottoman Empire
exercising governmental functions on behalf of that latter. The
claim was rejected by the court which observed that the function of
the bank as treasurer and paymaster is a function which could be
exercised by the bank to the public at large and the fact that the
Ottoman Empire was one of the customers of the bank was not
s: o
sufficient to remove the competence of the court over the dispute.
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The next case in which the question of immunity was directly
involved concerned the Caisse de la Dette.^ The main question
before the court was whether the Egyptian Government was entitled to
spend the surplus money of the commission as it deemed fit. This
case, which is often referred to as the Dongola Expedition case, was
in essence a dispute in which the court had to rule on whether the
money was spent in reconquering the Sudan after the Mahdi's
revolution. The money necessary for the expedition was drawn from
the commission's fund. Later a dispute arose concerning the
repayment of the loan. The Egyptian Government argued that the
advance of money was an act of sovereignty which could not be
questioned by the Mixed Courts. The Courts, however, declined to
assume jurisdiction on the ground that the advance of money for the
expedition was des depenses extraordinaires and thus constituted an
act of sovereignty. The importance of this decision lies in the
fact that it was the first decision of its kind in which the Mixed
Courts accepted the distinction between sovereign and private acts
and actually based its decision on such a ground, although the final
result was to grant the immunity claimed. In this case the court
seemed to be influenced to a measurable extent by the fact that the
attempt to reconquer the Sudan, which was undertaken by both the
British and Egyptian Governments, was essentially an act involving
the assertion of sovereignty in other territories and notoriously
designed to achieve that purpose. In this context, the court was
prepared to view the advancement of the fund as an extraordinary
purpose.
Another significant case in which the question of state
immunity was directly at issue was one in which the status of the
Sudan was examined by the Mixed Courts.^ The plaintiffs brought
an action for repayment from both Egyptian and Sudanese Governments
for work they had done in Port Sudan, claiming that the Sudan was an
integral part of Egypt and that, therefore, the Egyptian Government
was responsible for its debts. The most interesting point in this
case was that the Egyptian Government relied on the Anglo-Egyptian
Convention of 1899 which established the condominium over the Sudan,
asserting that the Sudan was established as a distinct and separate
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entity from Egypt. On the other hand, the Sudan Government,
relying also on the same convention, claimed that the Mixed Courts'
competence was excluded over the Sudan. Both arguments were
accepted by the Court which, accordingly, declared itself
incompetent.
The decision of the court was in accord with the provision of
the convention, since it was expressly provided in Art. VII of the
Agreement^ that the jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts shall not
extend to nor be recognized in any part of the Sudan. However, the
same appears not to be true as far as the argument of the Egyptian
Government is concerned, since it was clearly felt by the court that
the Agreement in effect had vested some sort of sovereign rights
over the Sudan in the Egyptian Government. Moreover, the decision
virtually runs counter to the Public Debt Commission's case, since
it was clearly recognized in that case that what the Egyptian
Government had done in raising funds for reconquering Sudan was an
act of sovereignty. It is in regard to this particular point the
decision has not provided a satisfactory answer to the question of
why state immunity should be granted.
The distinction between sovereign and private acts continued to
be applied by the Mixed Courts, throughout their history, to
disputes in which the Egyptian Government was involved. Cases
regarding the responsibility of the Egyptian Government to maintain
law and order and its consequences were examined by the courts on
the basis of the same distinction in order to rule over private
litigants' claims against the Government.
During a riot in Alexandria in 1921 a foreign alien, standing
on a balcony, was shot by a policeman. An action for loss of life
was brought against the Egyptian Government before the District
Court of Alexandria. The court refused to entertain the action on
the ground that the act of the police was essentially an act of
sovereignty of the Egyptian Government. When the case was brought
before the Mixed Court of Appeal, the court ruled that there was no
doubt that the police were part of the state organ for the purpose
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of law and order. Nevertheless, their acts were subject to
judicial review like any other administrative action. The court,
however, held that the Egyptian Government had been negligent in
arming an unskilled employee and therefore was vicariously liable
67
for the act of its servant. It is not clear how the court in
this case based its decision on negligence. If the act of the
police, as the court had observed, constituted an act of
sovereignty, then it becomes very difficult to understand how the
court assumed jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the case. As
had already been stated by the courts on numerous occasions, the
question of jurisdiction goes with immunity, and if there is
immunity on the basis of a sovereign act, then it could rightly be
asked how the court could entertain the suit albeit with this
virtual absence of jurisdiction, which the court seemed to imply by
classifying the act in question as a sovereign act.
The Summary Tribunal of Alexandria in a similar case went a
step further and held that the question of sovereignty could not be
invoked in cases where the police were guilty of gross negligence in
their normal duties and, as a result, an individual had suffered
68
injury. This was a case in which the claimant brought an action
for damage to property during a demonstration against opponents of
the Government. The court held the Egyptian Government responsible
for the repair of the plaintiff's car.
Apart from the contradiction with the concept of jurisdiction,
these two cases were a source of serious concern to the Egyptian
Government, for it was difficult to see how, under these
circumstances, a government could discharge its duties to the public
in maintaining law and order. Moreover, these judgements had
bluntly invoked the question of the protection of innocent
individuals, since in fact there was no statutory provision giving
the private individual the right to claim compensation for damage
69
occurring during a riot.
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It may be remarked that it was on the basis of the "mixed
interests" formula on the one hand, and the distinction between a
sovereign and a private act on the other, that the Mixed Courts were
prepared to subject foreign states and their agencies to the
jurisdiction of the courts. These two concepts were so closely
linked to the question of competence that the courts had never
hesitated to declare themselves competent in cases in which foreign
states were directly or indirectly impleaded. There was perhaps
not a single case in which an individual foreign government had been
treated favourably in this regard. All were made subject to the
jurisdiction of the courts on the same legal basis.
The relevance of the previously discussed cases to the general
treatment of state immunity may be summarized as follows:
In the first place these decisions broadened the extent to
which the Egyptian Government was subject under domestic law to
civil suit for their wrongful acts arising from contracts or torts.
Since the establishment of the Mixed Courts, the Egyptian Government
has been open to suit in the courts for breach of contract and for
claims of damages and thus the immunity of the Egyptian state for
tort claims has been removed with certain exceptions that are
discussed when considering tort actions against the Egyptian
Government. Thus, the Mixed Courts have followed a clear evolution
toward greater state responsibility for injury to citizens.
In the second place these cases have restricted immunity to
instances in which the Egyptian state has acted in its official
capacity as a sovereign political entity. These cases had given
the Mixed Courts an ample opportunity to test the application of the
distinction and eventually to develop a body of case-law which
provides the restrictive trend with valuable materials and legal
analysis when assuming jurisidiction over foreign states.
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III. THE GENERAL TREND
1. Possible Exceptions to the General Rule of
State Immunity
The rule laid down by the Ottoman Bank case of 1890 concerning
the competence of the Mixed Courts over foreign states began to be
settled by the courts towards the 1900s. It was not surprising
that under the circumstances explained above, namely the impact of
continental jurisprudence on the courts' structure and composition,
the Mixed Courts followed those of Belgium and Italy to decide suits
against foreign states so long as the question of sovereignty was
not involved. This trend of judicial opinion was reaffirmed early
in 1901 when the first case involving the matter of state immunities
came before the Court of Appeal in Alexandria in the case of
Gelderland.^ The "Gelderland", a Dutch cruiser, collided with an
Egyptian merchant vessel in Port Said and her captain in his
official capacity brought an action for recovery of damages. The
court declared itself competent on the ground that the Dutch
Government was submitting voluntarily to the jurisdiction "which it
can indubitably do".
Having thus endorsed the restrictive doctrine of immunity, the
case marked a new era in which the Mixed Courts had recognized that
voluntary submission constituted a waiver of immunity, thus enabling
the courts to assume jurisdiction. It seems that the court had
interpreted the institution of proceedings by the captain of the
Dutch Government-owned vessel as an act of voluntary submission,
since the captain had decided of his own accord to bring the suit
before the Mixed Courts and had thus indicated his intention to
submit to the jurisdiction of the courts. The effect of this
submission was clearly to disentitle the Dutch Government from
pleading jurisdictional immunity in the context of the proceedings
that had been initiated by its own volition.
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(a) Succession
It was not until 1912 that the same court set forth the
doctrine which has come to be identified with continental
jurisprudence. In the Dame Marigo case,^ the court approved for
the first time the distinction between the competence of national
courts over the sovereign and the civil acts of foreign states.
Property real and personal situated in Egypt had been left to the
Greek state, and the widow of the testator instituted proceedings to
break the will. The Greek state was made a respondant, and entered
a plea to the jurisdiction of the court. The court refused to
accept the plea and declared itself competent.
In so doing, the court held that the only bases for competence
of courts as regards foreign states as defendants are sovereignty
and independence, which traditionally prevented them being subjected
to the jurisdiction of other states. As an exception, the
principle of immunity must be strictly interpreted and should not be
extended beyond the reason for its existence. Although the Greek
treasury was a foreign government organ, the court decided that the
same principles should be applied as if it had been a department of
the Egyptian Government. Thus the court found it necessary to
classify the acts of the Greek treasury. They were found to
emanate from the Greek Government as a personne civile, and were
therefore acts of a private character.
The importance of the decision lies in the fact that it is the
first instance in which the Mixed Courts began to recognize the
bases of state immunity in international law, namely, the
sovereignty and independence of states. Yet sovereignty was said
not to be involved since there was still no reason to extend it to
litigation regarding real property or succession in the country of
the forum. The influence of the continental jurisprudence on the
court was noticeable in this case: the chamber of the court
comprised eight judges, five of whom were foreigners. The court
also employed the comparative law technique by looking to judicial
decisions from outside their own jurisprudence. It referred to a
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leading Belgian case on the subject in approving the distinction
72under discussion. However, it is of interest to recall that
cases involving succession, gift or bona vacantia have been
increasingly recognized not to attract immunity in various recent
7Qnational legislations, conventions and draft conventions.
(b) Public ships employed for commercial purposes
It should be observed that the practice of states with regard
to state immunity in general started in many countries with the
recognition of the immunity of public armed ships,^ and gradually
the principle of state immunity was applied to the state itself or
its organs. The Mixed Courts case-law had similarly followed this
line. The Sumatra case (1920)^ involved a British vessel
belonging to His Brittanic Majesty and was commanded by Captain
Hall. The "Sumatra" collided with the "Mercedes", a Spanish ship,
in the harbour of Alexandria. An action for damages was brought
against Captain Hall who contested jurisdiction, claiming that the
court could not entertain a suit against a foreign state. He
produced a certificate to the effect that the vessel was owned by
His Brittanic Majesty despite the fact that she was engaged on a
commercial voyage and was commanded by a civilian. The court
rejected the claim, holding that it would be a negation of justice
to grant sovereign immunity where a civil wrong had been committed
by an employee of a foreign state in the management of its private
interests and without any connection with its political action.
Having thus retained jurisdiction, the Court of Appeal found it
necessary to proceed with the case upon its merits, and this having
been accomplished, a later judgement was given to the effect that no
fault had been established on the part of the captain of the British
ship and, therefore, no damages were awarded. The court clearly
based its jurisdiction on the private character of the activities of
the ship. It also rejected the criterion of ownership as a
decisive factor in determining the question of immunity. Thus the
fact that the ship was actually owned by the British Government was
considered to be irrelevant to the issue of jurisdiction.
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On this point, two judgements may be contrasted. The first,
is the W. Stapledons case,^ in which an English merchant vessel was
involved which had been charted by the British Admiralty for the
transport of troops. An Egyptian subject was killed as a result of
the manoeuvres of the vessel in the harbour of Port Said. In an
action for damages, the court declared itself incompetent to
investigate the responsibility of the British Government, or of its
agent, for the alleged fault of the officer in the performance of
his duty. The court held that:
It is generally admitted in international law that immunity
from jurisdiction in favour of warships extends to merchant
ships especially designed for the transport of troops and
commanded by officers belonging to the maritime corps. 77
It is clear from this judgement that the fact that a ship is a
private and not a public ship does not deprive her of immunity if it
is being used for a public purpose and is manned or commanded by an
officer of the Royal Navy and not merely a civilian. Therefore the
criteria for immunity now comprised three separate elements:
ownership on the part of the foreign state, performance of public
acts and command by a regular officer.
The second case was decided by the same court on 15 January
70
1924. The ship belonged to the Government of Hidjaz, and was
ordinarily armed and used for the defence of the Red Sea ports.
She was arrested in Egyptian waters for an alleged debt. At the
moment of attachment, she had been disarmed and employed in the
carriage of pilgrims. Her local agents raised the plea of
sovereign immunity on the ground that she was a public vessel
designated for coastal defence. In denying immunity, the court
pointed out that the mere fact that the vessel was the property of a
foreign government would not exempt it from the jurisdiction of the
court, and immunity could not be granted to states acting as
ordinary civil persons. The judgement cited a Belgian decision on
the subject as well as previous Egyptian case-law.
At any rate the decision, like its predecessor, attached more
importance to the concept of ownership by the foreign state, but the
latter decision differs from the former in the test to be employed
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to distinguish between the private and public character of the
activities concerned. In the latter case, the court preferred to
adopt the 'subjective' test, or the capacity in which the foreign
government acted rather than the so-called 'objective' test, or the
nature of the activities involved.
On the other hand, the seizure of two Egyptian vessels by the
Soviet Government was held to be outside the jurisdiction of the
Mixed Courts, because the act of seizure was a clear manifestation
of the sovereign authority of the Soviet Union. It may be remarked
that the above three cases do not provide a satisfactory solution to
the difficulties inherent in the test which would permit the making
of a distinction between private and governmental service of foreign
state ships. However, it should be borne in mind that these cases
were decided before Egypt became a party to the 1926 Brussels
convention and its 1934 Additional Protocol,^ which favoured a more
restricted doctrine of immunity with regard to government-owned and
operated vessels employed in commercial and non-governmental
service. The convention expressly combined the character of the
service with that of its purpose, thus providing a two-way system
for solving the problem. Until its abolition in 1949, there was no
incident in which a foreign state had been sued in respect of its
ship, and the impact of the convention on the courts' jurisprudence
thus remains unknown.
(c) Commercial transactions
Another important exception to the general rule of state
immunity developed by the Mixed Courts is the commercial activities
of foreign states carried on by one of its organs or agencies. The
Mixed Courts, following the general trend of restricted immunity,
assumed jurisdiction in cases where state organs were involved, on
the same basis on which they declared themselves competent over
actions brought against the foreign states themselves.
Generally speaking, in all cases concerning state-owned
enterprises engaging in activities that were either private or
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commercial in nature, it was the established practice of the Mixed
Courts to assume jurisdiction. The first case involving a private
contract conducted through a sovereign entity which was decided by
the Mixed Courts was that of the Bank of Athens (1923).88 In 1918,
an Armenian resident in Egypt subscribed to an Armenian Republic
loan at a branch of the Bank of Athens. In 1920 Russia occupied
Armenia, and the subscriber claimed his share back from the Bank.
The Bank argued that it held the money on behalf of the Armenian
Government, and only the latter could make the appropriate order
concerning the money. It was held by the District Court of Cairo
that the plaintiff was entitled to the refund of his money. When
the loan was subscribed, it was designed to help the Armenian
Republic, a purpose that was no longer realizable since Russia had
expressly declared its intention to absorb Armenia. Under these
circumstances the Court concluded that Armenia's status was
completely changed from that which was contemplated by the plaintiff
when he had subscribed to the loan, and thus was no longer a
republic for the purpose of the loan. However, the question of
immunity was only marginal. The decision of the court appears to
have been based on the non-existence of the foreign state rather
than on its entitlement to immunity. But the refusal of the Bank's
argument implied that, even if the Armenian Republic was still in
existence, the plaintiff would still have been able to dispute the
validity of the bank's right to hold the money on whatever other
grounds. The decision was also seen as a popular one since it
avoided any detriment to the considerable Armenian minority in
Egypt.81
The first case in which a state-organized entity appeared
82before the court was that of Borg (1926). This was an action
brought against the defendant Bank, an agency of the French
Government, for the repayment of a deposit. The defendant
contested jurisdiction, inter alia, alleging that the Bank was part
of the French state and hence not liable to be sued in Egyptian
courts. The court refused to accept the contention and declared
itself competent on the basis of the implicit submission to
jurisdiction by carrying out commercial activities outside her own
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territory. The court observed that it was irrelevant "whether the
defendant was separate from or incorporated in a French Department
of Government". The exercising of banking functions, including the
receiving of funds for deposit, were essentially private acts.
According to the judgement, the Bank was a mere alterego or organ
of the French Government. However, the plaintiff's claim was
dismissed by the courts on other grounds.
Perhaps the most interesting point in the judgement is the
notion of implied consent to submit to the jurisidiction which was
identified by the courts to stem from the carrying out of commercial
transactions by a foreign state outside its own territory. The
courts had in effect entered an arena which was not well known in
state practice and very little had been written on the point. It
seems that the issue as far as the courts were concerned was not
only that of principle, but also of practicality, in the sense that,
when a foreign state entered the free market outside its frontiers,
it consented implicitly to waive any state immunity in regard to its
commercial activities. The second point of interest in the
judgement relates to the determination of whether the bank was an
organ of the French Government and thus entitled to immunity. The
court focused attention on the relation between the French state and
the Bank and found that the relation was solely a matter of
supervision. In this context, the Courts held that the supervision
exercised by the French Government was not considered to be
sufficient by itself to transform the exercise of private rights
into a manifestation of public authority.
OO
Similarly, in the Monopole des Tabacs case, the management of
a tobacco monopoly was held not to involve an act of sovereignty as
the state had extended its activities into the realm of private
interests. The case concerned a plea of immunity from a suit by a
former employee of the Turkish Tobacco Monopoly for damages for an
alleged unfair dismissal. The Turkish Government claimed immunity,
alleging that the monopoly was an agency of the Turkish Government
and that the action could not be maintained in the Egyptian Courts.
The Court of Appeal of Alexandria held that the Turkish Government
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was not acting in its public capacity in conducting the tobacco
monopoly and therefore it was impossible to accept the allegation
that, as the plaintiff was an employee of the Turkish state, his
dismissal was an act of public administration.
Apart from the characterization of the monopoly as essentially
management of a business of a private character, the case added an
exceedingly important exception to the general rule of state
immunity, namely contracts of employment concluded by the foreign
state or its agency and to be performed within the jurisdiction of
the local courts. The recognition of this exception in effect
amounts to a recognition of an independent cause of action in favour
of an employee against the employer state. That is to say, the
breach of a term of contract of employment, based on an existing
contractual relation, is binding on the employer state for the
performance of a service in the forum state. It is not clear from
the judgement whether the jurisdiction of the court is based on the
non-governmental nature of the monopoly concerned or on the specific
breach of the contractual obligation arising out of the contract of
employment. The courts appear to have combined both the elements
to presuppose the existence of a valid jurisdiction. However, the
court has left open the question of applicable law to the dispute,
since the parties had not expressly chosen the law to govern their
contractual relations, although the importance of the case is the
point of jurisdiction and not the applicable law. Finally, the
case tends to suggest that the legal consequences of dismissal in
breach of a contract of employment were the result of an act done in
the exercise of non-governmental authority and, therefore, immunity
was implicitly recognized in cases where such legal consequences
were a direct result of an act of public power. It should be
recalled at this point that the area of contract of employment has
been regarded as an exception to state immunity by the countries
which have adopted national legislation on state immunity,®^ and is
reflected in an increasing number of regional conventions and draft
O rr
conventions on the subject.
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An interesting case in which the claim of immunity was denied
in relation to a commercial transaction on behalf of a foreign state
was that of Egyptian Delta Rice.*^ In this case the Commercial
Tribunal of Alexandria confirmed an order holding two Spanish
organizations, the General Commissariat of Supply and Transport and
the Industrial and Development Rice Federation, jointly liable on a
contract to buy rice. The court applied the distinction between
actes de gestion and actes de pouvoir with the result that the order
against the two organizations was affirmed. The most interesting
aspect of the decision is that the purchase of rice for the feeding
of the Spanish population during the crisis that followed the Second
World War was considered by the court to be a commercial transaction
and not necessarily an act of the Spanish sovereign authority. The
court characterized the transaction as commercial since,
in negotiating this purchase herself, instead of leaving the
matter to private enterprise, Spain proceeded in much the same
manner as any other Spanish trader would have done who wanted
to buy rice in Egypt, that is she got it out of Egypt with the
necessary permit and carried it to Spain in a Spanish ship in
order to re-sell it on the usual commercial lines. 87
It is worth noting that the distinction drawn by the court,
between commercial and public transactions, was somewhat harsh,
since in buying the rice, the Spanish Government was exercising its
responsibility to its people, and as such the transaction should
have been safeguarded by immunity. The court, however, refused to
take account of the motive of the Spanish Government in purchasing
the rice and rigidly preferred to determine the function of the
Spanish organization by reference to the nature of the act. Taken
in this context, the decision was regarded as an extreme example of
OO
commercial transactions.
Further, the Mansourah District Court affirmed a decision of
the Summary Tribunal that the Mixed Courts had jurisdiction over the
on
Palestinian Railways. The court assumed jurisdiction in an
action against the Palestine Railways, notwithstanding the plea that
it was a state organ and immune from liability. The court
classified the activities of the Railways as a commercial venture of
the Palestine Government on the following grounds:
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1. In conducting a railway undertaking the Government of
Palestine was performing an act of administration; 2. by
making the contract of carriage it had entered the sphere of
private law; and 3. in view of the fact that the contract was
to be performed in Egypt, the Mixed Courts had jurisdiction.
The decision is a clear judicial endorsement of the restrictive
doctrine of immunity based on the concept of trading activities of a
foreign state. It may be remarked that the judgement has not only
affirmed non-immunity in respect of a commercial contract but has
also added another element or qualification, namely, that the
contract has to be performed within the forum state or within the
jurisdiction of the local courts, for the latter's competence to be
perfected. In this way the court relied not only on public
international law but also on rules of private international law to
determine issues of jurisdictional competence over foreign states.
A decision following closely on the lines here laid down was
rendered on 14 February 1927 by an Italian judge sitting in the
Court of Referee in Cairo,^ when he held that the renting of a
furnished villa by the Sudanese Government was not an act of public
authority but a contract of private law, for which the government
was subject to the jurisdiction of foreign courts. Hence the judge
was competent to order the making of an inventory required by the
tenants upon the handing over of the villa.
Cases of commercial activities of foreign states continued to
appear before the Mixed Courts until its last days. Shortly before
the courts were finally closed down, the Mixed Courts in Cairo held
that a contract for the purchase of immovables by a foreign legation
to be used as an "hotel diplomatique" constituted a commercial act
and not a sovereign act and therefore was subject to local
jurisdiction.^ Thus the buying of immovables for use by a foreign
embassy was essentially a commercial activity, and immunity should
not be granted to foreign states concerned in a case in which a
dispute has arisen out of the performance of the contract of
purchase. The fact that the immovable was intended to be used for
a diplomatic mission did not seem to the court to be relevant nor
did it influence the decision in any degree. If it had, then the
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decisive test would have been the purpose of the contract rather
than its nature and, by ignoring that purpose, the court was
manifestly emphasing the character of the contract rather than its
motive.
2. Sovereign Immunity and Acts of Confiscation
In 1927, the Mixed Court of Alexandria was called upon to
consider the effect of an act of confiscation and recognition on
Q O
the issue of jurisdictional immunities. In this case, the
"Costi", a vessel belonging to the plaintiff, the National
Navigation Company of Egypt, had been seized on the high seas by a
band of men alleged to be acting under the instruction of the
Russian Government, taken to Odessa, confiscated by a decision of
September 2, 1927, and fitted out as a part of the Soviet merchant
fleet. While the vessel was anchored in Alexandria, the plaintiff
had issued a writ claiming its possession. The referee judge of
the tribunal, in delivering the judgement of the court, held that
the court was incompetent. He held that, however illegal and
reprehensible the confiscation, it was incontestable that, in using
the force of arms as well as the authority of its judiciary in
getting possession of the "Costi", the Soviet state was manifesting
its sovereign authority. As to the contention that the Soviet
Government had not been recognized by the Egyptian Government and
thus enjoyed no immunity for its acts, the court observed that the
fact that the USSR had not been recognized by Egypt might have
diplomatic and political consequences in the relations of the two
governments, but it would not sanction the refusal on the part of
the judges to accord to the USSR the prerogatives it enjoyed as a
sovereign state or to admit its undeniable existence. An order was
thereupon entered to lift the seizure.
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3. Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign Armed Forces
The Mixed Courts of Egypt granted jurisdictional immunities in
cases clearly involving manifestation of public authority.
Belonging to this category were cases involving members of foreign
armed forces. Certain actions brought by individuals against
members of foreign armed forces were not allowed to proceed because
these actions were clearly regarded as impleading an agent of a
foreign state exercising a duty for that foreign state. To that
extent they were regarded as clear cases of sovereign immunity.
QO
In the Guebali case the claimant leased his villa in Cairo to
the head of the French Military Mission in Egypt. After the expiry
of the lease, the defendant refused to give up possession of the
villa and claimed sovereign immunity as a member of the allied
forces in Egypt. The court rejected the defendant's argument and
ruled that, in the absence of a specific agreement between Egypt and
France, the transaction was an ordinary contract between a landlord
and a tenant and had nothing to do with sovereign immunity. A
state acting in its private capacity was not exempt from the
jurisdiction of the local courts and there could be no justification
for an agent of the state to be accorded immunity in relation to his
private business.^ On the other hand the rule of sovereign
immunity was recognized by the Mixed Courts in cases involving
accidents which occurred during military transportation. The Mixed
Court of Appeal granted immunity to the Greek Government in an
action by a plaintiff who was a victim of physical injury caused in
an incident involving a lorry belonging to the Royal Hellenic Air
Force. The court ruled that the Greek Government was immune from
the jurisdiction of the local courts because, in conducting the
operation of military transport, it was acting in its sovereign
capacity and was thus jurisdictionally immune.
The above cases were decided on the general principle of law
developed by the jurisprudence of the Mixed Courts in this area.
At the outbreak of the Second World War, the defence of Egypt was
assumed by British forces. Egypt concluded with Britain, on
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26 August 1936, a treaty agreeing to the terras by which immunity
from jurisdiction for the British soldiers and sailors was
considerably extended. By Art. 4 of the treaty it was agreed that
no member of the British Forces "should be subject to the criminal
jurisdiction of those courts in matters arising out of his official
duties".^ The exemption expressly provided for was unequivocally
confirmed by the Mixed Court of Appeal in the case of Ministere
Public v. Edward Alexander Spender*^ in which an action for damages
for an assault was brought against Spender, a civil servant with the
British forces in Egypt. The court refused to entertain the action
and held the immunity to extend to all the legal consequences of the
criminal acts of the defendant.
But the majority of the cases touching the issue which were
decided by the courts, were concerned not with members of the
British forces proper, but rather other foreign armed forces allied
to them. The question before the Mixed Courts was, therefore,
whether in the absence of such formal agreement with other powers
Egypt tacitly agreed to receive onto its territory other foreign
men-of-war allied to the British forces and to accord them the
benefit of the provisions of the 1936 Treaty or other similar
privileges and immunities. Since, by virtue of Art. 1 of the above
Treaty, the term "British Forces" was defined to include three
classes of persons, viz. i- soldiers, sailors and airmen; ii- every
civilian official of British nationality accompanying or serving
with the said forces, who was either granted relative status as an
officer, or held a pass designating his status, and who was paid out
of the British public funds; iii- wives, and children under 21
years of age, of the person mentioned in the preceding paragraphs,
the matter was further complicated by other provisions of the
convention: in particular, the Special Article by which the
privileges and immunities thus conferred were enjoyed only by
persons "stationed with or attached" to the British Forces who were
sojourning in Egypt in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of
Alliance.
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The first case in which the Mixed Courts addressed the question
of assimilation was that of Triandafilou.^ The appellant, a Greek
subject, being a sailor on a torpedo boat of the Greek fleet, struck
with a knife an agent of the local police. He was convicted by the
lower court and imprisoned for eight months. He appealed against
this judgement on the ground of the incompetence of the Mixed
Courts. The Court of Cassation rejected any suggestion that the
Egyptian Government had tacitly conceded to the members of the Greek
forces the same privileges and immunities that had been enjoyed by
the British forces under the 1936 convention. Having thus rejected
any assimilation between the two forces, the court proceeded on the
question of jurisdiction according to the general principles of law
and excluded at the outset the immunity of the warship since the
defendant was arrested on shore. The court observed that the
opinions of jurists were divided concerning the extent of immunities
of members of crew when they had gone ashore. The court cited the
Resolution of the Institute of International Law at its Stockholm
meeting in 1928 as being a consolidation of the relevant rules of
international law, and which was considered by the court as a
substantial reproduction of a similar work culminating in the
adoption of the Hague Rules of 1898 on the subject. The Resolution
in part stated that:
.... if personnel of the vessel while on shore on duty, whether
individually or collectively, are charged with offences
committed on shore on duty, the territorial authority may
proceed to their arrest but must deliver them over to the
commander of the vessel upon demand.
Basing its consideration on the above Article, the court confined
itself to the question as to whether the defendant was on duty when
he committed the offence. The court ruled that the sailor was
still on duty when he committed the offence since he did not return
on board to give an account of his deed. Being on duty was
considered by the court to be based on the nature of the order given
by the commander and not with regard to the person carrying out the
order. The court found that the defendant was sent ashore to
obtain supplies for the vessel and as such he was on official duty
regardless of his criminal actions and was thus immune from criminal
prosecution.
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Although the decision seems sound as to the determination of
the crucial time at which the defendant was held to be on prima
facie official duty, the same cannot be held to be true as regards
the nature and the circumstances in which the crime was committed by
the defendant. To regard the defendant as still on duty when he
was drunk and had stabbed a policeman is to extend the immunity of
members of the crew beyond the reason for which such immunity was
intended. The decision was criticized by an American commentator
on the subject,*'"'^ who took the view that the Resolutions of the
Institute of International Law cited by the court were intended for
application to foreign armed forces in time of peace, and Egypt was
de facto at war and thus, according to his view, the court was wrong
to borrow the rules embodied in the Resolutions as a base for its
decision. However, the defence can rightly be justified on grounds
of technicality since the Mixed Courts were seeking to apply their
jurisdiction on sensitive occasions and to strike a balance between
the desirability of enforcing the ordinary law with the needs of the
military forces stationed in Egypt for its defence.
The Mixed Court had another opportunity to examine the status
of members of the Greek forces in Egypt in a case involving a Greek
subject who was charged with criminal misappropriation before he
1 QO
joined the service. The defendant was prosecuted on the charge
of having continuously, from 1934 to 1938, misappropriated funds
which he managed as a business agent of a certain Nicolas, who had
become insane. After the prosecution was started, and while the
case was at the preliminary stage before the correctional court in
Cairo, the defendant joined the Greek Air Force in Egypt and
immediately maintained that the jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts had
been divested by his incorporation in the said force. He also
argued that the consent to the sojourn of the Greek troops is given
without reservation and as such involves as of right, in virtue of
international custom, complete immunity from jurisdiction as decided
by the Schooner "Exchange" case. On the other hand, the Egyptian
Government argued that it did not agree to grant to the Greek troops
the benefit of immunity from jurisdiction whether in civil or
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criminal matters, but the sole option of applying their military
code "within the limits of the Greek army".
The court rejected the defendant's plea of immunity, relying
inter alia on the official notice given by the Egyptian Government
on the subject of the character clothing the sojourn of the Greek
troops in Egypt and its previous decision in Spender's case. The
court also rejected the defendant's interpretation of the rule laid
down in the Schooner "Exchange" case, that the licence given to the
Greek troops to enter Egypt implied complete jurisdictional immunity
as a matter of international custom. The invitation of the Greek
troops to enter the jurisdiction of Egypt could not be interpreted
as a surrender of its sovereign power, an interpretation which was
well excluded by the fact that Egypt had expressly denied general
immunity in civil cases save as secured by the rule of state
immunity. For these reasons the court declared itself competent.
It may be remarked that the court, faced with the absence of a
special agreement governing the status of foreign armed forces in
Egypt, referred the matter to the Egyptian Government for its
official views and, on receipt of such views, the court regarded
them as highly relevant for the determination of the issue before
it. This policy appears to be in conformity with the new political
climate following the adoption of the Montreux Convention of 1937
which was designed to remove all the restraints placed on the right
of the Egyptian government to enact laws concerning foreigners in
the country, and further reinforced by the established jurisprudence
of the Mixed Courts to draw the distinction between private and
public acts of foreign states.
Cases involving members of foreign armed forces without
specially agreed immunity continued to appear before the Mixed
Courts. The next case involved a Spanish member of the French
i cn
Foreign Legion in Egypt. J The defendant was remanded before the
Court of Assizes for having, on 1 September 1943, attempted to
murder one Tahan, while on land in Egypt outside premises occupied
by his unit. He raised the question of the competence of the
- 184 -
jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts by arguing that there was in
existence an international custom, according to which a soldier who
is a member of a body of troops present in a foreign country with
the consent of the sovereign of that country is subject only to the
jurisdiction of the military courts of his own country to the
exclusion of other jurisdiction.
Once again, as there was no agreement between France and Egypt
relating to the immunities of French troops from the jurisdiction of
the Mixed Courts, the court reviewed at length the whole question of
military immunity and laid special emphasis on the distinction
between simple sojourn or passage of troops and occupation of
territory. The court referred to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936
(Arts. 1 and 8), for guidance to the solution of the difficulties
inherent in that distinction and also to the situation of Great
Britain in whose territory a large number of foreign troops were
present and whose status had remained intact and undisturbed
throughout the Second World War.
The Court of Cassation ruled that a tacit renunciation of
sovereignty could not reasonably be presumed, and stated that:
.... the Allied troops found in Egypt are not in occupation of
the territory; their activity is limited to purely military
activity within the confines of the premises which have been
assigned to them and in the centres of military operations
properly speaking without any public or administrative control
over the whole or any part of the territory.
Accordingly, the defendant's contention that he was governed by
French law was rejected.
The court agreed that the local courts could not interfere in
the internal administration of the military regulations peculiar to
the forces themselves, but pointed out that violation of common law
outside the military premises and without the soldier being on duty
at the time was the subject of doctrinal debate and different
judicial practice. American, British and Australian practice were
cited by the court, to show that the presence of foreign forces
within the local jurisdiction was exceptional and their immunities
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could not easily be presumed. The court also referred to the
Bustamente Code of 1928 to the same effect.
The court declined to accord immunity from jurisdiction to
the defendant on the ground that he was not on duty at the time of
the offence, and was outside the military premises for his own
private purposes. It held that there was no generally established
doctrine of immunity in international law in favour of foreign
troops present within the jurisdiction of another country with the
latter's consent.
The court rejected the appellant's claim that the Montreux
Convention of 1937 had transferred to the jurisdiction of the Mixed
Courts dating back to the period of the competence of the Mixed
jurisdiction, and that the French consular courts had always
declined to assume jurisdiction for the application of the French
military code in Egypt and thus the Mixed Courts cannot have a
wider competence than that possessed by the consular jurisdiction.
The court regarded the Montreux Convention as having enabled full
recovery of Egypt's sovereignty in criminal matters and full freedom
to legislate in regard to foreigners without regard to previously
applied foreign law.
The decision was regarded as a landmark, since it combined
various strands of the previous judgements, and resorted to
comparative law techniques by citing, analysing and examining
international opinions and the judicial practice of other juris¬
diction on this point. The decision also illustrates the
consistent adherence on the part of the Mixed Courts to draw a
distinction between private and public acts not only in relation to
foreign states but in relation to their representatives as well.
Finally, the decision may also be regarded as a further step towards
the revival of the Egyptian sovereignty as far as jurisdiction over
foreigners is concerned.
The rejection by the Court of Cassation of the contention that
there was a general immunity in time of war under which all members
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of the armed forces of a foreign power stationed or passing through
the territory of another power was upheld by the same court in
another case. In the Minister Public v. George Anne^-^ case, the
court dismissed a similar contention raised by the appellants who
were members of the crew of French warships anchored at Alexandria
and were accused of avoiding detention after their arrest in
connection with robbery and other crimes. The court also rejected
the contention that it was for France to punish the appellants or to
decide whether they were more useful on board a warship or in
prison.
1 r\si
This case may be contrasted with that of Korakis. The
defendant and three other members of a ship belonging to the Greek
fleet anchored at Port Said were charged with having caused grievous
bodily harm to one Zoumberos. The police arrested them and handed
them over to the military police of their own country. When they
were later charged with the offence mentioned, they pleaded the
incompetence of the Mixed Courts. Their contention was supported
by the commander of their ship, who based his objection on the
Resolutions of the Institute of International Law of 1928.107
court in the first instance accepted the objection and the Parquet
appealed on behalf of the Egyptian Government against the judgement.
In dismissing the appeal, the courts adopted the view that the
Resolution cited by the respondant must be regarded as applicable in
time of war as well as in time of peace.
The discussion of the matter by the court centred on striking a
balance between the two rival principles: the principle of
territorial jurisdiction and the legal fiction that the warship is a
floating territory of the flag state. The second of these two
principles involved the result that members of the crew enjoyed 'by
way of extension' personal immunities which would result in
withdrawing the crew to a greater or lesser extent from territorial
jurisdiction. In the court's opinion the question was not one of
the existence of jurisdiction but of the exercise of such
jurisdiction. Thus, if the commander waives such personal
immunities, e.g. by handing over the offender to the local
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authorities, the territorial power recovers the exercise of
jurisdiction. "If, however, the commander only surrenders them
subject to the reservation that he does not abandon the exercise of
jurisdiction already vested in him", this condition must be
respected by the territorial power.
On the other hand if, having arrested the offenders, the local
authorities handed them over to the commander of their vessel
without reservation the courts of the state whose flag the ship
flies recover their competence. If the surrender of the offenders,
in this case by the local police to the Greek authorities, was done
without any such reservation, the latter could properly claim the
exercise of jurisdiction by their courts according to Art. 20 of the
Resolution referred to above.
The reasoning of the court, while valid in itself, seems to
deviate from the principle already established by the previous
decisions that members of the crew when arrested on shore in
relation to penal charges were still subject to the competence of
the courts in the absence of an agreement with their countries as to
their privileges and immunities. The Resolutions of the Institute
place much emphasis on the question whether the sailor was on
official duty when he committed the offence, whereas the court
avoided the question of whether the defendants as sailors were on
duty or not. Furthermore, the court regarded the principle of the
immunities of a warship as vital to the determination of the issue,
whereas it was clear that the respondants were arrested on shore.
To this extent, the extension of the immunities of the crew to cover
acts committed outside the ship is a far reaching extension which
cannot be easily supported by the established jurisprudence of the
Mixed Courts in this area.
Cases concerning immunities of members of foreign armed forces
continued to appear even after the close of the Second World War and
right up to the last few days immediately preceding the abolition of
the Mixed Courts. The majority of the cases decided by the Mixed
Courts in that period were cases involving the British armed forces
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which were subject to the Anglo-Egyptian Convention of 1936. In
this way they posed no particular problems to the Mixed Courts, and
constituted a group of straightforward decisions if compared with
the other cases.
Two cases will illustrate the attitude taken by the courts
1 08
with regard to this category. In the Hanon case, decided by
the Civil Tribunal of Alexandria, the Military Governor in Egypt
requisitioned the plaintiff's villa in Cairo in June 1943 to be used
for the British troops in Egypt. The requisitioned premises were
leased to the British forces for the Lord High Admiral of Great
Britain. During the tenancy a substantial part of the property was
destroyed by fire and the claimant brought an action for damages
against the Egyptian Government and British Admiralty. In a note
communicated by the British Foreign Office to the court, it was
stated that "His Majesty's Government is not subject to the
jurisdiction of the court in Egypt". At the hearing, the Admiralty
chose not to appear and the claimant asked for judgement against it
by default.
The court held that it was not entitled to exercise jurisdic¬
tion over the Admiralty. It relied partly on the general principle
of state immunity, the effectiveness of which required that agents
of foreign governments should be accorded similar immunities for
acts done in their official capacity. The court identified the
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 26 August 1936 as the source of such
immunities as far as the British forces in Egypt were concerned.
The court stated that:
It is a matter of common knowledge that members of the British
forces in Egypt were not subject to the jurisdiction of the
Egyptian courts for matters arising out of their official
duties. This is an exceptional privilege secured for the
members of its forces by the United Kingdom Government. It
would become a dead letter if the Egyptian courts were to allow
plaintiffs to consider members of the British forces as
representatives of their government and if the court in this
case were to authorize the plaintiff by these means to sue the
British Government directly as responsible for the acts of the
British Admiralty. 109
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The second case was that of Hewet v. The Treasury. The
appellant claimed that he was exempt from all taxes in respect of a
commercial transaction performed by him, on the ground that he was a
member of the British forces in Egypt which were exempted from
taxation according to the provisions of the convention accompanying
the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. The Egyptian fiscal authorities
argued that road taxes, licence fees, taxes deducted from commercial
enterprises or share dividends were not within the exemption as
purely commercial income taxes. The court in the first instance
held the defendant was not so exempt.
The Mixed Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal and held that
the immunity granted by the 1936 Treaty only applied to the British
camps and forces as a whole, together with individual members of the
troops in their capacity as members. In other words, in the opinion
of the court a distinction should be drawn between the activities of
those individuals not in the exercise of their functions and
activities which have a direct relation to military services. In
the light of this consideration the court concluded that the
appellant was carrying on an enterprise which was essentially his
personal business and had nothing to do with his military services.
The decision dispelled any doubt that might have existed concerning
the interpretation of the provisions of the treaty regarding
exemption from taxation. The decision also served as a useful
guideline for the Egyptian fiscal authorities that such exemption
could only be granted in regard to activities which had a clear
connection with the military service. This guideline was vital
since quite a number of the local British community with business
interests had been incorporated in the British troops.^^^ These
sorts of problems were already within the court's consideration when
it was observed that:
.... The High Contracting Parties at the time of drawing up
the Treaty of 1936, which convention was the basis of any
exemption, did not contemplate the case of members of the
British Forces recruited within the country but only that of
military forces which normally came from abroad. 112
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If the defendant in this case was allowed to escape jurisdiction
that would amount in reality to a new kind of capitulation.
The cases decided by the Mixed Courts concerning jurisdiction
over visiting armed forces may be divided into three categories.
The first concerns those actions which were brought by private
individuals against members of foreign states armed forces
whose immunities were not regulated by an agreement with their
respective powers. Cases belonging to this category are legal
actions involving purely civil matters. The courts assimilated
those members with their respective sovereigns on the general rule
of state immunity as they were organs or representatives of foreign
states. The courts drew a clear distinction between acts done by a
soldier or sailor in the course of his official duties and those
performed in his private capacity, and declined to assume
jurisdiction only over the former. What the courts had done was
simply to extend the restrictive view of immunity which they applied
in actions against foreign states to civil actions brought against
the members of foreign visiting forces.
The second category concerns those legal actions brought
against members of foreign forces and involving violation of the
Egyptian penal law. The majority were brought by the Egyptian
Government, while some also involved private litigants. Of this
group, the courts have relied on international usage and doctrine on
the subject and tried to find a workable solution to many problems
arising out of the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over members of
foreign troops. The matter was further complicated by the absence
of agreements regulating the immunities of those forces from the
Egyptian local courts. When it is recalled that the Second World
War brought a very substantial number of foreign military personnel
from various countries, the significance of those decisions becomes
more apparent. It should be noted that none of these cases involved
jurisdiction over acts committed within a camp nor acts occurring
on board warships or aircraft. Further, these cases were decided
on the clear understanding that they were incidents involving
jurisdictional immunities relating to the public armed forces of
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friendly foreign states as distinguished from hostile forces. In
most of them the court had emphasized the fact that these troops
were present in Egypt, not as occupying powers but as cooperating
forces to fight the Second World War.
The decisions of the Mixed Courts in this group of cases are
overwhelmingly against any theory of absolute immunity from the
exercise of criminal jurisdiction over foreign armed forces.!^
Although the courts had attempted, somewhat unsatisfactorily, to
grant the offender the immunity enjoyed by his warship, ^^ it is
quite clear that no absolute immunity arose, but only a priority of
the right to exercise jurisdiction. In most cases the Mixed Courts
expressly refused to interpret the tacit consent of the Egyptian
Government to the presence of those troops within its territory as a
surrender of sovereign rights to administer its penal law to all the
inhabitants of the country and thus took a firm legal standing which
seems to correspond to the intention of the drafters of the Montreux
Convention of 1937 who agreed that Egyptian sovereignty should be
revived and that the Egyptian Government should recover its full
freedom to legislate on penal matters.
The third group of cases are those concerning the British
forces in Egypt whose immunities were specifically regulated by
the Convention annexed to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. Prior
to the treaty the status of the British troops in Egypt was somewhat
anomalous. In a single case decided by the Mixed Court of
Alexandria in 1932, it was held that the British forces were
completely exempt from the exercise of jurisdiction by the local
courts. In that case a member of the British forces in Egypt ran
over the claimant and caused her injury. A military tribunal had
rejected her claim and she brought an action against Colonel E.S.
John, the British Commander. It was held that, although there was
no agreement between Egypt and Britain regulating the immunities of
British troops .from local jurisdiction, yet international law
recognized such immunity. Although it is not clear from the report
in what context international law was applied to the incident, it
could be argued that the position of the British troops in Egypt
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before 1936 was not the mere presence of visiting troops but the
presence of an occupying army, albeit in a peaceful manner, and this
might have influenced the judgement to some extent. The court also
considered it unnecessary to examine whether in principle a
distinction may be made between private acts and public acts,
because it was found by the court that it was not disputed that the
act in question falls into the latter category. Thus the judgement
seems to be based on the assimilation of representatives of foreign
troops with their sending powers. It is probable that it was
in relation to this part of the judgement, the reference to
international law was made. However, the immunity of British
forces in Egypt had been regulated extensively by the Anglo-
Egyptian Treaty of 1936, due to the change in the status of these
troops from an army of peaceful occupation to that of visiting
forces. Following the ratification of the treaty and its annexed
convention, any immunity the British forces might claim from the
exercise of local criminal jurisdiction had to be traced to the
relevant provisions of Art. 4 of the Convention. jt was agree(j
that:
No member of the British forces shall be subject to the
criminal jurisdiction of the courts of Egypt, nor to the civil
jurisdiction of those courts in any matter arising out of his
official duties ....
Accordingly, any case which did not come within the terms of this
article would be subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts.
Following the ratification of the convention of 1936, the Mixed
Courts, as discussed previously, had attempted to interpret the
provision in a restrictive manner, and to prove that the cases
did not fall within the terms of the article and to assume
jurisdiction consequently. These attempts had actually resulted in
establishing exceptions to the apparently absolute immunity enjoyed
by the British forces in Egypt before the 1936 Convention. The
significance of these efforts does not lie in their success or
failure, but as it was stated:
They illustrate the metamorphosis which the British Forces in
Egypt had undergone. Whatever the immunities these forces had
enjoyed previously as an army of peaceful occupation of Egypt
were now ended. 117
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Under the new regime, the only immunities which the British forces
could enjoy from the jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts were those
privileges and immunities which directly flowed from Art. 4 of the
Convention and from nowhere else. It is in these considerations
that the real significance of these judgements lies.
The result of the review of all these cases demonstrates
abundantly the significant contribution made by the Mixed Courts to
international law in their treatment of the problems raised by the
presence of foreign armed forces in Egypt - a problem that in
several other countries has aroused long, and even bitter,
controversy. Acute problems were satisfactorily resolved by the
application of the simple test of service commande. The majority
of cases were decided by the courts by asking whether the soldier or
sailor was on duty or off duty at the time of the commission of the
offence. The test was proved to be valuable and received a general
"I 1 O
welcome from international lawyers. °
To this extent they succeeded in drawing a careful balance
between the needs of military operations and Egyptian's sovereign
interests and to prevent the former from becoming a source of
annoyance to the latter. Moreover, the exercise of jurisdiction
over foreign troops was especially important in a country like Egypt
where there were a large number of foreign forces of various powers,
so that law and order might be preserved. It was also essential in
other directions, particularly the rising nationalist resentment
against the number of privileges and immunities enjoyed by these
forces, and both the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the Montreux
Convention of 1937 were designed to suppress this source of anxiety
to the Egyptian Government.
4. Immunity from Attachment and Execution
In this area of state immunity, as in others, the practice of
the Mixed Courts ranged on the side of the continental doctrine of
sovereign immunity. Thus foreign governments which had been
validly held not to be immune from suit, and had been adjudicated to
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be liable on some obligations, were likewise held not to be immune
from measures of attachment and execution.
In a case involving an action between an individual and the
Greek treasury, ^0 t|ie Mixed Court of Appeal made it clear that
difficulties concerning the execution of a judgement against a
foreign government were not a factor in deciding whether a foreign
government was subject to the jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts or
not. It further drew a distinction between immunity from
jurisdiction and immunity from execution. In the opinion of the
court, these were separable and independent from one another.
While the former concerned the determination of the right of the
parties in the dispute, the latter related more specifically to
the immunity of foreign state property from pre-judgement measures,
as well as from execution of the judgement rendered. Thus,
difficulties arose as to the execution of judgements which it had
rightly been said did not affect the assumption of jurisdiction in
the first place.
Another view that has been advanced in the judicial reasoning
of the Mixed Courts was that immunity from execution was rejected
once jurisdiction had been exercised on its merits. This view was
reflected in the decision of the Court of Appeal in the Monopole des
I O 1
Tabacs case, when the court not only assumed jurisdiction and
rendered judgement against the Turkish Government, but also
confirmed the attachment of Turkish state property which had been
ordered by the lower court. The court relied on the jurisprudence
of the Mixed Courts, according to which there was no reason to
exempt foreign states from measures of execution of judgements
obtained against them upon property which they possessed in their
private capacity or actually used in their commercial operations.
In this context the decision of the court was entirely in accord
with the restricted view of immunity it applied to the stage of
jurisdiction. At least in conceptual terms, there is no valid
reason why a distinction should not be drawn between property used
for public purposes and that used for commercial activities.
Furthermore, the decision also appears to provide sufficient
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safeguards to property belonging to foreign states in their
sovereign capacity and thus excludes execution in regard to property
covered by diplomatic immunities or any other property used in
governmental services or dedicated for public purposes.
This view was further confirmed by the decision of the
Commercial Tribunal of Alexandria in the Egyptian Delta Rice
case,^^ where the court affirmed an order of execution given
against the Egyptian assets of two Spanish organizations, and
rejected the contention that the organizations were absolutely
immune from execution as an 'organisme d'Etat'. It should be borne
in mind that the order sought to be set aside was essentially a
pre-judgement measure and not strictly speaking an execution of
judgement. Hence there was a need here to uphold immunity for
obvious practical reasons, for if the suit was directed against the
state or its property, immunity could be invoked by the state to
I OO
prevent the continuation of the proceedings. Immunity from
jurisdiction thus upheld would make attachment of state property
pointless, as there would be no principal claim in respect of which
attachment may be sought to satisfy an eventual judgement.
5. Conclusion
The above survey of the judicial practice of the Mixed Courts
clearly shows the acceptance of the then so-called Italo-Belgian
practice on state immunities which is based on the distinction
between actes de gestion and actes de pouvoir. The adherence to
that practice was a direct result of the influence of various
factors in operation at the time when the courts were established.
Apart from the influence exerted by the judges of the courts,
who were derived from continental Europe, other evolutions in
legal analysis had greatly contributed towards the adoption of a
restricted theory of immunity by the courts. In identifying these
factors, there is a series of inter-related streams of legal
precepts to which that evolution may be attributed:
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1) The Mixed Courts, according to their charter, had exclusive
jurisdiction over civil and commercial disputes between natives and
foreigners, and between foreigners of different nationalities.
Later the court went beyond the letter of their Reglement and
assumed jurisdiction whenever mixed interests were traceable. This
formula of mixed interests brought within the competence of the
Mixed Courts all disputes in which foreign states and their organs
were directly involved.
2) The courts also had jurisdiction over the Egyptian Government,
administration and estates of the Khedieve and his family, when
foreigners were involved in a suit against them. The disputes in
which the Egyptian Government was involved were significant to that
evolution in two respects: a) they had somewhat broadened the
extent to which the Egyptian Government was made subject to domestic
law for its private activities and b) they provided the courts with
ample opportunities to distinguish between the public and private
capacity of a sovereign. It was essentially on the basis of that
distinction that in later years the Mixed Courts developed the
restrictive theory of state immunity.
The restrictive theory had been consistently followed by the
courts right up to their dissolution in 1949. The courts had
adopted every possible limitation of immunity whenever the dispute
resulted from the operation of what might be considered a normal
commercial transaction not by its nature involving the performance
of an act jure gestionis. Transportation of passengers by sea;
administration of state railways; government commercial monopolies;
the renting of immovable property; contracts for the purchase of
merchandise for sale and the exercising of banking functions, all
had been condemned because they were measures taken outside the
confines of the governmental mission. A considerable freedom was
exercised by the courts in determining what other acts should be
included in this category.
In contesting the jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts over foreign
states, it has been argued that, because there is no possibility of
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enforcing judgement against a foreign state, there should be no
possibility of exercising jurisdiction against a foreign state. In
other words, it would be unreasonable to admit competence in the
courts which would result in an empty judgement. On this issue,
the Mixed Courts had expressly denied that the validity of a
judicial decision was dependent upon matters concerned with
execution. The difficulty of enforcing a judgement against a
foreign state was not a factor in deciding whether that government
was within the jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts. Moreover, every
judicial decision exerted some kind of moral pressure on the parties
concerned. This moral pressure is more powerful than the most
energetic method coercion. What is even more clear is that the
Mixed Courts had actually ordered and affirmed measures of execution
against property of foreign states, thereby going beyond the
continental doctrine in this respect.
On the other hand, the Mixed Courts had treated cases of
confiscation as an act of public authority and ruled that it is
outside the competence of the courts, however illegal the act of
confiscation might be. In carrying out such an act the foreign
state was regarded as immune from suit in relation to the property
confiscated on the ground that the foreign state would be
manifesting its sovereign will. To this area of immunity the Mixed
Courts had added cases in which members of foreign armed forces were
involved, since they clearly involved the exercise of sovereign
authority although the rule of absolute immunity was not found to be
implicit in them. Most of these were cases decided under the
provisions of a bilateral agreement which were determined by the
special circumstances in which they had come into being. Apart from
such cases, restricted immunity was uniformly applied by the courts
in cases involving foreign armed forces in Egypt. However, it is of
interest to mention that the judicial practice of the Mixed Courts
clearly proceeded from the presumption that territorial jurisdiction
was the basic norm and cases of state immunity would thus appear to
be exceptions to that general rule. In other words, the courts
regarded its jurisdiction as the starting point, the normal
situation, whereas immunity was the exception. This also partly
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explains the restrictive trend adopted by the courts towards state
immunity. If one realizes that the rule of state immunity as first
down was then modified later by the industrial, commercial and
technological progress of the international society, it becomes very
interesting to compare the sharp increase in the practice of
restrictive immunity by the Mixed Courts since its establishment in
the 19th century, a comparison which clearly reveals a reversal
order of events in the historical development of the law of state
immunity. The jurisprudence of the Mixed Courts relating to state
immunity clearly illustrates the contribution they made to the
development of the law, both on issues of jurisdiction and
enforcement. Their decisions were regarded as being solidly based
on valid ground and were generally welcomed in various parts of the
legal world. They were cited and analyzed by the courts of other
countries and discussed by international writers.
The decisions of the courts also refute the view that the
establishment of those courts was primarily designed to protect the
interests of foreign powers in Egypt. They show that justice was
handled according to the merits of the case and not on the identity
of the parties. Jurisdiction was assumed over foreign governments
regardless of their influence or position in Egypt's administration,
whether they were British, French, Turkish or American, and the
nationality of the judges did not seem to influence the judgements
rendered to any measurable extent. The decisions rendered against
foreign states were carried out without any recorded protestation on
the part of those states, even although they may have strongly
disagreed with the result. Therein lies the significance of the
jurisprudence of the Mixed Courts on issues of sovereign immunity.
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B. JUDICIAL PRACTICE (2): THE PRACTICE OF THE NATIONAL COURTS
IV. THE ABROGATION OF THE MIXED COURTS AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL COURTS
The existence of the Mixed Courts in Egypt was regarded as a
limitation of judicial sovereignty and a gross injustice, since the
country in which they had originated in the 18th century had finally
abrogated the capitulations and this was recognized by the Treaty of
Lausanne 1923."*^ The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936"^^ aimed at a
complete suppression of the legislative and fiscal immunity of
foreigners in Egypt and was concluded after a prolonged course of
negotiation. This treaty at last brought to an end a chapter in
the history of the capitulations in Egypt which had begun earlier in
the 17th century with the introduction of the Ottoman laws and
treaties in Egypt.^7
Britain recognized that the capitulatory regime which was
actually in existence was incompatible with the spirit of the times
and the actual situation in Egypt (Art. 13). Egypt would enjoy
complete control over her own affairs; the British Array would
retire from Cairo to the banks of the Suez Canal; and Egypt would
be permitted to resume her active participation in the administra¬
tion and control of the Sudan.
As far as the capitulations were concerned, the new policy was
summarized in the first clause of the Annex to Art. 13:
It is the object of the arrangements set out in this Annex (1)
to bring about speedily the abolition of the capitulations in
Egypt, with the disappearance of the existing restrictions on
Egyptian sovereignty in the matter of the application of
Egyptian legislation (including financial legislation) to
foreigners as its necessary consequence ....
The legislative attribution of the Mixed Courts was to cease.
Clause 5 of Art. 13 states:
.... the present legislative functions of the Mixed Tribunals
as regards the application of the Egyptian legislation to
foreigners will terminate. It would follow from this that the
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Mixed Tribunals in their judicial capacity would no longer have
to pronounce upon the validity of the application to foreigners
of an Egyptian law or decree which has been applied to
foreigners by the Egyptian Parliament or Government, as the
case may be.
The Treaty contained a precise agreement that the Mixed Courts were
to be maintained during a transitory period still to be fixed. It
was an object of the agreement according to clause 1:
.... to institute a transitional regime for a reasonable and
not unduly prolonged period to be fixed, during which the Mixed
Tribunals will remain and will, in addition to their present
judicial jurisdiction, exercise the jurisdiction at present
vested in the consular courts. At the end of this
transitional period the Egyptian Government will be free to
dispose with the Mixed Tribunals.
It is clear that these clauses provided for the total abolition
not only of the judicial privileges of foreigners resident in Egypt,
but of their legislative immunity as well. All that remained was
the declaration, made by the Egyptian Government in clause 6 of the
Annex, that legislation applied to foreigners would not be
"inconsistent with the principles generally adopted in modern
legislation", or discriminatory, in fiscal matters, against
foreigners or foreign corporations.
Clauses 2-4 of the Annex, while providing for obtaining the
consent of the interested powers to the proposed judicial
organisation, ended with a threat of more drastic action:
2) As a first step, the Egyptian Government will approach the
capitulatory powers as soon as possible with a view to a) the
removal of all restrictions on the application of Egyptian
legislation to foreigners and b) the institution of a transitional
regime for the Mixed Tribunals as provided in para. 1 (ii) above.
3) His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom as the
government of capitulatory power and as an ally of Egypt, is in no
way opposed to the arrangements referred to in the preceding
paragraph and will collaborate actively with the Egyptian Government
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in giving effect to them by using all its influence with the powers
exercising capitulatory rights in Egypt.
4) It is understood that, in the event of its being found
impossible to bring into effect the arrangements referred to in
para. 2, the Egyptian Government will retain its full rights
unimpaired with regard to the capitulatory regime, including the
Mixed Tribunals. In accordance with these provisions, the Egyptian
Government on 16 January 1937 invited the capitulatory powers to a
conference which was to meet at Montreux on 12 April 1937.
Representatives were sent to the conference by the Government
I O O
of Egypt and by the 12 capitulatory powers, together with the
Union of South Africa and the Irish Free State.
The Egyptian Government's proposals were contained in a second
circular which was handed to the legations in Cairo on 3 February
1937.^"^ The claims of the Egyptian Government, as elucidated in
the memorandum, may be summarized as follows:
i- The immediate transfer to the national courts of all
jurisdiction which was then exercised by the Mixed Courts.
ii- The maintenance of the Mixed Courts only for a transitory
period under decrees of foreign judges.
The memorandum demanded that a clear agreement must be reached on
the definition of the term 'foreigners'. The circular made it
clear that the term included the citizens, but not the 'subjects' or
the 'proteges' of the 12 capitulatory powers. It should be
emphasized, however, that this definition is appreciably narrower
than the meaning customarily given to the word foreigners by the
Charter of the Mixed Courts and its judicial practice.
The second demand made in the memorandum, and not previously
warranted by the 1936 Treaty, was the abolition of the doctrine of
"mixed interests" under which the Mixed Courts had enormously
extended their jurisdiction beyond the letter of their charter.
The memorandum also sought to introduce certain modifications into
the composition of the courts themselves. It suggested that, as
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vacancies occurred on the Mixed bench during the transitory period,
they should be filled by Egyptians, irrespective of the nationality
of the deceased or retiring judge.
The issues presented by the Egyptian circular caused a
diversity of opinion, thus giving rise to prolonged discussions at
the conference before which these demands were put. The Egyptian
delegation was led by Mustafa al-Nahhas Pasha, the Egyptian Prime
Minister. He took to the conference the Egyptian demands, in the
shape of drafts for a convention abolishing the capitulations, and
for a revised Reglement d'Organisation Judiciare governing the
conditions under which the Mixed Tribunals were to operate during
1 QQ
the interim period.
At the conference the question of the abolition of capitula¬
tions raised no divergence of opinion among the delegates of the
capitulatory powers and the Egyptian demand was accepted as it had
131been formulated by Egypt. Although considerable heated
discussion surrounded the Egyptian proposals which proposed to
modify the then existing system of the Mixed Tribunals, after
protracted negotiations, an agreement was reached on 8 May 1937, and
signed by all delegates subject only to ratification by ordinary
1 09
procedure.
The abolition of the capitulations was thus accomplished.
Art. 1 of the convention provided: "The High Contracting Parties
declare that they agree .... to the complete abolition in all
respects of capitulations in Egypt". The status of foreigners in
Egypt after the abrogation of the capitulations was expressly
governed by Art. 2(1) of the convention: "Subject to the
application of the principles of international law, foreigners shall
be subject to Egyptian legislation in criminal, civil, commercial,
administrative, fiscal and other matters". Egypt had recovered her
sovereignty and the legislative attribution of the Mixed
jurisdiction was to disappear. The legislation to which foreigners
would be subject would not be inconsistent with the principles
generally adopted in modern legislation and would not entail any
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discrimination against foreigners or against corporations registered
under Egyptian law in which foreigners had substantial interests.1^3
It was the duration of the transitional period before the Mixed
Courts should cease that caused controversy.-^^ It should be
recalled that the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 provided for the
operation of the Mixed Courts for a "reasonable but not unduly
prolonged period". The convention in its Art. 3 accepted the
Egyptian demand in the following words:
The Mixed Courts of Appeal and the Mixed Tribunals now existing
shall be maintained until the 17th October, 1949. As from the
15th October, 1937, they shall be governed by an Egyptian law
establishing the Reglement d'Organisation Judiciare ....
On the date mentioned in paragraph 1 above, all cases pending
before the Mixed Tribunals shall be remitted, at the state
which they have then reached and without involving the parties
in the payment of any fees, to the national tribunals to be
continued therein until they are finally disposed of.
The period from the 15th October 1937 to the 14th October 1949,
shall be known as 'the transitional period'.
From the beginning of that transition period, vacancies on the
tribunals are to be filled with Egyptian judges, provided that
foreign representation shall never fall below one-third. 135
Although some Egyptian political parties pressed for the immediate
abolition of the Mixed Courts,it was realised that an immediate
abolition of the Mixed Courts could have effected a veritable exodus
of capital to the detriment of the country. On the other hand,
there was a practical difficult as, for administrative reasons
affecting many of the parties, the courts could only be abolished
after some transitory period during which the remittance to new
judicial organizations could be effected. Moreover, the period was
believed sufficient to enable Egyptian judges to fully familiarise
themselves with European legal systems.
Detailed rules were set up by the new Reglement d'Organisation
Judiciare concerning the operation of the Mixed Courts during the
interim period. For the purposes of the Mixed Courts' jurisdiction,
the word foreigner was defined in Art. 25 of the new Reglement to
include "the nationals of the High Contracting Parties to the
Montreux Convention and the nationals of any other state which may
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be added by Egyptian decree". By another paragraph of the same
Article, ressortissants of the mandated territories of Syria, the
Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan were specifically excluded from
the jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts.
The jurisdiction of the courts in civil and commercial matters
had been redefined by Art. 26. Unlike the old Reglement, the new
charter extended the competence of the Mixed Courts to cases of
foreign personal status and stated that the Mixed Courts should
138
apply to such cases the national law of the parties.
The theory of mixed interests was abolished altogether by Art.
33 of the new Reglement, but such abolition was made subject to a
number of exceptions:
1) Egyptian companies already formed, in which there are
substantial foreign interests, shall be considered 'foreigners' for
the purpose of jurisdiction, unless otherwise provided by their
statutes. (Art. 34).
2) With regard to bankruptcy cases, the old extensive practice of
recognizing the Mixed Courts' competence was also reaffirmed by the
1 3Q
new system.
3) With regard to foreign mortgages, the proposal of the Egyptian
Government had been accepted. If there was a mortgage in favour of
foreigners on real property by whomsoever possessed or owned, the
Mixed Courts were made competent to pronounce upon the validity of
the mortgage and on all consequences thereof, including the judicial
sale of property and the distribution of proceeds. (Art. 36).
The convention was signed at Montreux on 8 May 1937,and came
into force in 1938. 11 Egypt itself ratified the Convention on
19 July 1937 with only two dissenters.
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The Mixed Courts closed at midnight on 14 October 1949, after
three-quarters of a century of judicial work. ^ An entirely new
Civil Code was introduced in the same year,-*-^ the preparation of
which was entrusted to a distinguished Egyptian jurist, Abel Razaq
al-Sanhuri."'-^^ The new code also invited the development of a new
and distinct jurisprudence, namely the Islamic Law. As mentioned
above, Art. 3 of the Montreux Convention provided that, on 15
October 1949, all cases pending before the Mixed Courts should be
remitted, at the stage they had then reached, to the National
Tribunals, to be continued therein until such cases were finally
1
disposed of by the National Courts, which were thus established
to administer the new Civil Code,^^ and to absorb the Mixed Courts
both in form and functions. In this way, the new courts were
necessarily the successors of the Mixed Courts.
Other legislation required to give effect to the Montreux
Convention, particularly in relation to the end of the transition
period, were duly enacted. Of these, the most obviously necessary
enactment was Law No. 115 of 1948 abolishing the Mixed Courts and
Consular Courts and remitting cases pending before them at the end
of the transition period to the National Courts.
By Law No. 64 of 1949 a new Court of Appeal was established at
Mansourah so that from 15 October 1949 there would be, together with
those already existing in Cairo, Alexandria and Assiut, a Court of
Appeal in the national system. Another enactment was promulgated
in 1949 (Law No. 79 of 1949), in which provision was made for the
transfer to the new national system from 15 October 1949 of judges
and officials of the Mixed Courts of Egyptian nationality, without
prejudice to any existing salary right superior to those enjoyed by
the judges and officials of the National Courts.
- 206 -
V. THE NATIONAL COURTS AND JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES
1. The Confirmation of the Restrictive Trend adopted
by the Mixed Courts
It was thought that the promulgation of the new Egyptian Civil
Code of 1949 would immediately destroy the value of judicial
1 48
precedents which had been built up by the Mixed Courts. Yet as
far as the question of state immunity is concerned, frequent resort
to the rich jurisprudence of the Mixed Courts is observable in the
practice of the National Courts. As a matter of fact, it has been
the tendency of the National Courts to adhere consistently to the
trend firmly established by the Mixed Courts on the subject.
Furthermore, neither the new Civil Code nor any other national
legislation has been enacted to govern cases involving issues of
state immunity. The influence of the Mixed Courts has thus been
enduring. To this has been added the continued presence on the
national bench or the bar of a number of able Egyptian lawyers who
had received their early training in the Mixed Courts.
The first judgement to be rendered by the National Courts in
this field was one in which the People's Republic of Yugoslavia was
involved,^ delivered by the Civil Tribunal of Alexandria on 12 May
1951. It was an application by the Federated Republic of
Yugoslavia asking that an order of attachment by the District Court
of Alexandria be discharged. The order was on the basis of an
application made by the Kafr El-Zayat Company authorizing it to take
certain measures of sequestration on goods alleged to be the
property of the Yugoslav Republic. The District Courts found that
a contract had been made at Belgrade between the Kafr El-Zayat
Company and the Yugoslav firm of Hempro for the purchase of chemical
products, namely 750 tons of carbonate of soda at £12 a ton; only
150 tons of the product had been delivered, and the company was
therefore obliged to buy the balance elsewhere at a total price of
£6,500. The Yugoslav firm had since been nationalized, and now
formed part of the Federated People's Republic of Yugoslavia. The
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company claimed that the Yugoslav Republic was responsible to the
same extent as Hempro. These contentions were accepted by the
District judge and judgement thereon was entered against the
Yugoslav Republic authorizing the company to sequestrate certain
goods of the Republic which were held by the Egyptian customs
authorities and some banks. In an appeal to the Civil Tribunal,
the Yugoslav Republic claimed that the order should be set aside
inter alia, on the grounds that a) foreign governments are immune
from the jurisdiction of local tribunals; b) in view of its
constitution and the peculiar social organization of the Yugoslav
Republic, the exercise of foreign commerce is exclusively under the
control of the government, and therefore its commercial acts cannot
be regarded as acts performed jure privatorium. Although the order
was set aside on other grounds to be examined later, the court
refused to accept the contention that in this particular case the
commercial activities performed by the Yugoslav Republic constituted
an act of sovereignty. The court stated that:
It is necessary to distinguish acts of sovereignty which
foreign governments and their representatives performed in the
exercise of their state functions, and which are considered, by
their very nature, as acts of sovereignty. Disputes which
result from any such acts are not subject to the jurisdiction
of the national courts. They must be resolved by methods
which are in conformity with the rules laid down by public
international law such as diplomatic channel, arbitration or
international conferences. As regards any dispute which
results from an act done by a foreign state under the same
conditions as a private individual, that is subject to the
jurisdiction of the national courts. 151
The court, however, had left open the question whether, in the
circumstances of the case, the collective nature of the organization
of state economy undertaking the exercise of activities aiming at
producing or exchanging goods, would thus widen the limits of the
competence of the state and therefore necessarily imply exercise of
sovereignty. The court observed that the international practice
and doctrine had moved along the restrictive theory of immunity, a
result which had been achieved by making the distinction between
public and private acts. That distinction, in the court's view:
.... has limited immunity to disputes arising from the
performance of acts of sovereignty, that is to say, acts which
cannot, by their very nature, be performed except by state and
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are considered as acts of public authority and related to
public interests.
By implication, acts of a private nature appear to be excluded from
state immunity, even if done by the state through the exercise of
public power.
Indeed, the Yugoslav argument in this case is a part of the
general theory propounded by the socialist countries regarding state
immunity, namely: a sovereign state cannot have two different
personalities. According to this thesis, a state cannot act
otherwise than a sovereign entity, and all functions undertaken by
1 s?the state are governmental and official. This theory has
1 BBattracted some support among Western jurists.
Whatever the merits of this theory, the facts upon which it is
based are not borne out by the practice of the majority of states
which tend to differentiate between the public and private
activities of states. There seems to be no solution to this
unavoidable difference since it involves ideological conceptions
which are difficult to implement in practice.
The decision of the Civil Tribunal of Alexandria implicitly
rejected this dichotomy and preferred the distinction between
sovereign and private acts as this was in accord with the increasing
international practice. Perhaps the most interesting point in the
judgement is that, even in the case of sovereign acts which are
generally regarded as attracting immunity, the court does not
absolutely absolve the foreign government from liability, for it
suggests that disputes arising from such acts are still to be
settled by amicable methods according to public international law.
In other words, absolute immunity in the case of public acts is not
wholly absolute since it is subject to another 'modifier', that is
to say, the defendant state would still be answerable to the
complaint being made against it.
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2. Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States
are a Matter of Public Policy
An interesting trend has been initiated by the current case-law
of the National Courts where jurisdictional immunity was held to
constitute a question of ordre publique, which is for the court to
determine and there is no presumption of waiver in such a case.
This view was reflected in the decision of the District Court in
Cairo of 1964.The suit was brought by the plaintiff, a former
mechanical engineer, against his employer Saudia, the Saudi Arabia
Airline. The court found as a fact that the claim rested on a
contract of employment with the defendant, which contract was issued
in accordance with a Royal Decree passed by the Saudi Government.
As stipulated in Art. 13 of the contract: "any dispute ....
concerning the application or the interpretation of the contract
shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Saudi courts". The
defendant neither entered appearance nor raised the question of
immunity in any form. The court held that it had no jurisdiction
for the following reasons:
1) That it is well established in international law that the
jurisdiction of the local courts will be determined according to:
a) the nationality, residence or domicile of the defendant; b) the
place where the contract is to be performed; and c) by agreements
between the parties.
2) Both doctrine and practice agreed that a foreign state is
exempted from the jurisdiction of the territorial state. Such
exemption ensues from the principle of sovereign equality of states,
and thus the Egyptian courts have no right to review acts and
obligations of foreign governments.
3) The incompetence of the Egyptian courts in suits brought
against foreign states is a matter of public policy, and therefore
the court may announce its incompetence of its own motion, even if
such lack of jurisdiction was not directly pleaded by the foreign
state, or even if such a foreign state failed to enter an appearance
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before the court. Such non-appearance on the part of the defendant
state does not constitute an effective waiver of immunity.
4) Since the parties had expressly agreed that for the settlement
of any dispute arising under the contract, recourse was to be had to
the ordinary Saudi courts, the court held that this choice of
jurisdiction was binding between the parties, and as such, should be
respected. It, therefore, declared itself without jurisdiction.
It is clear from this judgement that a more unqualified
immunity was adopted by the court. It is surprising that no
mention whatsoever was made by the court to the distinction between
public and private acts, a distinction which was firmly established
by the Mixed Courts and endorsed by the National Courts in the
Republic of Yugoslavia case. Further, the judgement raises the
point of interaction between immunity and jurisdiction. The
jurisdiction of the courts, according to the judgement, is a matter
of public policy, so that a judge in a case automatically has to
raise the question of immunity without waiting for the state itself
to be able to prove that it enjoys immunity. Under these
circumstances, immunity need not be invoked expressly. To this
extent the concept of public policy was indirectly used to justify
the existence of state immunity. Whatever the justifications on
which the court based its decision, its judgement stands as an odd
instance in the jurisprudence of the Egyptian courts on the subject
and runs counter to an established trend of those courts.
Admittedly, that part of the judgement which tends to base its
jurisdiction on the choice of the parties and other rules of private
international law is entirely satisfactory, although even in the
absence of such choice, the jurisdiction of the court could still be
frustrated by the notion of public policy. It was in the light of
some of these observations that the appeal to the Cairo Court of
Appeal was successful.
- 211 -
3. Jurisdictional Immunities of States Apply Only
to Acts of Public Law
The restricted theory of immunity was reaffirmed by the Cairo
Court of Appeal in its decision of 4 May 1966.^5 ^he decision of
the court was a result of an appeal against the decision of the
District Court of Cairo in the aforementioned case. The appellant
alleged that the rules governing judicial competence of the
territorial state is a matter of public policy and it is not
permissible to contract outside it, and if the parties agreed to
refer any dispute under the contract to the Saudi courts, that was
contrary to public policy and, therefore, such choice of juris¬
diction should not be recognized. The appellant also claimed that
the Saudi Arabia Airline is a public corporation undertaking
commercial activities and rendering services to the public at large,
and thus subject to the jurisdiction of the Egyptian courts.
The Court of Appeal made the principle of territorial
sovereignty the point of departure by observing that state authority
in judicial matters is generally territorial in the sense that every
subject, person or property physically within or connected with the
territory of the state, is subject to its territorial jurisdiction,
but the state competence is not exclusive or absolute since there
are cases in which this competence may be relaxed, such as suits
brought against heads of states, diplomatic representatives of
foreign states, or international organizations.
As to the immunity enjoyed by the foreign state from this
territorial supremacy, the court went on to state that:
such immunity is not absolute, in the sense that, this immunity
cannot apply in the case of a foreign state which chooses to
engage in business transactions with private persons, but only
where it is apparent that the state has acted as a subject of
international law, exercising its public powers. 156
The court, in following the restrictive view of immunity, found it
necessary to examine the nature of the dispute in applying the
distinction. It took the view that the contract of employment was
entered into between the Saudi Government and the appellant.
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Therefore, the contractual relation was subject to the public and
not private law. The court also seemed to be influenced to a
measurable extent by the fact that the Saudi Government terminated
the contract of the appellant for political reasons, a fact which
was not contested by the latter, and consequently declared itself
incompetent to review an act of the Saudi Government undertaken by
that Government in its sovereign capacity.
The significance of the decision of the Court of Appeal lies in
the fact that the distinction between public and private acts was
judicially endorsed and in this way it superseded the District
Court's decision. However, the characterization of the contract of
employment as a political act of state is certainly open to
question. Instead of basing its decision on the choice of
jurisdiction clause, the court went even further and investigated
the question of competence by reference to exterior factors rather
than by the express choice of the parties. The first essential
point for the determination of exercise or non-exercise of the
jurisdiction of the court relates to the existence of the
governmental authority of the states. On this point the court
arbitrarily assumed that the act of termination of contract results
from an act in the exercise of governmental authority of the Saudi
Government. There appears to be no valid reason to support the
ruling of the court that the legal consequences of the termination
of the contract by a commercial airline are necessarily a result of
an act done in the exercise of governmental authority.
Consequently the appellant unsuccessfully applied to the
Court of Cassation alleging that the contract of employment is a
commercial and not a public act of the Saudi state. The appellant
cited the Saudi Royal Decree No. 45, passed in 19 February 1963, and
establishing the Saudi Arabia Airline as a corporate body which can
sue and be sued as a separate legal entity from that of the Saudi
Government, and therefore the Saudi Airline was neither an agency of
the Saudi Government nor an instrumentality of the Saudi state.
The applicant also added that the jurisdiction of the Egyptian
courts was based on the trading activity of the company irrespective
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of the nature of the contract. The employment of the appellant was
merely an accessory to a private law activity consisting of the
exploitation in Egypt of a commercial undertaking. The Court of
Cassation, in affirming the decision of the appellant Court, ruled
that: "the contract was concluded between the [applicant] and the
Saudi Government" and that there was nothing to argue about as far
as these express words were concerned. As to the argument about
the separate legal personality of the company, the court held that
this argument is a fact which should have been raised before the
court in the first instance, for relying on a foreign law, namely,
the Saudi Royal Decree, was no more than a fact which would have to
be proved before the District Court, a thing which the applicant had
failed to do. Accordingly, the court held that the claim of the
appellant constituted a new cause of action, raised for the first
time, and was thus inadmissible before the Court of Cassation which
was essentially a court of law and not of fact.
These decisions seem to run contrary to the general trend of
restricted immunity prevalent in the Egyptian courts for nearly a
century in regard to private activities of foreign states as
amenable to local jurisdiction. Although that part of the decision
of the Court of Appeal which differentiates between public and
private acts is essentially correct, there are a number of debatable
points elsewhere in these judgements. The first point of interest
relates to the determination of jurisdiction. If the distinction
between private and public acts is accepted by the appellant
court, one would expect the court to determine the existence
of jurisdiction on that basis, namely the involvement of the
governmental authority of the state, in the exercise of which the
cause of action has arisen. To rule that the conclusion of the
contract of employment by an airline with a civilian engineer is a
public act of a foreign state is to adduce a proposition which
cannot be easily supported by doctrine or practice. The nature of
the services performed by the employee form an important element.
Depending on whether those services are official or not, the content
of state immunity differs. Perhaps the finest point about the
proceeding is that the underlying reason for labour legislation is
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the protection of individuals, which constitutes an important
element of social development in today's world. If a rule of
immunity is permitted to apply in these areas, private individuals
may be left remediless in their efforts to pursue what they regard
as valid claims against foreign state employers.
4. Ex-Sovereign or Head of State Enjoys No Jurisdictional
immunities from Local Courts
It has been firmly established in international practice that a
foreign sovereign is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts
of another state and is not liable to personal arrest or detention
within the territory of another state. These immunities of foreign
states have often been regarded as part of the general jurisdic¬
tional immunities of states since the majority of writers have
treated the immunities of foreign heads of states together with
those of foreign states. The same tendency is prevalent in treaty
1 57
practice. Although judicial decisions are not unanimous as to
the limits of this exemption, the general rule of immunity seems to
be fairly settled. Whereas earlier cases frequently concerned
immunities of the sovereign head of state, some recent cases have
been reported concerning immunities of heads of states who were no
longer sovereigns.
Traces of issues of immunities of ex-sovereigns in current
Egyptian case-law can be found in the judgement of Cairo District
Court of 1971.1^8 The litigation involved a suit by an Egyptian
national brought against a Saudi Minister of State in his capacity
as receiver of the inheritance of the late King Saud ibn Abdul Aziz
Al-Saud. The respondent moved to dismiss the suit on the ground
that the Egyptian courts were incompetent because Art. 29 of the
Egyptian code of civil procedure specified certain actions which may
be brought against the foreigner, resident or domiciled in Egypt,
none of which was satisfied in that petition.
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Although the issue of jurisdictional immunity was not raised by
the respondant, the court took the view that the first and primary
question to be examined was evidently the competence of the court.
In order to deal with this issue, the court decided to investigate
the nature of the claim under consideration. It stated that both
doctrine and practice recognized a contract of debt as an admissible
document, if duly signed by the debtor, no matter whether he is a
sovereign or a private individual, and the same was true as far as
the satisfaction of the debt was concerned. The court went on to
say that:
Although international custom confers upon foreign sovereigns a
broad exemption from jurisdiction of the territorial authority,
this immunity does not result in exemption from application of
substantive law, but only from the jurisdiction of the
territorial courts.
In the view of the District Court, jurisdictional immunities
cover the foreign sovereign while he is still reigning, but cannot
be claimed by a deposed sovereign or a former head of state because
he is no longer serving the general interests of the same society in
the intercourse of its members. Therefore neither he nor his agent
can justify his exemption from the competence of the court by
relying on this extinguished immunity. Accordingly, the court held
that the plaintiff would have to prove that the contract of debt was
duly signed by the ex-king. Such was not the case, however, as
sufficiently evidenced by the facts. Hence as the debt was not
signed by the late king, he was not legally obliged to repay it.
Although such debt may be claimed from his successors, since the
latter are foreigners who have no residence or domicile in Egypt,
and since the suit did not involve a property situated in the forum,
nor did it arise out of obligations which should have been performed
therein, applying Art. 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
plaintiff was not entitled to have this action heard before an
Egyptian Court, and therefore the court was not competent to take
cognizance of the case.
Two comments of a fairly general nature may be made. The
first is that the case was brought in 1970 after the dethronement of
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King Saud and even after his death. The court did not discuss
whether the debt had been contracted by the late king while he was
still reigning or after his deposition. The desirability of this
point being examined by the court lies in the fact that, if the
extent to which a foreign head of state is exempted from local
jurisdiction is a controversial issue and much less settled in both
doctrine and practice, this immunity seems to be totally non¬
existent if the foreign head was deposed either at the time of the
dispute or at the time of bringing the action. The non-immunity
could be said to have a retroactive effect in this case, in the
sense that suits may be brought against him before foreign courts in
respect of any action done in his capacity as sovereign with the
exception of acts done by him in the exercise of his public
authority.
Secondly, the court has clearly pointed out that state immunity
is jurisdictional in nature, in the sense that immunities do not
result in exemption from the application of the substantive law of
the territorial jurisdiction before whose authorities proceedings
have been brought and state immunities invoked. This absence of
legal and substantive immunity from local law is clearly manifested
upon a waiver of immunity or voluntary submission to the local
jurisdiction. On the occurrence of such a waiver or submission,
all the substantive and procedural law of the forum will resume
their application. This view of non-existence of legal exemption,
if carried to its logical consequence, would mean that, if an action
was brought against a foreign sovereign after his deposition, he was
amenable to the local jurisdiction in respect of his private and
non-official acts, including those performed during his reign. On
this particular point, the judgement seems entirely satisfactory.
5. Immunity From Execution
Although the decisions of the National Courts offer little in
the way of precedents in the execution field, it may be mentioned
that the only reported instance in which immunity from execution was
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directly raised was the case involving the Republic of Yugoslavia,
discussed above. The district judge authorised the company to
sequestrate certain goods alleged to belong to the Yugoslav Republic
and which were held by the Egyptian customs authorities, Barclays
Bank and the Egyptian National Bank. Before the Commercial
Tribunal of Alexandria, Yugoslavia claimed that the order be set
aside, especially in as much as it permitted the sequestration of
goods in the hands of third parties. As already mentioned, the
court assumed jurisdiction because of the commercial nature of the
transaction. As far as the order of attachment was concerned, the
court took the view that, according to Art. 547 of the Egyptian
Code of Procedure,sequestration of goods is regarded as a
purely provisional measure, irrespective of the nature of the debt.
However, the court accepted the Yugoslav claim and ruled that the
judgement obtained against the Yugoslav state could not be levied on
its property. The court observed that such attachment, according
to the majority of writers in international law, was not allowed,
whether it be purely as a provisional measure or with the object
of preventing that government from taking the goods out of the
jurisdiction. It matters not whether it acts in a private or
public capacity. The court seemed to be influenced by the theory
that the judgment creditor of a foreign state should not be
permitted to interfere with any sovereign function of the state by
sequestrating its property whereby such functions were exercised.
For these reasons, the court set aside the order of the lower
tribunal.
It is remarkable how in this decision immunity has gradually
shifted from procedure to substantive law. It is quite a jump for
any one, including the court, which sought to touch ground half-way,
to accept the view that jurisdictional immunities however liable to
qualification they may be, will always be of an absolute nature
where property rights are in dispute. It is true that
jurisdictional immunities differ from the immunity from execution in
nature, stage and the standard by which each form of immunity is
judged, but it does not seem logical to suppose that immunity from
execution is ipso facto absolute whenever property rights are
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involved. Furthermore, the court, without considering the nature
of the property against which execution was sought, presupposed that
state functions would be hampered if its property was attached.
There might be some justification if the property in question was
identified as being used for diplomatic functions or other
governmental purposes such as military service, but the same is not
necessarily true in regard to property which the foreign state owned
or in which it had an interest and is purely designed for a non¬
governmental function. Hence it was not enough to assert that
immunity from execution was necessary for the exercise of state
functions in all circumstances. Immunity belongs to the state and
not to the property and, if the state concerned was made subject to
the jurisdiction of the local courts in respect of its commercial
activities, there appears to be no reason why the same jurisdiction
should not be exercised in relation to property designed for
commercial purposes.
The above examination of the National Courts' case-law in
respect of state immunity allows the following findings:
1) Although the Mixed Courts ceased to function in 1949, and since
a new Egyptian Code has been promulgated in substitution for the
Mixed Code which these courts used to apply, there is still no
provision in that Code nor any other text in Egyptian law which
expressly designates the competent court before which an action
against a foreign state may be instituted, nor is there any definite
text upon which to rely in determining their competence concerning
suits against foreign states, although the National Courts have
obviously been influenced by the prevailing practice of the Mixed
Courts with regard to state immunity. In the majority of cases,
the jurisdiction of the court is based on the distinction between
public and private acts of the foreign states. The latter are
regarded as essentially within the jurisdiction of the courts,
whereas the former are not.
2) The question of determination of competence is made further
complex by the view that jurisdictional immunities are a matter of
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public policy and, as such, can be determined by the court of its
own motion, even if it is not expressly invoked by the foreign
state. The impact of this judicial view tends to move the courts
towards a more absolute immunity, since the issue of state immunity
would automatically have ousted the jurisdiction of the court
without waiting for the state itself to be able to prove that it
enjoyed such immunity. However, this view was reflected in only one
single decision and did not receive further confirmation.
3) The case-law of the National Courts has also confirmed that no
foreign state can be said to be immune from the laws of the
territorial state applicable within that state territory, but from
the jurisdiction of the territorial state which was considered to be
the basic norm.
4) The judicial decisions of the National Courts do not, as yet,
provide a clear ruling on the issue of immunity from execution.
The single case decided on this point offers no satisfactory
solution. It is certainly difficult to deduce from that judgement
a clear-cut evolution in Egyptian case-law towards a restrictive
approach to immunity from execution. On the contrary, it may be
regarded as a precedent of absolute immunity from execution,
contrary to the established practice of the Mixed Courts.
At any rate, the cases show a clear willingness on the part of
the Egyptian courts to interfere and assume jurisdiction and its
jurisprudence continued to develop positively in the protection of
private litigants, despite the fact that some of the cases involved
a neighbouring Arab state with good political relations with Egypt.
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CHAPTER FOUR
IMMUNITY OF FOREIGN STATES IN EGYPTIAN LAW
I. TREATY PRACTICE
1. International Conventions relevant to Some Aspects
of State Immunity
While as yet there is no general treaty or convention on state
immunities,"'" there are several conventions of a universal character
which have some direct bearing on the rules of state immunities. An
extensive account of these conventions is beyond the scope of this
study. The salient provisions of some of those instruments may,
however, be noted that touch upon the question of immunity and to
which Egypt has become a party.
(a) Brussels Convention of 1926^
The International Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules relating to the Immunity of State-Owned Vessels, signed at
O
Brussels, April 10, 1926 , and its Additional Protocol signed at
Brussels, May 24, 1934,^ deals with immunity in respect of claims
arising from the operation of vessels and transportation of cargoes.
It lays down the principle that sovereign states which engaged in
commercial shipping are liable to suits in local courts, in the same
manner as private individuals. Art. 2 provides:
For the enforcement of such liabilities and obligations shall
be the same rules concerning the jurisdiction of the tribunals,
the same legal actions and the same procedure as in the case of
privately owned merchant vessels and cargoes and of their
owners.
The convention specifically excludes:
ships of war, Government yachts, patrol vessels, hospital
ships, auxiliary vessels, supply ships and other craft owned
or operated by a state, and used at the time a cause of
action arises exclusively on governmental and non-commercial
service. 5
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It is interesting to note that there is no immunity reserved
for foreign states in the field covered by the convention except for
the classes of vessels listed above, which apparently were deemed to
comply with the two requirements set out in the provision:
"belonging to or being operated by the contracting state" and "being
.... on governmental and non-commercial service". These criteria
by which to judge immunity are linked to a time factor. Their
relevance depends on those particular conditions being met at the
time the obligations were created.
In case a seizure or arrest of a foreign vessel is in doubt as
to whether that vessel falls within the scope of Art. 3, Art. 5
provides for the procedure to be followed by that court in order for
it to avail itself of the information needed. The diplomatic
representative of the state that owns the vessel may be invited to
inform the court of the nature of the vessel concerned. This is a
practical solution and an acceptable one, since it will be for the
judiciary of the forum-state and not for the executive branch to
take the initiative. Most significantly, the convention has
removed the difficulties arising out of the traditional claims of
foreign states to immunity from execution in respect of proceedings
connected with their maritime property. In all cases concerning
salvage and general average claims, agreement relating to a hire of
a ship or of the carriage of goods, damage caused by the ship either
in collision or otherwise, loss or damage to cargo, etc., the state
may be sued and the judgement, if given against the foreign state,
may be enforced by arresting the ship and seizing her cargo.^
Egypt was not among the original signatories to this convention
but has subsequently adhered to it in 1951.
In relation to this convention, the question of state
succession does not arise as the convention includes a territorial
clause enabling a high contracting party at the time of signature or
ratification or accession to extend the application of the
convention to its self-governing dominions, colonies, overseas
possessions or protectorates.^ However, at the time of the
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signature of the convention by Great Britain, no such declaration
was made in respect of Egypt nor any other of its overseas
territories or dominions. The absence of such a declaration,
although not conclusive as to the status of Egypt, may serve as an
indicator in that particular respect. However, it should be borne
in mind that the United Kingdom itself had not ratified the
convention until 1980.® At the time of the adoption of the
Brussels Convention and its Supplementary Protocol, Egypt was
already an independent sovereign state, and when she acceded to
these instruments, she was exercising a mere right of accession and
not succession.
(b) The Law of the Sea Conventions
Egypt is also a party to other multilateral conventions
partially dealing with similar issues. The Geneva Convention of
29 April 1958 on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone^ contains
provisions confirming the principle of state immunities in respect
of warships and other vessels employed in governmental and
non-commercial service. Part I, Section III, of the convention
deals, inter alia, with the right of innocent passage to which it
would seem that under the provisions of the convention all ships are
entitled. This section is divided into four sub-sections: A.
Rules appplicable to all ships; B. Rules applicable to merchant
ships; C. Rules applicable to government ships other than warships;
D. Rules applicable to warships.
Art. 21 provides that "the rules contained in sub-sections A
and B shall also apply to government ships operated for commercial
purposes". Sub-section A deals with the right of innocent passage
which all ships can exercise. Sub-section B deals with the
jurisdictional powers of a state in respect of foreign merchant
ships. Art. 19 of subsection B deals with criminal jurisdiction
with regard to crimes committed on board foreign merchant ships.
Art. 21 says that these rules are applicable to government ships
operated for commercial purposes. The combined effect of Arts. 19
and 21 would be the complete assimilation of the position of a
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government merchant ship to that of a private merchant ship for the
purpose of Art. 19. The vessels are characterized under the
convention according to the nature of their service or activities.
The old tendency to treat ships as state ships simply by virtue of
their ownership appears to have been abandoned.""^ However, the
coastal states are under a duty, according to Art. 22, to respect
the rules of international law, particularly those relating to the
privileges of certain government ships.
As far as immunity from execution is concerned, this convention
occupies a special place; it adopts the solution which had already
existed in the Brussels Convention of 1926 in respect of measures
against vessels of foreign states. In fact, taken together, Arts.
20 and 21 of the Geneva Convention enable measures of execution and
sequestration of vessels of foreign states being used for commercial
purposes, albeit within rather restricted limits.
The Second Geneva Convention"'""'" reiterates the principle of
immunity of ships on the high seas (Art. 8(1)), yet the convention
limits the application of this immunity to certain classes of public
vessels only, namely: warships and ships owned or operated for
government non-commercial service (Art. 9). The term 'government-
ship' covers both state-owned and state-operated ships engaged in
non-commercial activities and other government ships. The former,
while on the High Seas, enjoy "complete immunity from jurisdiction
of any state other than the flag state". All other government
ships are not so immune and are accordingly treated as private
ships.
These two conventions clearly reflect the principles laid down
in the Brussels Convention of 1926 and thus confirm the distinction
between warships and state-owned ships operated for commercial
purposes. In this context, the 1958 Geneva Convention may be said
1 )
to be declaratory of the current state practice in this field.
The trend to equate state-owned ships operated for commercial
purposes with private merchant vessels has received further
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confirmation in the 1982 United Nations Conventions on the Law of
the Sea.^ Art. 236, entitled "Sovereign Immunity" provides:
The provisions of this convention .... do not apply to any
warship, other vessels or aircraft owned or operated by a state
used, for the time being, only on government non-commercial
service.
Apart from confirming the distinction, the provision also lays a
special emphasis on the character of the service of the ship
concerned for the purpose of determination of the existence or
non-existence of immunity. Egypt acceded to the convention on 26
August 1983.^ Such ratifications cannot be dismissed as mere
acceptance of the distinction, since it is on the basis of that
distinction that the status of the ship and the extent of sovereign
immunities are to be determined.
(c) Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961
A further example of the kind of rules incorporated in
international conventions affecting jurisdictional immunities of
foreign states and their property may be taken from the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961.^ Like the former, this
convention is the outcome of the work of the International Law
Commission (ILC). During the preparatory work, various theories
were advocated concerning the judicial bases of diplomatic
immunities. The first was that of extra-territoriality of the
diplomats and of embassy premises according to which the premises of
the mission represent a sort of extension to the territory of the
sending state. The majority of members of the ILC found it hard to
accept this fiction. The dismissal by the ILC,^ following a
similar rejection by the League of Nations Experts Committee,^ may
be taken as conclusive. The remaining explanations, based on the
representational qualities of the diplomat and functional
necessities of his office, are not so much opposed as complementary.
The chief importance of the functional explanation lies in its
shifts of emphasis; it indicates the way in which states have
sought to move away from the assumption that immunities might be
demanded automatically on a plea of sovereignty; to the notion that
the question whether or not immunities are to be accorded is one
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which is subject to re-assessment in the light of practical needs.
In fact, the commission was guided by the functional theory: "in
solving problems on which practice gave no clear pointers, while
also bearing in mind the representative character of the head of the
mission and of the mission itself".^ The result was that both
theories are yoked together in the Preamble of the convention:
"
. . . . the purpose of .... privileges and immunities is not to
benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of the
functions of the diplomatic missions as representing states".
It is clear from what has been said that the Vienna Convention
restates the general principle, that a foreign state and its
property are immune from civil and administrative jurisdiction, as
long as it acts in its governmental capacity. Art. 22 of the
convention that deals with the inviolability of the premises of the
mission reiterates the same principle. It was clear enough from
the text as it stood that the mission premises were the premises
used for the functions of the mission. Such inviolability is not
the consequence of the inviolability of the head of the mission, but
is an attribute of the sending state by reason of the fact that the
2D
premises are used as the headquarters of the mission. It may be
of interest to note that some members of the ILC took the view that
the immunity of the premises of the mission is a distinct "form of
state immunity attaching to a building used for governmental
9 1
purposes". Thus Art. 22 of the Vienna Convention is also
apparently based on the idea that the immunity of embassy premises
is justified by, but is also limited to, the purpose of providing
protection for diplomatic activities.
Again, according to Art. 24, mission archives and documents are
declared inviolable. Inviolability is accorded in instances where
the papers are manifestly used for the legitimate functions of the
mission and in this context the functional theory has again been
endorsed. Art. 27 of the convention, although conferring immunity
on the diplomatic bag by maintaining that the diplomatic bag may not
be opened or detained (Art. 27(2)), it should also be recalled that
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this inviolability is limited to a bag containing diplomatic
))
documents or articles intended for official use.
The fact that diplomatic immunities belong to the state and not
to individuals or property may be supported further by Art. 23 which
provided that the immunities might be waived by the sending state.
Thus immunities are attributed to a state as a subject of
international law and therefore are restrictively confined to the
sovereign functions of that subject, and in the course of the work
of elaborating the convention, the immunities of diplomatic missions
have been considered as one aspect of the immunity of the state,
although strictly speaking it does not cover the immunities of state
per se.
In fact, there is a gap in the 1961 Vienna Convention
concerning immunity from jurisdiction of the permanent diplomatic
mission in its capacity as an organ of the foreign relations of
the state. Art. 22 does not refer strictly to immunity from
jurisdiction but to inviolability. Undoubtedly, inviolability is
the privilege, or in other words, the essential immunity, from which
other immunities can be deduced, principally immunity from execution
of judgement, taxes and tariffs. Egypt acceded to the convention
? O
on 19 June 1964 with a minor reservation.
(d) Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 1963"^
25This convention was acceded to by Egypt on 21 June 1965.
While there was clearly some relationship between diplomatic
intercourse and immunities and consular intercourse and immunities,
it was not a relationship of an organic type, as had been the case
with the various subjects discussed at the UN Conference on the Law
of the Sea 1958. It contained corresponding provisions partially
covering the immunities of state property used in connection with
the consular mission and for what is regarded as essential for the
r\ r
performance of their official functions.
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(e) International Convention on Civil Liability for
Oil Pollution Damage 1969
With the increasing threat that pollution from foreign ships
has posed to the coastal states, the issue of who has the
jurisdiction over the offending vessels has been a significant
source of serious controversy between coastal and flag states at the
UNCLOS III. Following the accident of the Torrey Canyon in 1967,^
a conference was held at Brussels to tackle the issue of oil
pollution and to adopt measures of an exceptional character to
protect the maritime interests without affecting the principle of
freedom of the High Seas. Subsequently a convention was signed on
2 8
29 November 1969, giving the coastal state the right of
intervention in cases of maritime casualties, "which may reasonably
be expected to result in major harmful consequences".^
Most significantly the principle of immunity of state vessels
found its way into the convention. Paragraph (2) of Art. 1 reads:
2. However, no measure shall be taken under the present
convention against any warship or other ships owned or operated
by a state and used, for the time being only on government and
non-commercial services.
The convention restricts the immunity to ships employed by the flag
state for governmental purposes, thereby excluding state-owned
merchant vessels.
OQ
The conference was sponsored by IMCO (now IMO), u and Egypt, as
an IMCO member, was among the voting participants. The ratification
or accession of Egypt to this and other maritime treaties is not
without significance in confirming an exceedingly important
distinction between warships and other government ships, a
distinction so vital to the question of state immunity. Most of
these conventions are intended to be of a universal character and
some of them could even be regarded as declaratory of existing state
practice on these issues.
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(f) Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States, 1965
Egypt was among the first countries to ratify the ICSID
Q 1
convention, signed at Washington in 1965. The convention
provides for recourse to arbitration by the centre set up for that
purpose only with the express consent of the state party to the
dispute. The centre's most important objective is to provide a
climate of mutual confidence between foreign investors and host
states so as to encourage the flow of resources to developing
OO
countries on reasonable terms. Much has been written about the
ICSID, but for the purpose of the present section, the discussion
will focus primarily on the issue of sovereign immunity under the
convention.
i. Immunity from jurisdiction
Under the provisions of the convention, immunity from suit is
eradicated at the outset. The convention prevents a contracting
state from raising any plea of immunity that would frustrate the
proceedings or the recognition of the award. Consent to ICSID
arbitration and the binding character of the resulting awards
constitute an irrevocable waiver of immunity from jurisdiction.
Art. 54 of the convention bars the contracting state from raising at
the time of recognition or enforcement of an ICSID award the plea of
sovereign immunity from jurisdiction. This rule is undoubtedly of
paramount importance to the effectiveness of the award rendered.
Furthermore, a plea of immunity would constitute a serious
interference with the ICSID machinery and would be incompatible with
o /
the freely given consent by that state to ICSID arbitration.
Indeed, raising the plea of immunity would be inconsistent with the
free will and equality of the parties, in the sense that the state
party to arbitration would resort to a type of defence which is
totally unavailable to the other party who is assured that such
immunity is being waived by the state partner.
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ii. Immunity from execution
Unlike immunity from suit, the convention surrenders measures
of execution to domestic rules of immunity. Art. 55 provides:
Nothing in Article 54 shall be construed as derogating from the
law in force in any contracting state relating to immunity of
that state or of any foreign state from execution. 35
Thus it is possible, as in the case of other arbitral awards, that
those rendered within the framework of the convention will be
subject to different treatment in contracting states. It is
obvious that under the article a contracting state may forcefully
oppose an ICSID award on the basis of sovereign immunity and that is
bound to raise doubts as regards the effectiveness of the whole
machinery, and the solution adopted by the convention in this
particular regard is to be regretted. However, this singular
shortcoming may well be appreciated if a number of considerations
are borne in mind:
1) The solution thus adopted could not be avoided in view of the
fact that, at the time when the convention was drafted, there were
divergent opinions among the representatives on the meaning and
scope of immunity from execution.^
2) Since the convention entered into force in 1966 the restrictive
doctrine of immunity has significantly extended to cover immunity
from execution as has already been mentioned elsewhere. This new
progress seems to give a new practical significance to ICSID awards.
The investor in whose favour the award is rendered is now in a
position to choose the forum within whose jurisdiction the assets of
foreign states are located and which jurisdiction recognizes
non-immunity from execution and thus increases his chance of
37
success.
3) The shortcoming can also be mitigated by the fact that the
parties may at the time of the negotiation of the agreement to
submit the dispute to the ICSID, exclude expressly the right of the
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state party to raise the plea of immunity from measures of
enforcement in connection with the execution of the resulting award.
Moreover, issues of immunity from execution should, however, be
viewed in the context of the convention as a whole, which offers
definite safeguards to the investor. The plea of immunity would be
contrary to the obligation of the contracting state to comply with
the award and the state involved would be exposed to various
OO
sanctions provided for under the convention. In the light of
these considerations, the theoretically troublesome issue of
sovereign immunity under the convention appears to raise no major
difficulties and seems to lose a great deal of its practical
significance. By signing the ICSID convention and entering into
ICSID arbitration, Egypt or its state entities have effectively
waived their immunity from jurisdiction, although such waiver does
not, however, constitute a waiver of immunity from execution.
Relating to consent, Art. 25 provides that: "When the parties
have given their consent, no party may withdraw the consent
unilaterally". However, the situation may be more complex when the
governmental party raises a last-ditch defence based on ultra vires.
If the signatory to the agreement to arbitrate lacks the capacity to
conclude the agreement, then the consent of the sovereign may be
challenged as null and avoid.
In Egypt, public sector commercial entities are given general
OQ
freedom to contract loans by the present Public Sector law. Where
the signatory is the government itself or one of the ministries or a
constituent subdivision or an agency of the Egyptian Government,
then the agreement must be approved by the people's assembly. In
the case of a loan, this is a requirement laid down by the Egyptian
constitution, Art. 121 of which says: "The executive authority
shall not contract a loan .... except with the approval of the
people's assembly". Once approved, the loan agreement is published
in the official Gazette and becomes a public document.^ The
publication of the agreement, including the clause to arbitrate,
in the Egyptian official Gazette constitutes an irrebuttable
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presumption that the governmental entity in question is duly
authorized to sign the arbitration agreement, and consequently it
rules out the possibility of a plea of immunity being raised on
ultra vires grounds.
Since Egypt's ratification of the convention in 1976, 12 cases
involving Egypt have been presented to the ICSID, six of which are
pending; four have been the object of settlement; and only two
have resulted in an award.^
The Egyptian ratification of the convention is significant to
the issues of sovereign immunity in that it shows that Egypt, as a
developing country and importer of technology and investment, is
prepared to waive its immunity in cases involving investment
disputes, at least at the adjudicative level of the proceedings, as
far as the ICSID arbitration is concerned. It also shows foreign
investors that there is no restriction in Egyptian law upon Egypt's
authority to subscribe to such waivers.
(g) Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958^"
The distinction between recognition and enforcement is critical
in litigation against sovereign entities because, according to
different legal systems, a state may waive its immunity from
jurisdiction without waiving its immunity from execution. Thus
both sovereign entities and private parties will look to applicable
treaties to obtain the recognition of the award, including the New
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards, accepted by Egypt on 9 March 1959.^
The convention endorses the principle of recognition and
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and endows foreign awards
with the same status as domestic awards. It recognizes the
principle of the binding nature of the foreign arbitral award
without the need for it to be embodied in a judicial decision. The
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convention contains provisions regarding, inter alia, recognition of
an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration (Art. II) and
recognition of arbitral awards as binding and enforceable in
accordance with the rules of procedure of the state where the award
is relied upon (Art. III). Under the convention there are a
number of grounds on which confirmation of an award will be refused
(Art. V).
1) The convention requires that a foreign arbitral award must be
made in a contracting state according to the local procedural rules.
However, doubts might be raised where it may be held that the
sovereign state cannot be presumed to submit the local procedural
rules and thus waive its immunity.
2) A sovereign defendant state could challenge recognition of a
foreign arbitral award on the ground of its lack of capacity to
enter into the agreement to arbitrate.
It should also be borne in mind that the convention permits the
contracting state to reserve its application to its commercial
transactions. A private party should therefore include a
stipulation in its contract with a sovereign entity to the effect
that the latter engages in the performance of the contract in his
private capacity and not as a sovereign authority. In this way the
private party would ensure that the defence of sovereign immunity
will not be raised on the basis that the sovereign entity has
entered into the commercial contract for purely public purposes.
In contrast to the ICSID arbitration, the New York Convention
offers a definite advantage. Under the ICSID Convention the award
is final and binding upon the parties, and remedies against the
award are limited to revision on the ground of newly discovered
facts (Art. 51) and annulment on certain restricted grounds (Art.
52). The ICSID Convention also eliminates many of the grounds for
attacking awards under the New York Convention, such as public
policy grounds,^ even although the former convention, as has
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already been noted, has not totally eliminated the problem of
sovereign immunity from execution.
Although there is domestic legislation governing recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgements in Egypt, there is no
corresponding enactment for the enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards. Yet there are a number of court decisions confirming the
enforceability of foreign arbitral awards.^ However, the Egyptian
courts have not always used the convention and have instead applied
the rules set out in the code of Civil and Commercial Procedure for
the Enforcement of Foreign Judgements to the Enforcement of Foreign
l±£\
Arbitral Awards.
It should be emphasized that the practical recognition of
foreign arbitral awards in Egyptian courts is drastically limited.
Certain problems have arisen in connection with the enforcement of
such awards involving challenges to the validity of ICC arbitration
clauses and ICC arbitration proceedings themselves. In the
majority of cases, the Egyptian party to an ICC arbitration clause
argued that these clauses are incompatible with Art. 502 of the
Egyptian Code of Civil Procedure relating to the mechanism of the
appointment of arbitrators. The Egyptian courts have tentatively
allowed this line of argument to prevail. In several cases the
Egyptian courts have stayed the arbitration proceedings while
awaiting the examination of the case on its merits.1^ In other
cases the very ICC proceedings have been attacked in Egyptian courts
AO
and judgements given tended to annul the arbitration itself.
These decisions have called into question the advisability of
using the Cairo Regional Arbitration Centre,an arbitral
institution established in Egypt in 1983 with the collaboration of
the Egyptian Government. This concern was first felt in the Centre
itself and it submitted a memorandum to the Egyptian Government
asking for an amendment in the law in order to clarify the legal
position and avoid uncertainties concerning the enforcement of their
awards.The Egyptian attitude has been criticized by a number of
leading experts in the field of arbitration"^ who stressed the need
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for an urgent clarification of the meaning of Art. 502 of the
Egyptian Code of Civil Procedure so as to restore the confidence of
international businessmen in the feasibility of having recourse to
arbitration with Egyptian parties and on the efficacy of
52
international arbitration in Egypt. ^
To sum up, a foreign arbitral award is final and binding and
cannot be appealed against in Egyptian courts. As a contracting
state to the New York Convention, foreign arbitral awards,
especially when rendered against the Egyptian Government or one of
its public sub-divisions, should be treated as final and binding
except in cases provided for in Art. 2 of the Convention. However,
a private party, in whose favour an award has been rendered, has to
take into account the fact that the significance of the binding
character and finality of the award is seriously mitigated under the
present Egyptian case-law. The fact becomes crucially important
for a private party obtaining an award against an Egyptian sovereign
entity which has assets only in Egypt and where the award may only
be enforced there.
2. Bilateral Treaties
In contrast to its participation in multilateral treaties,
Egypt has rarely concluded bilateral treaties with foreign states in
this field. One of the bilateral treaties which deserves to be
mentioned is the Protocol on the Trade Delegation of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics in the Republic of Egypt. According
to Art. 2 the functions of the Delegation have been enumerated as
follows:
(a) to promote the development of trade relations between
the USSR and the Republic of Egypt;
(b) to represent the interests of the USSR in the
Republic of Egypt in all matters relating to foreign trade;
(c) to carry on trade between the USSR and the Republic
of Egypt.
The status of the Delegation in the territory of Egypt has been
explicitly provided for in Art. 3:
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The Trade Delegation shall form an integral part of the Embassy
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Republic of
Egypt, and shall have its headquarters in Cairo.
and as such:
the Trade Representative of the USSR in the Republic of Egypt
and his deputies shall enjoy all the privileges and immunities
accorded to members of diplomatic missions.
Art. 6 of the Protocol significantly provides that: "the
privileges and immunities accorded to the Trade Delegation under
Article 3 above shall apply also to its trading activities".
Nevertheless the same Article categorically excludes jurisdictional
immunities in disputes.
(a) .... relating to commercial contracts concluded or
guaranteed in the Republic of Egypt by the Trade Delegation in
accordance with Article 2 of this Protocol .... in such cases
the Trade Delegation shall designate a representative to appear
on its behalf before the court.
Paragraph (b) even authorizes enforcement of judgments in Egypt:
"final judicial decisions against the Trade Delegation relating
to commercial contracts concluded or guaranteed by the Trade
Delegation". Such execution may be levied "only on the property
of the Trade Delegation and on goods belonging to it". Despite
these reservations, the derogation from the principle of state
immunity is crucially important; in particular, that jurisdiction
over disputes involving commercial transactions concluded or
guaranteed by the Trade Delegations are, as a general rule, subject
to the jurisdiction of the courts of Egypt.
In substance the Protocol reproduced the relevant provisions of
several other treaties concluded by the USSR relating to the status
of the latter's Trade Delegation (discussed in Chapter 2). It is,
however, noteworthy that the Protocol concluded with some of these
states excluding provisional measures but allowing execution of
final judgment against the Trade Delegation "not only on property
and goods belonging to the delegation itself", as had been the case
with the Egyptian Protocol, but on "all property of the Soviet
State".These are, of course, minor differences and in any case
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confirm the view that the Soviet Union's treaty practice by no means
favours absolute immunity and in no case do these various agreements
provide for the exclusion of local jurisdiction and enforcement.
Another example of Egyptian bilateral treaties in this respect
can be furnished by the Agreement with regard to commerce and trade
concluded with Japan in 1985,-^ which reflects a substantially
similar trend. Immunity from jurisdiction and execution have been
dealt with in Art. 7 which reads:
In disputes relating to commercial transactions entered into by
the Japanese Government or one of its commercial enterprises,
the Government of Japan shall claim no immunity from suit or
from execution before any of the Egyptian Courts. 56
This provision amounts to an expression of waiver of immunity from
jurisdiction and immunity from execution, although it is not clear
whether the provision also covers attachment and arrest. The words
are general enough to include attachment, since attachment is a
corollary to the assumption of jurisdiction and also serves to
provide security or guarantee of payment or satisfaction of the
final judgement against which no immunity could be invoked. The
provision also indicates consent on the part of the Japanese
Government to attachment and execution in respect of all property
belonging to that Government in its private capacity or at least in
respect of special types of property, particularly those relating to
the dispute before the court. The provision, however, cannot be
construed to include other types of state property used for official
functions such as diplomatic premises and property, for these are
protected by international arrangements of a customary nature. It
is of interest to learn that the immunity is not regulated on a
reciprocal basis, and this in turn tends to support the restrictive
attitude of both governments towards immunity from suit and
execution.
The examination of these multilateral and bilateral treaties
appears to confirm the proposition that Egyptian treaty practice
establishes at least one important feature of the law of state
immunity, that restrictive immunity is established as a kind of
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common denominator both for jurisdiction and execution. In no case
do these various conventions and treaties make ownership on the part
of foreign states a decisive criterion to determining immunity
questions. The real test in most of these instruments lies in the
nature of the activities or of the property involved as the case may
be.
The above Egyptian treaty practice is relevant at a variety of
levels. In the first place, Egypt's multilateral treaty practice
is entirely consistent with the restrictive doctrine of foreign
sovereign immunity. In the second place, and despite its limited
bilateral practice in this field, a similar consistency is fairly
observable in the few bilateral treaties that Egypt has concluded
with other states. In the third place it is of course unnecessary
to emphasize the importance of the multilateral conventions in this
complex branch of the law. Within the limits of their application
such conventions help to rule out any uncertainty as to the position
of foreign states. At any rate, Egypt's multilateral practice may
be significant from a quite broader viewpoint; namely it lends
support to the view that the restrictive doctrine of foreign
sovereign immunity constitutes the general rule of customary
international law. This broader relevance is particularly
important since some of these conventions explicitly recognize that
their provisions enunciate general norms of international law and
thus claim to codify rather than develop the law.~*^ Furthermore,
treaty practice in and of itself constitutes an important form of
state practice and may also be evidence of opinio juris. That
state treaty practice is generally regarded as being significant for
the formation of customary law goes back, in part, to the Asylum
case:
A custom could not be invoked against Peru, which far from
having by its attitude adhered to it, has on the contrary,
repudiated it by refraining from ratifying the Montevideo
Conventions. 58
The ICJ appears to have taken a similar stand in The North Sea
cases, where it stated that: "a very widespread and representative
participation in the convention might suffice of itself"59 £or a
conventional rule to generate customary law.
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In the writings of jurists the same view enjoys wide
predominance. For instance, Thirlway maintains that:
It is also possible to regard ratification of a general
convention as acts of state practice accompanied by opinio
juris if the latter term is widened ... to include the
intention to conform to and to assist the emergence of a
developing rule of a customary law. 60
and Professor Baxter argues that:
With ratification and with entry into force of the agreement
... the signatory firmly commits himself to the view of
customary law set forth in the treaty. 61
Other writers have also maintained that: "the strongest
expression of opinio juris is the ratification of the law-making
treaties".^ However, it might well be argued that acceptance of
these conventions by Egypt would involve recognition of dozens of
articles with an indeterminate number of rules contained therein,
and yet an expression of opinio juris, in order to be effective,
must be directed towards concrete legal rules. Whatever the merit
of this argument, its practical effect would be lessened if we
consider that, for signature or ratification of the convention or
the subsequent practice of the parties to have any significance for
the formation of customary rule, the opinio juris would have to be
demonstrated beyond the mere contractual obligation.^ Egypt, even
before acceptance of these conventions, has maintained, in different
quarters, that in its view, the conventional rules were also
customary, as evidenced by the statement of her delegation before
the Afro-Asian Legal Consultative Committee. However, upon entry
acceptance, or after entry into force of conventions, there is a
lack of a definite statement on the part of the Egyptian state that
it has adhered to the conventional rules on account of the customary
rules embodied therein.
Moreover, the absence of reservation in the Egypt's acceptance
of these conventions, directed toward the articles providing for
immunity or non-immunity, is highly relevant in this context.
Although the absence of such reservation is not conclusive as to
Egypt's opinio juris, it serves as an indication of the acceptance
- 251 -
of the general framework of the customary law embodied in these
conventions.
II. GOVERNMENTAL PRACTICE
1. Views expressed within an International Forum
The practice of the executive branch of the government, the
organ charged with conducting the state's foreign relations,
constitutes another important source of international law of state
immunities. While Egyptian municipal decisions and treaty
practices are numerous, there appears to have been no incident in
which an Egyptian court deferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
on the issue of sovereign immunity. The absence of such deference
has been explained by an Egyptian writer on the subject^ in a
rather convincing manner. A.A. Sirhan observed that the present
trend of non-deference is in keeping with the restrictive view of
immunity adopted by the Egyptian court since the 19th century.
Again, the non-existence in Egypt of national legislation regulating
the claims of sovereign immunity makes it a little bit difficult to
assess the contribution of the executive branch as reflecting the
position of the state as grantor or recipient of state immunity,
since the administrative branch can play a central role in
initiating, introducing and assuring the passage of legislation on
state immunities in line with the views and policy of the government
in power.
This relative dearth of materials in the form of internal or
interdepartmental advice or diplomatic correspondence should not,
however, constitute a major problem in identifying the views of the
Egyptian Government on questions of state immunities. The ILC was
of the opinion that this obstacle could be effectively overcome by
examining the views which had been received from various governments
in response to the requests of the Commission.65 q^e Commission
invited the member states to reply to a questionnaire on the topic
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"Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property" prepared by
the Commission's Special Rapporteur in cooperation with the
6 6
Secretariat. The answers by the governments to the
questionnaire, with additional comments and suggestions, could help
to fill in the gaps.^
68The questionnaire consisted of 20 different questions
covering almost every aspect of the issue under study by the
Commission. It would not be useful to the present inquiry to look
into the replies on an answer by answer basis. Instead, the views
expressed by the Egyptian Government as a whole are summarized as
follows:
i- There is no text in Egyptian law which expressly recognizes or
denies immunity of foreign states.^
ii- The practice of judicial decisions in Egypt tends to base the
immunity accorded to foreign states and their property on
principles of international law. (Answer to question 2).
iii- The reply also endorsed the rule that the plea of immunity from
jurisdiction is a matter of public policy.
iv- The Egyptian courts, according to the reply, have firmly
adhered to the doctrine that immunity of foreign states is not
absolute, but rather is limited to acts of sovereign authority.
v- As far as the views of the executive branch of the Egyptian
Government are concerned, in the reply it was stated that it
adopts the restrictive view of immunity. The opinions of the
executive branch regarding the question whether or not, in a
given case, a particular government ought to be accorded state
immunity is not conclusive and is subject to the control of the
judiciary according to certain constitutional limitations.
(Answer to question 4).
vi- It is clear from the reply that general information about the
applicability of the doctrine of reciprocity by the Egyptian
courts could not be provided because there are no known cases
in which this issue has arisen. (Answer to question 5).
As a whole, the reply is further strong evidence of the
Egyptian Government's adoption of restrictive immunity of foreign
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states in its official practice. The importance of the reply lies
not only in the fact that it expresses the view of the Egyptian
Government as a territorial state granting or denying immunity but
also in reflecting the view that such immunity might not be claimed
by it if sued before foreign courts in certain cases. Under these
circumstances it would not be conceivable for the Egyptian
Government to rely on the absolute doctrine of state immunity if
sued before the court of another state in cases relating to its
commercial activities, for states are not only grantors, but also
beneficiaries of immunities. It is in this context that the reply
serves to act as a two-way system. However, in practice, the
Egyptian Government had adopted the entirely reverse attitude, as
will be more fully discussed later.
The Egyptian judicial practice on state immunity has been
repeatedly referred to by the International Law Commission in its
work on the subject.^ As a matter of fact, it is the only
developing country whose practice the Special Rapporteur
systematically cites. He is of the opinion that the judicial
practice of countries other than of common law jurisdictions and the
civil law system during the formative period of the law of state
immunity was not so firmly established on the question because
African countries were not composed of many independent sovereign
states and the independent sovereign countries of Asia were subject
to the foreign extraterritorial rights known as capitulations. It
is interesting to mention in this respect that the judicial practice
of Egypt to which the Special Rapporteur is currently referring, is
a direct result of this very system of capitulations by which the
Mixed Courts of Egypt were established. At any rate, all the
Egyptian judicial practice employed by Mr Sucharitkul is clear, and
often strong, evidence for the wider restrictive view of immunity
upon which he seems to base his draft Articles on the topic.
The position taken by the Egyptian delegates in the Sixth
Committee sheds little light on the Egyptian practice on the
subject. In discussing the Report of the ILC on its work during
the 34th session, the Egyptian delegate, Mr El Banhawy, expressed
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his delegation's endorsement to the method adopted by the
International Law Commission in studying the subject generally.^
In the discussion during the 37th session of the Committee, Mr El
Banhawy again fully supported the conclusions reached by the Special
Rapporteur regarding the subject and in particular the following
four points:
i- that jurisdictional immunities of states and their property
were not a pre-emptory norm, since they could be renounced;
ii- that the claim to immunity should be limited to cases under
consideration by the courts of other countries;
iii- that the legal basis for the articles emanated from state
practice; and
iv- that the subject should be approached flexibly in order that
the great majority of states might be able to accept the
■7 o
Commission's recommendations.
So far these are the only instances in which the Egyptian
delegation to the Sixth Committee has expressed its views on the
subject. However, it should be mentioned that, during the
preparation of this study, the views of the Egyptian Government on
the ILC's work and its draft Articles have not been made known.
2. Opinions expressed within Regional Forums
(a) Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee
The statements expressed by the Egyptian Delegation in the
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Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee are illustrative. The
committee discussed the immunities of states at its first and second
sessions at New Delhi (1957) and Cairo (1958) respectively, and
concluded its work at its third session in Colombo (1960).^ As
mentioned elsewhere, the subject was referred for the opinion of the
committee by the Indian Government. At the Cairo session, the
secretariat of the committee, in order to help the committee to
finalise its report on the topic of state immunity, invited all
participant countries to take part in the questionnaire prepared by
the Secretariat.^
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The questionnaire was divided into seven parts, each of which
dealt with a separate heading. The salient questions were inserted
under the appropriate headings, namely: general aspects of state
immunity, governmental activities of a purely 'private' or
'commercial' nature, state trading organizations, position of
foreign trade representatives or agents, suits against foreign
states and their instumentalities, and finally questions tending to
provide answers towards the solution of the problem. Instead of
beginning with the general aspects of the topic, the questionnaire
began with questions on the legal conception of state immunities.
Detailed questions on the subject were inserted. The committee had
also tried to bring about a certain uniformity in the order of the
treatment of the issues involved by requesting that the order of the
questionnaire be followed. Questions were also worded simply,
clearly, straightforwardly and briefly. Compared with the UN
Secretariat questionnaire referred to above, that of the Asian-
African Committee differs materially in order and emphasis and
considerably in content and method. The work of the committee on
state immunity has received general acceptance by the world
community through their citation and examination by different courts
and jurists.
The answers prepared by the delegation of the UAR (Egypt and
7
Syria) were elaborate and informative. For the sake of brevity,
the view of the Egyptian Government, as they were reflected in the
reply, may be briefly noted as follows:
1) The doctrine of sovereign immunity should be limited in its
application to public acts of a foreign state. A distinction
should always be made between acts performed by the state in its
capacity as a sovereign power and other acts, even if these are non¬
commercial transactions.
2) The delegation agreed with the view expressed by some members
that the state assumed the role of a private person by entering into
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trade or other private activities and in respect of such
transactions its waiver of immunity should be presumed.
3) Although the Egyptian Government engages in the purchase of
materials and equipment from foreign countries and these
transactions are negotiated either through government officials or
by companies controlled by the government, any claims of state
immunity arising out of such transactions are not to be recognized.
4) In spite of the fact that the Egyptian Government owns ships
which are run for commercial purposes, and companies controlled by
the Economic Development Organization practising banking and
insurance business in some of the Arab countries, the Egyptian
Government takes the view that any disputes arising out of such
transactions should be subjected to local courts whether or not they
are carried out by the state itself or by the state trading
organizations.
5) The granting of immunity to governmental trade representatives
or agents depends on the nature of the transactions performed by
such representatives or agents.
6) When the plea of immunity is raised by a foreign state, the
court's decision on a sovereign immunity question is exclusively a
matter of judicial process and as such should not be left to the
discretion of the executive branch.
7) In cases where a decree is passed against a foreign state, such
a decree may be executed on its private property. It is essential
that the property in question be within the jurisdiction of the
court. As for execution on its private assets located abroad, this
depends upon the law of the defendant foreign state or the law of
the country within which the asset is situated. The answer
expressly excluded measures of execution against the public property
of the foreign state.^
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8) In an answer to the question whether the contesting parties to
the dispute can seek international judicial settlement on any
question of state immunity rather than municipal litigation, the UAR
replied that the municipal courts should remain competent to decide
such questions. But, according to the memorandum, this should not
be taken to mean that the matter of state immunities is not suitable
for settlement by arbitration.
It is clear from the memorandum that the Egyptian Government
regards sovereign immunity as limited and always subject to
restrictions. It is interesting to note that the memorandum has
presumed the existence of valid territorial jurisdiction and waiver
of immunity from the mere fact that the foreign state has entered
the free market, although such a presumption can neither be
supported by practice nor by doctrine, yet it appears to be based
on practicality since experience has shown that participation by
states in trade automatically entails waiver of immunity. Most
significantly, the memorandum expressly stated that the government
cannot claim immunity from suit in relation to its trading
activities, no matter how such transactions are conducted, as long
as those transactions are commercial by nature.
The memorandum also endorsed the fact that the adjudication of
suits involving foreign states is essentially a legal matter and
should not be influenced by foreign relations considerations. This
view tends to suggest that the best course is for disputes to be
litigated in ordinary courts away from state-to-state negotiations.
Indeed, diplomatic negotiations are notoriously a very bad
substitute for an exact determination of legal rights and
obligations both under municipal and under public international law.
If the private entity or individual would have to rely on its
government to assert its claim through diplomatic channels,
obtaining redress would become very difficult. Negotiations would
be of small comfort to the private individual who is a third
important element in the dispute. In this way, direct recourse by
private individuals to ordinary courts seems to be the only
effective guarantee against their trading partners and in accord
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with the restrictive theory. It is probably due to these factors
that the memorandum even preferred the dispute to be submitted to
the national courts rather than to international judicial
authorities, though without a prejudice to settlement by
arbitration.
(b) The League of Arab States
The Arab League, under its pact, is authorized to prepare draft
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Articles for approval by its member states. The question of
state immunity has not, however, attracted the attention of the
League or its Legal Committee. However, the committee, on the
basis of 11 subjects listed in the 1964 memorandum of the
Secretary-General of the Legal Committee, selected a list of six
topics, including the question of state immunity. But the topic
has never been tabled for discussion by the Committee, ^ nor
does there appear to have been any step taken in the form of
recommendation, draft Articles, or a resolution concerning the
subject. This singular absence of any initiative does not
necessarily indicate a lack of interest on the part of the League
and its legal committee, but is merely a question of priority in the
Council's requests. It might be further observed that rules
governing state immunity are urgently needed, particularly for those
groups of states in which there is much latent hostility between the
sundry members, whereas the need is not so pressing with regard to
the smaller, regional organizations where, presumably, there is
greater concurrence of aims and purposes and less in the way of
international business transactions and international adjudications.
This may explain why relatively little attention has been given to
the question of state immunity within the context of the Arab
League.
Nevertheless a convention has been adopted under the auspices
of the League dealing with some aspects of state immunity, albeit in
a very subsidiary way. As early as 1952, the Council of the League
approved the Agreement regarding the Execution of JudgementsSO which
O *J
was ratified by Egypt on 25 July 1954. This Agreement contains
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a provision partially dealing with the general principle of state
immunities in the context of foreign judgements rendered against a
state party to the Agreement to whom a request for execution has
been presented. Art. 4 provides:
This Agreement shall not, in any manner whatever, apply to
judgements rendered against the government of the state
requested to execute or any one of its officials in respect of
work done by him on account of his official duty. Nor shall it
apply to judgements, the execution of which will be contrary to
international treaties and agreements in force in the state
requested to execute.
It is clear from the words of the Article that the provisions
of the Agreement cannot be pleaded to an action brought upon a
judgement rendered in the territory of any other contracting party
against the government of the requested state. Again, a judgement
obtained against such governments would not be executed, if by its
execution, a violation of an international treaty or agreement would
consequently result. Thus a judgement of this kind is regarded as
strictly territorial and not entitled to judicial recognition beyond
the jurisdiction of the court which pronounced it. The legal value
of judgements of this sort remains uncertain. It is only certain
that such judgements can be used for diplomatic purposes or for
other inter-governmental channels for non-judicial settlement.
Therefore, in the final analysis, this provision recognizes the
principle of state immunity, albeit with very restricted scope.
The provisions of the convention are commonplace and also
outdated. They are modelled on the regime laid down by the Geneva
on
Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927.
The Arab League Convention deals only with the enforcement of
judgments and arbitral awards and no reference is made to their
recognition. The parties to the Arab League Convention are
supposed to enjoy more favourable treatment because of their
membership of a body which is essentially regional. To this
extent, reliance on the provisions of the convention by private
parties against state parties or their entities would not enhance
the possibility of the enforcement of their judgements.
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It should be mentioned that the Arab League Convention is being
8 3
replaced by a new convention signed in Riyadh on 8 April 1983.
This new convention, unlike its predecessor, deals with enforcement
of arbitral awards. It also avoids the double exequartur rule by
recognizing enforcement without examining the merits of the case.
The new convention sets forth the traditional conditions of i-
arbitrability of the dispute; ii- the validity of the arbitration
clause; iii- the proper notification of the parties and non¬
violation of public policy and moral rules of the place where the
enforcement is sought (Art. 37). The award also must not violate
the provisions of the constitution of the state where the
enforcement is sought, or the tenets of Islamic law (Art. 30(9)).
If the award has satisfied these conditions, it will be enforced
without re-examining its merits by the courts. Most significantly,
the provision dealing with non-enforcement of judgements against the
government of the state where enforcement is sought was abandoned,
thus paving the way for private parties seeking to enforce their
awards against the governments of one of the contracting states and
providing them with some security against an immunity plea.
The ratification of the 1952 Arab League Convention by Egypt
does not appear to add anything new as far as Egyptian domestic law
is concerned, since the provisions of the convention are strikingly
similar to those of the civil and commercial code.
3. The Views of the Egyptian Government as Beneficiary
of State Immunity Before Foreign Courts and
Arbitral Tribunals
The views of the Egyptian Government towards the rule of state
immunity can also be found in its pleadings when sued before foreign
courts and arbitral tribunals. Belonging to this category of
practice is the argument raised by the Egyptian Government before
OA
the Swiss Supreme Court in 1960. In 1951, the plaintiff leased
her villa in Vienna to the Egyptian Minister to Austria, who acted
as the diplomatic representative of the Kingdom of Egypt in
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Switzerland. The premises were to be used for mission purposes and
as accommodation for the Minister. In 1957, the defendant
terminated the lease on the ground that the tenant did not perform
his obligations and claimed a certain amount of damages. To secure
the resultant judgement, she applied for and obtained an order of
attachment against funds of the Republic of Egypt deposited in a
Geneva bank. In an attempt by the Swiss Embassy in Cairo to serve
the garnishee order together with the order of payment on the
Egyptian Government, the latter's foreign office refused to accept
service or to be forwarded the papers by arguing that the order of
attachment and execution violated the immunity of the Egyptian
state. Later, in May 1959, the Swiss Embassy in Cairo certified
that it had attempted service and the Geneva execution office
accordingly found that the order of payment had not been challenged
by the Egyptian Government, and transformed the original garnishee
order into a definite order of attachment.
In the spring of 1959, the tenant evacuated the villa. During
the interim, the owner had increased her claim against the tenant,
as the result of an expert survey of the building and furniture, and
had succeeded in obtaining an additional amount and a subsequent
order of attachment. Service was again attempted and likewise
opposed by the Egyptian Government. The order of attachment was
directed against the funds which were designed to cover security and
the purchase price of war materials which Egypt had concluded the
purchase of in 1953 with a Geneva Corporation.
Before the Supreme Court of Switzerland, the United Arab
Republic sought to set aside the order of attachment on the grounds
that it had not been properly summoned and that the suits by the
landlord violated the immunity of foreign states from local
jurisdiction and execution. The court rejected these arguments.
As to the nature of the rule of state immunity, the court observed:
According to the established jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court, the rule of immunity from suit is not an absolute rule
of general scope. A distinction must be made according to
whether the foreign state acts by virtue of its sovereignty
(jure imperii) or as a party under private law (jure
gestionis). Immunity from suit can be claimed only in the
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former case. In the latter case, the foreign states can be
sued in the Swiss courts and subjected to measures of
execution, provided that the legal relation involved has a
territorial connection with Switzerland .... 85
The court cited a number of authorities, both judicial and
doctrinal, from various legal systems as guidance. Perhaps the
most interesting point in this part of the judgement was that the
court had cited the practice of the Egyptian courts, both before and
after the abolition of the Mixed Courts, to the effect that immunity
of states from suit is limited to acts of government.
In order to determine the character of the act involved, the
court looked to its nature and held that the transaction in that
case had all the characteristics of an agreement between private
parties: ".... the obligations of both parties resulted from
private law, and the parties understood this so well that they
agreed to submit their dispute to ordinary civil courts"."....
when signing the lease it acted like any private individual renting
real estate".^
As far as immunity from execution was concerned, the court
rejected the argument by observing that immunity from execution is
confirmed by courts and writers only when there is immunity from
suit, a view which was not adopted by the Swiss courts. Again the
court based this absence of immunity from execution on the ground
that powers of execution are the natural consequence of the power
to adjudicate. The court also rejected the Egyptian argument
that the purpose for which the funds were deposited was to finance
the purchase of weapons from the Swiss firm as an act of national
defence. The court found that the firm was already dissolved
and the fund was ultimately to be used to settle the Egyptian
obligations under the contract with the liquidators. A sizeable
balance remained after the settlement and became available to any
other use the Egyptian Government might desire. It may be remarked
in the first place that the argument of the Egyptian Government that
the plea of state immunity is available to foreign states against
suits before foreign courts is incompatible with its judicial
practice, as the court has rightly noted, and runs counter to its
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governmental practice which has always been in favour of restricted
immunity and, as such, cannot be justified from a legal point of
view.
Secondly, the argument that the funds were used for the purpose
of national defence seems to be a valid argument. However, the
generality of the argument failed to take into account the
circumstances under which the deposit was made and the consequences
which followed the dissolution of the firm with which the government
was dealing. If funds remaining available after settlement of the
obligations under the contract with the Swiss firm had been
converted into funds of the Egyptian Embassy in Switzerland or any
other diplomatic mission, there might have been some grounds for
invoking immunity, but funds deposited by the Egyptian Central Bank
in Switzerland or in any other foreign state would entirely fall
outside the ambit of immunity, and would thus be used for the
specific purpose of satisfying a judgment or a creditor's interest.
The conversion of funds held by the Central Bank of Egypt into
accounts of its diplomatic missions abroad would protect those funds
against measures of execution at least in such jurisdiction as held
funds of diplomatic missions to be immune, such as Britain and
Germany.
The participation by Egypt in international commercial
arbitration has also resulted in a number of cases in which Egypt
has maintained the plea of state immunity vis-a-vis the jurisdiction
of the arbitral tribunals themselves. A couple of cases merit
close attention.
OO
The first of these is the Pyramids case. A United States
company had concluded an agreement in 1974 with a public body, the
Egyptian General Organization for Tourism and Hotels (EGOTH), for
the construction by that company of a large tourist complex near the
site of the Pyramids. The United States company had demanded the
Egyptian Government's signature on the contract and the signature
had been given by the Egyptian Minister of Tourism, preceded by the
language "approved, agreed and ratified". Later on, the plateau of
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the Pyramids was classified by the competent administrative
authority as being in the public domain of antiquities and
accordingly the project raised a general outcry and the Egyptian
Parliament ultimately blocked its implementation, even although the
United States company had already spent large amounts of money on
preliminary studies. In 1983, the case was brought before the
arbitral tribunal of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).
Egypt objected to the ICC jurisdiction, maintaining that it was not
a party to the supplemental agreement and that it had not signed any
agreement containing an ICC arbitration clause. The Egyptian
Government signed terms of reference and participated in the
arbitration, while maintaining its objection to jurisdiction.
O Q
Nevertheless, the arbitration tribunaloy ruled that the Egyptian
Government was bound by the contract and had implicitly waived its
immunity from jurisdiction. The Egyptian Government had then
requested the Court of Appeals of Paris to set aside the arbitral
award, which the court had done in 1984, stating that the Minister's
signature was not a contractual commitment of the Egyptian state but
merely approval of various administrative authorizations within the
Minister's competence. The decision also accepted the Egyptian
argument by ruling that, where a party objects to ICC jurisdiction,
it may still participate in the arbitration (sign terms of reference
etc.) without risking being considered to have waived its
jurisdictional immunity. The decision of the Court of Appeal to
set aside the award was rendered on the same day that leave to
enforce the award was granted by a court in the Netherlands.^
It may be observed first of all that cases in which parties to
arbitration may have recourse to ordinary courts of law are
inevitable in order to solve some problems that might arise during
arbitration procedure. The significance of this need becomes more
crucial if a state party to arbitration objected to the jurisdiction
of the tribunal as Egypt had done in this case. Again the
desirability of this recourse seems most important, especially if
one considers that the absence of supervision by the judicial
authorities amounts to saying that there could be no appeal against
any arbitral award that might be rendered. In this way the
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judicial supervision by the local court offers, as in this case,
some comfort to the state party to the dispute which could request a
national court to provide it with guarantees against particularly
serious risk. To this extent it would be a mistake to say that such
an intervention by the national courts would be incompatible with
the "free will" of the parties. Once the parties have bound
themselves to a given arbitration centre in a given country, it
would be difficult to rule out the natural consequences of the
supervision by the local courts.
In the second place, the participation in the proceedings by
the Egyptian Government might well be interpreted to constitute a
valid waiver of immunity from the tribunal's jurisdiction. To
this, the Paris Court of Appeals seemed to reply that Egypt has an
undeniable legitimate interest in defending the case before the
tribunal.
Finally, the most negative aspect of the case was the argument
of the Egyptian Government that it had not waived its immunity
from jurisdiction and the acceptance of that argument by the court.
It is not clear from the report on what grounds the court presumed
the absence of such waiver of immunity. However, it is evident
that, when the Egyptian government expressly ratified the
arbitration agreement, it also expressly admitted the need for an
arbitral institution, but did it not also implicitly subscribe to
the rules of international business, which quite rightly include
arbitration? If that kind of argument is allowed to prevail,
serious concern may be raised about the efficacy of the arbitration
system itself.
The same line of argument has been adopted by the Egyptian
Government vis-a-vis the jurisdiction of another ICC arbitration, in
the context of a particular type of multi-party arbitration
resulting from an industrial contract involving Egypt and three Arab
states.^ On 29 April 1975, the sovereign states of United Arab
Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the Arab Republic of Egypt,
concluded an agreement by which the Arab Organization for
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Industrialization (AOI) was established. On 27 February 1978, the
AOI entered into an agreement with the claimant, Westland
Helicopters Ltd., an English company registered under English law,
to create a joint stock company of which AOI had 70% of the shares
and the claimant the remaining 30%, as a result of which the Arab
British Helicopters Co. was to be created to carry out quality
control on, and sell helicopters manufactured by the claimant. On
4 January 1978, the committee established by the interested four
states concluded with the British Government a memorandum of
understanding, especially designed to guarantee the performance by
the four states of their obligations towards the British company.
In 1979, following the recognition of Israel by the Arab Republic of
Egypt as a consequence of Camp David Accords between Egypt and
Israel, the other three states withdrew from the organization which
was later dissolved. Egypt, for its part, issued a law on 18 May
1979 which provided for the continuity of the organization as a
legal person under Egyptian law.
In arbitral proceedings instituted in Geneva, the three Arab
states chose to default, while the Egyptian representative raised a
remarkable multitude of objections, challenging the jurisdiction of
the ICC Court of Arbitration, inter alia, on the ground of Egyptian
sovereign immunity. The tribunal preferred on its own motion to
examine the argument also in relation to the other three defaulting
states. The tribunal found that it was necessary to distinguish
between 'adjudicative immunity' and 'enforcement immunity' and, due
to the nature of the proceedings, only the former was discussed.
Then it was ruled that:
According to a view accepted in Switzerland [the place of
arbitration], as elsewhere, the signing of an arbitration
clause implies the waiver of this ground. The 4 states in
creating the AOI, whose obligations were binding on themselves,
could not have overlooked the possibility of being proceeded
against at law in respect of these obligations. The creation
of AOI therefore implies a waiver of immunity in respect of
obligations entered into by AOI. 92
The tribunal rejected all the objections raised by the respondant
and declared itself competent. Egypt had also instituted
proceedings for the annulment of the award given by the tribunal.
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Undoubtedly the case had raised some complex legal problems
which were further complicated by the sensitive political issues
involved, since it was clear that the decision of the other three
states to put an end to the existence of the AOI was a decision
issued in response to the summit conference of Baghdad following the
Egyptian recognition of Israel and, therefore, constituted, as it
did, a primarily political decision which could simply be claimed
to constitute an act of states. However, the regrettable dilatory
tactics adopted by the advisors of Egypt in that case were hardly
compatible with normal international practice in the field of
QQcommercial arbitration.7 It was observed by an expert in this
field that "all possible techniques were utilized to prevent the
arbitral tribunal from adjudicating the jurisdictional issue" and
concluded that "whatever the political or other motives may have
been for the defence, the tactics employed should be vigorously
condemned".^
The resort by Egypt to the defence of sovereign immunity
against the adjudicative jurisdiction of the tribunal raised at
the outset the question why Egypt had accepted the arbitration
proceedings in the first place. Was it not because of their
expediency, neutrality and confidential character? How can any
investment dispute be successfully resolved by arbitration
proceedings if a state party to the arbitration can somehow raise
the plea of sovereign immunity and thus frustrate the very object of
arbitration? With an arbitration clause, the contract will be
entered into with confidence since the private parties will be
assured that the commitment assumed will be enforced irrespective of
the sovereign capacity of the other partner. It is hard to imagine
the existence of such confidence if a state party is allowed to
raise jurisdictional immunity to avoid the very competence of the
arbitral tribunal sitting pursuant to an agreement contained in a
contract between a state and a private investor.
It has been correctly observed by Judge Schewebel that the plea
is inadmissible. He has analyzed the issue in the following words:
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A state is entitled, in certain restricted circumstances, to
plead immunity from suit against it which is maintained in the
courts of another state, on the principle par in parem non
habet imperium. But the principle that one sovereign shall not
judge another without the latter's consent cannot apply to
proceedings before an arbitral tribunal which is an instrument
of the sovereignty of no state; one sovereign is not sitting
in judgment upon another. 95
This analysis has also been supported by other international
lawyers,^ who maintained that in an international arbitration
to which a state is a party, by virtue of having entered into a
valid and effective arbitration agreement, such a defence is
unavailable.^ If the plea of sovereign immunity was allowed to
prevail in this case, that would render nugatory the existence and
effectiveness of the whole machinery.
In the light of these observations, it was rightly maintained
that these tactics can hardly ".... enhance the credibility or
prestige of Egypt or to further that country's efforts either to
attract new investment or to build up Cairo as a centre for
international arbitration".^
It is not clear from the available material the actual position
taken by the Egyptian Government in the above cases. Here the more
general question may be asked: how is the position of Egypt in the
preceding cases determined? To answer this question two possible
explanations may be given. In the first place, if the Egyptian
Government's view was dictated by the substantive law of state
immunity in the forum state, i.e. that it enjoyed immunity from
local jurisdiction and execution according to the governing
municipal law of the territorial state, then there would seem to be
no inconsistency at the legal level, for a state is perfectly free
to invoke the municipal law of another state with a view to
defending itself and protecting its interests. On the other hand,
if the views articulated by the Egyptian Government were dictated by
its appreciation that the restrictive doctrine of state immunity is
not a general rule of international law, then an inconsistency would
arise here.
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How would such an inconsistency be construed and what would its
significance be to Egypt's established position as to the
international customary law of state immunity? There are obvious
associated risks with the evaluation of this matter. Firstly,
because of the confidential nature of most of the documents
containing the legal arguments advanced on behalf of the Egyptian
Government, it is doubtful if the position taken by Egypt in these
cases should be accorded any high evidential value. The
confidential nature of these documents will deprive the student of
international law of the necessary details which explain the
practical aspects of the legal position taken before a foreign
tribunal.
Secondly, legal advisers may either intentionally or
unintentionally express views which run counter to the practice of
their own governments. This is neither wrong nor unnatural in
itself, since it is part of their task to look at the day-to-day
work from the point of view of the stable permanent interests of
their countries and, against this background, formulate their views
on controversial or unsettled legal points. More significantly, it
is highly relevant to take into account the context within which the
governmental view is announced. A concise expression of this point
of view is offered by the most authoritative Professor George
Schwarzenberger:
. . . Due regard must be paid to the context in which views are
expressed. For what is said in an answer to an inconvenient
question in a national code or stated in pleadings before an
international court may differ considerably from replies to a
questionnaire on a topic is that are likely to be covered by a
codification conference. 99
Thirdly, it is true that the conditions of uniform practice
require that the instances of practice of individual states, and of
states in general, circumscribe, apply, or refer to, and thereby
express, the same customary rule.^^ Yet it has been pointed out
that some instances of inconsistent practice may well be inevitable.
The very heterogeneity of the various types of state practice
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involves the possibility of different pictures of the one rule when
applied by different bodies on different occasions. Moreover, the
changing circumstances surrounding the application may bring about
some inconsistencies, as the ICJ pointed out in the 1951 Fisheries
case:
Too much importance need not be attached to the few
uncertainties or contradictions ... They may be easily
understood in the light of the variety of the facts and
conditions prevailing in the long period which has elapsed
since 1812. 101
However, further studies need to be made to see how far the national
legal advisers' view corresponds to the ideological position taken
in the state practice of their respective countries in other
quarters.
In the light of these considerations, the problem of explaining
the probative value of the views of the Egyptian Government when
sued before foreign tribunals becomes somewhat more manageable. To
plead sovereign immunity from suit for breach of contract or
vis-a-vis the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunal does not, in and of
itself, undermine the opinio "juris of the Egyptian state on the
customary rule of state immunity, which is firmly established from
the country's judicial, treaty and other governmental practice on
the subject.
III. STATE IMMUNITY IN EGYPTIAN DOMESTIC LAWS
1. Enforcement of Foreign Judgements
Apart from convention and treaty arrangements, the enforcement
of a judgment of a foreign court in Egypt is governed by Egyptian
102domestic law. The domestic legal position relies to a large
extent on the notion of reciprocity. The Egyptian court will
enforce a foreign judgment subject to the same conditions of the
court of the other country involved. Accordingly, a foreign
judgment may be enforced in Egypt, without re-trial or examination
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of the merits of the case, subject to the following:
i- the foreign courts offer reciprocal treatment to judgments
obtained in the courts of Egypt. If such reciprocal treatment
is not offered by the court where the judgment is obtained,
then the Egyptian courts will re-examine the merits of the case
in the same manner as that adopted by such courts;
ii- the courts of Egypt are not competent to hear the dispute which
constituted the object of the foreign judgment while foreign
courts are shown to be competent to hear the dispute in
accordance with their respective laws;
iii- the parties to the dispute were notified and properly
represented in the proceedings;
iv- the foreign judgment is final and conclusive according to the
foreign law; and
v- the foreign judgment does not conflict with prior Egyptian
judgment in the same case and is not contrary to public policy
or morality in Egypt.
If the foreign judgment satisfies the conditions set up in the
legislation, then the judgment will be enforceable irrespective of
the sovereign authority of the entity against whose assets the
enforcement is sought. Public entities and their properties do not
enjoy in the courts or under Egyptian law, any right of immunity
from suit, set-off, attachment or execution of a foreign judgment,
irrespective of the obligation incurred. Accordingly a person in
whose favour a foreign judgment was made against the Egyptian state
or one of its public entities must apply for an order to enforce the
judgment (the exequartur) and, upon that application, the judgment
will be examined to ensure that certain conditions have been
fulfilled without the fear that immunity might be raised to prevent
the judgment being enforced, since it is the established practice of
Egyptian courts that states and their organs do not enjoy immunity
in respect of their commercial transactions.
Egypt has also entered into two treaties with western states
for reciprocal enforcement of judgments, namely France and Italy.
These treaties contain provisions dealing with enforcement which
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should take precedence over the conditions contained in the Code of
Civil and Commercial Procedure. But certain judgments are excluded
from the effect of the treaties, such as judgments dealing with
bankruptcy and composition with creditors. The treaties set out
the conditions for enforcement and provide that enforcement may be
refused if the judgment conflicts with public policy or the dispute
is already the subject of a judgment in Egypt or of court
proceedings. Once again the immunity from execution seems to pose
no particular problem under the provisions of the treaties.
However, legal practitioners were mindful of the fact that the
benefit of the provisions of the treaties are only available to the
nationals or legal persons established under the laws of the states
party to these treaties and cannot be relied upon by holders of
foreign judgments from elsewhere. Further, the provisions of the
treaties, excluding judgments dealing with composition of creditors,
may place the persons in whose favour a judgment was obtained in one
of these countries at a disadvantage when it is opposed by a
borrower from the Egyptian public sector. Such a person has to
rely on other laws in order to enforce his judgment against a public
entity borrower.
2. Immunity in Respect to Income Tax, Stamp Duties and
Withholding of Taxes
It appears that foreign states are not immune from the
jurisdiction of the Egyptian courts in respect of taxation for the
revenue or income derived from the trading or commercial activities
conducted within Egyptian territory. This attitude has been
confirmed in the Egyptian answers to the UN Secretariat's
questionnaire.^he same holds true, even if such activities are
conducted through public companies, provided that either their
"actual seat of management" or their "principal activities" are
established in Egypt.
Art. 3 of the Tax Act of 1939-^6 provides: "Foreign companies
and enterprises operating in Egypt shall be treated as Egyptian
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companies for the purpose of the application of this tax". The Tax
Act has devised a separate criterion for the purpose of its
application that the "foreign company operating in Egypt" are those
companies, the sole purpose of which is to invest in Egypt. This
provision is broad enough to include either foreign companies wholly
belonging to a foreign government or other enterprises in which a
foreign government holds shares, acquires equity or becomes a member
in any other form. Moreover, the dividends payable on the shares
of these companies are subject to tax on income realized in Egypt
in any manner whatsoever, even indirectly. The generality of
the words used, coupled with the absence of any reference to
exemption of state-owned companies in the preparation work of
1 07these provisions, tends to suggest that a foreign state cannot
invoke immunity from the jurisdiction of the Egyptian Courts in
a proceeding relating to the determination of its rights and
obligations arising from its shareholdings in a company, provided
that one of the two substantial connections, namely, "the actual
seat of management" or "their principal activity" is established in
Egypt.
This interpretation is moreover in accord with the judicial
practice of the country in denying immunities to a foreign state
when engaged in commercial activities. This is understandable
1 QO
since Abdel Razzaq al-Sanhuri, and the committee which put the
Civil Code of 1948 together, had drawn extensively "on the decisions
of the Egyptian courts, comparative legislation and the Sharia" as
sources by which the code had been drafted.109 al-Sanhuri himself
declared, before a committee set up by the Senate: "I put it on
record now that three quarters, or five sixths, of the provisions of
this law are based on the decisions of Egyptian Courts and on the
existing legislation".HO
The rule of non-immunity is also applicable regarding stamp
duty and other taxes. For example, the basic position regarding
loan agreements as contained in the law governing stamp dutylH is
that, if the loan agreement is signed in Egypt, stamp duty is
payable. The rate is four per mille on the amount of the loan.
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It is the responsibility of the lender to pay the duty and he
cannot, as a matter of public policy, shift the burden of payment
onto the borrower. If the agreement is not signed in Egypt, duty
will only become payable if and when the agreement is used in Egypt
(Art. 7). This is defined to include any action which is designed
to produce any legal effect. Therefore no stamp duty or any other
documentary taxes or charges imposed by or in Egypt are payable on
or in connection with an agreement so long as it is signed outside
Egypt and is not used in Egypt to produce legal effect.
As a general rule of domestic tax, movable capital tax is
payable on interest payments. The current rate is 32%, although
this is reduced by the many double taxation treaties Egypt has
entered into with Austria, Finland, Italy, India, Iraq, France,
119
Japan, Norway, Sudan, Sweden, the UK and USA. ^ Most of these
require that a foreign company must have a permanent establishment
in Egypt for it to be subject to tax. Exceptions from this tax
are enumerated with respect to companies formed under the Foreign
Investment LawjH^ and foreign currency loans made by foreign
banks to the state or any of its departments or public sector
organizations.All payments to be made by the borrower may be
made in full without any deduction or withholding for, or on account
of, any taxes, levies, duties or fees of any nature imposed by the
Egyptian Government or any taxing authority therefor. However, in
the case of disputes relating to any of such fiscal liabilities, the
Egyptian Courts will be competent to hear the dispute irrespective
of the identity of the defendants and at the same time will enforce
the full payments to be made by the borrower who is not allowed to
deduct any payable taxes or fees.
3. Immunities of State Ships
As far as Egyptian domestic law is concerned, there appears to
be no text which formally grants foreign state vessels the immunity
generally denied in judicial practice. As has been discussed
earlier, the Mixed Courts had been consistent in denying immunities
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to government ships in regard to their commercial activities, ^
although the determination of the nature of the service of the ships
in some cases had been somewhat less consistent.^^ However, there
are some provisions dealing with some specific aspects, in which
vessels belonging to foreign states may be involved. It should be
borne in mind that the generality of the language used in these
provisions makes them equally applicable to both private and public
ships. One of these legislations which regulates, among other
things, the competence of the Egyptian courts in certain maritime
cases, is Art. 19 of the Commercial Maritime Code of 1883 which
provides:
Where a foreign ship comes into collision with a merchant man
or where a merchant ship affords salvage services to foreign
ships, any disputes which may arise therefrom shall be referred
to the decision of the regular courts of justice.
The claim that such provisions could be interpreted to be equally
applicable to foreign state-owned vessels can be corroborated by
the fact that these legislative provisions were promulgated in 1883
to cope with the many problems created by the consular jurisdiction
in Egypt, under which every consulate had nominated a judge for
causes in which its ships had the role of the defendant.Indeed,
if one speaks of capitulations and consular jurisdiction in Egypt,
one generally has in mind the numerous claims of immunities from
local jurisdiction made by the consuls of other states on behalf of
their nationals and their property. This in fact was most
characteristic of the consular regime in Egypt. It was precisely
against this capitulatory background that the Maritime Code was
promulgated, with the manifest object of reducing the scope and
consequences of the prevailing immunities enjoyed by consuls, their
nationals and property in Egypt.
4. Movables and Immovables
Apart from these, there are other provisions in the Egyptian
civil code which could similarly be interpreted to apply to foreign
governments. For example, according to Art. 18 of the civil code,
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possession, title and other property rights in respect of movables
and immovables are stated to be governed by the law where such
property is situated. The interpretation that Art. 18 applies
equally to foreign states can be supported by the fact that other
provisions of the code placed in the chapter of persons and
concerning their civil rights are applied to the Egyptian Government
as well. Again under the terms of Act No. 81 of 1976,foreigners
may acquire movable or immovable property under certain
circumstances, whether by way of purchase or inheritance. In the
absence of any limitation to the contrary, this would permit real
actions asserting ownership or possession of movables or immovables
claimed by foreign governments, and personal action against a
foreign head of state as heir or devisee of an estate or as a
participation possession or ownership in any other form.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY AS REFLECTED IN
SUDANESE PRACTICE
I. THE INFLUENCE OF THE COMMON LAW
In the Sudan there are no statutory provisions concerning state
immunity and the judiciary has only sporadically entered that area
which has largely been neglected by scholarly opinions. In
rendering an account of the Sudanese law concerning the subject,
there is thus very little to draw upon.
In dealing with the contribution of the Mixed Courts to the
development of the law in Egypt, it has been noted that the
nationalities of the judges, the large foreign population and the
growing number of commercial cases have played a major part in
bringing home to Egyptian law the doctrine of restrictive immunity.
This, however, is certainly not the case in the Sudan, where the
capitulations were inapplicable as there was no foreign population
nor consular jurisdiction. The Condominium Agreement of 1899"^
expressly excluded the operation of the capitulatory rights in the
Sudan. Unless a distinct separate agreement was made, the drafters
of the agreement found that the Europeans would assume that they
were entitled to the same privileges and immunities to which they
O
were entitled in Egypt under the capitulations.
The divergence of this practice may be explained by the fact
that the British Government feared that, if the capitulations had to
be introduced in the Sudan, they might well be used as an umbrella
by other European powers and their agents in the country, causing
unnecessary difficulties to the smooth functioning of the joint
administration in the Sudan.^ Such difficulties were a source of
endless anxiety to the British authorities in Egypt. Lord Cromer
was anxious to prevent Europeans acquiring in the Sudan the
privileged status which was theirs in Egypt. Throughout his
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Egyptian career, he had been hampered by the anomalies of the
international status of the country, the nominal suzerainty of the
Ottoman Empire, the control over Egyptian finances exerted by the
European commissioners of Egypt's external debt and the enclaves of
privilege derived by the consular authorities from the
capitulations. The capitulations, however appropriate they might
be for special reasons in Egypt, were certainly unsuited to the
Sudan, where both commonsense and the rights acquired by conquest
demanded a political and administrative system of a similar kind,
but different from that applicable to Egypt. Lord Cromer stated
that:
It was necessary to invent some method by which the new Sudan
should be, at one and the same time, Egyptian to such an
extent as to satisfy equitable and political exigencies,
and yet sufficiently British to prevent the administration
of the country being hampered by the international burr
which necessarily hung on to the skirts of Egyptian political
existence. It was manifest that these conflicting requirements
could not be satisfied without the creation of some hybrid
form of government hitherto unknown to international
jurisprudence. 4
Art. V of the Agreement was drafted so as to prevent the
commissioners of the debt from interfering in the finances of the
Sudan and Art. VI to prevent foreigners from claiming rights under
the capitulations in the following words:
In the definition by proclamation of the conditions under which
foreigners, of whatever nationality, shall be at liberty to
trade with or reside in the Sudan, or to hold property within
its limits, no special privileges shall be accorded to the
subject of any one or more powers.
Most significantly, the jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts of Egypt
was stated in Art. VIII ".... not to extend, nor be recognized for
any purpose whatsoever, in any part of the Sudan".^ This was
expressly endorsed by the Mixed Courts themselves. The Mixed
Tribunal of the first instance in Cairo affirmed this view in 1910.^
The distinction drawn in Art. X of the Agreement between the
political status of Egypt and that of the Sudan was also an attempt
on the part of the British Government to exclude interference of
foreign powers in the affairs of the country. It was in this way
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that the capitulatory regime of Egypt was made inapplicable to the
Sudan and the jurisdiction of the Mixed Tribunals was also excluded.
On the other hand, the reception of the common law in the Sudan
since the beginning of this century^ has greatly contributed to the
disregard on the part of the Sudanese lawyers of continental law and
continental legal practice which played a significant part, as was
the case in Egypt.
In both pre and post-independent Sudan, English common law
precedents and rules were extensively referred to, without being
Q
described as foreign law. In almost all branches of the law,
English common law was cited and relied upon. In the law of
contract,^ law of tort,^ property,^ constitutional and
TO 1 Q
administrative law, and the law of trust, English rules and
statutes were applied without objection. Although English law has
been deviated from in some cases,^ and other systems of law have
occasionally been referred to,^ the fact remains that there was no
radical change from the pattern and trend initiated earlier by the
courts in the period before independence. National judges became
acquainted with English precedents, English treatises and English
judicial techniques and terminology, and the reliance upon English
rules greatly increased. The same practice was followed as regards
cases involving international law issues as will be seen later.
No serious thought appears to have been given during this
period to the possibility of adopting or adapting the Islamic law.
There seems to be no recorded explanation in the available
literature for this attitude. The reason appears to lie in the
fact that the national judges have inherited from their predecessors
a judicial system within which resort to rules of Islamic law would
be totally unthinkable. The situation remained as it was until
recently when Islamization of the law was carried out in 1983. As
in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, the Shari'a Courts were confined to
the personal and family law of the litigants, whether they were
Muslims or not, provided that, in the case of non-Muslims, the
parties "make a formal demand signed by them asking the court to
entertain the question and stating that they agree to be bound by
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the ruling of the Shari'a law".-'® This resulted - as in India
years before - in judges, trained in English law, largely
importing the principles and precepts of English law, and even the
decisions of English courts, as the most convenient expedient. It
is not surprising therefore, that the then prevalent English law
doctrine of absolute immunity found a fertile soil in Sudanese
judicial practice as will be explained later. At present, and
after the codification of most of the Sudanese law, legal precedents
and rules of equity and good conscience still retained their
importance as sources of law,'^ but they are now superseded by the
Shari'a law, being the main source of law by virtue of the Judgments
(Basic Rules) Act 1983."''®
Under the sources of the Judicial Decisions Act, both Sudanese
precedents and rules of equity are recognized as valid sources of
law to be applied in the absence of legislation on the dispute
before the courts. Art. 3(b)(v) enables the judge, in the absence
of legislation, to look for help from the Sudanese precedents,
provided always that these precedents do not run counter to the
rules of the Shari'a or the opinions of the majority of Muslim
jurists.
Art. 3(b)(vii) enables the judge to seek ".... the rules of
equity as adopted by various noble divine legislations and the
meaning of justice felt by good conscience". Whatever equity,
justice and good conscience might have meant in the past, the
meaning is now totally different because reference to the rules of
equity under the new legislation does not mean equity in the sense
of the repealed Sudanese enactments, Indian or English law. On the
contrary, resort to equity rules is governed by a completely new
concept of equity, namely: rules of equity recognized by other noble
divine legal systems, i.e., the rules of Islam, and the rules laid
down by other religions recognized by Islam such as Christianity and
Judaism. Otherwise the judge may, as a last resort, employ the
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rules of justice as felt by good conscience.^ What is more, under
the Act, the rules of equity, justice and good conscience are
relegated to the seventh and last source to which the judge may
refer in the absence of express legislation. Needless to say, the
promulgation of these new Acts has had the result of moving the
Sudan away from its common law heritage and bringing its law closer
to the dominant legal systems and the laws of Egypt and its Arab
neighbouring countries.
The above brief survey shows how rules of English law were
generally received and accepted by the Sudanese courts. The
explanation becomes more evident in cases involving sovereign
immunities decided by those courts. Whenever the issue of
sovereign immunity was raised before the courts, the judges heavily
relied upon applicable English rules. Although they agreed that
English law was not binding on the Sudanese courts, they followed
that law, rightly or wrongly, thus increasing the trend towards an
absolute view of immunity. None of the decided cases referred to
authorities other than English on the subject, and even when the
latter were referred to, they were never distinguished as foreign
cases.
II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
The number of Sudanese judicial decisions on state immunity is
rather limited - amounting to no more than five cases - some of
which deal with immunity questions only marginally. Also, the
judgements are all on the facts, since the Supreme Court had not so
far had the chance to formulate a firm ruling in this matter.
The fundamental position of the courts has long been in favour
of absolute immunity of foreign states from judicial process. As
early as 1959, a case was brought against the Egyptian Irrigation
o Q
Department. The plaintiff in this action was a Sudanese car
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driver once employed by the defendants, the Egyptian Irrigation
Department situated in Khartoum. Following a dispute between the
two parties, the plaintiff instituted a proceeding claiming arrears
of pay from 1952. A summons was served on the defendants and, on
their failure to appear, a default judgement was given in favour of
the plaintiff. The defendants later appeared and asked the court
to set aside the decree. They filed a statement of defence in
which they rejected the claim on its merits without making any
reference to the competence of the court. For some reason, the
hearing of the case was adjourned until 1 December 1960. During
this interval, the defendants decided to raise the question of
jurisdiction, alleging that the department was an agency of the
Egyptian state and, as such, was immune from suit. Consequently,
the court framed the preliminary issues before it as follows: Did
the Government of UAR submit to the jurisdiction of the Court? and,
if so, can the submission be withdrawn?
The court started by observing that the reciprocal independence
of states was one of the most universally recognized principles of
international law; that no government could be subjected against
its will to the jurisdiction of another, since the right of
jurisdiction is inherent in its sovereignty. However, the court
went further and stated that this immunity may be declined by way of
express or implied waiver. In the opinion of the court, such
waiver can be effective only if the sovereign power seeks the aid of
the court as a plaintiff, or where, in answer to a summons, it
appears as a defendant and without challenging the decision of the
court, defends the action on its merits. On this point, the court
referred to the English cases of Duff Development Co. Ltd. v. The
Government of Kelantan and another (1924) and Mighell v. Sultan of
Johore (1894), and approvingly cited Lord Esher that: "It is only
when the time comes that the court is asked to exercise jurisdiction
over him [the sovereign] that he can elect whether he will submit to
jurisdiction".
The court found as fact that the defendants had received the
summons, signed it, entered an appearance in the first hearing and
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filed a detailed statement of defence. In the course of these
motions, the defendants made no reference to their being immune from
jurisdiction and it was only after the issues were framed that the
incompetence of the court was raised. In view of these facts, the
court held that "the Government of the U.A.R. had clearly and
unequivocally submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court of the
Sudan".
As to the second issue, the court ruled that, where the foreign
government had itself submitted to the jurisdiction of the court,
such submission is irrevocable as regards that issue, since
"submission covers the proceedings up to the judgement stage and
indeed up to the final appeal". An interesting point about this
decision is that it has upheld the ruling that waiver of immunity by
a foreign state enables the court to exercise its jurisdiction.
According to this judgement, immunity, once renounced, cannot be
reclaimed. Such waiver operates to preclude that state from denying
the consequences of its own conduct and remains subject to all
stages of the exercise of judicial jurisdiction "up to the final
appeal". The use of these words by the court tends to suggest that
these stages do not include measures of execution. In other words,
a waiver of immunity from jurisdiction does not imply consent or
submission to measures of execution.
Perhaps the most striking feature about the case is that the
court adopted the common law court technique in citing and relying
upon the opinion of English jurists and law books. The court
91
unquestioningly relied upon R.H. Graveson's view to the effect
that ".... submission gives the court power to enter judgement, to
hear an appeal and to award costs against the foreign sovereign;
but not to enforce a judgement by execution".
The notion of waiver of immunity and its consequences arose
29
again in a case decided by the Court of Appeal in 1969, in which
another agency of the Egyptian Government was involved. The
applicant sued the UAR Educational Mission for the recovery of
£s307.981 after leaving their service as a schoolmistress. A
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subpoena had been served on the respondents and, on their failure to
appear, an ex parte decree was rendered. The respondents appeared
later and raised the question of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the
District Court declared itself incompetent and dismissed the case.
The Province Court set aside the dismissal order and remitted the
papers to the lower court for trying an issue which it had framed.
In the Court of Appeal the applicant contended that the respondents
had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by appearing and
hence had waived their immunity. In reply, the respondants denied
any submission. The Court of Appeal accepting this argument
observed that: "mere appearance to contest jurisdiction does not
amount to surrender to jurisdiction".
The court referred to a statement of Lord Sumner in Duff
9 9
Development Co. v. Government of Kelantan and said: "It is
obvious that the foreign sovereign has to appear at some stage or
another to raise a voice of objection vis-a-vis jurisdiction", and
that a foreign sovereign is subject to the jurisdiction of the local
court "only when he submits to it as a plaintiff or by appearing as
a defendant without objection". The case was cited by the Court of
Appeal without even being described as an English or foreign
precedent.
The applicant also asserted that the question of immunity ought
to be resolved by a quasi-judicial mode by seeking an advice from
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this question. The Court of
Appeal categorically accepted the assertion and stated that the
question whether an entity forms part of the foreign sovereign and
is thus recognized as immune is a part of the political question
doctrine. The court concluded that: "Who is immune and why, are
questions for the authoritative political decision-maker and hence
outside our province qua courts of law". The court assumed that
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had had sole responsibility for
making the decision involved, and therefore a certificate should be
obtained from it as to the position of the Egyptian Educational
Mission before the courts of the Sudan.
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The Sudanese courts have accepted too readily the assertion
that both the Egyptian Department of Irrigation and the Educational
Mission were organs of the Egyptian state. It is undoubtedly true
that proceedings against organs of a foreign state may implead the
foreign state concerned, especially in regard to the activities
performed by them in the exercise of the sovereign authority of the
state. In both the cases, the entities involved were subsidiary
organs of the Egyptian Government. The former was a branch of a
sub-division of the Egyptian Ministry of Irrigation, charged with
the task of supervising the flow of the Nile waters through the two
dams constructed in the Sudan to regulate the withdrawal of the
water from the Nile by both countries throughout the various seasons
of the year, by an Agreement signed in 1959.^
A survey of the provisions of the treaty could easily show that
this Department is not entrusted in any way with the exercise of
sovereign rights on behalf of the Egyptian Government, but only
administrative functions conducive to the attainment of the
objective of the Agreement. On the other hand, the Egyptian
Educational Mission is an organization established in 1957 as part
of the cultural cooperation scheme following the Agreement signed
between the two countries in 1957 and entrusted with the task of
running private schools in the Sudan. In this sense, neither of
them necessarily form any part of any ministry and are not them¬
selves autonomous state organs answerable to the Egyptian Central
Government. In the light of these considerations, it is difficult
to see how the court in the first place had characterized the
Irrigation Department as a state entity and thus considered the
action against it as impleading the Egyptian state. In the second,
although the court avoided making that characterization by deferring
the matter to the political organ of the Government, yet the
decision clearly proceeded on on that assumption, since the judge¬
ment was rendered on the basis of the absence of an effective waiver
of immunity, a basis which undeniably presumed the pre- existence of
immunity of the entity concerned, which could be effectively waived.
Furthermore, both cases arose out of activities conducted by the
entities in question not in the exercise of the sovereign authority
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of the Egyptian state. A contract of employment is necessarily a
private act performed in the exercise of a purely non-sovereign act
and, as such, cannot be said to implead the Egyptian Government.
The principle of immunity has been affirmed by the District
O C.
Court of Omdurman in an action brought against the Turkish
Government in respect of personal injuries suffered by the plaintiff
as a result of an accident in which a car belonging to a Turkish
trade representative was involved. In defence it was contended
that the Turkish representative was identified with the Turkish
Government, hence he could not be subjected to the jurisdiction of
the court. In refusing to permit the suit, the court observed
that:
The Republic of Turkey is a sovereign state; that by virtue of
the principle of immunity from jurisdiction in international
law, a sovereign state cannot be made to submit to the
jurisdiction of a foreign state against its will.
This was true even as regards suits arising out of personal injuries
occurring within the jurisdiction of the court. The court
therefore declared itself incompetent.
Despite the increasing acceptance of the restrictive doctrine,
especially since the early 1970s, the Sudanese Courts show no
inclination to move in this direction. The decision of the
9
Khartoum District Court of 1975 firmly adhered to the old version
of state immunity in dismissing a suit brought by a former clerk
concerning an employment contract concluded with the French centre,
forming part of the French Embassy in Khartoum. The District Court
dismissed the plaintiff's claim for £sl,000 as compensation for
remuneration based on a contract of employment. In dismissing the
claim, the court held that the reciprocal independence of states was
consecrated by international law; that each state was sovereign
within its borders. It followed that one could not cite a foreign
sovereign before one's court. The court said: "To do so would be
a violation of the rules of international law". The court cited
more than three English cases, all of them old, and a number of
rather out of date editions of common law books, and made no
27reference to systems other than English law.
- 296 -
The immunity of a foreign sovereign or head of state has
indirectly been discussed in a recent decision rendered in the
9 R
matter of the Trial of May Coup d'Etat Preparators. During the
course of the trial, one of the defendants sought to summon Yasir
Arafat, the PLO's President, as a defence witness. The court,
partially relying on an informal advice from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, declined to issue the summons on the ground that Mr Arafat
is akin to a foreign sovereign, since the PLO is a recognized
foreign entity by the Sudanese Government. The court held that
Mr Arafat is a foreign head of state, that he enjoys jurisdictional
immunities from personal arrest, detention, and all other legal
process within the territory of the Sudan, including the process of
summons against his will.
Thus the judicial practice in Sudan comprises a few cases from
which it may be concluded that the traditional doctrine of absolute
immunity is too readily followed on the lines adopted by earlier
English courts in this respect. A possible explanation for this
may be summarized as follows:
1) The British judges who were appointed in an earlier period had
no theoretical knowledge of civil law systems and were not trained
in any continental system where the doctrine of restrictive immunity
emerged and developed.
2) The first generation of Sudanese judges to join the Bench were
trained exclusively in English law. They were far removed from
continental practice in international law, of which, due to the
absence of law reports, no readily accessible record was available.
3) Generally speaking, English rules were the only laws within the
29
contemplation of the parties in commercial and related matters.
It is also important to emphasize that the local judicial
precedents have a unique position under the Sudanese legal system.
Courts often accepted the authority of local precedents, even in a
3D
situation where they can easily be distinguished. Naturally
- 297 -
enough, no change in the law is expected to be effected by judicial
decisions and, to this extent therefore, very little in the way of
change may be anticipated from the judiciary.
III. TREATY PRACTICE
O I
In the Sudan, treaty-making power rests with the executive.
Parliament is normally advised of a treaty that calls for
implementing legislation. However, certain classes of treaties
require the approval of the legislature before the executive may
ratify or accede to those treaties. Examples are: a) treaties of
alliance and defence; b) treaties involving a territorial change;
c) treaties changing or requiring changes in domestic law; or d)
treaties imposing financial obligations upon the state. The
requirement is, in principle, independent of the need for
implementing legislation; the respective classes of treaties cannot
be ratified or acceded to unless they are approved by the
on
legislature, whether or not they require implementing legislation. ^
1. Multilateral Treaties
-a-3
Relating to the international conventions on state immunity,
O /
the Sudan has not yet become a party to these instruments, with
the exception of three, namely: the Vienna Conventions on
Diplomatic Relations 1961; Convention on Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States of 1965 and
the Law of the Sea Convention 1982. When the Sudan achieved its
independence in January 1956, it rejected the conclusion of an
agreement providing for the devolution of treaty rights and
O C
obligations. Reference to Sudan's succession to treaties
concluded by the co-dominion was made in Egypt's Declaration of the
Independence of the Sudan of 1 January 1956, in which the Egyptian
Government expressed its understanding that the Sudan would continue
to give full effect to the agreements and conventions made on behalf
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of or applied to the Sudan by the co-domini with a similar statement
07
by the United Kingdom that: "Since the Sudan Government has only
now assumed powers in regard to external matters", it requested the
British Government to "make specific mention of the agreements and
conventions contemplated by the above-mentioned letter" so that it
OO
may be in a position to comply with the British request. The
British Government prepared a note containing the treaties which,
according to its view, were to be given effect by the Sudanese
OQ
Government. The note was sent to the Egyptian Government. Egypt
realized that most of the treaties embodied in the note had been
concluded by Great Britain alone and that, among these treaties,
Egypt was only interested in the Nile Waters Agreement of 1929 and
those embodied in the Convention of 1899, which related to the
boundaries between the Sudan and Egypt.^ The matter was suspended
because of the Suez crisis (1956) and the resulting termination of
Anglo-Egyptian relations. Thus, no agreement was reached between
the Sudan on the one hand and Great Britain and Egypt on the other
as to the determination of the previous treaties and agreements by
which the Sudan would continue to be bound. However, the Sudanese
Transitional Constitution of 1956 provided in Art. 67 that "No
treaty, agreement or convention with any other country or countries
.... shall have effect in the Sudan unless ratified and re-affirmed
by Parliament by law". The object of this text would seem to be
merely to explain the status of future treaties.
At any rate, several domestic legislative acts were passed
in the following year either ratifying or affirming various
multilateral treaties. These were the Constitution of the FAO,^
UNESCO,^ WHO^ , the Charter of the United Nations and the
recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ,^ the
Constitution of the ILO and a number of ILO conventions,^ the
A
Convention on International Civil Aviation, the four Geneva
conventions on armed conflict,^ and the World Meteorological
AO
Organization Convention.
It may be observed that treaties made on behalf of the Sudan
or applied to it before independence were not regarded as binding on
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it after its independence. There has been no specific declaration
to succession to treaties, but instead various laws were promulgated
to accede to certain multilateral treaties. However, it should be
emphasized that most of the conventions dealing with various aspects
of state immunity were invariably adopted after the independence of
the Sudan in January 1956, with the exception of the Brussels
Convention of 1926 and its Additional Protocol of 1934 to which
Egypt had acceded in 1951 in its own name, and which the United
Kingdom ratified only in 1980.^ The Sudan has as yet not accepted
the other treaties on state immunity. The reasons for delay in the
acceptance of treaties on state immunity are not clear. However,
according to the information obtained from informal discussions with
the officials concerned, the protracted administrative work involved
in carrying out an examination of treaties by several government
departments has been one of the important factors for such delay.
The views of a relatively large number of government department
offices and agencies have to be obtained before the instrument is
submitted to the competent body for approval. Elaborate inquiries
and consultations have taken place between various departments and
bodies on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961. The
inter-departmental consultations on this convention were so
prolonged that the Sudan was able to accede to it only after an
interval of 20 years.^
Progress towards acceptance sometimes stopped altogether
because of the impossibility of reconciling divergent opinions as in
the case of the Conventions of the Law of the Sea 1958. Of course,
the Sudan, like other developing countries, lacks the financial and
technical resources needed to collect and compile existing
information concerning how certain legal concepts and issues
concerning the same or related subject matter has been treated in
the past.
The consequences of such delays in the acceptance of those
conventions, particularly those dealing with specific issues of
state immunities, are apparent in the present inquiry. In the
absence of a high record of acceptance of these instruments by the
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Sudan, it is virtually impossible to appreciate and evaluate the
country's attitude towards those concepts and the issue of
immunities. By the same token, the views of the country cannot be
solely deduced from the fact that it has accepted only three of
those conventions, particularly when there is no domestic
legislation implementing the provisions of those conventions nor are
there judicial precedents involving their interpretation by domestic
courts.
In addition to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
1961 and the Law of the Sea 1982, the Sudan has recently become a
party to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
CO
between States and Nationals of Other States. State signatories
to the convention have discretion to exclude certain items from its
field of application and the Sudan has made use of that faculty in
connection with oil. However, obstacles may present themselves if
the Sudan challenges the binding nature of the rule of non-immunity
if arbitration is initiated outside the orbit of the convention.
For example, if the Sudan denies the binding nature of this rule, a
private litigant may be exposed to the expenses and delays of
litigation so as to establish the binding character of the state's
consent to arbitration. Again, problems may arise at the time of
recognition and enforcement of an award rendered against the Sudan,
outside the orbit of the convention, since the Sudan may argue that
recognition is a preliminary to execution and raise a plea of
immunity in that connection. The problem becomes apparent if we
recall that the Sudan has not yet become a party to the UN
Convention of Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards of
1958, nor does it have any bilateral arrangement with other
countries relating to recognition and enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards. A private litigant who obtained an arbitral award
against the Sudan would have to take these possibilities into
consideration when seeking to enforce his award which was rendered
by a non-ICSID arbitration. Such obstacles are removed in the case
of an ICSID arbitration, since consent to submit the dispute to
arbitration under the convention, once given, cannot be unilaterally
revoked and thus constitutes an irrevocable waiver of immunity.
- 301 -
The problem of immunity from execution is also resolved at the
time of recognition of an award rendered pursuant to the convention.
The ratification of the convention by the Sudan signifies the
acceptance of the obligation to recognize the award and to enforce
the pecuniary obligations imposed by it, as if the award were a
c:o
final judgement of a court in the Sudan. J
It may be asked whether ICSID arbitration is designed mainly
for investment disputes or if it necessarily covers all disputes
that may arise from the Sudan's commercial and financial activities.
For instance, the Sudan is a heavily indebted country to foreign
institutions and financial communities; and borrowers may well
invoke the provisions of the convention against it in cases
concerning loan agreements. However, there is general agreement
that the convention, in the absence of express reservation by the
state party, applies to loan agreements.The answer to the
question is extremely important both to lenders and governmental
borrowers in the context of the restructuring of Sudan's foreign
sovereign debts. Since there seems to be no precedent on this
point, it might be in the interests of lenders who wish to enter
into loan agreements with Sudanese governmental organs and to
benefit from the protection offered by the convention, to secure an
explicit agreement that the guarantees under the convention include
not only direct investment but transnational loans as well,
otherwise their agreements might be excluded from the ambit of the
convention and accordingly they will have exposed themselves to the
obstacles mentioned above.
Alternatively, the plea of immunity which may be raised by the
Sudan Government in the context of an arbitration concerning
sovereign debts may be avoided simply by express agreement to the
contrary in the arbitration clause without reference to the ICSID
Convention. At any rate, the ratification of the convention by the
Sudan seems indicative of the willingness on the part of that
country to strike a balance between immunity and sovereignty, in
order to encourage the flow of capital and services into a country
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which desperately needs the foreign contributions, so vital to its
development. It is indeed a fact that the realities of the
contemporary world, based on the need for closer cooperation between
developed and developing countries and for a new, fairer and more
equitable international economic order, require a more flexible
approach to the concept of sovereignty and immunity.
2. Bilateral Treaties
The Sudan has entered into a number of bilateral treaties
relating to immunity. Among these is the Agreement on Technical
Co-operation between the Kingdom of Netherlands and The Democratic
Republic of the Sudan 1969."^ Under para, (h) of Art II of this
treaty the Sudan agreed to ".... grant the Netherlands personnel
immunity from legal action in respect of any act done and words
spoken or written in their official capacity". The agreement
between the Government of the Republic of France and the Sudan of
1969 similarly provides in Art. 10(2) that the French Government is
exempted from local jurisdiction in respect of any acts or words
performed by it and covering the activities contemplated by the
agreement.^ However, the agreement expressly excluded from such
exemption "suits instituted by third parties in respect of an act
attributable to the French Government, resulting in personal injury
or physical damage in the Sudan", and other acts of a wilful or
malicious conduct on the part of the French employees in the
country.
The tendency to exclude personal injuries and damage from the
scope of immunity is also observable in other bilateral treaties.
CO
For instance, the Agreement between Canada and the Sudan, which
provides that the Government of the Sudan shall exempt Canadian
firms from civil liability for acts performed in the course of their
duties except where it is legally established by a Sudanese court of
law that such acts result from gross negligence or wilful misconduct
on their part (Art. V). Strikingly similar words were employed in
the agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany^ and Italy^.
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The Agreement of Technical Assistance with the UK is
peculiar, since it is consciously proposing an extension of immunity
beyond its normal and established scope. In Art. XV(1) of the
Treaty, the Sudan agreed to bear all risk and claims resulting from,
occurring in the course of, or otherwise connected with an action
performed or omission made in the course of the duties of the
British officers. Without affecting the generality of the
preceding sentence, the Government of the Sudan agreed to:
indemnify the Government of the U.K. and the technical
assistance officers and hold them harmless against any and all
liabilities, suits, actions, demands, damages, costs or fees
on account of default, injuries to persons and property, or
any other losses resulting from or connected with any act or
omission performed in the course of their duties.
Moreover, it was provided in para. (2) that the Government of the
Sudan, if requested by the Government of the U.K. or by a technical
assistance officer, would "conduct on behalf of the Government of
the U.K. or the technical officer any litigation arising out of acts
or omissions referred to paragraph (1) of this Article".
This agreement not only granted immunities to the UK
Government and its employees from the jurisdiction of the local
courts, but even obliged the Sudanese Government to defend any claim
or suit which might be brought against them. Another peculiar
aspect of this extension is that the UK Government is exempted from
cost in the event of participation in a judicial process and its
liabilities, for any risks or claims concerning the execution of the
agreement are assumed by the Sudan. The memorandum accompanying
the agreement protested against such an extension, largely on the
ground that the scope of the immunities provided for in the
A O
agreement is extensive and judicially unmanageable. Nevertheless
the agreement was approved and ratified.
In the light of these provisions, the following facts are
discernible:
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1) Generally speaking, most of the foreign states concluding
agreements in this area maintain a position of immunity from process
before Sudanese courts under a variety of circumstances. Most of
these treaties reiterated the qualification that the act complained
of should have been done in the performance of an official act on
the part of the foreign state or its representative. Whether this
restriction could be interpreted as providing a criterion introduced
to distinguish between acts performed jure imperii and acts
performed jure gestionis is not clear, and cannot be easily
determined from the terms of the agreements. However, the presence
of such qualification presupposes the existence of an absolute
standard of immunity which is refined, or the applicability of which
is minimized.
2) The most unusual feature of the agreements is that in which
the liability for personal injuries and physical damage to third
parties is excluded from the scope of immunity. It is significant
to observe that this exception has been tied into both the questions
of immunity and jurisdiction. In other words, the liability of the
foreign states or their agencies to pay damages in respect of an act
resulting in personal injury to a third party operates even where
the foreign state or its instrumentality has been acting in the
exercise of governmental power, only so long as the act occurred in
the Sudan. Until recently, this exception of state immunity was
relatively unknown in those jurisdictions applying a more "absolute"
principle of immunity and generally the practice of states has been
r q
neither uniform nor consistent.
3) The Agreement with the UK constitutes a class of its own and
is probably the "most controversial" of all treaties in so far as it
deals with certain types of privileges and immunities not traceable
in traditional state practice. The undertaking by the Government
of the Sudan to assume all liabilities and claims arising out of the
activities of British officers in the Sudan, to indemnity the UK
Government and its officers and exempt them from judicial process,
and even to defend them in any suit brought against them in respect
of their activities in the country, is a far reaching provision.
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This Agreement adds to the uncertainty and ambiguity already
existing in treaty practice on this subject and it is difficult to
fit it into the traditional models of state immunity.
The treaties which grant foreign governments certain
privileges and immunities in their own name posed no particular
problem. However, it might be argued that personnel immunities are
not state immunities proper. To this it may be replied that their
immunities were specifically regulated by state to state
arrangements and that those employees of foreign governments do not
enjoy immunities as subjects of international law. The immunities
they possess belong to their respective states who are the real
beneficiaries of these immunities and which the Sudan agreed to
extend to the latter's employees by way of bilateral agreements.
IV. GOVERNMENTAL PRACTICE
Like Egypt, there is no published documentation in the Sudan,
from which the attitude of the Government on the subject could be
deduced. Answers to the UN questionnaire could be used to remedy
the situation resulting from the scarcity of published documentation
of the existing governmental practice.
The attitude of the Sudanese courts was reiterated in these
words: "the courts regard the doctrine of immunity as absolute but
subject to waiver".^ The role of the Sudan Government, especially
in the definition or delimitation of the extent of the application
of these immunities, was said to differ according to the
circumstances of each case. The executive branch "may widen or
restrict the scope of the immunities and privileges accorded to
states and their property as circumstances may dictate".^
If a foreign state applies to the administrative authorities
of the Sudan for a patent licence, a permit or any other administra¬
tive action, the reply stated that special treatment on procedure
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and substance could be conferred on the foreign state and it would
f\f\
thus not be treated like any other applicant.
According to the reply, waiver of immunity from jurisdiction
does not imply consent or submission to measures of execution and
the courts of the Sudan will have to reconsider the question of its
own competence when it comes to the execution of judgement rendered
against a foreign state.^
The present topic is of critical importance to the Sudan
Government. It is of interest to consider the attitude of the
Sudanese Government in the reverse situation. In other words, when
faced by claims before foreign courts and tribunals, the Attorney-
General's Chambers are responsible for defending such cases and has
usually instructed the foreign lawyers retained by it to plead
sovereign immunity before foreign courts and tribunals.
Of peculiar interest are the two cases in which the Sudan
Government was involved before foreign jurisdiction. The first of
these was Turiff s case. ° An English construction company,
Turiff, had entered into a contract on 8 November 1959 with the
Sudan Ministry of Public Works for the erection of new houses in
which to resettle the people whose land would be inundated by the
pile-up of water following the completion of the Aswan High Dam.
The Sudan Government had only a period of 44 months within which to
have the housing project completed. It was thus apparent that, if
any substantial part of the scheme was to be completed in time,
Turiff would have to work with great speed. Shortly after the
beginning of the work, complaints began to be made by each of the
parties. The Sudan Government alleged delay on the part of Turiff
and the latter claimed that they were unable to proceed faster for
lack of, and changes in, decisions as well as lack of raw materials,
transport facilities, etc.
These cross allegations reached their climax in August 1963,
when the Sudanese Minister of Interior addressed a letter to Turiff
claiming that the company had failed to fulfil their obligations
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under the contract and that the Government intended after 14 days to
take possession of the site and to employ other contractors to carry
out a large part of the work undertaken by Turiff. The
Government's right to do so was disputed by Turiff but in vain. In
October 1963 the Government brought other contractors to the site
who commenced their own work. Turiff accepted such repudiation of
the contract. On 21 October 1966, both parties signed an
arbitration agreement and accordingly a tribunal was established
under the auspices of the Hague Court of Arbitration.^9 By clause
3 of the arbitration agreement disputes were defined as those both
falling within the description and defined in the pleadings to be
served. The matters to be determined by the arbitration were
described as those capable of being so determined and that all the
necessary requirements to constitute the tribunal and to confer
authority upon it had been complied with. Clause 4(1) conferred on
the tribunal, inter alia, 1) the power to interpret the agreement,
to judge its own competence to decide any matter in dispute; and 2)
to proceed with the hearing of the case notwithstanding any failure
on the part of one of the parties to participate in the proceedings
and to make any such order or award as it should think fit (Clause
4(7)).
The Sudan Government argued in its preliminary pleading that
the contract between the parties was void because of a mistake.
The Government incorrectly believed that no part of Turiff's share
capital was owned directly or indirectly by South African companies
and that was said to be a fundamental mistake, as the policy of the
Government had been for a number of years to have no commercial
dealings with the Government of South Africa or its nationals.
This point was made clear and in considerable detail by the Sudan's
Prime Minister to the British Ambassador at Khartoum.^ On 14 May
1969 the Sudan Government took the quite unprededented step of
withdrawing from the proceedings by a letter addressed to the Court
of Arbitration at the Hague.^ The tribunal continued with the
proceedings and gave an award ex parte in favour of Turiff. The
tribunal rejected the South African issues as the burden of proving
these matters fell upon the Government which chose not to appear and
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to support its allegations. The claim of the company was accepted
and damages were awarded for the unpaid remuneration and repudiation
of the contract.
Perhaps the most interesting point in the dispute was that
Turiff had sought an attachment order before the Hague District
Court against certain vessels belonging to the Sudan Shipping Line,
which was owned jointly by the Government and the Bank of the Sudan.
In the event, no proceedings for attachment were in fact taken, but
had they been, the Sudan Government had decided to plead sovereign
immunity from execution on the ground that, under the rules of
public international law, the property of foreign states is immune
72from measures of execution. The case was amicably settled by the
parties before the District Court decided the issue of sovereign
immunity. It may be remarked that the conduct of the case by the
Sudan Government before the arbitral tribunal can hardly be
reconciled with established practice in commercial arbitration under
which the consent of the state party to arbitration once given
cannot be unilaterally revoked. The decision of the government is
particularly damaging in view of its lasting negative effect on the
'image' of the country in the minds of future investors.
The way in which the case was conducted shows that the
apprehension of some Arab states "about exposing their young fragile
public corporations to foreign arbitration", does relate to real
problems. Dr Zaki Mustafa has listed a number of common problems
including: 1) lack of adequate understanding; b) lack of
consultation and coordination between and within the government
units concerned; 3) failure to realize that what may sometimes seem
to be politically desirable or convenient may not be legally
feasible or advisable; d) failure to raise the proper defences when
73
the proceedings started.
Some other jurists have maintained that the refusal by the
Sudanese Government to afford the arbitral remedy for which it
contracted with an alien constitutes a "denial of justice". Judge
Schewebel, briefly mentioning Turiff's award, expressed the view
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that the award can be read to support this analysis. He summarized
his conclusion as follows:
.... the award is open to the construction that to give effect
to Sudan's attempt to frustrate the arbitral process would
give rise to a denial of justice. The Turiff award, however
summary on this point, thus arguably is authority for the
position that, if a state by its unjustified absence from
arbitral proceedings causes an international arbitral tribunal
not to proceed, a denial of justice under international law
results. 74
Whether the passage of the award led to this conclusion is beyond
the scope of this study. However, due to the same considerations,
the decision of the Sudanese Government to plead sovereign immunity
in order to avoid the enforcement of the award is equally
regrettable. Under these circumstances one cannot afford to ignore
the degree to which international economic pressure can be brought
to bear on the economic standing of a developing country like the
Sudan. The Turiff's award was rendered before the Sudan had
acceded to the ICSID Washington Convention of 1965 and it is hoped
that the ratification of the convention may remove these
shortcomings and contribute towards a better understanding of the
concept of commercial arbitrations and the rules applicable to them.
The same attitude can also be noted in ordinary judicial
proceedings involving the Sudan Government before foreign courts.
A recent case was initiated against the Sudan in a New York district
court.^ The facts are as follows. A US company agreed to work
as a carrier in transporting American famine aid to different parts
of the country. The agreement was signed in Khartoum in 1983,
under which the Sudan Government agreed to pay all taxes, duties and
the like for the famine relief aid. A dispute had arisen on this
term as well as on other managerial matters. Consequently the
company instituted proceedings against the Republic of the Sudan
claiming damages for breach of contract and a summons was served on
the Sudan Government through the Sudanese Embassy in Washington.
Although the Sudan has not yet formally appeared before the court to
defend the claim, it is clear from inter-departmental correspondence
that the Sudan will invoke sovereign immunity to contest the
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jurisdiction of the court on the traditional ground of sovereign
immunity.
The relief operations carried out by the Sudan to stave off
famine raises an interesting question of categorization, namely,
whether or not these operations could be regarded as commercial
activities. On the point whether humanitarian activities, even
where ostensibly conducted through an agreement involving huge
financial obligations, would be considered as a governmental act,
there is a scarcity of precedents,^ no academic discussion, and the
matter still remains to be resolved.
Even if that act is characterized as commercial, it remains
extremely doubtful whether under the US Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Act the American Court would be able to establish its jurisdiction
over the present dispute. Since, according to Art. 1605(a)(2) of
the Act, the act of the Sudanese Government a) is not based "upon a
commercial activity carried on in the United States" by the Republic
of the Sudan; b) is not based "upon an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the Republic of
the Sudan"; nor c) is it based "upon an act outside the territory
of the United States in connection with a commercial activity" of
the Sudan elsewhere "and that act causes a direct effect in the
United States". There appears to be no territorial nexus between
this activity connected with the United States and the plaintiff's
claim. The contract was concluded outside the United States, and
was to be wholly performed elsewhere, and there seems to have been
no "direct effect" in the United States. However, the court may,
under the present increasing tendency towards restrictive immunity
in US judicial decisions, consider the "direct effect" clause to be
applicable since the plaintiff is a US national and the remuneration
under the contract is payable in US currency.
There is no available information from which evidence can be
drawn of the motive of the Sudan Government for claiming sovereign
immunity before other jurisdictions. However, statements expressed
by the Sudanese delegate to the Sixth Committee of the United
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Nations' General Assembly throw some light on the rationale of the
Sudanese governmental practice in this matter. In addressing the
Report of the International Law Commission on its work in the 38th
session, the Sudanese delegation shared the concern expressed by the
delegates of other developing countries regarding the sacrifice to
state sovereignty which might result through an unwarranted
extension of the doctrine of restrictive immunity. He stated that
the commission should deal with the concerns of the developing
countries in a manner that would enable those countries to pursue
their socio-economic programmes.^ Further, he also explained that
certain activities carried out by states should not be regarded as
commercial activities. That was particularly applicable to
developing states with mixed economies or developing countries
establishing non-profit development corporations. He maintained
that these activities were mainly undertaken as part of the
development process and, as such, they "should not be regarded on
the same basis as activities of private entities, or as governmental
activities that were clearly profit-oriented".''^
Although he was not specifically speaking about his own
country, what he has said is perfectly true in the Sudan where the
government has intervened and monopolized certain strategic
commodities such as sugar, petroleum products, flour, etc., in order
to establish and maintain the standards of subsistence in the
country. Indeed this is highly desirable for the government in a
country with such serious financial and other problems. If
disputes arising out of these activities are to be regarded as
commercial and thus subject to the jurisdiction of foreign courts,
major obstacles may be put in the way of the government and further
restrict both the internal and external efforts of the government
in achieving these standards. Important questions remain to be
answered: Would it be in the interests of the Sudan Government to
adhere to the doctrine of absolute immunity in the present day
world, when sued before foreign courts and tribunals? Would it be
in the interests of the Sudan Government if foreign states that
enter into a commercial contract then claim immunity in proceedings
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brought by one of its nationals who claim rights under the terms of
the contract? The essential point is that, in determining the
policy on this matter, the Sudan Government has to see itself both
as a forum state and as a defendant state in another forum, and base
its decisions on wide political, legal and economic considerations.
As a defendant before other jurisdictions, it would not be in
the interests of the Sudan Government nor its public entities to
maintain absolute immunity vis-a-vis that foreign jurisdiction.
Such a situation would appear to be unsatisfactory both for the
promotion of economic development and the fostering of good
international relations. The successful growth and prosperity of
the Sudanese economy depends on favourable external economic and
financial relationships. In future, the Sudanese economy may
require even greater contributions from the foreign sector.^
Whether these will be forthcoming will depend in the first place on
the degree of support and encouragement given to foreign investors
by the government. These include an attempt to attract foreign
investment by adopting domestic legislation to encourage the
80
investment of foreign capital and a sensible attitude towards
questions of sovereignty and immunities in external economic
relations. In connection with this last point, and in order not to
lose the advantage of certain commercial activities and the flow of
capital from other countries, it is advisable that the country
should agree to some limitations of its immunities, otherwise
international investors may well shy away from investing in the
country which would be a very real loss. Like other developing
countries, the form and shape of the Sudan's own activities are also
changing, since it increasingly participates in and joins multi¬
national corporations for its own benefit. These are relevant
considerations in developing a legal framework.
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V. MUNICIPAL LAW AND STATE IMMUNITY
As the question of jurisdiction of a municipal court is
primarily determined by the court itself, at least in the first
instance, the judge who is called upon to decide the issue may refer
to his own municipal law to determine his own competence. Thus
provisions of municipal law may prescribe the possibilities for
states or state instrumentalities becoming parties to disputes
before municipal courts, particularly when foreign states appeared
as plaintiffs or otherwise relinquished their immunity by submitting
O 1
to the jurisdiction of the local courts. Examples of such
municipal enactments may be found in several texts dealing with the
question of jurisdiction generally such as the Constitution, the Law
of Civil Procedure, Commercial Law, Taxation Law and Conflict of
Law.
1. Jurisdiction over the Sudanese State
The rule under which the Sudanese Government itself is subject
to the laws of the land is uncontested in Sudanese law. It was
formally expressed for the first time in The Interpretation and
o o
General Clauses Ordinance 1955 as "The Government shall be bound
O O
by all laws unless expressly exempted therefrom". The word law
was defined in S.4 of the Ordinance to mean "any legislative
enactment and includes ordinances and provisions and orders and any
regulations, rules, by-laws or orders made under the authority of
any ordinance or provisional order".®^
The submission of the state to the rule of law was made a
constitutional provision in the Permanent Constitution of The Sudan
o tr
of 1973. Art. 59 provided that "the state is subject to the rule
of law and the supremacy of the rule of law shall be the basis of
government". The same principle is reiterated in the Transitional
86Constitution of The Sudan of 1985 and its amendments. According
to Art. 11, "The state and all other juridical bodies, whether
natural or corporate, official or private, shall be subject to the
- 314 -
O "7
rule of law as administered by the courts". Most significantly,
Art. 26 of the constitution has expressly denied any jurisdictional
immunities to the state in respect of all of its activities. The
Article reads, "The right of litigation is reserved for all,
every person has the right to petition the competent courts and the
state is not immune from judicial process regarding any of its
activities"
The significance of this provision is clearly expressed in the
on
Explanatory Memorandum that accompanied the Bill. * According to
it, the former rule of Sudanese public law which, originating at a
time when state absolutism flourished in the Sudan, forbade the
judiciary to decide litigation involving the state, is no longer
enforceable. Commentators on the subject have added that the
system inaugurated by the Transitional Constitution has been
inspired by distrust of the governmental practices under previous
regimes. Its intent was to safeguard private rights from incursion
by the executive, by putting them under the protection of the
judiciary.90
2. Jurisdiction over Foreign States
(a) Jurisdictional immunities of foreign states
Like Egypt, there is no text in Sudanese law which formally
allows or disallows foreign states jurisdictional immunities. The
power of the courts to take cognizance of a suit in which a foreign
state is involved appears to stem from Chapter II of the Civil
Procedure Act 1983. The Act mainly reproduced the provisions of
the repealed Civil Procedure Act 1974, and its provisions apply to
civil procedure and matters relating to the conflict of laws and to
any proceedings not specifically provided for by other laws. Art.
8 established the jurisdiction of the courts in cases of suits
brought against foreigners who have domicile or residence in the
Sudan "except suits in respect of immovables situate abroad". Art.
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9 permitted suits in Sudanese courts against non-resident
foreigners, in the following circumstances:
(a) if the subject matter of the dispute is connected with a
movable or immovable in the Sudan;
(b) if the suit is in respect of a liability which arose or
was performed or ought to be performed in the Sudan, or
in respect of an act of bankruptcy or other acts which
took place in the Sudan.
Moreover, Art. 13 declares the courts of the Sudan competent to
decide suits not within their jurisdiction "if the defendant submits
to such jurisdiction expressly or impliedly and the court shall not
of its own motion declare itself incompetent for the lack of
jurisdiction". If Arts. 8, 9 or 13 are applied by courts in a suit
involving a foreign state, the result would appear to be that such a
foreign state may be made subject to the jurisdiction of the courts
of the Sudan. It is true that the use of the word 'foreigners' in
Art. 9 is an internal evidence that the Article is intended to apply
to individual foreigners. But the absence of the same word in the
subsequent provisions of the same chapter of the Act strongly
suggests that the scope of the Articles is not limited to
engagements contracted by individuals alone.
(b) Exemption from custom duties and other
fiscal liabilities
A foreign state is not normally liable to taxation or custom
duties levied by the Sudanese Government. But the position of a
foreign state where it establishes a business - official or
commercial - or maintains an agency or instrumentality, is not
clear. There is no explicit provision in Sudanese law which
establishes or denies immunities to foreign states in these matters.
Indeed state property is exempted under the Immunities and
Privileges Act 1956 from certain kinds of taxation, as long as the
property is used as diplomatic or consular premises,^ and immunity
from income tax is accorded to members of diplomatic and consular
missions under the Vienna Conventions 1961, 1963.
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When it comes to private investment, the matter has to a
large extent been regulated by various enactments recently
no
promulgated, under which investors in the Sudan enjoy certain tax
concessions, such as exemption from payment of business profit tax
for a specific period of time which may be extended under certain
Q3
circumstances. Legislation such as the Industrial Investment Act
1974; Agricultural Investment Act, 1977; Agricultural Investment
Act 1976 and the Provisional Order: The Encouragement of Investment
Act 1980, are all designed to attract foreign capital and to
encourage investment in the country. Extensive privileges and
facilities have been accorded to foreign enterprises by these laws
to varying degrees and under varying circumstances.
However, such legislation could be validly used by foreign
investors against the Sudanese Government or its department as far
as these incentives are concerned. In the absence of any domestic
legislation, the better view seems to be that a foreign state must
be presumed to have submitted to the sovereign authority of the
territorial state, including its power to impose taxes, unless the
territorial government either waives or consents to the exemption,
94
for any reason or consideration, of its own free will. It
follows that, unless otherwise agreed in a bilateral treaty or
multilateral convention, property taxes in the Sudan are payable,
and accordingly any such immunities from tax lie outside the scope
of the application of the principle of state immunities in the
Sudan.
Detailed rules are set up for foreign companies.If
incorporated under the Companies Ordinance, they are subject to the
taxes, regulations and formalities required to be satisfied by Arts.
247-255. No express exemption is provided for state-owned
companies or companies in which a foreign state holds shares. Of
course, if a foreign state set up a corporation with a distinct
legal personaly in order to carry on trading or commercial
activities in the Sudan, proceedings against such a corporation
would not necessarily implead that foreign state. The corporation
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concerned would be sued in its own name and the provision of the
Ordinance would thus be applied.
Moreover, it is generally believed that the law of the state of
incorporation is exclusively applicable to all matters relating to
the relationship between shareholders inter se or between them and
the company, formation, registration, and the winding up of the
entity concerned. The rational basis of the application of the law
of incorporation is thought to lie in the fact that it is difficult
or impossible to imagine the applicability of another law or another
separate or independent legal system.^
(c) Jurisdiction over state-owned vessels passing
through Sudanese territorial waters:
The Sudan Territorial and Continental Shelf Act, 1970^
regulates the position of foreign ships in Sudanese territorial
waters. According to Art. 7, Sudan shall have the power to take
all necessary action in the territorial waters: "... to protect
itself against any act prejudicial to security, safety or interests
of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, according to the Sudanese
laws, and rules of international law". Article 8(1) states that:
ships passing through the territorial waters shall comply with
the Sudanese laws in force as well as the provisions of
international law and agreements and, in particular, of those
relating to carriage and navigation".
The word 'ships' has been used generally and without qualification,
leaving ample room for the argument that the word 'ships' includes
government ships engaged in commercial activities. If this
interpretation is accepted, then these ships would not enjoy
immunity either from judicial or other executive authorities of the
Sudan.
Reference to the 'rules of international law' in the above-
mentioned Articles may well be construed to mean those rules under
which international law does not require extension of immunities of
military ships to government merchant ships, and consequently the
legal status of the latter is deemed to be the same as that of
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private merchant ships. These provisions are clearly influenced
by the Geneva Conventions of 1958, to which the Sudan has not yet
become a party, and their interpretation is subject to the prevalent
rules of international law in which there are no binding rules that
grant any particular category of non-military ships the same status
as that of military ships from the point of view of state immunity.
The nature of the jurisdiction of a state over its territorial
waters is still a matter of controversy. Many writers strongly hold
the view that the territorial waters form part of the territorial
state and that the state exercises a right of ownership dominium or
absolute sovereignty over these waters; while some others maintain
that the state has only a limited sovereignty entitling it to
exercise merely a jurisdiction, as opposed to dominium over these
waters.^ Whether this right is really of ownership or
jurisdiction, it seems that state practice confirms the view that
foreign merchant ships in territorial waters are under the
jurisdiction of the coastal states, subject to the right of innocent
passage.100 The Sudanese Act appears to follow the same practice
by providing that all foreign vessels (military or merchant) must
strictly observe the laws and regulations of the Sudan while in its
territorial waters. It seems that a foreign ship in Sudanese
territorial waters, while not exercising the right of innocent
passage, subjects herself to the local laws in respect of criminal,
civil and administrative jurisdiction. On the other hand, a
foreign vessel passing through the Sudanese territorial waters in
lawful exercise of her right of innocent passage enjoys a certain
degree of immunity from local jurisdiction. Although that degree
of immunity has not been specifically provided for in the enactment,
the better view seems to be that it is subject to the provisions of
the Act and other principles of international law.101
(d) Measures of execution against the property
of foreign states
The Sudanese law throws little light on the issue of immunity
from execution against the property of foreign states. The matter
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has not yet arisen, even indirectly, before any court of law.
Since the Sudanese judges in effect confine themselves to applying
the municipal law of execution without really troubling themselves
with international law, it is clear that any examination of Sudanese
law on the matter must be focused on this same law.
The law concerning measures of execution before Sudanese Courts
is generally governed by the Civil Procedure Act 1983. It is
important to note that the Act has been made applicable to all other
civil proceedings which are not provided for by other laws.
Detailed rules concerning execution of judgements have been set up
by the Act. By virtue of Art. 232, the power of the court to order
an execution of a judgement duly passed in accordance with the Act,
may take any of the following forms:
1) to order payment of any sum of money specifically decreed;
2) to order the attachment or sale of any property;
3) to arrest the defendant and detain him in prison;
4) to appoint a receiver;
5) to take any other measure of execution required by the nature
of the thing decreed.
Measures of execution involving property start with the defendant's
movables, with no measures being allowed first against his
immovables, unless the court is satisfied that his movables could
not meet the judgement passed against him (Art. 234).
Again complicated procedures are laid down for the exercise of
the measures and the various circumstances under which they may be
taken. Most importantly, this chapter of the Civil Procedure Act
is applicable to the execution of all judgements and decrees
entrusted to civil courts of law. But the question which has never
arisen in practice is this: could the rules and procedures laid
down in the Act be equalled applied to the property belonging to
foreign states, and in particular could they be applied by analogy
to the property of entities representing foreign states in the
Sudan?
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Given the lack of any precedent specifically on this point, an
exhaustive answer is not an easy thing to give. However, two
tentative observations can be made in this respect. In the first
place, where an entity according to the municipal law of the country
to which it is attached is regarded as an organ of that state, it
may subsequently be identified with that state, so the property of
that entity must be considered as belonging to the state itself, and
as such enjoys absolute immunity from the process of execution
following the general trend of absolute immunity from the
jurisdiction observable in the country's judicial practice. Thus,
to extend by analogy the scope of a procedure such as that provided
for in the Civil Procedure Act 1983 to foreign states would
constitute an undertaking, the legitimacy of which would be
extremely questionable. According to this interpretation the
status of property belonging to foreign states should not be dealt
with in the same way as the property of private individuals. On
the other hand, it could well be argued that the provisions of the
Civil Procedure Act 1983 are equally applicable to foreign states
for the following reasons:
1) The Act is generally applicable to all civil cases which have
not been provided for by other laws. Obviously enough, suits
against foreign states fall into this category.
2) The chapter on execution is expressly stated to apply to all
measures of execution entrusted to civil courts of law without any
distinction or qualification whatsoever.
3) There seems little purpose in distinguishing between private
and public property in this respect. Both are subject to the same
due process of law enforced by ordinary courts of law.
A) The argument that the chapter on execution applied only to
individuals seems equally inconclusive, since other provisions of
the chapter are applied to the Sudanese Government. Art. 231
enables the court to order the execution of judgements rendered
against the Sudan Government albeit with certain reservations as to
- 321 -
time and procedure. Accordingly, it could well be asked why, since
the courts are competent to take measures of execution against the
Sudan Government at the instance of an individual, foreign states
and their property should enjoy a privilege which the legislator has
been unwilling to accord to the Sudanese Government. Even if this
argument is accepted, and thus the property of foreign states was
made subject to local jurisdiction, more delicate questions may
arise, namely: What categories of property are subject to these
measures, and according to which law are the legal interests of
foreign states in these properties to be ascertained? In answering
the first question, it should be remembered that the applicability
of the Civil Procedure Act 1983 to the property of foreign states,
does not affect the general rule of state immunity, since the rule
would still remain that measures of execution and sequestration
shall not be enforced against the property of a foreign state, where
this property is used in connection with governmental activities
which are not related to any commercial undertaking. In other
words, once the property of foreign states has been proved to fall
outside the orbit of this rule, then the chapter of the Act on
execution is applied in its entirety to the situation.
As to the question of determining which legal system is to be
applied to ascertain the interest which a foreign state has in
certain property, the Sudanese system of private international law
may come into play and, therefore, whether to apply national law or
foreign law could be determined by employing the appropriate rules
of Sudanese private international law.
(e) Immunity within the context of foreign judgements
The effect of judgements rendered by foreign courts in the
Sudan is governed by Arts. 38-42 of The Civil Procedure Act 1983.
Section 38 provides that:
A foreign judgement shall be conclusive as to any matter
thereby directly adjudicated upon between the same parties or
between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigation
under the same title ....
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Accordingly it will not be possible for a litigant to ignore the
foreign judgement and petition a Sudanese court on the original
cause of action. Where an action has been based on a foreign
judgement under this section, the defendant may raise any of the
following objections:
a) the decision has not been rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction;
b) the decision is contrary to international law, or is based on a
refusal to recognize the law of the Sudan in a case in which
such law is applicable.104
Under the first exception the Sudanese courts will not enforce a
judgement if it is not delivered by a court of competent
jurisdiction. In cases where a foreign state was sued as
defendant, it may well be argued by the foreign state that it was
impleaded before the foreign court without its consent and, as a
sovereign state the foreign court had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the suit in the first place. Although contesting
jurisdiction of local courts on the basis of sovereign equality is
in itself a very debatable issue today, at least this is the law as
far as Sudanese judicial practice is concerned. Therefore, under
this exception, a foreign court will be a court of competent
jurisdiction only if the sovereign state voluntarily submitted to
the jurisdiction of the foreign court and thus waived its immunity.
Exception (c) gives the Sudanese courts the power to disallow
an action of a foreign judgement obtained against a foreign state if
the judgement appears".... to be founded on an incorrect view of
international law, or the refusal to recognize the law of the Sudan
in cases in which such law is applicable". It is clear from the
words of this exception that a foreign judgement rendered against a
foreign state by a foreign court, and found to be based on the
restrictive view of immunity, will neither be recognized nor
enforced by the Sudanese courts, since the doctrine of restrictive
immunity is not the Sudanese law applicable in such cases.
A similar measure is the Egyptian Judgements Ordinance 1901105
which was enacted prior to the Civil Justice Ordinance. This
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raises the question as to the relation between the Civil Procedure
Act 1983 (which has substantially reproduced the provisions of the
Civil Justice Ordinance 1929) and the Egyptian Judgement Ordinance
1901. It was argued that an Egyptian judgement will be enforced
provided that the conditions laid down in the Egyptian Judgement
Ordinance are satisfied as the provisions of the Civil Procedure Act
are not relevant. The effect of an Egyptian judgement in any
civil or criminal proceedings disposed of by an Egyptian court is
expressed in Section 4 of the Ordinance as res judicata in the
Sudan.
Section 3 of the Ordinance states that the Ordinance will not
apply to any judgement of an Egyptian court being:
.... (b) a judgement against the Government or against any
officer of that Government in respect of any official act of
such officer ....
Clearly, then, the sub-section excludes from its scope the
recognition and enforcement of judgements of an Egyptian tribunal
pronounced against the Egyptian Government or any of its officers
acting in his official capacity. In the final analysis, this
subsection constitutes authority for the proposition that the
Egyptian Government cannot be made a party to any proceedings before
the Sudanese courts on the basis of a judgement obtained against it
in Egypt, at least under the provisions of this ordinance.
However, it should be emphasized that the Sudan has not yet entered
into any treaty with Western or other states for reciprocal
enforcement of judgements and the domestic legal position relies to
a large extent on these provisions, particularly an archaic regime
laid down in 1929 when the Civil Justice Ordinance was first
promulgated. The Sudan also has not yet acceded to the Arab League
Convention on Execution of Foreign Judgement.
Is a foreign arbitral award enforceable in the Sudan? The
Sudan is not a party either to the League Convention on the
- 324 -
Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards107 nor the Convention on
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.100 This
fact, coupled with the absence of domestic legislation,100 does not
encourage the enforcement of foreign awards in the Sudan.
The ratification of the Washington Convention of 1965 by
the Sudan may considerably lessen the foreign investors' degree
of frustration as far as immunity from suit is concerned, but
nevertheless this advantage is not available in the case of
enforcement of an ICSID arbitral award in the Sudan. The question
of immunity stands out more clearly in the jurisdiction of the Sudan
where enforcement is sought than in other jurisdiction. Art. 55 of
the ICSID Convention states that the provision relating to the
recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award given in the
context of the convention is not to be interpreted "as derogating
from the laws in force in the contracting states, relating to
immunity from enforcement of the said state or a foreign state".
Indeed, if enforcement were sought in the Sudan of an award rendered
against the Sudan or one of its public corporations, an award would
have to be submitted to the local procedures laid down to this
effect. Unfortunately there are no Sudanese local rules nor
judicial precedents on this point.
VI. THE FUTURE
The law of state immunity in the Sudan as it now stands is
unsatisfactory in most respects. It is largely outdated and its
future is unpredictable. However, new developments may persuade
Sudanese courts to consider their earlier authorities, developing
and adapting the law to new circumstances (including the changing
views in international law). Except over a relatively long period
of time, the Sudanese courts could not be expected to generate
sufficient case-law for this purpose. The main reason seems to be
that cases involving issues of state immunities do not arise
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frequently in a jurisdiction such as the Sudan, which is not a
centre for transnational litigation and arbitration. Again, the
Islamization of the Sudanese laws may persuade the courts to adopt
new trends and seek guidance from the rules of Islamic law as has
happened in other parts of the Muslim world, notably Pakistan, where
occasional references to the Islamic approach on state immunities
have been made. Indeed, such reference has become mandatory with
the introduction of the Sources of Judicial Decisions Act 1983.
A survey of the preparatory works of the various Law Reform
Commissions-'-^ does not indicate any prospect of change. There is
no reference in the agendas of these Commissions to the issue of
foreign state immunities. These Commissions often work under
strenuous conditions. Firstly, there is no channel through which
the views of judges, lawyers and other observers on certain
questions of law reform can be communicated. Secondly, the
resources for comparative legal research and studies at the command
of the Commission appear extremely meagre. Thirdly, most of these
Commissions are politically controlled and the reform of the law is
in the hands of officials, and not of an independent body, and thus
their initiatives can be overruled by the political intervention of
the government. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to
imagine that any reform of the law of state immunities might be
carried out by the Law Commission.
Indeed, legislation on this subject is highly desirable. It
is interesting to note that many of the common law countries, which
could not contribute to the development of the law of state
immunities, have resorted to the process of legislation to exclude
the application of the common law rules, and specifically to put an
end to the application of the doctrine of absolute immunity.^
But, whether the Sudan Government is prepared to legislate in the
foreseeable future is not certain. One could perhaps argue that
the work of the International Law Commission may eventually result
in an internationally agreed convention, to which the Sudan may
subsequently adhere, and review its own legislative position.
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judgements and fails to mention foreign arbitral awards.
110. Since independence, several law commissions have been
established to revise, modify and redraft the Sudanese laws in
1966, 1970, 1977 and 1983 respectively. The Preparatory works
of these Commissions are available from the Law Commission
Division of the Attorney-General's Chamber, Khartoum. These
consist of a number of files with detached reports and records
under different titles and subtitles.
111. Apart from the USA and the UK, countries like Pakistan,




THE ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF STATE IMMUNITY
CHAPTER SIX
THE ISLAMIC CONCEPTION OF STATE AND SOVEREIGNTY
I. THE ISLAMIC APPROACH IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
If by international law one understands rules and principles
which govern relations between states, the employment of the
comparative approach would at first sight appear to be excluded,
because rules which are universal in character do not lend
themselves to comparison.^- Nevertheless, international lawyers
have discussed at length the link between private law and
international law in order to promote the study and development of
public international law. A certain amount of attention has been
directed to the question of the relevance of private law rules as a
source from which public international law may be developed. It
has been shown that a strong link exists between comparative
research in private law rules and international law and that
research must precede any attempt to codify public international
law. Similarly, attention has also been devoted by publicists to
discussing the contribution of comparative law to the formation of
custom and general principles of international law. As far as
custom is concerned, municipal law may be regarded as a 'practice'
within the meaning of Art. 38(l)(b) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice. Municipal law has been examined by
both the PCIJ in the Lotus case,^ and the ICJ in the Anglo-Norwegian
Fisheries case,^ and the North Sea Continental Shelf case,^ in order
to ascertain whether 'practice' appears to be sufficiently general
as an essential prerequisite for a binding customary rule.
The publicists have also assigned a significant role to the
comparative method in the exploration of the "general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations" and in the application of these
principles to international law. That transposition necessarily
implies the comparison of municipal law in order to determine
whether these municipal rules are in fact recognized by civilized
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nations. However, it must be admitted that, despite the
theoretical necessity of resorting to a comparative method, the
decisions of international tribunals are not well provided with
comparative views.^ Two reasons are advanced for the absence of
comparison: in the first place the general character of these
principles is so common, that the judges felt no need to mention
them expressly, and reference is often made to natural justice,
Roman law or commonsense. In the second place, the comparative
method raises the question of practical difficulties concerning the
O
legal systems to be compared. It may be argued that one of the
continuing consequences of the event of recent generation is that
all of the major legal systems of the world are now in a period of
active growth. Even those systems which, like Islamic law, have
passed through a long period of arrested development, have now
acquired a new vitality. Therefore the different legal traditions
of the world must be taken into account in determining what the
statute of the ICJ describes as "the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations".^
Since the beginning of this century, new ideological and
regional systems of law have been formed, e.g., American
international law, European international law, Islamic international
law, Soviet international law and the international law of the
Afro-Asian or newly independent states. It has been correctly
argued that, unless a comparative approach is adopted to this
multiplicity of systems, "we may well find that there are as many
international laws as there are states".^
As to the question of comparative research, it has largely been
confined to the systems of law founded on Roman law and had little
or nothing to do with Islamic law. There is, as Gutteridge
observes, a definite value in approaching other legal systems for a
comparative method.
If we regard the development of the law of nations in the
light of present day conditions, there seems to be no
justification for an attitude which would regard Roman law and
the modern civil-law systems as the sole source of the
principles which can be utilized in order to fill in gaps in
international law. 11
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To do so, he further argues, is to place a meaning on the phrase
"principles recognized by civilized nations" which fails to
correspond to the new situations which have arisen since the age of
Grotius when the Roman law was regarded as the only source of law
1 O
and the standard by which justice should be handled".
A contemporary Muslim scholar has claimed that the conventional
approach to tracing modern international law back to Grotius has
1 ^
great shortcomings. He suggests rather that we see it as a
continuum, ranging from the Roman period, through the Islamic
period, to the present day. He asserts, moreover, that the gap
between the Roman period and the publication of Grotius, De Jure
Belli ac Pacis, is bridged by the influence of Islamic legal
concepts which predate later European codification by centuries, and
provide the "missing link" in its development. We can thus expect
to find some analogous rules to that of international law in Islamic
legal theory. Indeed the most important explanation for this
narrow view may be that, in the major part of the history of
international law, it has been regarded as primarily European and
Christian,^ although this view has recently been labelled as
historically unsound.^ It has long been the impression that the
Islamic legal system has nothing to contribute to the development of
the law of nations. Islamic law was regarded as of speculative
rather than of practical interest and received attention from
relatively few scholars. However, recent exposition of that legal
1
system is beginning to dispel that impression.
An examination of the concept of state immunity in the Islamic
legal system appears to be valid and of importance for the
development of rules of international law on the subject. But in
this specific regard, two general propositions can be made.
Firstly, in the contemporary world international law can no longer
be simply a projection of a group of closely related legal systems
based on the civil and common law traditions, but must rest on the
broader intellectual foundations necessary to give it worldwide
authority in an age which is no longer prepared to accept the
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leadership of any one nation, culture, ideology or legal system.
Our legal inheritance must henceforth embrace the non-Western legal
traditions, ^ including the Islamic legal system. Secondly, the
Islamic legal system does in fact contain certain ideas and
principles capable of being incorporated into international law.
The concept of state immunity has assumed a significant
position in the new international community which is radically
transformed and influenced by various political, economic and social
factors. In the light of this change, the task which now confronts
international lawyers is that of:
achieving an intellectual revolution, corresponding to the
political and social changes of outlook in other branches of
knowledge which will give us a legal system with sufficiently
broad and deep foundations to command the allegiance of a world
community with a fundamentally changed composition and
distribution of influence. 18
It must be stressed that what is intended here is not simply to
present the similarities which exist in both international law and
the Islamic legal system on the doctrine of sovereign immunity, but
to show the different intellectual approaches to this doctrine.
The need for a similar outlook has also been cogently stated by Sohn
in the following words:
We would need to assemble from non-Western countries historic,
diplomatic and legal precedents seldom available in generally
accessible languages. We would need to leave the narrow
confines of studies comparing merely the principal Western
legal systems and to acquire a more different knowledge of
non-Western laws and customs. 19
Such a comparison can contribute to the development of international
law generally, and in particular in that of state immunity, in
several ways.
Firstly, states often adhered to their legal conceptions and
seldom changed them when they came into contact with other states.
If a state is accustomed to a rule of law in national affairs, it
20will accept it as normal and desirable in international affairs.
The mental habits developed by legal systems of different customs
and varying traditions may produce an essentially similar result.
When, for example, it was found that the concept of absolute
sovereign immunity is alien to the whole spirit of the Islamic legal
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system, this was clearly highly relevant for the attitudes towards
the concept of immunity in international law which may be expected
of, or encouraged among, states belonging to that legal system.
When it was found that, under the tenets of Islamic law, the law
binds the governor no less than the governed, this was likewise
relevant to the better understanding and development of the concept
of state immunity in international affairs. Consequently, if we
find that the Islamic legal system, under which one-fifth of the
population of the world live, opposes the concept of sovereignty as
an absolute in national affairs, we can approach the international
rules on the subject in a greatly improved climate with much higher
hopes of a large adherence to that concept in international law and
thus contribute to the development of the emerging customary law on
the subject. Secondly, the examination of the Islamic concept of
sovereign immunity is also relevant to other legal fundamental
issues such as the binding nature of the rules of international law.
The comparative method is of particular relevance when "the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations", as provided for
91
in Art. 38(l)(c), are at issue. Without entering into a detailed
9 9
discussion regarding the meaning of the phrase "civilized nations"
it may be observed that there is a fair amount of agreement among
publicists that that phrase includes principles of different legal
systems of the world at large. The majority of jurists:
take the line that general principles recognized in
international law constitute a reservoir of principles which an
international judge is authorized by Article 38 to apply in an
international dispute, if their application appears relevant
and appropriate in the different context of inter-state
relations. 23
These general principles can only be found by comparing the various
legal systems in the world. It necessarily implies an essentially
comparative method without which such general principles cannot be
discovered and ascertained and eventually transposed into interna¬
tional law. The significance of the resort to such comparison
becomes highly desirable if the problem in question is not
sufficiently regulated by custom and treaties, as in the case of
sovereign immunity which has not yet been settled by custom or
international convention. The general principles can thus play an
important role in shaping both the broader rules and the specific
details of that law.
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Thirdly, the comparison of the Islamic legal system will reveal
that the concept of sovereignty and the doctrine of state immunity
are both based on the idea of the rule of law, owing to the supreme
position which the law occupies in the Islamic state. The state's
sovereignty is subject to the law and not above it. It is well
known that the idea of sovereignty as a power which is beyond legal
control is one of the obstacles to the supremacy of international
law and seriously impairs its authority. Thus, one might
reasonably expect states affiliated to that legal system to accept
as natural the rule of law in their international intercourse and
hence to minimize the consequences of rigid adherence to the
absolutist conception of sovereignty, which has increasingly been
regarded as anarchic and inconsistent with international society.
Such are the general considerations on which the validity of such a
comparative study is based.
It must be emphasized that comparison is not intended here as a
descriptive method but is intended as a comparison as to spirit and
conception. In the words of Lord Macmillan:
No-one can address himself to the study of comparative law
without being struck with the essential similarity of the
problems of human relations the world over and, despite the
diversity in the forms of solution which each national system
of law has devised, with the general resemblance in substance
of these solutions. 24
This observation is highly relevant since it came from a man with
unique experience in different legal systems derived from his career
as a judge in the judicial committee of the Privy Council which had
a jurisdiction throughout the old British Empire and Commonwealth.
The value of the comparative method depends largely:
on its employment as a corrective to any tendency there may be
on the part of international judges or lawyers or on the part
of the draftsmen of treaties to employ concepts or rules which
either belong exclusively to a single system or are only to be
found in a few of such systems. 25
The possible consequences of any similar trend has been expressed by
Lauterpacht in the following words:
To attribute to one system of a particular time and space the
qualities of a universal law and to see in it a vehicle of the
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To attribute to one system of a particular time and space the
qualities of a universal law and to see in it a vehicle of the
development of international law, may well result in checking
that development. 26
In an attempt to outline the Muslim position regarding
sovereign immunity, one is faced with a host of problems, not least
of which is the fact that so many relevant works are available only
in Arabic. What is attempted here is a simplified explanation of
some of the most important ideas in the Islamic legal system that
pertain to the problem of sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity,
with all its complexity, has certain generally agreed bases. These
clearly relate to sovereignty, state functions and jurisdiction.
An examination of these precepts in the Islamic legal system merits
primary attention.
II. THE SOURCES OF THE ISLAMIC LAW OF NATIONS
Before discussing the ideas of state and sovereignty in Islam
in any detail, it may be useful to mention briefly the sources from
which these ideas are drawn and their nature.
9 7
The Qur'5n; The Qur' an is the first source of law in point of
time no less than in point of importance. To Muslims, it is the
very word of God. Nothing that contradicts the Qur '"an is
9 8
permissible. It is the original primary basis and most
fundamental source of that law. It differs from positive law such
as statute and legislation in that these are the creation of human
9Q
will. To this extent, the Qur'anic injunctions consist mainly of
broad and general propositions as to what the aims and aspirations
on
of Muslim society should be.
The Sunna: The second source of Islamic law is the Sunna which has
been defined as sayings, deeds and tacit approval which are related
to the Prophet Mohammed. The bulk of the rules of law have been
drawn from the corpus of the Sunna and includes the treaties made by
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him and the charters and decrees he promulgated from time to time,
as well as injunctions issued to the commanders on the battlefield.
The authority of the Prophet comes next only to the Qur'an because
the Qur 'an itself bestows legislative and interpretative authority
Q 1
upon the Prophet.
Beside the Qur'an and Sunna which provide the basic norms and
rules, there are auxiliary sources. These are simply
methodological legal devices to help jurists extract and posit legal
rules from the primary sources. This leads us to the third source
of the Islamic law of nations, namely Ijtihad or the opinion of
jurists.
Opinion of jurists: Freedom of juristic reasoning in the solution
of problems not specifically regulated by the primary sources is
OO
almost unfettered. According to this freedom of expression of
personal opinion, the opinion of jurists becomes an important source
of Islamic law generally. However, it should be mentioned that the
significance of jurists in Islamic society goes far beyond that of
jurists as such. They are more like a class, serving Islamic law
in other ways than simply a profession, since the sphere of law is




The authoritative jurists have a very significant role in
Islamic law. They developed the science known as siyar or
international law, which was a part of general jurisprudence and
laid down elaborate rules of war and peace governing the
relationship of Muslim and non-Muslim states before Europeans and
O C
others wrote their treatises on modern international law. The
exercise of personal reasoning by jurists is not a single thing of
one specific source. It may be qiyas (reasoning by analogy),
maslahat mursala (public interests), istihsan (seeking the most
equitable solutions) or istislah (seeking the best solution for the
general interests). The jurists have used qiyas to deal with some
of the problems which have arisen in international relations. The
process entails analogical deduction from what has been reported in
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the Prophet's traditions. Again, they employed the concept of
general interests to face the new problems arising from the contact
between Muslim and non-Muslim states. This concept of general
interests, according to their view, was wide enough to embrace all
of the problems which might arise in the course of that relation¬
ship. The basic juristic norm on which they based this process was
that the Shari'a (Islamic law) was devised for the interests of the
people, i.e. bringing into being what was in the interests of the
community, and avoiding what was not. Accordingly, they maintained
that all issues of international relations can be measured by this
formula.
The caliphs' practice: The practice of the four first caliphs,
generally known as the "rightly guided caliphs", is also considered
an additional subsidiary source of the Islamic Law of Nations.
There are strong reasons for accepting the practice of the highly
guided caliphs as precedents of the Islamic Law of Nations and to
recognize their legal authority. These caliphs, being among the
foremost companions of the Prophet, were in a position to know his
practice on matters of international law more thoroughly than
others. Secondly, they strictly followed the Shari1 a in both
letter and spirit during their own caliphates, diverging from it
only when strong reasons, backed by legal evidence, were to be
found.^
Custom: Another important source of law is custom. Islamic law
admits 1 urf (literally "what is known" about a thing, and so
constitutes "custom"). It does not recognize the criterion of
customary practice because it is concerned only with the systematic
Q 7foundation of the law, not its true historical origins. The
Qur'an recognizes custom as a legal principle of subsidiary and
supplementary value in the form of the principle of "avoiding
hardship". The Qur'an says: "He has chosen you and has imposed no
O O
difficulties upon you". Accordingly, it is maintained that, to
prevent the people from practising certain customs without
justification, is tantamount to imposing difficulties upon them.
The Sunna has also embodied and ratified many norms of pre-Islamic
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Arabian customary law concerning diplomatic immunities, and certain
treaties which are not incompatible with Islamic laws and the status
QQ
of foreign traders in a Muslim state. v
Treaties : Treaties are another important source of law.
Concluding treaties with non-Muslims is permitted by the following
verse of the Qur'an:
How can there be for the polytheists a treaty with Allah and
with his apostles, save those with whom ye have made a treaty
at the sacred Mosque, so as long as they act uprightly by you,
do ye act uprightly by them; verily Allah loves those who
fear. 40
This precept was unequivocally supported by the Prophet's practice
in concluding a number of treaties with non-Muslims, and followed by
his successors.^"'" The jurists unanimously agreed that treaties,
once concluded, were binding on a Muslim state, unless the object of
the treaty or its terms were contrary to the express injunctions of
/ 9
the Qur'an and the Sunna. They also agreed that the principle of
pacta sunt servanda, as commanded by the Qur'an, is of general
application unless otherwise specified.^
It can thus safely be said that the Islamic Law of Nations is
part of the corpus of Islamic law,just as the original jus gentium
was a branch of municipal Roman law.^ It has been maintained that
the sources of the Islamic Law of Nations, if taken in a modern
context, conform generally to the same categories defined by modern
jurists in Art. 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ, namely agreements,
custom, authority and reason, whereby the Qur'an and the Sunna
represent authority, principles derived from treaties falling into
the category of agreement. Local practice, equivalent to custom
and juristic writings of Muslim scholars, represents reason.But
on careful examination of Art. 38(1), it becomes difficult to
perceive any 'source' which could be equivalent to authority. If
the term 'authority' could be assumed for "judicial decisions as
sources of legal authority", then the recognition of such decisions
as authority for the law is limited by the effect of Art. 59 of the
ICJ which provides that the "decision of the court has no binding
force except between the parties and in respect of that particular
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case". Moreover, if 'reason' is regarded to be equivalent to
the teaching of the most highly qualified publicists, it would
be appropriate to note that these teachings are mentioned as
"subsidiary means" of determining the law.^
At this stage of the development of the law, the role of the
writers in international law seems to be shrinking.^ In the
Islamic legal system, the opinions of jurists are regarded as
auxiliary sources of law which can supplement the primary sources of
the Islamic Law of Nations. Despite their methodological status as
a secondary source, the opinion of jurists was influenced both by
the development of the law generally and the Islamic Law of Nations
specifically, as this was "derived from custom and reason rather
AO
than from other conventional sources".
III. THE ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF STATE AND SOVEREIGNTY
1. Internal Sovereignty
The concept of sovereignty as one of the bases of the modern
state was first enunciated by Jean Bodin in his work, Six Livres de
la Republique, published in 1576.^ His theory of sovereignty
furnished a theoretical and legal justification for the gradual
extension of the powers of the French kings over their feudal lords.
"Majesty of sovereignty", Bodin declared, "is the most high,
absolute and perpetual power over citizens and subjects in a
commonwealth .... that is to say, the greatest power to command",
and this has been largely followed by modern writers.""l
It is well-known that the notion of absolute sovereignty is the
key concept of the absolutist theory of the state in modern
jurisprudence and international law. The novelty of Bodin's, and
to a degree, Hobbes's, conception of sovereignty lays down three
related points.
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i- Sovereignty was regarded as being essentially legislative in
character. The power of the ruler is often discussed in terms of
the prerogatives of the crown, referring to a collection of rights
CO
and duties attached to monarchy or rulership. ^ The most important
of these rights is the power to make law.
ii- The concept of sovereignty was seen to be essentially a matter
of logic. If something was supreme and the source of civil law,
then the law was the will of the sovereign who thus could not be
subject to it. If the sovereign were subject to the law, he would
no longer be the source of it and therefore not a sovereign.
iii- The final and most distinctive element of the concept in modern
theory is the identification of the sovereign with the state, an
identification so obvious that the immunity of the local sovereign
was later extended to cover the case of foreign sovereigns with whom
foreign states have subsequently been identified.
There are other novel features,-*^ but these are the more dominant
ones.
In the Muslim legal system, the law is regarded as sacred and
eternal. But, since "men are the enemies of each other",-^ as the
Qur'an has revealed, society cannot survive without authority. The
divine legislator did not rule directly over the people. It became
necessary to delegate that authority to a human ruler to represent
the divine authority on earth, to provide tranquillity, stability
and continuity. Thus, in Islam, as in Medieval Christendom, Muslim
jurists think of sovereignty as a concrete object, in contrast to
modern writers who approach it as an abstract theory. Some of the
contemporary Muslim writers subscribe to the view that sovereignty
in Islam ultimately lies with, and belongs to Allah (God),^
relying on the Qur 'an, which states: "Say: 0 Allah'. Lord of power
and rule, thou givest power, to whom thou pleasest .... in thy hand
is all good. Verily over all things Thou hast power".^ According
to this theory, whoever actually assumed this sovereign status,
whether an individual or an institution of people, was merely a
trustee for what Allah had given them. In other words, ^e jure
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sovereignty belongs to Allah while only _de facto sovereignty is
delegated to human authority and this must be exercised according to
c: o
the dictates of God.
Some other writers, however, hold that the sovereignty of God
cannot operate in human society because God cannot be an immediate
ruler in the political and substantive sense. According to them,
it is not God but God's law which provides the basis of
sovereignty.-^ This may be described as akin to the European
concept of law, except that in the Islamic legal system the primary
rules of law are divine given.
After his election, the first caliph, Abu Bakr, enunciated the
nature of the relationships between the ruler and the ruled and
stressed the subordination of the state to the Shari'a (Islamic
law). In his inaugural address, he declared himself not to be a
master but a servant of the state and, as such, he was open to
criticism and correction. He said:
I have been elected but not the best among you. If I do good,
support me; if I err, then set me right. To tell truth to a
person commissioned to rule is a faithful allegiance; to
conceal and lie is a treason. In my sight the powerful and the
weak are alike. By Allah', he that is weaker among you, shall
be strongest in my sight, until I shall have redressed his
wrong; and he who is strong, is weakest in my sight until he
conforms to the law and I have taken from him that which he has
wasted .... obey me as long I obey God and his Apostle, and if
I withdraw from God and Apostle, you withdraw from me, as in
that case, obligation of obedience on your part to me,
terminates. 60
Thus the ruler or the person entrusted with the sovereign authority
must rule according to the Shari' a and maintain the faith in word
and deed. It is of course the primary duty of the head of the state
to safeguard the interests of the state, but in this regard he must
always act within the framework of the law. The ruler in Islam,
although in practice the holder of divine authority, is not, in
contrast to modern authority, above the law, both he and the state
are the instruments by virtue of which the law is enforced.
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Another basic principle of sovereignty in Islam is that the
government is a trust from God to a human sovereign. The
traditions of the Prophet clearly declare: "It [the headship of the
state] is a trust and surely on the day of judgment it will be a
source of shame for those who took it with trust and gave it full
rights".The same view was also stressed by the Prophet's
successor. It was put authoritatively by 'Umar, the second caliph,
in his letter to his governor at Basra, when he wrote:
People have an aversion from their rulers, and I trust to Allah
that you and I are not overtaken by it, steadily and
unexpectedly, or by hatred conceived against us. See to the
execution of laws even if it be for only one hour of the day,
and if two matters present themselves to you, the one godly and
the other not, then choose as your portion the way of God ....
open your gate to them [the governed] and give heed in person
to their affairs, for you are but a man among them except that
God has allowed you the heaviest burden. 62
The scope of legislation by the government in Islam is also
limited because the burden of law-making is with God. It is not
for man to grade his ruling as more or less important. As
mentioned earlier, the basic rules are determined by the Qur'an and
the traditions. The only area of laws in which human interference
is allowed is that where lack of information incapacitates man from
the knowledge of God's detailed rules. Consequently, it can be
said that the basic assumption of the Islamic juridical theory of
the state is that the authority, regardless of who may be entrusted
with its exercise, must be derived principally from a divine source.
The profound difference between Islamic theory and modern
jurisprudence is that the state in the latter searches for its
sovereignty after its birth, whereas the state in Islamic theory is
established according to pre-determined rules, namely the Shari'a.
Those who assume responsibility of government must do so according
to the basic principles laid down by this very pre-determined law
and they have no right to act outside it. However, it is not
advocated that the Islamic state is a theocratic state. By
theocracy we generally mean a form of state that functions under
divine authority, i.e. a government which recognizes God as supreme
ruler in civic affairs and accepts his revelations as the basis on
which state and society must be built. An Islamic state cannot be
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described as a theocracy because theocracy is often identified with
the endeavour to invest a priestly hierarchy with supreme political
power, for the simple reason that in Islam there is no priesthood or
clergy, for every adult Muslim has the right to perform every
religious function. Nor could any person or group of persons
legitimately claim to possess any special sanctity of the religious
functions entrusted to them.
It is important to emphasize that God has never been regarded
as the immediate ruler in Islam; only his representatives on earth
are the real executives. It was therefore the divine law, or the
sacred code, regarded as the source of governing authority, which
was the essential feature in the process of control under such a
nomocracy system. This is what is called the divine homocracy.
Majid Khadduri came very close to this with his theory that the
Islamic community found its most highly developed expression in law
rather than in theology. He quoted the Oxford Dictionary's
definition of nomocracy as "a system of government based on a legal
code; the rule of law in a community".63
In the above discussion an attempt has been made to throw light
on the concept of internal sovereignty in Islam as distinct from the
modern conception of sovereignty. The main landmarks of the
Islamic conception may be briefly summarised in the following
points:
1) In Islam, sovereignty is not regarded as legislative in
character. The ruler or the head of state has no prerogatives, nor
any collection of rights and duties attached to his rulership. In
Islamic theory both the ruler and ruled are equally bound by the
divine law, and the powers of the ruler are derived from and defined
by that law, with which no human power can interfere.
2) The logical implication evolved by modern thought that the
sovereign could not be bound by law is unthinkable in Islamic theory
since he had no right to make the law in the first place, and thus
the law cannot be his command. The Islamic theory even rejects any
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form of mixed or shared sovereignty (shared or mixed between the
ruler and God) as a contradiction in substance as well as in
terms.^ The sovereign can neither make nor break the laws.
3) In Islamic theory, the state is not synonymous with the human
or de facto sovereign. The divine law gives to the ruler the right
to rule as an agent, and in this respect crudely corresponds to
Hobbes' idea of "unity of the representer" theory^ and runs counter
to that of Austin, who conceived this power to be absolute.^
In view of the above-mentioned assertions, there cannot be in
Islam a state which can conform to Austin's or Hobbes' definition of
sovereignty. To quote H.A.R. Gibb:
The Head of the Umma is Allah, and Allah alone. His rule is
immediate, and his commands as revealed to Mohammed, embody the
law and the constitution of the Umma. Since God is himself the
sole legislator, there can be no room in Islamic political
theory for legislation or legislative power, whether enjoyed by
a temporal ruler or by any kind of assembly. There can be no
'sovereign state' in the sense that the state has the right to
enact its own law though it may have some freedom in
determining its constitutional structure. The law precedes the
state, both logically and in terms of time; and the state
exists for the sole purpose of maintaining and enforcing the
law. 67
2. Legal Basis of International Relations in Islam
In order to determine the Muslim position regarding sovereignty
in its external manifestation, it is necessary to turn our attention
to the concept of the jihad. The attitude held by some non-Muslim
scholars is that the doctrine of jihad is the sole basis for
external relations in Islam, and that the centuries of interaction
in the past between the Islamic world and non- Muslim states on an
68international plane was based solely on unilateralism. It is
important to note from the outset that jihad actually means
striving, not necessarily war. Muslim jurists have distinguished
four types of jiha*d: that of the heart, of the tongue, of the
hands, and finally that of the sword. The jihad, in the broad
sense of the term, did not necessarily call for violence or
fighting, even although a state of war existed between Islamic and
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non-Islamic territory, since Islam might achieve its ultimate goals
(IQ
by peaceful as well as violent means.
It is true that in classical legal literature Muslim jurists
used the word jihad as a synonym for the word fighting.™ But this
fighting denotes only one aspect of jihad which encompasses the
struggle against evil in whatever form or shape. The Qur'an
prohibits war in every form save in the fulfilment of a religious
purpose, namely the protection of faith. The Qur'an requires that
Muslims must be just and kind to those who do not fight them or
drive them out of their homes:
Allah forbids you not with regard to those who fight you for
[your] faith, nor drive you out of your homes, from dealing
kindly and justly to them, for Allah loveth those who are
just. 71
Permission to fight is given to Muslims "against those who fight
against you". Muslims are prohibited from committing aggression
and the ethical-legal sanction of this lies in the admonishing
sentence revealed in another verse "Allah loveth not the
aggressor".^
From the above Qur'anic verses, it is clear that permission to
fight is not an unconditional one. Muslims are allowed to fight
only if the enemy fights them; they must cease hostilities if the
7 3
enemy does. If the sole reason for fighting was to establish
Islam's supremacy on earth, then the injunction to cease hostilities
if the enemy desists from persecution, tends to detract from the
achievement of this objective through violent means.
In essence one can distinguish two main attitudes to the
doctrine of jihad: the attitude of some classical jurists and the
contemporary attitude - which reflect differences in Islamic
thinking about international relations. To understand both states,
it is necessary to mention that the classical Muslim jurists divided
the world into two spheres: dar al-Islam and dar al-harb. The
former comprised Islamic and non-Islamic territory held under
Islamic sovereignty. It is defined as: "the land in which the
legal code of Islam is in effect and in which the ceremonial
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activities of the religion are observed".74 On the other hand, dar
al-harb (the outside world) is the territory which is characterized
by three elements i) the observance of the non-Islamic code; ii)
the proximity of non-Muslim territory; and iii) the absence of aman
or safety which is guaranteed by the Islamic state to all of its
subjects.^ Other classical Muslim jurists have added another
category of foreign state, namely, dar al-Sulh or dar al'ahd, which
strictly speaking is not under state sovereignty yet is in tributary
relations to it.7^ Faced, thus, with the controversial exposition
of the doctrine of jihad, the traditional view held that a state of
war exists between the two territories and peace is only temporary.
Islam's theory of international relations by necessity had
undergone changes on the basis of historical experiences. The
transition which thus occurred has been attributed, according to
Khadduri, to three main factors. The first was the replacing of
the classical doctrine of jihad as the permanent state of war
between Islamic and non-Islamic territories with the adoption of the
principle of peaceful relationships among nations of different
religions. As fragmentation of the Muslim world took place
(roughly from the 16th to the 19th century), Muslim rulers began to
make treaties establishing peace with non-Muslim states. The year
1535 marked a significant turning point in this process, for it was
then that Sultan Sulayman the Magnificent and the King of France
made a treaty of peace and mutual respect.77 Other European rulers
were invited to adhere to this treaty if they so wished. The
treaty was important both as a recognition by Islam of nations of
different religious and also as a step in the movement towards the
incorporation of both Muslim and Christian states within a single
community.
The second factor was the principle of separation of religious
doctrine from the conduct of external relations. The relegation of
Islam to a domestic level arose owing to a schism in the Muslim
world which occurred at the beginning of the 16th century when it
split into three zones: Ottoman, Persian and Indian. Gradually
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the principle of euis regio, eius religio became the basis of
governing, first the relations among the Christian states of Europe,
and later among the states of different religions throughout the
world.
As to the third important factor, Khadduri points to the
adoption by Islam of the principle of territorial sovereignty, as a
result of the territorial segregation mentioned above. Whereas
previously allegiance had been to symbols of religious unity which
transcended any territorial boundary, loyalty was now directed to
70individual states.
At any rate there seem to be two trends in contemporary Islamic
thought relating to international relations. First, the trend that
is founded on a nationalist basis, and this is very clearly
reflected in the fact of the League of Arab States which follows
closely the modern conception of sovereignty. The League, formed
in 1945, was set up to foster inter-Arab cooperation in the fields
of security, economics and social matters. The League has as its
purpose, "the strengthening of relations between the member states
.... and to safeguard their independence and sovereignty:".^
Secondly, the proliferation of Islamic conferences and summits in
recent years would suggest that, rhetorically, at least some of the
old universalism remains. But perhaps in some sense Islam remains
a "diplomatic family", like the commonwealth, in this particular
regard
As early as 1966, a number of Muslim states put forward the
idea of holding an international Islamic conference, in which
non-Arab Muslim countries could participate. Efforts in that
direction culminated in the organization of an Islamic conference to
discuss international development and problems affecting the Muslim
world. This new trend, called neo-Pan-Islamism, is not aimed at
the restoration of Islamic unity, as was the Pan-Islamic movement in
the 19th century, nor does it indicate a desire to reinstate the
exercise of the traditional Islamic system in international
relations. Rather, it is an inspiration to cooperate as an Islamic
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bloc within the community of nations. Thus, in contemporary
international relations, the Muslim states have come to accept the
present-day idea of peaceful co-existence.
The trend towards accepting the reality of present-day world
order is reflected in the Charter of the Organization of Islamic
Q 1
Conference (0IC).OA This charter specifically enshrines as basic
principles sovereignty, equality and non-interference. In order to
realize the objectives of the Charter, member states have undertaken
to be "inspired and guided by the following principles":
1) total equality between member states;
2) respect of the right of self-determination, and non¬
interference in the domestic affairs of member states;
3) respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial
integrity of each member state;
4) settlement of any conflict that may arise by peaceful means
such as negotiation, mediation, reconciliation or arbitration;
5) abstention from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity, national unity, or political
independence of any member state.
These principles, which enjoy the unequivocal and collective
endorsement of the Islamic states, could be said to form the basis
of Islamic international relations today. These principles are
enshrined in the UN Charter despite minor variations, and there is
overwhelming authority to the effect that these principles are
82
widely recognized as general principles of international law.
Consequently, it is possible to conclude that the classical
theory of international relations, based on jihad, expounded by some
classical jurists, and restated by modern non-Muslim scholars, is
neither sanctioned by the provisions of the Qur'an, nor is it
explicitly recognized by the Sunna. The practice of Muslim
countries in today's international relations reveals consistent
acceptance of the universal community of nations based on legal
equality and reciprocity. Such acceptance of general principles of
international law by Islamic states is not contradictory to the
legal basis of external relations in Islam.
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IV. THE CONCEPT OF JURISDICTION
In order to discuss the concept of jurisdiction over foreigners
under the Muslim legal system, a distinction must be made between
dhimmis and musta'mins.
1) Dhimmis are non-Muslims accepted as being in hegemony with the
state. Their consent takes the form of dhimma, an agreement by
which the rights and duties of both parties are determined. They
are regarded as subjects of the state and not as aliens and, on
payment of an annual capitation tax (jizya), the dhimmis receive a
OO
pledge of security and protection from the Islamic state. °
2) In contrast to the dhimmis, the musta'mins are non-Muslim
aliens who have entered the Islamic state for a limited period, and
whose status is governed by the terms and conditions upon which the
permission to sojourn was granted. Even with regard to subjects of
a belligerent state, the Islamic state has ordained its full
protection once a posteriori permission had been granted and the
bona fide status of the visitor established. A sojourner was
termed a musta'min (holder of a covenant of protection), capable of
having rights and being liable to duties. Musta'mins have complete
liberty to enter and leave the Islamic state; and, as a musta'min,
OA
_
his person is inviolable and his property protected. Once aman
(safe conduct) has been granted, it is binding on the state and
cannot be forfeited unless such permission turns out to be
o tr
prejudicial to state security or its public law and order. Even
the resumption of active hostilities between the Islamic state and
the state of origin of a musta'min is considered no reason to
declare him an enemy alien, cancel his aman and confiscate his
property so long as he did not openly help the enemy by spying for
them, or exporting weapons, war materials and goods to strengthen
the enemy. The significance of the legal device of aman in the
past must not be underestimated. It was important both for Muslims
and non-Muslims as it served as a 'passport' to facilitate contract
trade and exchange of commodities. Indeed, this legal device is
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considered to be relevant even in modern times. The extent and
far-reaching character of this concept can be seen from a recent
decision rendered in the High Court of Pakistan in State Bank of
87India v. The Custodian of Evacuee Property. Following the
outbreak of war between India and Pakistan in 1965, Pakistan
confiscated certain property as belonging to 'enemy aliens'. The
plaintiff sued the administrator of the rights and assets concerning
this property. In the first instance, the court held that the
plaintiff had no locus standi since he was found to come under the
definition of 'alien enemy' in accordance with Section 38 of the
Civil Procedure Code of Pakistan. On appeal, the High Court
reversed the decision of the lower court and applied the classical
concept of aman as part of the body of Shari'a, in addition to the
express statutory provisions which failed to cover the facts of the
case adequately.
The High Court examined the law of war and peace, with special
reference to enemy subjects according to the Islamic legal system.
It held that aman "is a pledge of security by virtue of which an
enemy alien would be entitled to protection while he is in dar
al-Islam [territory of Islam]". The court also supplemented the
provision of the Civil Procedure by applying Shari'a when it
observed that: "no procedural technicality can take away the right
of a musta'min". The core of the concept of aman in Islamic
jurisprudence has been summarized by the court as:
.... enemy aliens when under express or implied aman cannot be
deprived of their rights as to property and to deal with it
.... subject, of course, to the conditions that the exercise of
such rights does not directly or indirectly add to the war
potential of the enemy. 88
Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff was a holder of aman
and without having violated the conditions of that aman had locus
standi to bring the action.
As a general rule, a Muslim state enjoys the right of
jurisdiction over its natural born subjects whether Muslims or
dhimmis, and must'amins (aliens) resident in, or passing through,
its territory until such persons have changed their status in a
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manner recognized by Islamic law. However, a distinction cannot be
easily drawn here between jurisdiction and applicable law. This is
because, firstly, private international law in Islam is an integral
part of Islamic jurisprudence and derives its authority not from any
foreign source but from the sovereign will of the Muslim state
itself, which will is subject to the same divine law. Early Muslim
international lawyers amalgamated both public international and
private law and dealt with details of both in the same works on
SiyarSecondly, discussion of private law rules is necessary,
since the question of exemption from local jurisdiction always began
from a private claim in which one of the parties invokes a remedy
governed by a private international law rule. Thirdly, examination
of some of the concepts of private international law is highly
relevant for the purpose of our discussion, since it is one of the
aims of this section to refute the long-held impression that Islamic
law is eminently personal in character, an idea which is mainly
derived from the regime of the capitulations which appeared as a
complete system in the Islamic world towards the end of the 18th
century. These capitulations, as we have seen, for example in the
case of Egypt, extensively limited the sovereignty of the Muslim
state in favour of foreign states and their nationals. These
privileges were further extended to others, especially Christians,
and some Muslims who had resorted to foreign protection to escape
the jurisdiction of the state courts.^
In the light of the foregoing considerations, it may be useful
to refer briefly to some private law rules which often involve
compression and simplification of a vast body of rules, and which
could be usefully treated as an independent science. This is an
attempt to substantiate the above-mentioned assertion - nothing
more.
This section is accordingly arranged in several subdivisions
which cover the various aspects of jurisdiction in Muslim state
courts: the general rules governing jurisdiction and applicable
law in civil transactions, jurisdiction on fiscal matters and
jurisdiction over foreign armed forces. The term jurisdiction
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is used in its broad sense, to include not only jurisdiction over
court litigation but also jurisdiction of other executive and
administrative organs.
1. The Competence of the Muslim Courts to assume
Jurisdiction in Civil Cases involving Non-Muslims
In principle, the Muslim judges have jurisdiction in suits
arising between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, between two dhimmis
belonging to the same community or cases concerning scriptuaries of
different communities. However, the question has raised a
doctrinal discussion of great importance among Muslim jurists. The
opinions expressed by the various schools of law are summarized as
follows:
(a) The Shaft'ites
According to the shafi'i school, in a civil suit between a
Muslim and a non-Muslim the Muslim judge is required to exercise
jurisdiction, whether the non-Muslim party is a dhimmi or a
musta'min, whether the subject matter of dispute is marriage or
otherwise, and whether the Muslim appears as plaintiff or is being
sued as defendant.
If both parties are dhimmis of the same creed, the most
authoritative view in the shafi'i school is that the judge must also
apply his own law since it is the duty of Muslims to protect the
dhimmis and to see that justice has been rendered in their disputes.
But if they are dhimmis of different communities, the unanimous view
of the shafi'ites is that the Muslim judge has jurisdiction and
Islamic law should be applied, whether the suit was brought before
him by both or by only one of the parties. But, if both parties to
the dispute are musta'mins, the judge can only assume jurisdiction
if they agreed to bring their suit before him and to abide
consequently by his decision. If they did bring the suit before
him, the Muslim judge had a choice either to assume jurisdiction or
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to decline. They based their opinion on the verse of the Qur'an
which reads: if they do come to theee, Either, judge between
them or decline to interfere".^
(b) Hanbalites and Malikites
According to the Hanbali and Maliki schools of law, both
plaintiff and defendant must agree to bring their suits to the
Muslim judge in order that he may assume jurisdiction. If they so




In cases other than personal status, non-Muslims and Muslims
are both subject to the jurisdiction of the Muslim courts. The
Muslim judge has jurisdiction even if the suit is brought by only
one of the contestants. They based their view on the following
verse of the Qur 'an: ".... so judge between them by what God hath
revealed".^ On the other hand, in cases involving marriage and
divorce, Abu Hanifa required that the Muslim judge has jurisdiction
only if the parties had agreed to bring the suit before him, while
his disciples Mohammad, Abu Yusuf and Zufar differ from their
teacher by making it a duty on the Muslim judge to try the case even
if the dispute was submitted to him by only one of the parties.
These are the main differences of opinion among the various
schools of jurisprudence on the question of the competence of Muslim
judges in cases in which non-Muslims are involved. The better view
seems to be that the Muslim judge must try the case whether the
parties are dhimmis or musta'mins if they submit to his
jurisdiction. It is not necessary that both parties agree to bring
their suit before the Muslim judge, as it is sufficient if the
matter is brought to his cognizance by only one of the parties.
i. The verse of the Qur'an which states: "If therefore they have
recourse to thee, then judge between them, or decline to intervene"
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is a repealed (mansukh) provision.^ The choice in this verse was
replaced by another provision of the Qur 'an which reads: if
any do fail to judge by [the light of] what God hath revealed, they
are not better than unbelievers".^ If a Muslim judge declined to
interfere in suits between non-Muslims, he surely failed to judge by
QO
what God has revealed.
If this argument is accepted, then the Muslim judge must try
the cases between non-Muslims, whether dhimmis or musta'mins,
without the requirement that both parties should have agreed to
submit to his jurisdiction, as in disputes between Muslims. The
provision of the Qur 'an which states: "so judge between them by
what God has revealed" is an entirely general prescription which
contains no qualification whatsoever concerning the consent of both
parties to bring the suit. Moreover, the nature of justice
requires that the complainant brings his claim before the judiciary
and, if proved, a decision will be rendered in his favour. The
enforceability of the decision is on no account dependent on the
acquiescence of the defendant.
ii. As mentioned earlier, the protection of non-Muslims and the
guarantee of their property and rights is a duty incumbent upon the
Muslim state. This duty cannot be effectively carried out in the
absence of judicial protection afforded through the courts of law.
In turn, this protection cannot materialize if its enforcement is
made dependent on the consent of the defendant as this would
seriously undermine the rights of the injured party, a result which
would be clearly contradictory to the precepts of Islamic law which
prohibits injustice and orders redress of wrongs.
2. Competence on Fiscal Matters
The Muslim authorities have shown considerable tolerance by
throwing open the doors of the Muslim states to non-Muslims for
trade purposes. Non-Muslim merchants were as a rule granted aman
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(or safe conduct) for four months, subject to renewal if their
business transactions were not completed during the interim.^9 in
Islam, however, there is a close connection between taxation and
government. The taxation regime reflects in theory the
circumstances of the state in its relation with outside trade.
Detailed rules were laid down for the rate of taxation to be applied
to foreign trade. Foreign merchants were required to pay a duty of
10% on all the goods they imported into a Muslim state and this
explains why the regime of taxation of foreign trade is known as
'Ushur.100
The right of collecting tax is based on the idea that foreign
traders during their sojourn in Muslim territory enjoy the
protection of the Muslim state and so come under its taxing power.
This toll is payable once for any goods imported into the Islamic
territory and is not repeated if foreign merchants travel from one
district to another within the Muslim territory, for with respect to
foreign merchants, all Muslim districts are like one single
district.101 However, the toll may be repeated if the merchants
have meanwhile returned to their own country and decided to re-enter
the Muslim state, for upon their return the effect of the amian which
i no
was originally given to them will expire.
In levying this tax, Islamic jurisprudence recognizes the
doctrine of reciprocity. Foreign merchants entering the Muslim
territory for trade would be treated in an equal manner as Muslim
merchants would be in foreign states. The jurists relied on the
practice of 'Umar, the second caliph. When 'Umar was asked, "How
much shall we collect from the harbis [foreign non-Muslim traders]",
he said: "How much do the harbis collect from us?" When he was
told that they collected 10 per cent, he said: "Collect from them
10 per cent". 103 was reiated by al-Sarakhsi that 'Umar said:
"Collect from them the rate they collect from us" and when further
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asked "If it is not known what rate they collect?" he answered:
"Collect from them ten per cent".10^
Foreign merchants are never taxed when they have little
property, because they will need it for food and other essential
needs, and since they have so little property, it needs no
protection from robbers.105 Some jurists added that taxation of
such little property would be contrary to the essence of aman (or
safe conduct) originally envisaged.105
If the principle of reciprocity is to be adopted, then it must
be interpreted as follows:
1) The actual rate of taxation should be calculated on the basis
of this reciprocity. If Muslim merchants in a foreign state are
subject to, for instance, 10 per cent, then foreign merchants will
be subject to an equal percentage and, if a heavy tax is collected
from Muslim merchants abroad, then the head of the state is advised
to reciprocate by enforcing a similar tax.10^
2) If certain categories of items and merchandise of Muslim
merchants benefit in a foreign state from exemption of taxation, the
same should apply to goods and merchandise imported into the Muslim
"I QO
state by foreign traders. uo
3) The children and women of foreign merchants are exempt from tax
on condition that similar treatment is accorded to Muslims by their
3. Jurisdiction Over Visiting Armed Forces
Armed forces belonging to a foreign power enjoy complete
immunity from the jurisdiction of the Muslim state provided that
they had entered the Muslim territory with the consent of the local
authorities. The status of such forces was stated by al-Sarakhsi
in the following words:
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If an army of a foreign power entered Muslim territory and a
Muslim should go to them by permission and contract with them
for some transaction, his case would be on the same footing as
if he entered their territory, for a military camp possesses a
resisting power. And Islamic jurisdiction does not extend to
their camp just as in their territory .... Don't you see that
if a Muslim army had entered a foreign territory and the
transaction has taken place there, it would have been treated
as if it had taken place in the Muslim territory. 113
Thus, visiting armed forces are regarded as autonomous units subject
to the jurisdiction of the respective power. However, contemporary
Muslim writers have adopted the view that all immunities that did
result from the presence of foreign armed forces were definitely
exceptional and not to be lightly implied.Various practices
have been quoted to support that view. For example, it was
reported that certain soldiers who belonged to foreign armed forces
during the Abbasid period were ordered to pay the price of goods
they had bought from Muslim markets.
We may conclude this preliminary examination with the following
observations:
1) The principle according to the views of the majority of Muslim
jurists is that Muslim judges have jurisdiction over non-Muslim
cases, for Islam must dominate and not be dominated. The principle
is laid down in the Qur'an in the following verse: "So judge
between them by what God hath revealed".
2) In the field of foreign trade the fiscal competence of the
Muslim state to impose taxes and customs is fairly established in
the Islamic jurisprudence, although that competence may sometimes be
relinquished on reciprocity considerations.
3) Exemption from territorial jurisdiction is recognized by cases
in which foreign armed forces are involved, although that exemption
is implicitly limited in operation.
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THE ISLAMIC APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
AND ITS RATIONAL BASIS
I. THE THEORY
The Islamic approach to sovereign immunity generally rests on
the idea of the rule of law. The rational basis of this approach
could be based on different considerations.
1. The Principle of Territorial Sovereignty
The first cardinal principle upon which the Islamic concept on
sovereign immunity is based is that of territorial sovereignty and
jurisdiction. Islamic jurisdiction, as mentioned earlier, is
exercisable, with minor exceptions, over all persons and subjects
within the Muslim state. In addition, the idea of personal law has
no place in Islam. Islamic law is territorial in the fullest sense
of the word and is thus applicable to all events occurring within
the borders of the Muslim state. However, several writers, in
discussing the extent to which Islamic law applies in disputes
involving foreigners, assert that Islamic law is not applicable in
its entirety to non-Muslims. They believe that the law to true
believers is something eminently personal. To them it springs from
the individual and is associated only with him. They maintain that,
since Muslim law is religious, it can be applied only to Muslims,
while non-Muslims (subjects or foreigners) are bound by no law but
their own. These views appear to be based on a misconception of
the real nature and character of Islamic law and sovereignty.
Islamic law is a religious law only in the sense that it has basic
ethical grounds and some of its general principles are to be found
in the Qur'an and in the pronouncements of the Prophet. Beyond
that, the corpus of the Islamic law as it developed over the ages is
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man-made in the sense that it has resulted from the efforts of
jurists of the various schools of law.
The idea that non-Muslims are exempt from Islamic state
jurisdiction in all matters has sometimes been carried to its
extreme. It has not infrequently been maintained that non-Muslims
resident within the Islamic state are free to judge their own
controversies, to set up their own standard of conduct and to
establish their own judicial institutions within the Muslim state.
This alleged freedom without regard to the rights and interests of
the whole body of the state is a 'malignant and sinister' legacy
from the colonial era and should be discarded as anarchy.
Furthermore, these ideas cannot be attributed to the Islamic
jurisprudence. As explained, there is unanimous agreement, even
among classical Muslim scholars, that Islamic law applies to all and
that the Islamic state has full power and control over all persons
and things within its territory. Equality before courts of law is
a cardinal principle of justice in Islamic jurisprudence. With
respect to non-Muslims, a modern Islamic scholar writes: "They
shall enjoy what we do enjoy and shall be responsible for carrying
O
out the same obligations as we do".
The view that Islamic law is personal, constitutes in the last
analysis the fundamental grounds which underlie the capitulations in
Western writings. It is maintained that Muslim law is inapplicable
to non-Muslims, and as such, Christians and other non-Muslim powers
and their nationals were declared immune under the pretext of the
capitulations from local jurisdiction. If this was so, and it
certainly is not, there would be no question of subjecting these
foreign powers to the territorial jurisdiction of the host countries
with which the capitulation treaties had been concluded. Indeed,
the idea has been employed for a much more far-reaching purpose.
It has often been maintained that the regime of capitulations, as
applied to the countries of the East, was connected with the
inferiority of civilization and retarded their admission to the
family of nations. It has also been maintained that the purpose of
these capitulations was the protection of Europeans in the East
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since the East lacked the legal institutions to protect foreigners
in conformity with the requirements of civilization. This major
misunderstanding was correctly dispelled by Alexandrowicz in a
valuable research when he commented that:
Europeans coming to the East would not have been able to
establish their settlement and engage in trade without the
existence of ancient legal custom which permitted the admission
of foreigners and safeguarded their activities as merchants. 3
In the case of the Ottoman capitulations, these treaties were
concluded to provide a temporary solution for jurisdictional issues.
This was regarded as necessary as more and more Europeans began to
settle in the Ottoman Empire, and in most cases it was effected
through concurrent jurisdiction, as in the case of Egypt, where the
concept of mixed jurisdiction was employed. Again, most of the
treaties were motivated by political and commercial considerations
and were clearly not based on any precepts of Islam. In short, the
whole history of extra-territoriality in the Ottoman Empire can be
divided into two stages.
In the first stage, the old capitulation treaties between the
Porte and the European powers, which formed the basis of the
so-called legal rights of foreigners in some Muslim countries and
were concluded between 1835 and the middle of the 19th century, were
accorded to foreigners in a simple form out of grace. Most of them
were motivated by the principle of religious tolerance and,
moreover, these privileges were regarded as of little importance
because at that time the Ottoman Empire was strong and quite capable
of looking after herself.
In the second stage, when Turkish power declined, this was
accompanied by an increase in the number of Europeans resident in
her dominions. Gradually they were taken out of the local
jurisdiction and, as a result, they enjoyed extensive exemptions
from the poll-tax payable by the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire.
These exemptions were extended until foreigners were paying less in
taxation than the citizens in general. All this was justified on
the idea of personality of the law and the principle of religious
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tolerance.^ It is true that tolerance is inherent in Muslim law,
as was explained earlier. However, that tolerance later shifted
from the purely jurisdictional sphere to the political sphere.
This tolerance, which was originally recognized in acts of worship
and personal status, was later extended, under the device of the
capitulations, to include almost the entire judicial and
administrative systems as well as customs of the Ottoman Empire,
Egypt, Morocco, etc. It was under these circumstances that the
idea of personal sovereignty emerged.
Later the Ottomans themselves became conscious of the
limitations on their sovereignty as a result of the capitulations
and, in the second half of the 19th century, started to promulgate
laws reducing the jurisdiction of the communal courts and limiting
that jurisdiction to matters of religious practices and personal law
cases.^ In short, it can be said that sovereignty within the
Muslim state is territorial in the sense that it extends its
authority over all persons (Muslims and non-Muslims, subjects or
foreigners), things and lands. If the principle of full sovereignty
of the Muslim state over its own territory is accepted, then it
follows that this sovereign authority is supreme and uncontested
within the Muslim state' s own territorial confines and that another
entity, whether private or sovereign, carrying out an activity or
performing an act therein is subject to the law of the land, which
recognizes no exception in favour of foreign individuals or foreign
sovereigns.
2. The Analogy with the Local Ruler of the Muslim State
As mentioned in Part I, one of the rational explanations of
state immunity in modern international law is based on the
historical development of analogy with immunities of local
sovereigns. This is peculiar to common law countries. In English
law, the Crown could not be sued in local courts by any injured
party. The law presumed that the King could do no wrong, and
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therefore if the King commanded an unlawful act to be done, the
wrong of the instrument is not thereby indemnified.^ This
prerogative was removed by the Crown Proceedings Act 1947.^ As
mentioned earlier, the immunity of the Crown was extended by the
English courts to cover the case of foreign sovereigns with whom
foreign states have subsequently been identified. Accordingly, the
concept of foreign state immunity from jurisdiction derived in part
from the fact that some states were immune from the jurisdiction of
their own courts.
The Islamic approach to the problem of state immunity is
radically different. It cannot be denied that a head of state
occupies a unique position within the Muslim state. Yet, unlike
the common law concept, Islamic law does not recognize this extreme
immunity. The power of the head of state in Islam is restricted.
He enjoys no prerogatives and is obliged to submit to the Shari'a.
This limitation arise from the special character of Islamic law,
being primarily of divine origin. It makes no distinction between
the law governing the rulers and that governing the ruled. The law
being thus of sacred origin demands the obedience even of the head
of state himself, and the administration of the state is envisaged
to be brought into harmony with the dictates of this law.
The Islamic theory in this regard may be formulated as follows:
the relations arising from the acts of the head of the state, even
in his capacity as a ruler and a holder of sovereign powers, are not
exempt from the operation of the Shari'a. Equally, if he does a
thing in his private capacity, he is liable to be tried before an
ordinary Muslim court, just as any other individual. The theory is
partly based on the concept of 'Adl. 'Adl (justice) is the goal
and purpose of the Shari'a, which guarantees justice for everyone.
Indeed, there are many verses in the Qur'an which speak about
justice: "God commands justice, the doing of good and liberty to
kith and kin and he forbids all shameful deeds, and injustice and
O
rebellion". Another verse reads:
0 ye who believe stand out firmly for God, as witnesses to fair
dealing, and let not the hatred of others to you make you
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swerve to wrong and depart from justice. Be just, that is next
to piety; and fear God. 9
The Prophet himself heard cases against his proper person and did
full justice to the complainants. It was reported that once the
Prophet unintentionally injured the skin of a Bedouin, who claimed
retaliation. Then the Angel Gabriel came to him and said: "0
Mohammad'. Lo'. God hath not sent thee as either a tyrant or an
arrogant. Whereupon the Prophet called upon the Bedouin and said:
take retaliation from me".^
Mohammad himself was always strict and fair in his dealings.^
He disregarded distinction and discouraged undue reverence. He
used to join with his companions in their manual labour and said:
"I am only a man like unto you".^
No less difficult than keeping a promise is the doing of
justice in cases where one of the parties concerned happens to
belong to a distinguished dignitary or social rank. A woman
belonging to the tribe of Makhzum was found guilty of theft, and her
relations requested Usama ibn Zaid, for whom the Prophet had much
regard, to intervene and entreat the Prophet to release her. The
Prophet said: "0 Usama, do you mean to come to me and intercede
against the laws of God?" He convened a meeting and thus addressed
them:
Nations which have preceded you have been wiped off the face of
the earth, for the one reason only, that they imposed
punishment on the poor and relaxed the laws in favour of the
rich. I swear by God that if Fatima, my daughter, were to be
found guilty of theft, then I would have her hands cut off. 13
Any number of instances could be quoted,^ but what has been said is
sufficient to show that the Prophet himself did not claim any
special prerogatives or privileges from the operation of the law.
He looked upon all alike. Rich or poor, high or low, master or
servant, all he treated in the same way without any regard to
dignity or rank. Thus he exemplified and worked out all the
principles revealed to him in the Qur'an regarding doing justice,
keeping of a promise, fairness in dealing and disregard of
distinction. In the closing days of his life, he thus addressed a
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public gathering:
People'. You may have had claims against me. If I have whipped
anybody's back, let him retaliate on this my back. If I have
condemned or censured anybody's honour, here is my honour to
take revenge upon. If I have taken anybody's property, here is
my property; let him take it .... In fact dearest to me is
the one who takes his claim from me if he has right thereto, or
forgives me. Thus I shall meet my Lord with a clear
conscience.
A man rose and claimed that the Prophet had borrowed some money from
him. This was at once paid to him.^^
The Prophet's successors followed in his footsteps
consistently, e.g., no less than the second caliph, 'Umar, and the
fourth caliph, 'Ali, accepted to abide by their agreements and to
appear before the courts as ordinary litigants without feeling that
their conduct was against their sovereign dignity."*"^ It was also
reported by al-Kindi,^^ that the Abbasid Caliph al-Mansur (754-775)
was sued by a woman before a Muslim judge. It was said that the
majesty of the Khilafa did not prevent him from humbling himself
before the law.
Consequently, a Muslim head of state, when he chooses to engage
in a personal or business transaction with private persons, enjoys
no immunity from the operation of the law, thus placing himself, by
this very act, on an equal footing with his commercial partner.
Equality before the law is the basic principle of Islamic law and
the ruler thus personally involved has no special prerogative or
immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts. As a modern Western
scholar observed:
Many texts .... can find nothing better to say, in praise of a
caliph, than to show him appearing with his opponent, on an
equal footing, before the qadi and submitting to the decision
he gives. Authentic or not, such stories reveal, at any rate,
the point of view of the doctrine. 18
Some Muslim scholars have carried this non-immunity to its
extreme. For instance, Ibn Qudama, an authoritative jurist of the
Hanbali school, maintained that the principle which required the
ruler to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of law, even
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applies to the ruler acting in a public capacity, just as much as to
any private individual acting in a private capacity. He
unequivocally states that:
Our legal scholars have said that a breach of faith on the part
of an Imam is more serious and heinous than a breach of faith
by anyone else, because of its evil consequences. For if the
Imam break faith and get a name for doing so .... the enemy
will not trust them in a covenant or truce .... and this will
cause the Muslim leaders to be discredited. 19
Again, just as the ruler enjoys no immunities from the substantive
law, one would not expect him to enjoy any regarding jurisdiction.
It was an established principle of Islamic jurisprudence that party
Of)
and judge cannot be one and the same person, not even the caliph.
Hence, whenever the ruler had any suit to file, or one was filed
against him in his private capacity, the judge of the local court
had exclusive jurisdiction.
The view that the head of state in Islam is subject to the law
even in relation to his public acts is rightly said to be based on
the requirement that any discretionary powers exercised by the ruler
for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of the state must
strictly be done within the confines of the Shari1a.^ Hence, if
the local sovereign in Islam does not enjoy exemption from the
jurisdiction in their own courts, one should not expect such
privileges to be extended to foreign sovereigns.
3. The Limited Nature of Sovereignty
Another explanation for finding a workable hypothesis on which
to base the Islamic approach to state immunity is the idea of
limitation of sovereignty in the Islamic legal system. The idea is
derived from the basic principle that there is nothing approaching
absolute sovereignty in the Islamic legal system. If by sovereignty
one understands the power and authority of the territorial states,
these are always subject to and limited by law. As has been
mentioned, there is no privilege nor prerogative reserved for the
state. Whenever the state violates the law, it is accountable for
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its wrongdoing and cannot be allowed to raise any prerogatives in
the context of a claim made against it by a private individual.
Thus, in Islamic theory, sovereignty fulfils only specific
functions in the organization of society and should have its power
limited to the exercise of these functions within the framework of
the law. If the doctrine of vicarious liability can be used in
this regard, the sovereign authority will equally be responsible for
any act of its officials and organs which results in an injury to a
private individual. If sovereignty in Islam is not absolute, one
should not expect the immunities, if any, enjoyed by such
sovereignty to be absolute in its relations with other sovereignties
or with private individuals. It appears, according to this
approach, that the question as to whether one state must submit to
the jurisdiction of another or whether the second state must grant
the first immunity, is essentially a practical problem associated
with the nature of sovereignty: a sovereignty which is prepared to
submit to its own internal legal order is not prepared to grant a
foreign sovereignty what it denies to itself.
4. The Principle of Sanctity of Contract
Another rational explanation of the Islamic approach to state
immunity is founded on the basic norm of the principle of the
binding nature of contractual obligations. This principle is
corroborated by the various sources of Islamic law. In the first
and primary source of law, a number of verses can be found to
support the rule, e.g. "0 ye who believe fulfil [all]
9 9
obligations". This verse is interpreted to apply to all
contracts and agreements. A leading commentator on the Qur'an, for
example, categorically states that: "This is a command from God
that every lawful contract must be observed; and it is not
permissible to limit its application without proof of such
9 9
limitation". 3 Another verse says: ".... and fulfil [every]
engagement for [every] engagement will be inquired into [on the Day
of Reckoning]".^ Here again the commentator gives a general
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meaning and the command 'fulfil' is interpreted to be of general
O c:
application. The fulfilling of an engagement is described by the
Qur'an as an indication of good faith and piety: "successful indeed
are the believers .... those who faithfully observe their
covenants".^ Elsewhere in the Qur 'In it is said: "Fulfil the
Covenant of God which ye have entered into, and break not your oath
after ye have confirmed them. Indeed you have made God your
surety. For God knoweth all that ye do".^ Again commentators on
the Qur'an, like al-Qurtubi, state emphatically that the words
"fulfil the covenant of God" is a general term applicable to all
covenants which are made by the word of mouth and which man takes
upon himself".2®
The traditions of the Prophet, the second source of Islamic
law, clearly reiterate the principle of the sanctity of contracts.
The Prophet is reported to have stated: "Muslims are bound by their
stipulations".^ Similarly, another tradition affirms:
For everyone who commits a breach of faith, there will be set
up, on the day of judgement, a flag proportionate in height to
his breach in faith, but there is no one who breaks faith more
guilty than he who commands the common people. 30
If we turn to the work of leading Muslim jurists, we find
abundant authority for the proposition that contracts and
engagements are legally binding. In particular, the learned
jurist, Ibn Tayimiya, elaborated this principle in his famous
treatise al-Fatawa. He observed that God has commanded the due
performance and observation of contracts in quite general terms and
concluded that such a command proves that the natural presumption is
that the contract and stipulations provided for therein, are valid
Q 1
and permitted. His disciple, Ibn al-Qayyim, is equally emphatic
regarding the binding nature of the contract. He stated that
contracts must be duly enforced unless they are contrary to the
OO
provisions of the law. The rule was adopted by the Turkish Civil
CO
Code of 1877, which was entirely based on the Hanifi School of
Law. The code did not introduce new principles of law, but simply
codified the Islamic principles which served the civil law of the
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Ottoman Empire. Art. 83 provided: "a stipulation is to be
complied with as far as possible".^
In the LIAMCO v. Libya award, the sole arbitrator, Mahmassani,
referred to this rule as a general principle of law and concluded
that: "The principle of respect for the agreements is thus
applicable to ordinary contract and concession agreements. It is
binding on an individual as well as governments".^ After citing a
number of declarations of a universal character, custom, case law,
international doctrine as well as Islamic law, he concluded that the
binding nature of the contract generally held in Islamic law is
clearly consistent with the international law principle of pacta
sunt servanda. On the basis of that identification, he held Libya
responsible for its unilateral act of terminating the concession of
the American company. The same view was also followed by another
or
arbitral award given in Aramco's dispute in 1958. Basing its
decision on the Islamic system of law, the tribunal found that an
oil concession agreement concluded between the state of Saudi Arabia
and Aramco was valid and binding on the sovereign because it was:
In conformity with two fundamental principles of the whole
Muslim System of Law, i.e., the principle of liberty of
contract within the limits of the divine law and the principle
of respect for contracts .... Under Muslim law, any valid
contract is obligatory, in accordance with the principle
of Islam and the law of God, as expressed in the Qur'an:
"Be faithful to your pledge to God, when you enter into a
pact". 37
The principle is closely connected with the general good as an
ultimate purpose of the law. It is based on the doctrine of good
faith. The contract once made between the parties by mutual
consent, is binding in accordance with the principle pacta sunt
servanda.
The principle of sanctity of contract is firmly established in
the Islamic legal system. The implication of this principle in the
doctrine of state immunity, which is our immediate concern, requires
neither emphasis nor elaboration. The rule is so general that a
distinction cannot be drawn in this regard between a state or a
private individual. One of the authorities already mentioned
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places special emphasis on the fact that not only is the Muslim
sovereign as much bound by his contract, but also that a breach of
faith on his part is much more heinous in its nature and serious in
its consequences than that of anyone else. By the same token, a
foreign state who entered into contractual obligations in its
private capacity is not an exception to this basic principle. All
the authorities cited are of general application and special
prerogative or immunity is not reserved either to a local or foreign
sovereign from the operation of this rule. If a state engaged in a
commercial transaction through an ordinary contract, then it should
conform to the general rule by which that contract is regulated.
The Islamic theory eliminates many of the difficulties which
otherwise arise relating to the commercial activities of the
sovereign state. The problem is not resolved by reference either
to the nature or the purpose of the activities, but simply by
recourse to the contractual stipulations. Consequently it may be
said that the Islamic legal system would insist on allowing direct
access by private individuals against all their contractual
partners, whether private or sovereign, and whether the nature or
the purpose of the contract is public.
5. The Relevance of Diplomatic Immunity under
Islamic International Law
Ambassadors and diplomatic agents, under Islamic international
law, are accorded immunity in their capacity as representatives of
foreign states and foreign sovereigns. The Qur 'an and the Sunna
and the consistent practice of Muslim heads of states clearly
establish the privileges and immunities of diplomatic agents. The
Qur 'an contains several references to the concept of amain or safe
conduct, which forms the basis of diplomatic immunity. This aman
obligates the state to protect the diplomat until he leaves the
oo
Muslim territory. ° Aman is a trust and must not be breached.
According to the Qur'an: "If a pagan asks you for asylum, grant it
to him, so that he may hear the word of God, and then escort him to
where he can be secured". Thus security must be given to the
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asker, and safe return must follow. These mandates are also
clearly endorsed by the Sunna.
In the first years of the Islamic era (C.E. 622), a large
number of deputations were received by the Prophet and emissaries
sent out by him. The first deputation received was the Ta'if when
they went to Medina to declare their submission. The Prophet
personally received the head of the delegation, who was not a
Muslim. The tents of the delegation were pitched in the yard of
the Prophet's mosque - the highest honour which could be accorded
to a guest. They entered into a negotiation with the Muslims,
following which they offered to accept Islam on certain
QQ
conditions. The Prophet also received a deputation of 60 members
from the Christians of Nejran.1^ When the delegation entered
Medina, the Prophet was saying the afternoon prayers. It was
reported that the Prophet addressed them thus: "Conduct your prayer
here in this mosque. It is a place consecrated to God". They then
stood and prayed.^ This precedent clearly indicates that envoys
also enjoyed freedom of religion.
The Prophet also received other delegations from Banu Tayyi',"^
Banu Tamim,^ the Kings of Himyar,^ and from Kina.^ While the
Prophet received delegations from various tribes in Arabia and
envoys from various neighbouring powers, he also sent ambassadors to
the Arab and non-Arab rulers. The first delegation despatched by
the Prophet was the mission sent to Abyssinia, who succeeded in
securing the protection of the Negus, and thereafter delegations
were sent to the Byzantine Emperor, the Persian Emperor, the
Muquuqas or King of Egypt, to the Prince of Ghasan and to the Chief
of Hanifa. These deputations were all favourably received and
given presents.^
Envoys, along with those who are in their company, enjoy full
personal immunities. Their persons are sacred and inviolable.
They must not be killed nor be in any way molested. The envoy of a
foreign power, who was extremely rude and provocative in his
behaviour towards the Prophet, furnishes a good precedent. The
- 385 -
Prophet said to him: "Had you not been an envoy, I would have put
you to death".^ There is also the case of Wahshi, the Abyssinian,
who had barbarously murdered Hamza, the uncle of the Prophet, in the
battle of 'Uhud. He was mortally afraid to accept the assignment,
but he was assured by his people that the Prophet did not ever touch
the person of an envoy. And so it was proved when Wahshi presented
his credentials. The Prophet allowed no deviation from diplomatic
immunity. Equally, when the Quraish sent Abu Raf'i as an envoy to
negotiate peace with the Muslims, he declared his faith in Islam and
refused to return. The Prophet admonished: "You are an
ambassador, you must therefore go back and if you still feel as
strongly about Islam as you do now, you are always at liberty to
return as an ordinary Muslim".
In so far as personal inviolability is concerned, the majority
of Muslim jurists take the view that a diplomat is protected from
being prosecuted for purely personal criminal conduct.^ But on
personal civil acts, there is no precedent and the Muslim Chronicles
are silent on the issue. This is difficult to understand since
these missions were primarily despatched to facilitate contact for
economic and cultural purposes. In addition to their diplomatic
functions, these envoys often carried back with them commodities,
books and rarities from the Muslim lands.The property of
diplomatic agents was exempt from import duties on the basis of
reciprocity. As an eminent scholar of the Hanfi School,
al-Shaybani, says:
If the foreign state exempts Muslim envoys from custom duties
and other taxes, the envoy of such a state will enjoy the same
privileges in the Muslim territory, otherwise they may, if the
Muslim state so desires, be required to pay dues like any other
visitors. 51
The functions of a diplomat, as stated and practised in the
Sunna, are very much like those of today, except for differences
5?
brought about by modern technology. Whenever the Prophet
dispatched a mission, he directed it: i) to work patiently; ii) to
avoid harshness towards others; iii) to give good tidings to other
people and iv) not to incite hostility towards themselves or their
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mission. It has been argued that activities outside that scope
are not considered diplomatic, and the appropriate permissible
sanction in such cases is expulsion^ and nothing more.
Historically, diplomatic relations on much the same mandates, were
practised throughout the Middle Ages. Muslim and Christian
Chronicles give detailed descriptions of the visits of several
Byzantine ambassadors to Baghdad. Most notably, Charlemagne
despatched several missions to the Court of Harun al-Rashid (A.D.
799), in which the former, in addition to the exchange of diplomatic
correspondence and valuable gifts, sought to establish an alliance
with the Abbasid against Byzantine,or at least to establish
friendly relations between the two great rulers of Christendom and
Islam.Thus, in the area of diplomatic protection, Islamic law
has historically made a significant contribution.
In the U.S. Diplomatic Staff in Teheran's case,^^ the judgement
of the ICJ took particular account of the traditions of Islam, which
contributed along with others to the elaboration of the rules of
contemporary public international law on diplomatic and consular
inviolability and immunity. The court stated:
The principle of the inviolability of the persons of diplomatic
agents and the premises of diplomatic missions is one of the
very foundations of this long-established regime [of diplomatic
law], to the evolution of which the tradition of Islam has made
a substantial contribution. 58
The point was further illustrated by the dissenting opinion of Judge
Salaheddin Tarazi,"^ who cited an extract from a series of lectures
delivered by Professor Ahmed Rechid of Istanbul in 1937 at the Hague
Academy of International Law, to the effect that:
In Arabia, the person of an ambassador had always been regarded
as sacred. Mohammed consecrated this inviolability. Never
were an ambassador to Mohammed or his successors molested ....
The Prophet always treated the envoys of foreign nations with
consideration and great affability. He used to shower gifts
upon them and recommended his companions to follow his example,
saying: "Do the same as I".
He also referred to a work entitled International Law, published by
the Institute of State and Law and of the Academy of Sciences of the
USSR in which the following account was given:
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The Arab states, which played an important part in
international relations in the Middle Ages [from the 7th
century] had well developed conceptions regarding the Law of
Nations, closely linked with religious precepts. The Arabs
recognized the inviolability of ambassadors and the need for
the fulfilment of treaty obligations. They resorted to
arbitration to settle international disputes and considered the
observance of definite rules of law necessary in time of war
.... 60
It should, however, be noted that, although there was abundant
practice on diplomatic immunity, there was very little practice
concerning the position of foreign sovereigns before local Muslim
courts in earlier authorities. The plausible justification for
this scarcity of practice lies in the fact that sovereigns did not
very often go travelling in the territories of other sovereigns, and
still less frequently did they commit crimes or enter into
contractual relations with private individuals abroad. Due to such
paucity of precedents, one finds it necessary to argue from
immunities of ambassadors. If diplomatic immunities in Islam are
firmly established in favour of ambassadors, afortiori the
sovereigns they represented should be entitled to no lesser a degree
of favourable treatment, provided that they acted in their public
capacity and engaged in no private activities with individuals. It
has often been said that it is difficult to deny to the sovereign
what was conceded by Islamic law to the ambassador, for it would be
absurd to accord the principal less privileges than those enjoyed by
his agent.
II. THE ISLAMIC CONCEPTION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
IN PRACTICE
1. Treaty Practice
The Islamic concept of sovereign immunity is evidenced in the
practice of some Muslim states. Two instances may be noted. There
is a currently a clear trend in most Muslim countries towards
Islamization measures which in theory should have the effect of
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making the law less secular and more Islamic. Muslim states have
also called for the holding of Islamic Conferences and the formation
of regional pacts and alliances among Muslim states, and the most
important of these organizations is the OIC. Despite the fact that
the Charter of the OIC stresses the basic principle of respect for
sovereignty and independence, some of the agreements concluded under
the auspices of the organization seem to favour a restrictive view
of sovereign immunity.
The most notable example is the Agreement for the Promotion,
Protection and Guarantee of Investment among Member States of the
Organization of Islamic Conference.^ The Agreement offers a
comprehensive dispute settlement machinery by way of conciliation
and arbitration (Art. 17). If an award was rendered as a result of
arbitral proceedings, it would be final and binding upon the parties
and it would not be open to attack on any ground in the court of the
contracting state (Art. 17(2)(d)). The decisions of the arbitral
tribunal are not only binding on the parties to the dispute but are
also extended to all other contracting parties. This is expressly
stated as follows:
no matter whether it be a party to the dispute or not and
irrespective of whether the investor against whom the decision
was passed is one of its nationals or residents or not, as if
it were a final and enforceable decision of its national
courts.
It is clear that the provision is aiming at excluding any procedural
technicalities which might upset the decisions of the arbitral
tribunal including the plea of sovereign immunity.
Issues of sovereign immunity proper have been indirectly
covered by Art. 16 of the Agreement, which primarily provides for
safeguards against harassment within the host state, which is under
an obligation to allow the investor the right to resort to its
national judicial system:
1) to complain against measures adopted by its authorities against
him; or
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2) to contest the extent of its conformity with the provisions and
regulations and laws in force in its territory; or
3) to complain against non-adoption by a host state of a certain
measure which was in the interests of the investor, and which the
state should have adopted.
The implications of this provision are thus not limited to the
principle that disputes with certain foreign investors should be
settled in accordance with the law of the host state and by using
local judicial remedies. They include a rejection of any right of
the host state to claim the benefit of any immunity before its own
courts, in the context of proceedings brought by an investor from
another contracting state.
Although this is the principle, it is qualified under the same
article in the sense that:
If the investor chooses to raise the complaint before the
national courts or before an arbitral tribunal, then having
done so before one of the two quarters, he loses the right to
recourse to the other.
The significance of Art. 16 will be apparent if we realize that the
investor, by virtue of Art. 10(2)(a), already enjoys the right to
contest any measure of expropriation adopted by the host state.
Most significantly, the right secured by Art. 10 is independent of
any general right possessed by the investor to have access to local
r o
courts in any other case. It is clear that Art. 16 is designed
to illuminate any plea of sovereign immunity in the context of a
complaint made by the investor to bring a suit against the host
state and constitutes in the final analysis a waiver of immunity on
the part of the host state.
It is possible that the phrase concerning the choice of forum
is intended to account for the rather common situation in which a
foreign investor insists that, failing the proper conduct of the
arbitral proceedings, he be allowed direct access to the local
courts for a supervisory role or otherwise. However, in both cases
the plea of sovereign immunity does not seem to raise a major
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problem: for if the dispute was brought before an arbitral tribunal
under the agreement, consent to arbitrate could be construed to be
an effective waiver of immunity. If the agreement is implemented
in letter and spirit and is seen to be effectively functioning, then
Art. 16 could give rise to Islamic community law on investment in
which investors would be protected from any procedural impediments
concerning sovereign immunity.
2. The Theory in Judicial Practice
The Islamic theory of state immunity has also received judicial
endorsement. In point of fact, the efforts towards the formulation
of such a theory have resulted in two notable decisions being
rendered in one part of the Muslim world. Such utilization of
comparative law techniques could become a fruitful device for
municipal courts faced with the question of state immunity. Two
cases from Pakistan are mentioned here.
It is not easy to explain why Pakistan has been the only Muslim
country whose municipal courts have referred to the Islamic concept
and why it is only recently that they have done so. The better
view seems to be that the Pakistani municipal courts have been
influenced to a measurable extent by "The Objectives Resolution"
which was passed by the, then, constituent assembly on 7 March
1949, which reiterated the Islamic ideals and precepts. They
have been equally influenced by the introduction of Islamic laws in
the country with effect from 10 February 1979, and as a result, a
number of learned Pakistani judges have referred to the various
provisions of the constitution in detail, highlighting its various
Islamic features and characteristics in support of their findings.^
It is in this context that the Islamic conception of sovereign
immunity has been resorted to by the Pakistani Supreme Court.
In Mir Baluch Khan and Others v. Mst Lai Bibi and Others,*^ an
action was brought against an instrumentality of a foreign
government which pleaded sovereign immunity. The court, in
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summarising the different approaches that have been adopted by other
legal systems, made the following observations:
The Muslim Shari'a [Islamic law] does not embrace the concept
of the British common law that a sovereign can do no wrong and
cannot be sued in a municipal court of his own domain. On the
contrary in Shari'a, a sovereign can be sued in a court of a
Qadi [judge] and like any other citizen is subject to his
jurisdiction and bound to carry out any decree or order passed
against him by the Qadi. 66
The court concluded that the sovereignty of foreign states was no
more involved than was that of the Muslim state when sued in its
civil capacity. Accordingly, the court rejected a plea of
sovereign immunity and assumed jurisdiction.
Although the decision only briefly employed the comparative
method, nevertheless it is a remarkable judgement if one realizes
that it was adopted in the early 1970s when the municipal courts of
various countries had only started to favour the restrictive
doctrine of immunity. Furthermore, it is clear enough from the
language used by the court that non-immunity extends even to
execution of a judgement rendered against the Muslim state, thus
removing one of the obstacles which still persist in international
practice, namely the argument that it would be unreasonable to admit
a competence in a court which could result only in an empty
judgement.
The Islamic approach, as explained by the above case, has been
upheld by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in A.M. Qureshi v. USSR.^
The court declared itself competent over a suit brought by the
plaintiff who claimed to have entered into a contract with the USSR
and its trade representative for a commission to supply jeeps and
trucks to the Pakistan Government, and alleged breach of contract on
the part of the defendant. The USSR appeared before the court and
invoked jurisdictional immunities. The judge, who had referred not
only to the principles of Islamic law, but also to the recent trend
in customary international law, had reviewed international
conventions, municipal law and judicial decisions of many countries,
as well as the work of jurists and other eminent writers on
international law. He held that the test of acta jure imperii and
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acta jure gestionis are not the sole tests of determining the
availability or otherwise of the immunity of foreign states. There
was also a third category of cases under customary international
law, namely commercial and trade cases, in respect of which no
jurisdictional immunity is available to a foreign state.
Judge Muhammed Afzal Ullah entered into a detailed analysis of
the application of the Islamic norms of justice generally and the
Islamic Law of Nations in particular. He made some observations
on the question raised by the plaintiff's counsel with regard to the
application of Islamic law and judicial norms, in cases like the
present one. Having acknowledged the lack of precedents in the
Islamic law to resolve a similar dispute, he found it necessary to
argue from the general norms of that system. He maintained:
It is no more good to interpret expression "justice, equity and
good conscience" to mean the rules of English law, as in any
way applicable in Pakistan. Instead, accepted and fundamental
principles and judicial norms of Islam, its philosophy,
jurisprudence and its common law shall govern the application
of the rule of justice and equity as also would control the
discretion of the judge when the question of good conscience
and fair play is involved. 69
According to this judgment the residuary power possessed by the
judges in Pakistan, in the absence of legislation is the "Islamic
law of justice and equity" and in interpreting statutes and
provisions susceptible to more than one interpretation, the one in
conformity with Islamic principles and jurisprudence would be
adopted. The judgement also referred to the impression long held
in the West that the Muslim law had nothing to contribute to what
was inside the covers, and that this law is not of practical content
and value. To dispel that impression, he cited various practices
from Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, and other Muslim
countries to show that the Muslim law has been proved to cope with
modern theories of law and jurisprudence, and is capable of meeting
the particular needs of the modern age.
The judgement also referred to the Islamic Law of Nations and
cited various works on the subject. It pointed out that, unlike
Soviet, American, and European international law, the Islamic Law of
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Nations is the most ancient of its kind, "regulating the relations
of various communities and individuals and codified some eight
centuries before modern international law had achieved its
unquestioned recognition". A detailed examination of the sources
of law and comparison with international law was also made in the
judgement. The main differences of the two systems are summarized
by the courts in the following words.
First, Muslim international law attaches more importance to
ethical values because, though the study of international law
evolved into an independent branch of law, yet it continued to
be subservient to the religion. Second, in Muslim
international law we find, for the first time in recorded
history, a fully-fledged notion of recognized rights for the
enemy, in peace as much as in war. Moreover, Muslim jurists
were the first to develop the science of international law as
an independent branch of law in general and distinct from
political science in particular. 70
However, as section 9 of the Pakistani Code of Civil Procedure, the
Treaty between Pakistan and the USSR and the Pakistani State
Immunity Ordinance 1981 all confer jurisdiction on the local
courts, Judge Afzal Zulla felt that the need had not arisen to spell
out the details of Islamic law on the question of state immunity.
Yet the Islamic approach to the question, as based on the analogy
with the local sovereign, had been stressed by another judge
7?elsewhere in the decision.
The above two cases serve to show the basic characteristics of
the Islamic conception of immunity. Firstly, they rationalize the
Islamic approach by reference to spiritual standards and prevalent
religion. Islamic rules of justice and equity have been considered
as highly relevant to cases of immunity, because what is involved in
these cases is essentially a matter of "good conscience and fair
interplay". Indeed, substantive justice is the internal aspect of
the law which serves to determine the ultimate purpose of the law,
namely the 'general good', 'happiness', 'good faith' and
'equality' .
Secondly, the first case has laid down a comprehensive Islamic
doctrine of restrictive immunity by allowing measures of execution
to be taken against a foreign state if a judgement is rendered
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against it, thereby excluding any doubt that might be raised as to
the position of a judgement rendered according to the Islamic theory
of immunity. As has been mentioned earlier, this is one of the
thorny issues on which various municipal legal systems have greatly
varied.
Thirdly, the importance of these decisions lies not only in the
remarkable application of the Shar i ' a to issues of modern
international law, but also in the matter in which statutory
provisions have been supplemented by Islamic law, which are wider in
their application.
Finally, the significance of these decisions also lies in the
fact that Islamic law is still considered part of the law of the
land and may even override the common law concepts of state
immunity. Even in situations of conflict, where the common law
rules fail to provide adequate protection to the private individual
and the rules of Shari'a cover the issue, it seems that the latter
will prevail.
III. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ISLAMIC APPROACH TO
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
1. Although cases in which foreign states acting in their private
capacity are increasingly made subject to the jurisdiction of the
territorial states, the law of state immunities has remained
fundamentally that of international law and has continued to be
dominated by the principle of state sovereignty. The Islamic
approach to the problem eliminates any difficulties which may arise
by adherence to the conception of absolute sovereignty. To this
extent, the Islamic approach is more consistent with the emerging
case law. In an increasingly inter-dependent world, where complex
relations exist between government agencies and private entities,
the Islamic approach espouses the proposition that a restrictive
view of sovereign immunity ought to prevail.
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2. The Islamic treatment of sovereign immunity avoids a subjective
investigation of the acts of foreign states, an investigation which
in most cases proves to be unviable. Thus, at first glance, the
Islamic approach appears to be preferable to those taken by other
legal systems to solve the difficulties inherent in the
characterization of sovereign acts. The test according to the
Islamic approach is neither the purpose nor the nature of the
transaction, but simply the very contractual obligations created by
the agreement. Attempts to view state contracts differently from
those of the private individual do not accord with the singularistic
nature of the Islamic concept of law and justice and also run
counter to the pluralistic character of the contemporary world. The
significance of this approach lies in the fact that the Islamic
theory is wider in application and provides a far better protection
for individuals against arbitrary acts of the states than those
adopted by other legal systems in contemporary state practice. This
approach, if widely followed by Muslim countries, would inevitably
lead to the promotion of international commercial transactions and
thus the peaceful cooperation between states is further ensured.
3. One of the streams of evolution in legal analysis that gave
rise to the trend toward a restrictive view of immunity in
international practice is that domestic legislation began to
broaden the extent to which governments were subject under local
law to civil suits for their wrongful acts arising from contract
or tort. This assimilation of sovereign states with private
individuals had been recognized by Islamic law earlier, at a time
when it seemed inconceivable to formulate a definite conception of
state or its sovereign functions. Apart from the basic principles
of justice and fair dealing, another plausible explanation for this
approach lies in the Islamic conception of legal order which viewed
the individual as a subject of the law governing international
relations. Unlike the modern law of nations, which is essentially a
law regulating the relations of states, Islamic law is applicable to
individuals, states and communities. In this respect it could be
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said to have merged in its corpus the public as well as the private
law.
Majid Khadduri has particularly emphasized this aspect of
difference between the modern and Islamic laws on the ground that an
Islamic law of nations does not exist as a separate system, in the
sense that modern municipal law and international law, based on
different sources and maintained by different sanctions, are
distinct from one another. The Islamic law of nations was the
Shari'a writ large.^ It is well-known that some modern writers
such as Kelsen have rejected the traditional view that the rules of
international law regulate the relations of states and not of
individuals on the ground that, in the ultimate analysis, all law is
the regulation of human behaviour.^-* International law, he asserts,
should obligate and authorize the individual as well. Oppenheim
concedes that, although the rules of international law are primarily
meant for states, sometimes they create rights and obligations for
-jr
individuals and international organizations. Islamic law creates
rights and obligations for both the state and the individuals and
groups composing that state. The public and private law of Islam
are complementary to each other, and emanate from a common source.
They thus reject the dualistic view according to which municipal law
and international law have different sources and are maintained by
different sanctions. Instead, there is no dichotomy in Islam
between municipal and international legal systems, since they both
derive their validity from a super norm, the Shari'a. Thus, both
states and private individuals are subject to that unified system.
It can be taken for granted that Muslim states, or at least those
who have recently adopted the Islamization measures, would welcome
the recognition of the principle of assimilation of states with
private persons in civil suits, as evolved by current international
law. That willingness has already been reflected in some judicial
decisions in one part of the Muslim world to the effect that
traditionally Islamic law recognized no sovereign immunity to the
detriment of private individuals.
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4. It seems that the Islamic approach stresses the moral
principles apart from religious doctrine, in the relation between
individuals and sovereign states. It has been correctly observed
that:
The historical experience of Islam, indeed the historical
experience of all mankind, demonstrates that any system of
public order, on the national as well as on the international
level, would lose its meaning were it divorced completely from
moral principles. 77
Indeed, these moral considerations could add a new dimension which
could further provide a solid basis on which international relations
generally, and international trade in particular, could be
effectively and peacefully transacted.
5. Although the need to re-examine the rule of absolute immunity
in the light of international development cannot be over-emphasized,
it may be argued that the Islamic approach has essentially created a
system which could lead to the extinction of the doctrine of state
immunity itself. Whatever the merits of this argument, it must be
recalled that the approach takes the question of the rule of law and
the principle of fair dealing as the point of its departure, and
consequently treats any case of immunity as an exception and
therefore restrictively interprets it. Outside the area of
contracts and private acts, the immunity of state and its
representatives remained intact and uncontested. At any rate, if
the Islamic approach is indeed preferable and objective, then it is
curious why it has not been adopted by other legal systems. The
only possible explanation for this lies in the absence of adequate
comparative materials on the Islamic legal system at the disposal of
judges and lawyers of other systems. Although appreciating the
value of the comparative method, the sources have been drawn almost
exclusively from Western experience. Even with the Muslim states'
legal system, the Islamic approach has not been widely adopted.
These systems have been melting pots for civil, common and Islamic
law principles for a long period of time since decolonization.
Nevertheless, recent Islamization programmes in some Muslim states
will ultimately pave the way for more and more adoption of Islamic
principles as the law of the land. As far as the Islamic approach
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is concerned, and in the countries where there have been major
Islamization initiatives, there have been notable decisions in which
the Islamic approach was adopted: hopefully a similar approach may
be followed by other Muslim states.
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The discussions in the preceding chapters leads to the
following main conclusions:
1. International practice on the subject of state immunities
has grown primarily and essentially out of the judicial practice
of different states, belonging to different legal systems.
International conventions, opinions of writers, executive and
legislative practices relating to this field are practically all of
subsequent growth.
2. The decision of Chief Justice Marshall in the Schooner case
(1812), is generally considered to be the leading authority of the
absolutist theory of immunity. An examination of that judgement
shows that the doctrine of state immunity had been expressed as an
exception rather than a rule. Also, English law has always
acknowledged that the rule of state immunity has its own natural
limits. In the Parlement Beige case, for example, the concept of
immunity had been qualified by that of public use. Admittedly,
those qualifications have been somewhat ignored in later American
and English cases.
In civil law jurisdictions, the evolution of the rule of state
immunity has followed a different course during the 19th and early
20th centuries. In these jurisdictions, there was growing evidence
from the beginning of a trend towards disallowing immunity claims
for cases arising from commercial activities of foreign states.
The underlying reasons seem to be that the civil law system, notably
through administrative courts, affords a happy method of reconciling
a theoretical independence of judicial control with a practical
means of seeing justice done, even when the state is the offender.
3. A number of closely interrelated points of legal analysis have
contributed towards an awareness of such limitations being revived.
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The expansion of state functions and the growth in commercial
transactions among states have produced a series of paradoxical
consequences in the field of state immunity that could not have been
foreseen by the proponents of the doctrine of absolute immunity.
Again, national legislations were adopted in various countries to
eradicate the immunities of the local state from the jurisdiction of
the forum. States also began to waive immunity regularly either in
their treaties with other states, or when they concluded commercial
agreements for their interests. Finally, the doctrine of absolute
immunity was seen as archaic, unfair and discriminatory in
application. In consequence of these developments, and in the
context of the difficulties to which they gave rise, there has been
a steadily progressive evolution in international practice away from
the so-called absolute doctrine.
4. There have been significant developments in the law of state
immunity since the Second World War. Judicial decisions of various
countries have expressed doubts about the position of the absolute
theory and its theoretical basis in international law. Even in the
case of those countries which were considered as absolute immunity
jurisdictions, there has been a strong tendency to abandon the
absolute view of state immunity and more readily to admit
substantial restrictions on the application of the traditional
doctrine of immunity. Perhaps the most significant development has
been the negotiation and entry into force of one regional treaty on
the subject, several multilateral treaties dealing with some aspects
of immunities, and the enactment of seven national statutes
codifying the law of foreign state immunity. In addition, several
draft conventions on state immunity have also greatly contributed to
the progressive evolution of the rules of international law.
5. It is clear that the current rules of international law do not
now require, if indeed they ever did, that the territorial state
should abstain from exercising its valid jurisdiction over foreign
states or their instrumentalities in all cases. However, great
caution must be exercised in attempting to define customary rules
of international law on state immunity. Although there is an
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emerging trend of restricted immunity from national decisions and
state practice, yet what is the current rule of international law
relating to state immunities depends to a measurable extent "on what
degree of consensus is sought for the rule being articulated".
Accordingly, there are certain cases of immunity and others of
non-immunity. It is in respect of the latter that there is an
emerging consensus on a rule of international law which requires a
state to characterize certain activities as jure gestionis and thus
not subject to immunity. Between these remains a 'grey area' which
is subject to determination by future state practice. Indeed,
state practice cannot continue to exist in a vacuum but is
invariably affected by social, economic and political factors, all
of which tend to suggest more and more denial of immunity in suits
arising out of acts of foreign states which are performed jure
gestionis.
6. The examination of the Egyptian and Sudanese practice relating
to state immunity shows: firstly, that between these two
neighbouring countries sharing a colonial or semi-colonial past and
the present state of political, economic and social transition and
reorientation, there is no uniformity of practice in so far as the
emergence of customary international law is concerned. The
examination clearly shows that a forum state can preserve more or
less the freedom to formulate its own version of the law.
Secondly, unlike other rules of international law, the rule of state
immunity can still be largely determined by municipal law and
according to internal administration of justice.
7. The Egyptian practice, reflecting the attitude of Egypt as a
territorial state, is fairly consistent in favour of restrictive
immunity. The Egyptian judicial decisions since the 19th century
have adopted every possible limitation of immunity and
overwhelmingly endorsed the distinction between different categories
of state acts or different capacities of the state. To this
extent, it provides the emerging trend of restrictive immunity with
valuable materials and legal analysis. These judicial decisions
emphasize how much of the issue of foreign state immunity in today's
- 407 -
international practice is rooted in a long and evolving conceptual
analysis rather than something new to our time.
8. Treaty practice is no less illustrative. Egypt has become a
party to a number of multilateral conventions of a universal
character which have more or less sought to codify some aspects of
the rule of state immunities. The significance of the adherence to
these conventions by Egypt lies in the fact that Egypt has at least
accepted the underlying basis of these instruments, namely the
restrictive view of immunity. By contrast, Egypt has concluded
only two bilateral treaties with other states in this field. Both
of them expressly exclude the application of state immunity in
disputes involving commercial transactions of these foreign states.
In no case do those treaties make ownership on the part of foreign
states a test to determine immunity questions, nor to recognize
reciprocity as regulating such questions.
Belonging to the same category is the Egyptian governmental
practice. The attitude of the Egyptian Government expressed in
both regional inter-governmental and global organizations is fairly
settled in favour of restrictive immunity.
9. However, in examining the attitude of the Egyptian Government
as a beneficiary of state immunity, particularly when sued before a
foreign court or tribunal, a serious divergence can be observed.
In almost all cases brought against Egypt abroad, the Egyptian
Government chose to raise the plea of sovereign immunity, a move
which runs counter to its established practice in other quarters.
Thus there exists a definite disconjunction between its attitude as
a grantor of immunity on the one hand, and its attitude as a
recipient on the other. A state which is prepared to subject other
foreign states to its jurisdiction in certain cases should normally
be expected to refrain from claiming immunity from other territorial
jurisdictions if sued there in relation to similar activities.
However, in no case does Egypt appear to have explicitly denied the
existence of the emerging customary norm. It has at various times
invoked this norm in disputes with other states and in debates in
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international and inter-governmental organizations. With varying
degrees of interest it has participated in diplomatic conferences
for codification and development of the law on the subject and, in
the work of the Assembly's Sixth Committee, it has entered into
numerous treaties, including many general multilateral conventions
regulating wholly or partly the matter of foreign state immunity,
thus strengthening its firmly established position. This apparent
diversity in Egyptian practice does not lead to a denial or
depreciation of the restrictive immunity, nor in any way does it
affect the opinio juris of the Egyptian state as to what the law is.
10. Perhaps this contradiction may be attributed to various
political, economic and other technical or practical factors. The
political problem is well-known and there is no practical solution
thereto. The economic problem relates, among other things, to the
fact that most of the commercial activities of the Egyptian
Government are defined by internal law as public in character and
thus designed for the society's interests and development. Public
entities are created to engage in commercial activities and were
designed to operate for that goal. Being thus no longer open to
private persons, the Egyptian Government maintains that they should
be safeguarded by immunity. As to the practical problems, one
important general reason for this apparent contradiction,
independent of the nature and merits of the disputes, appears to be
lack of information on foreign adjudication, arbitration law and
techniques, among some at least, of the state officials or lawyers.
Some of the cases discussed show how such problems can simply result
from the absence of a degree of training of the state official
taking part in the proceeding in which their state is involved.
Indeed, this 'technical' deficiency is not peculiar to countries
like Egypt or the Sudan, but is common to the majority of developing
countries, and in particular when a state or state's entities are
involved. For example, when arbitral proceedings are instituted
against the Egyptian Government, it is perfectly entitled to
dispute, if necessary, the validity of the agreement to arbitrate.
But, of course, there are limits to the legal nature of the choice
of objections to be raised. One of these limits is indeed not to
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raise the objection of sovereign immunity vis-a-vis the jurisdiction
of the tribunal itself, since that would seriously threaten the
machinery of arbitration, which the parties have freely chosen to
settle the dispute.
The attitude of the Egyptian Government in this particular
regard has had a lasting negative effect. It is not likely to
enhance the credibility of Egypt nor to advance the country's
efforts either to attract foreign investment or build up Egypt as a
centre for international arbitration. This is particularly true,
given the fact that Cairo has been established as a centre for the
resolution of commercial disputes in Asia and Africa.
11. As in the case of Egypt, there is no text in Sudanese law which
formally grants or disallows immunity from foreign states. But, in
contrast to Egypt, the practice of the Sudan, both as a grantor and
receiver of immunity, has long been in favour of the traditional
rule of absolute immunity. The Sudanese judicial decisions do not
provide firm rulings on this matter. The number of decisions is
rather limited and all of them are on the facts. The same tendency
to grant foreign states sovereign immunity from the Sudanese
jurisdiction is also observable in bilateral treaties concluded with
other states. Some of them even go to the extreme in allowing
immunity in unprecedented cases not hitherto known in state
practice. By contrast, the Sudan has not yet become a party to
many of the multilateral treaties which deal with some aspects of
state immunity. The non-acceptance or delay in acceptance is often
caused by factors that have nothing to do with the contents of those
instruments, or which do not even implicitly suggest disagreement
with the treaties' aims. Nevertheless, the Sudan has become a
party to three of these conventions. It is, of course, unnecessary
to emphasize the importance of the acceptance of these conventions
in a complex branch of law, where municipal law is far from clear.
Within the limits of their application, these conventions help to
rule out any uncertainty as to the position of foreign states.
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12. In so far as governmental practice is concerned, the
fundamental position of the Sudanese Government is fairly settled in
favour of absolute immunity from foreign jurisdictions, motivated
primarily by domestic policies and considerations. The few cases
rendered against the Sudan in this respect, appear to lend support
to this view. The Sudanese economy requires a greater contribution
from foreign sectors. In order not to lose the benefit of certain
commercial activities and flow of capital from abroad, it is
submitted that the Sudan has to adopt a sensible attitude towards
issues of sovereign immunity, especially in relation to foreign
trade and imported capital.
Since the Sudan is not a centre for transnational litigation
and arbitration, the Sudanese courts could not be expected to
generate sufficient judicial decisions to change the law. However,
the adoption of a national legislation is highly desirable. The
level of commercial activities in the Sudan by foreign governments
and corporations has increased greatly, particularly by Arab
countries, and clarification of the law of foreign sovereign
immunity will encourage these activities by removing some of the
present uncertainties.
13. Economically, both Egypt and the Sudan are developing countries
and, from their colonial positions, they were born into the free
market system and there are usually no other means of finance open
to them. As a result they have entered into several treaties as a
means of attracting foreign direct investment. Both countries have
also enacted various national legislations granting incentives to
attain the same objective. State immunity is invariably associated
with development and, if a plea of sovereign absolute immunity is to
be maintained by them in disputes arising out of their development
activities, their future access to the market and their future
credit would basically come to an end, since more and more foreign
investors would shy away from entering into such agreements with
them. This argument is based on the assumption that, for the
foreseeable future, both countries will have to maintain some form
of relationship with outside trade and investment.
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14. Certainly, if the consequences of claiming sovereign immunity
in the context of proceedings relating to these economic development
activities is to reduce the flow of foreign investment, the end
result is likely to be counter-productive, even in the terms of
these countries' own national economic development. It must,
however, be observed that strictly legal considerations are not the
only ones that have to be borne in mind in negotiating economic
development agreements with sovereign states and their
instrumentalities.
Considerations of prestige, as well as of goodwill and mutual
trust, are equally important. Plainly, immunity avoidance
cannot be carried to the point of ignoring these and possibly
other, considerations that are of vital interest to the
parties.
By waiving immunity in these and similar cases, the interests of
both countries could also be better served in other directions,
since a waiver of immunity would be likely to provide an advantage
to those states when they are acquiring goods or services. A
prospective seller to them will not be able to justify higher prices
on the ground that the purchaser may default, leaving the seller
with problems of securing what they may regard as an effective
remedy.
15. Politically, and in terms of independence and sovereignty, both
Egypt and the Sudan may be regarded as newly independent states.
However, independence and sovereignty in this context are a
two-sided coin. In the first place, if sovereignty is taken as a
territorial concept, one would expect both countries to value their
independence very highly and with great jealousy of territorial
sovereignty. Secondly, in economic terms, the world is growing
more interdependent. No country can claim to be self-sufficient in
economic and technological terms: resources and markets are needed
by all. The nature of the financial and trade structure of the
world dispel any idea of absolute sovereignty. Thus sovereignty no
longer seems to have the absolute quality about it that it once
displayed. In both countries special emphasis has often been
placed on national sovereignty and national independence as an
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expression of their need for protection against external
interference. Thus, they would not find it easy to accept the
principle of state immunity if it conflicted with this principle.
16. But whatever attitude they choose to adopt in this regard the
fact that both Egypt and the Sudan agreed to adhere to international
instruments limiting sovereign immunities, and their participation
in international trade and arbitration, signal their willingness to
strike a balance between their countries' interests and the rules of
state immunity. In the end, that may be the most important lesson
their experiences teach.
17. Today international law is attacked, in essence, on two major
grounds which, with a little exaggeration, are represented in the
statement that it is neither international nor law. Whereas the
doubt as to the legal nature of the rules of international law are
of long standing, the denial of their international character is
mainly attributable to the rise of the Communist states and the
liberation of former colonies. To these countries the
international law of today is largely a European product; thus the
argument goes, the customary rules of this law should be binding
only among those who made them as res inter alios acta. This
argument, though invalid in many respects, is yet instructive. It
teaches at least that, in order to eliminate a major excuse for the
violation of international law, there should be greater participa¬
tion by other legal systems in the formation and development of
international law. For, by reflecting to a greater extent on the
principle of of non-European legal systems in the rules of
international law, the validity and fairness of international law
will be more widely recognized and more strongly supported. The
process of participation entails a comparative method.
18. The idea of the universality of international law leads one to
enquire into the approach adopted by the Islamic legal system to the
issue of sovereign immunities. The examination of the position of
state immunity under that system shows that different legal systems
frequently serve similar ends in quite comparable ways. In today's
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universal community of nations, Islamic law can make a valuable
contribution to the progressive development of international law
generally and the law of state immunity in particular. The Islamic
approach to state immunity is based on principles which lend
themselves to valuable use in consolidating and expanding the scope
of contemporary rules of international law on state immunity.
These principles have remained constant throughout the historical
evolution of the Islamic Law of Nations, and being rooted primarily
in the Qur'anic injunctions, are likely to subsist.
19. One such contribution could be the Islamic concept of
sovereignty. In contrast to other legal systems, Islam does not
consider the state to be an entity endowed with absolute sovereignty
both within its border and in its relations with other states. In
the Islamic conception, the will of the state is not unfettered by
higher norms; it is subject to the law just as the individual will
is. When transferred to the international sphere, this concept is
bound to have a greater effect on the abuses of the principle of
sovereignty. The Islamic conception can thus help to reinforce
this healthy trend towards minimizing the paradoxical consequences
of the principle of absolute sovereignty and immunity, so that it
will no longer impede the rule of law necessary for international
legal order.
20. According to the position occupied by the idea of the rule of
law in the Islamic legal system, the issue of jurisdictional
immunities of states cannot be determined according to the capacity
in which the foreign states act. It is not surprising, therefore,
to learn that a Muslim head of state, even when performing a public
act, is as much bound to observe his covenants and contracts
faithfully as an individual Muslim acting in a private capacity.
It is a primary duty of a Muslim ruler to uphold and enforce the law
and to set an example in this respect.
21. The binding force of contractual agreements is firmly
established in the Islamic legal system. All sources of the Muslim
law place great importance on the fulfilment of one's obligations.
- 414 -
They unequivocally require a person to respect his contract. The
commands are reiterated in general terms which make them applicable
both to individuals and sovereign entities. Under the Islamic
legal system the contract makes the law of the parties and neither a
party nor a court may unilaterally alter it. To this extent a
state party cannot rely on any sovereign immunity to avoid a
litigation which might arise in relation to the obligations created
by the contract. Once a contract has been concluded, a state party
is obliged to perform it, no matter how that affects its sovereign
dignity.
It may be asked what is the possible contribution of the
Islamic approach particularly in regard to the increasing problems
arising from the distinction between acts jure imperii and acts jure
gestionis? Since the contract is regarded as the law of the
parties which the court must apply, there appears to be no place for
a distinction between private and public acts of the state party.
The role of the court would be to interpret the contract, determine
its scope and oblige the parties to perform it. There is nothing
under the Islamic legal system which would allow the court to
decline jurisdiction over the contract on the ground that one of the
parties is said to have sovereign immunity. Thus the Islamic
approach provides a more objective criterion of determining
jurisdictional issues away from the often unviable distinction
between sovereign and private contracts.
22. Islam's particular view of the individual could be another
contribution of Islamic law to the further development of
international law. The insistence on the part of Islamic law of
allowing individuals direct access to local courts against their
sovereign commercial partner, is based in addition to requirements
of fair play and justice, on the fact that in Islamic law the
individual is regarded as a subject of the law governing
international relations and to this extent he must be protected by
that law.
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23. In the area of the protection of diplomats, Islamic law has
historically made a significant contribution. The relevance of
this contribution lies in the fact that the Islamic theory of
sovereign immunity is basically functional in character since it
recognizes that certain matters in the interests of diplomacy
require to be exempted from local jurisdiction.
24. At present the Islamic approach to sovereign immunity receives
little attention in the practice of Muslim countries. However, if
the current Islamization initiatives lead to a revival and
reassertion of the Muslim identity, and if Muslim lawyers and judges
continue to look to the richness of their heritage for principles
and rules applicable to the changing needs of society, there may
develop a more firm establishment of Islamic ideas. As a
consequence, the future could well see a greater incorporation of
the Islamic conception of sovereign immunity into the Muslim
countries' legal systems. If this conception gains preponderance
in the practice of Muslim countries, it may be considered as a
positive contribution towards ascertaining and developing the
emerging law in a highly important and complex area. It may even be
a necessary step forward on the path that leads to a rule on state
immunity equally accepted by all, however long this path may be.
25. Islamic law is claimed to have contributed to the development
of both the civil law system and the system of international law.
This brief comparative study is not meant to be taken as proof for
or against that contribution. Rather, it is to serve merely as an
invitation for further research into the rich source material of the
law of Islam. To date, little concern has been directed in Western
law schools and institutions to the study of Islamic law, either in
itself, or as a factor in the development of what Jenks has called
the Common Law of Mankind. As the latter could exist only through
the evolution and the rapprochement among the different legal
systems, it should be useful to direct more attention to such a
system as Islamic law.
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